Poteau ambush

Again the 14th Cav., 18th Reconn. was deployed across a 9000 yard front in the Losheim Gap, with some 850 odd men. It was not Devine's decision to deploy a cavalry group where there should have been 1 or perhaps 2 divisions. This was the sector that he was given to defend. Mounted cavalry by nature is mobile. It supports and reconnoiters. Who deployed the 14th as a static defensive force? Even if the 32nd Reconn had been in place, there would have been approx. 1500 men across this front. Intelligence gathered by the 14th prior to the Bulge was ignored. My father was (as I posted) was at Krewinkel. They captured a number of Polish nationals coming across the line in mid to late November. Some of those interrogated stated that they had seen vehicles, men and bridging equipment being moved forward. The 14th passed this info. back up the line. Don't worry they were told.

I visited the villages where the 14th was deployed with my father (2nd platoon) and Bill Barton, 1st platoon, Troop C. A non-military person could see the error in trying to defend the Losheim with such a minimal force. The minimal numbers that the 14th had were not sufficient to do more than engage and harass but not mount a frontal assault on the forces coming through. Each village did not have the numbers of men and vehicles stated in the previous post. The entire Troop C was outfitted as stated, but each individual village did not have those numbers. I just got off the phone with my father. He clarified some numbers. As stated, he was in Krewinkel. 2nd Platoon, Troop C at Krewinkel had 4 M8s, an armored car and perhaps 3 or 4 jeeps. They had 27 men at Krewinkel. On their left, approx. 220-400 meters down the road was Afst. 1st Platoon also had 3 M8s, and 3 or 4 jeeps. They did not have a full 27 men at AFst. To the right was the 106th Div. My dad did not recall how far, but it was such a significant distance that the German forces where able to easily split these large gaps. At Krewinkel, the first German forces came moving through at 6:30. 2nd platoon did not pull back out of Krewinkel to Manderfeld, about 1-2 km up the road until approx. 1600-1700 hrs. They left 300-400 dead Germans in the depression and small meadow that extended in front of the building they were firing from. The German number were so vast that many in the attacking forces simply went around Krewinkel and other villages.

2nd platoon was short on ammo. and had a number of self-propelled German guns moving down the ridges to their left. Artillery fire was being called in as it had been all day.

At one point, late on the Dec. 16th. or the 17th, Col. Devine went to Gen. Jones of the 106th to request from Jones redeployment orders for the 14th. Jones made Devine wait for some 4-5 hours and then never even met with him. To what effect? Prior to the offensive, 2nd Division was replaced by 106th on Dec. 11. Defensive plans for the sector had beenestablished with 2nd. When 106th took over, said plans were put in limbo. Devine asked 106th for reinforcements in the Krewinkel area. 106th, most likely unaware of the defensive plan that 2nd had established with 14th refused to send reinforcements.

Also, other accounts regarding the towed 3-inch anti-tank gun platoon attached to the 14th to help defend Lanzerath tell a different story than Devine's alleged refusal to utilize them. Evidence shows that after the initial barrage, said anti-tank platoon evacuated village when German paratroopers approached the town. They were in Lanzareth. Was Devine responsible


I interviewed 15-20 14th Cav. troopers and several officers back in 2002. They found a certain pride in being one of the scapegoats of the Bulge. They criticized Devine....but if the only incompetent actions in the U.S. command structure were on the part of Devine alone, how odd. Hasbrouck made huge blunders, yet rarely is this heard. His recommendation of denial of Unit Citations to the 14th was scoffed and laughed at by the 14th members I interviewed.

So many of these guys stated that during the initial stages of the Bulge, no one knew what the hell was going on. The more I read on the Bulge, the more I cast a critical gaze upon "sure" explanations.

I will post more. I need to better organize and re-contact several other members of the 14th Cav. They would undoubtedly want to contribute to this discussion.

