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Peleliu

Discussion in 'Land Warfare in the Pacific' started by denny, Sep 30, 2013.

  1. denny

    denny Member

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    General Rupertus was pivotal in this battle.
    He made a big deal about the Island being somewhat of a "cake walk"....I believe he is quoted in a pre-battle speech of saying the troops would be victorious in a matter of 3 days.
    I guess it was much closer to 70 days before the Japanese were no longer fighting on the island.
    It was a bit of a blood bath...a disaster in light of what the General had told the troops
    .
    The story goes that additional (Army) troop replacement/reinforcements were pretty much forced on him in two occasions.?
    What happens to guys like that...that seem to have no idea what they are up against...and when the battle goes south...they let arrogance and pride (it seems) get in the way of avoiding a prolonged catastrophe.?
    Maybe the Military does not see it as a mistake...just part of war...no "negligence" involved.?
    Thank You
     
  2. LRusso216

    LRusso216 Graybeard Staff Member

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  3. denny

    denny Member

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    Thanks for the links.
    I guess you have "good and bad" Generals...just like there are good and bad mechanics, painters, accountants, etc etc.
    The more rank you have...the more lives there are that come into your potential.
    Too bad.
    I am not enough of a Military person, or historian to know if some of these places should have just been Quarantined/Blockaded.....or if more troops and different tactics should have been employed.
    Lots of sad stories in WW2.
    best
     
  4. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I think Rupertus was a poor commander, but I do not think your characterization that he thought the battle would be a "cakewalk" is correct either. He thought the naval gunfire would be more effective due to changes made after Tarawa. Unfortunately, the Japanese learned from previous battles also and adapted their defensive techniques. The type of defensive scheme, defenses in depth and fortifications on the scale encountered at Peleilu had yet to be encountered. Tarawa had elaborate defenses, in fact probably the most dense defensive fortifications encountered during any landing in the war. Tarawa was very small though and while the defenses were well conceived, well laid out and well constructed, they could not be constructed in depth. Rupertus made his comment because he thought, incorrectly, his division could take the island in a similar amount of time as it took the 2d Division to take Betio (Tarawa). I think that if you look at the progression of the war in the Pacific, each battle became progressively more costly. Iwo Jima was Peleilu on steroids, the ultimate development of that type of defense. Okinawa was the application of all previous lessons learned and incorporated the most effective elements from all previous encounters.
    While Rupertus was a poor divisional commander, I do not think it accurate to assume that a more effective officer would have significantly reduced casualties or accomplished the securing of the island much quicker. The Japanese defenses were just that good. Sometimes there is no good option. The ultimate blame for the battle should be laid at MacArthur's feet. The island could have been bypassed and should have been. There had been bitter discussions within the military over which strategy should take priority in the Pacific. MacArthur's strategy of retaking the Phillipines won out and the taking of Peleilu and Angaur was seen by him as necessary to secure his flank. Admiral Halsey recommended, based upon Japanese resistance to his carrier strikes, that the US could bypass Mindanao and attack directly towards the central Philippines and the invasion date for Leyte was moved forward by two months. This changed situation made the invasion of Peleilu unnecessary and Halsey recommended it be cancelled, MacArthur did not/ would not cancel it and Nimitz was unwilling to stir up the interservice squabble by taking it upon himself to do so. So it wasn't a single commander that can have the full blame laid at his feet.

