Herbert Feis is a good read on this, as is the article in "Pearl Harbor As History" and Utley's "Going to War with Japan".
Yes indeed they are excellent. Anderson though gets into the nitty gritty of what exactly happened in terms of the bureaucratic mechanism, which is a curious story to say the least, but unsurprising considering it was U.S. Federal bureaucracy at work.
Ooops! Sorry. Yes, JSTOR is a pain if you don't have an account. I had one so long through the government I forgot.
So we only had those original seven or 8 pre-war carriers that up until each one was lost until the end of 1942/early 1943?
Sorry Rich, but it's you. This is included as part of the web address... There is only one blank space between the web address and the text I quoted...Try leaving at least 3 blank spaces between address and text, or better, start a new line. The JSTOR addy as it should be: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638003?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Most historical works are opinion pieces. It's not a pejorative term, just descriptive. I differentiate between hard data and "interpretation". For example, I just converted [SIZE=14pt]NAVY DEPARTMENT[/SIZE] [SIZE=16pt]AMERICAN SHIP CASUALTIES[/SIZE] [SIZE=16pt]of the[/SIZE] [SIZE=16pt]WORLD WAR[/SIZE] [SIZE=12pt]INCLUDING[/SIZE] [SIZE=14pt]NAVAL VESSELS, MERCHANT SHIPS SAILING VESSELS, and FISHING CRAFT[/SIZE] Compiled by Historical Section Corrected to April 1, 1923
Okay, but a data source is just that data - it isn't actually "history". Classically, ἱστορία, historia is an inquiry, it is knowledge acquired by research into data sources, which is then related in a narrative. My taxonomy would place Anderson's analysis as a primary data source driven narrative. The next would be what typically constitutes commercial "history", which is regurgitated secondary sources...analysis based upon works like Anderson's, which usually don't bother even attempting to evaluate whether or not the data actually supports the analysis. Then there are the opinion pieces masquerading as history, which are frequently based on flights of fancy or faulty memories.
They were not all lost. Lexington - lost at Coral Sea 8 May 42 Saratoga - certainly damaged a couple-three times, but never lost Ranger - no damage, not lost Yorktown - lost at Midway, submarine attack 6 Jun 42 Enterprise - same-same Saratoga Wasp - Lost, submarine attack 15 Sep 42 Hornet - Lost at Santa Cruz 26 Oct 42 Long Island - same-same Ranger So, of 8 carriers available at the start of the war, only 4 were actually "lost." In the meantime, before Essex is commissioned on 31 Dec 1942 the following escort carriers were commissioned. Except for Charger. all eventually saw action, some in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Charger (CVE-30) 3 Mar 42 Copahee (CVE-12) 15 Jun 42 Nassau (CVE-16) 20 Aug 42 Santee (CVE-29) 24 Aug 42 Sangamon (CVE-26) 25 Aug 42 Altamaha (CVE-18) 15 Sep 42 Chenago (CVE-28) 19 Sep 42 Suwanee (CVE-27) 25 Sep 42 Bogue (CVE-9) 26 Sep 42 Card (CVE-11) 8 Nov 42 Core (CVE-13) 10 Dec 42 And looking out to, say, the end of June 1943, a year after Midway . . . Essex (CV-9) 32 Dec 42 Independence (CVL-22) 14 Jan 43 Lexington (CV-16) 17 Feb 43 Barnes (CVE-20) 20 Feb 43 Princeton (CVL-23) 25 Feb 43 (lost 24 Oct 44) Block Island (CVE-21) 8 Mar 43 (lost 29 May 44) BelleauWood (CVL-24) 31 Mar 43 Prince William (CVE-31) 9 Apr 43 Breton (CVE-23) 12 Apr 43 Yorktown (CV-10) 15 Apr 43 Croatan (CVE-25) 28 Apr 43 Bunker Hill (CV-17) 25 May 43 Cowpens (CVL-25) 28 May 43 Monterey (CVL-26) 17 Jun 43 From that point, up to the surrender of the Japanese, there was a carrier (CV, CVL or CVE) commissioned, on average, every 9.8 days.
I think you mean USS O'Brien(DD-415)...USS Lansdowne survived the war, and was later transferred to Turkey.
I meant that a Japanese sub caused the loss of Wasp but that Lansdowne administered the coup de grace. Per usual, my attempt at being a wise guy fell flat though.