 

But, it was Devine's decision to only put one squardron up front. It was Devine's decision not to integrate the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion into his defenses but instead leave them hanging on his northern flank by themselves. This would have made a huge difference too. Instead of being largely helpless against the assault guns supporting the 18th VG these tank destroyer guns would have made short work of the German's armor and largely stopped their primary means of moving their advance. The 37's of the cavalry's armored cars and light tanks couldn't do this.
It was Devine's decision not to aggressively tie into the 99th and 106th Infantry Division's communications. These divisions supported his flanks.

Yes, a single division on that frontage would have stopped the Germans dead. A full cavalry regiment with the support it had could have too. But, the 14th's leadership failed in that task and failed badly. The individual troops fought bravely but that is a small consolation when the overall command is not organized and aggressively led from the top.

The 18th VolksGrenadier Division was hardly a great unit. It had recently been formed from the reminants of the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division around about 2500 survivors of that unit. The rest of the men forming the division (10,390 total) were pulled from various places. Many came with the 571st Reserve Division, a skeleton unit that performed basic training of new recruits up to that point. Others were Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe ground crew and flak troops culled locally in Denmark where the division formed.
Most of the division's nco's were pulled and sent to nco school when the division moved to the Ardennes. These key personnel would not return in time to participate in the division's offensive operations.
The 18th VG had just 11 Hetzer Jadgpanzer of its own attached. The 244th Sturmgeschultz brigade with another 20 StuG III was attached to give it some armored punch for the initial breakthrough. Its artillery was a mix of ex-Danish 75mm and German 10.5 cm giving it very little artillery support. Communications equipment was in short supply and the division had few motor vehicles assigned.

And, if they had been deployed with both squadrons up front those numbers would have doubled or tripled. With the tank destroyers deployed in support there would have been easily 5 or 6 times the man power (each tank destroyer battery had 6 3" guns manned by 12 men each along with a small security section in armored cars and a number of halftracked prime movers for the guns. They had several .50 and .30 machineguns and a number of bazookas available as heavy weapons) and the addition of the antitank guns would have given the cavalry an anti-armor punch they lacked along with a huge increase in HE fire power.
As it was the 18th was deployed more or less as you state. On their northern flank the 820th was likewise deployed by battery and section (2 guns) in a number of villages. They got hit by the veteran 12 Volksgrenadier Division that quickly overran their positions. In the process they lost almost all their guns and most of the survivors were fleeing in vehicles to the rear having litte else to fight with and no support.

In these opening battles the 18th VG (by their records) took 160 killed, 488 wounded and had, 672 missing.

There is plenty of blame to go around for the debacle in the Losheim Gap. It was about noon on the 16th when Devine asked the 106th for permission to pull back to a line along the Holzheim - Andler road which he received. At about the same time Lt. Colonel Ridge commanding the 32nd Cavalry disappeared telling his XO that he was " going back to get ammunition." This left the 32nd in a state of confusion as to what they were to do.
Initially when the Germans started their attack that morning the 32nd had been alerted to move forward and support the 18th. They had begun these preparations and had sent advance parties forward for that purpose. By noon they were ready to move up but, with the disappearance of the CO and an order from the Regiment to withdraw confusion reigned instead.
However, the 32nd did finally manage to get a line established along the Holzheim - Andler road by dusk. But, this withdrawal now left the 106th's northern flank partially exposed. The 99th to the North was likewise finding the Germans moving around their flank.