    This is more complicated General Rupertus' arrogance and pride. Part of it was Rupertus' arrogance. Another element is that Rupertus was not a very good General. Part of the reason Rupertus hesitated to use the Army troops was the erratic quality of US Army Infantry units in the Pacific. Some were very good, most were of average quality and some exceedingly poor and using them actually led to more casualties and slowed progress. Part of it is myth as to what might have been accomplished if the 81st had been committed earlier. Part of it is a lack of understanding how formidable the Japanese defenses were, and what could have been accomplished if a different tactical approach had been taken. IMHO, an earlier commital of the 321st would have reduced Marine casualties but only by shifting them to the Army units.
    You didn't bring up Colonel Puller, CO of 1st Marines, but one of Lou's links did and he is blamed for the destruction of the First Marine Regiment. He was not at the top of his game at Peleilu, and as addressed in the link Lou provided, it was partly due to the mental stress from his brothers recent death during the Guam operation and partly from his debilitated physical condition. An old leg wound was badly inflamed and he was in excruciating pain. While he still attempted to lead from the front, he wasn't as active as he had been in previous engagements. Had he been in his normal frame of mind and physical capacity, he might have bucked Rupertus when he continually pressed Puller and his 1st Marines to press forward in new assaults until more support was available. It is doubtful that he could have accomplished his objective any faster or with less casualties, they would have just been distributed to other units. It is also possible that if he had delayed, as some have suggested, that the positions he was facing, that overlooked the areas the 5th and 7th Marines were fighting in, could have allowed the enemy to defeat the invasion.
    Initially,1st Marines were sent against the elaborate mountain and cave complexes. 5th and 7th Marines were tasked with securing the airfield and south of the island. While resistance was stiff in their areas it wasn't anything like 1st Marines were facing. After securing their areas 7th and 5th Marines were shifted north against those same defenses and were chewed up in turn, as were the 81st Division units committed to the fight. Those defenses had to be ground down cave by cave, soldier by soldier, emplacement by emplacement. I'm not sure anyone could have accomplished it any cheaper. Anyone, given the same defenses and same mission as Puller, would likely have suffered similar casualties or they would have withdrawn, endangering the entire operation.
    Puller probably was overconfident in the capabilities of his troops, much as Lee was at Gettysburg. He had good reason to be confident in them.
    Puller is sometimes accused of refusing aid from the 81st Division, but this is largely speculation and Puller had not turned down help from the Army on prior occasions. The Army's 164th Infantry Regiment was attached to Puller's 7th Marines during the October 24th-25th, 1942 fighting on Guadalcanal. Puller was highly complimentary of their fighting capabilities on that occasion and in future engagements on the 'Canal. Vandergrift the Marine commanding awarded the 164th a unit commendation and their commanding officer Lt. Col. Robert Hall was awarded a Navy Cross. Marines even took to calling them the "164th Marines". The other two regiments of the Americal Division were more mediocre and while not bad, did not incite the same levels of respect. The 27th Infantry Division performed quite poorly during the Gilberts Operation and at Saipan and Marine units lacked confidence in their ability to operate in conjunction with them. The regiments of the 81st that fought on Peleilu performed very well, and were highly respected, particularly the 321st Infantry that was the first 81st Division unit committed and that which saw the most action. The 323rd Infantry that joined the fight on 15 October, a month into the fight. While they didn't face the same level of resistance as the 321st (and earlier Marine units) they still performed very well by all accounts. The third Regiment, the 322d didn't fight at Peleilu.
     
    lwd likes this.
  5. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    There is also the fact that all Generals have bad days, where they don't perform to their potential, even the greatest ones. they are after all human and suffer from the same weaknesses as us all. Rupertus was by most accounts not a very good general. Puller, a Colonel at Peleilu, but the focus of one of Lou's links was an excellent leader, both before and after Peleilu and it is really hard to make a firm judgement on his Peleilu performance. General OP Smith, the assistant 1st Division commander at Peleilu, was by all accounts an excellent General. He was the General that led the division at Inchon, Korea in an invasion that was called a "Million to one shot". He led the division in the recapture of Seoul and was the commander that saved the division when it was surrounded by twelve Chinese Communist divisions at Chosin Reservoir in 1950. He walked the terrain Puller's men had fought over, at the time of the battle, and was amazed at what they'd achieved. Sometimes commanders are given missions that cannot be accomplished with acceptable losses. Before passing judgement, you need to look at his entire career and then look at the tactical obstacles they are faced with.
     

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