NORMANDY: Allied High Command

Hi, gents!

I've been reading lately some articles about the Normandy campaign, something I hadn't gone very deep into and I'm surprised to see that most of the lessons of Italy had not yet been learned by most commanders. Did high-command decisions had such negative influence on the battle as in Italy? I do not want to make my own conclusions till I listen to what you who know much more about it have to say.

First, I read an article called "Leadership in the Normandy Campaign" by Williamson Murray in a special edition of "WWII Magazine" —"Normandy Campaign, Special Collector's Edition", 2004.

He basically focuses on six men: field marshals Von Rundstedt, German C.-in-C. West and Rommel, commander Army Group 'B'; and generals Eisenhower, C.-in-C. AEF, Montgomery, C.-in-C. land AEF/commander XXI Army Group, Bradley, commander I American Army/XII Army Group and Patton, commander III American Army.

I found what he said about Allied commanders quite controversial, but I wouldn't buy his conclusions merely because what he said about the two German commanders is not annalysed deeply enough and because he fails to mention why both men thought the way they did and why both their plans couldn't have worked.

However, what interests me is his view about Allied commanders. I think he's right about Eisenhower when phraising his diplomatic skills, his "iron will" and "first-class mind", though he wasn't an operetional-art master or a field-commander.

Still, his planning for 'Overlord' proved decisive and his victory over the bomber lords was astonishing.

My first question to you: what do you think about this decision? Did it have a decisive tactical or strategic effect on the campaign or/and did it affect the overall war effort?

The author next target is Monty. He says he was "in many respects a first-rate commander" but "was not the best the British had" [he rates Bill Slim as the very best]. He was popular, meticulous and "tactful sometimes" but he failed "to understand the crucial importance of speed in combat operations", underrated the American Army and certainly provoked some tension among HQs… I do agree with Murray on his statement that the attrition set-piece battles around Caën in Normandy in fact served the Allied, since there were few commanders as effective as Monty in this kind of operations.

Then he shoots hard against Bradley: "[he] was not, as the propaganda of the time suggested, a soldier's general. He was ambitious, but nor particularly talented". "But perhaps his greatest weakness was his inability to learn from the experience of others". "He was a solid technician without any deep or intuitive understanding of high command. There is no doubt he was a competent corps commander, but above that level, he was simply unprepared and unable to think beyond what field manuals suggested."

He also states that Bradley almost screwed things at Omaha Beach on June 6th by minimising naval bombardment and reling on bombing through clouds by the IX Air Force and almost "made the terrible mistake of stopping reinforcements from moving ashore into Omaha". What do you think of this?

Also, when at the end of July the German flank had been crushed and the III Army was made operational, Bradley ordered 4th and 6th armoured divisions to head towards Brest as stipulated by the original 'Overlord' plan, even if the German exposed flank was in the opposite direction. Bradley reverted this order by pressure of Monty and Ike.

Then, when Von Kluge —not mentioned at all in the article— launched his offensive against Mortain Monty decided to keep the bloundary line between Allied forces at Argentan, thus facing the Canadians considerable German opposing forces whilst Patton faced little. Patton wanted to throw Haislip's XV Corps into Falaise but Bradley refused (?). On the 17th Patton too suggested a wider envelopment over the Seine but Bradley also refused, delayig the closing of the gap and allowing 50.000+ German troops to escape.

Then in the same magazine I read "Imperfect Victory at Falaise" by Flint Whitlock which seems to be even harsher with Monty and a bit softer to Bradley, but which I'll comment later.

 

Well, I don't know about all that, it sounds to me like the guy just needs to shoot people down.

D-Day was an absolute success and the beggining of the push to Germany. The commanders were all qualified, although some were too pushy and others not at all. Ike knew what he was doing, I think in picking the men he did to land on the beaches. All generals have their quirks but the job went to the best men.

 

That's a big topic, Friedrich, and right now I'm afraid I don't have the time to read back and answer properly.

I have to say that I don't personally rate Williamson Murray too highly ; it sounds to me that here he's rehashing old arguments put forward by David Irving ( 'The War Between The Generals' ) and Richard Rohmer ( 'Patton's Gap' ).

Personally, I prefer Carlo D'Este's 'Decision In Normandy' for a more objective and balanced viewpoint. Normandy lends itself all too easily to 'armchair generalship' in retrospect.

 

I tend to agree with the author in most respects concerning the Allied generals.
I do consider Bradley to be an over-rated general.
Not a bad one, just not a very good one. His conduct of the battles before Cobra was poor ( broadfront attacks which weren't very effective and costly in casualties)His decision to halt his troops at the Falaise gap was also (in my view) a poor one.
Allowing his forces to be sucked into the battle of the Hurgen Forest, and his disregard of the warnings he got about the Ardennes before the Battle of the Bulge also don't cast him in a good light.

However having said that, it has to be noted that the performance of the Allied generals in the NW European campaign of 1944-5 was far better than the German generals( even allowing for the dead hand of Hitler)something that thanks to people like Irving is often overlooked

 

I think I have mentioned this before but Ike seems to have had his hands full just trying to keep the Allied Generals working together and keeping the invasion moving on. People like Monty and Patton could have spent days just throwing mud over each other while the battle goes second in importance for them. If Ike had not succeeded in this the invasion might have been lost just due to the fact of some real big hotheads in leading the troops.

So it´s good to have some "normal" Generals as well and not just "the talented and the jealous". I´m sure Ike was totally happy with Bradley just because he wasn´t going on about "Why are you giving him so much troops and I only get this lot" stuff..

The Falaise matter is quite many sided but a huge victory to the allied anyways. The Germans lost their vehicles the first time there and crossing the Seine the second time as well. I think in the end cutting the Falaise pocket totally would have been a beauty mark on top of it but maybe not possible as the Germans were running through with all their might. I don´t know where the allied could have gotten the troops to cut the pocket totally really.

The big question seems to be whether the allied should have stood back and get the supply lines in order in Aug 1944 or go for the Seine like Patton did. That´s why Patton ended out of fuel as they could not deliver the fuel etc in enough quantity. Of course it seems a nutty idea not to go after the Germans after beating them good but I´m sure the guys who counted the oil and food were not really happy about the way things turned.

As well the taking of Paris probably was the final key matter that really meant that the fuel was not going to be available to all allied forces. A porpaganda victory yes but not good for the supply buzines...

So quite a lot of things to think about for Ike back then..