The morning of the 17th found the 14th Cavalry still hanging on but under increasing pressure now from not just the 18th VG but the 1st SS Panzer as well. Devine on his own ordered a further withdrawal to a line from Born to Wallerode by mid morning. Around noon General Jones of the 106th ordered Devine to "Stay on the line you are on" (eg., the Holzheim (now in German hands) - Andler road). However, the 14th was already in motion.
Falling back the group found themselves in the middle of a giant traffic jam of corps units falling back on St. Vith. This made movement difficult at best.
Devine and his command party in making a reconnaissance towards the intended new line ran into Germans at Recht who shot up the party fairly badly. Colonel Devine and the other survivors withdrew singly and in small groups eventually making to the 14th's HQ. Colonel Devine upon reaching his command post in a badly shaken state turned over command of the group to Lt. Col. William Damon CO of the 18th Squadron.
Damon was ordered shortly after assuming command to report to VIII Corps HQ in Bastogne. He turned over command to Lt. Col. Ridge who had reappeared after his hunt for "ammunition." Shortly after that the Group XO Lt Col. Dugan showed up (having survived the Recht shoot up) and assumed command by virtue of seniority.
This shuffle of leadership left the group nearly headless for most of the afternoon of the 17th. That did not help matters at all.

It is clear that the 14th Group's squadrons fought doggedly against great odds. But, it certainly didn't help that their leadership and that above the group managed things so poorly.

 

One of the surviving 820th TD 3" guns at Poteau

 

I am always amazed at the absolute certainty with which cases are presented against the 14th. What happened to the 14th has been very poorly reported in most of all of the books of the account.

All due respect, but some accounts of the Bulge portray elements of the 14th retreating in hysterics. There is very little credible evidence to support this, but it is out there in many histories. What happens in the absolute vilification of Devine is that the entire 14th gets portrayed as these fleeing cowards. I ask questions about Hasbrouck and Jones because it then forces us to evaluate the historical evidence and perhaps conclude that there is a shared failure of leadership even amongst some of the untouchables (like Hasbrouck) Devine screwed up in some aspects but to assert that the rush through the gap is to be placed exclusively at his feet is absurd. To argue that if he had the 32nd Reconn. in place, that things would have been different, is speculation at best. Remember, this sector was not hot they were being told. Why wouldn't Devine have the 32nd's vehicles in Vielsam being serviced knowing that they would shortly be pushing into Germany?

You obviously know the area from research you have done. You know what a 9000 yard front looks like. Have you been to this area? I am doubtful of assertions that a 1500 man Cavalry Group could hold that area even if they had been more effectively linked in with 99 and 106.

On the 16th of December, Devine early recognized the urgent need for a counter-attack to create a defense of the Losheim Gap. At 1100, he asked General Jones by telephone for support from the six battalions of artillery behind the 422nd Regiment, Colonel Puett's Battalion, and the 422nd Regiment to join with his force in a counter-attack. General Jones refused the infantry support required at the time. Devine incompetent or Jones incompetent?

Where was Hasbrouck and 7th Armored for 10-12 hours? Sitting in Holland when Eisenhower told him to get moving. How much did the delay of this armor getting to this area allow for the punching through? Hasbrouck incompetent or Devine incompetent?

You surely understand the fog of war.

At one point (I believe in after action reports) Hasbrouck berates the 14th for abandoning 8" howitzers. 14th Cavalry did not have 8" howitzers!!! They were mobile cavalry. Tow this with a jeep? Hasbrouck's absurd assertion is symbolic of the inaccurate historical research that often times maligns the 14th's actions. When this 8" howitzer story was recounted by historian Ralph G. Hill, Jr. at the 1996 14th Cav. reunion, the laughter was sustained. The 14th Cav. members alive are not apologists for some of the errors that Devine may have committed, but they are fully aware of the incompetent leadership in other units in the area. Again, absurd to infer that if only the 14th had held that the gravity of the situation would have been less severe.

(I incorrectly stated the approx. number of dead in the area around Krewinkel. Your numbers are the closer approximation.)

Addendum:

I have been given access to some correspondence and research conducted by Ralph G. Hill, Jr., referred to above. Hill was an artillery officer during the Bulge. Rank and unit escapes me for the moment, but he saw action in the Ardennes. Occupation forces he was Military Government Branch. Hill conducted interviews of officers involved in the action throughout the northern shoulder, (including interviews of some German officers who I believe where involved in the assault on St. Vith) and engaged in correspondence throughout the years with a number of U.S. Army historians. He obtained 450 pages of combat reports created by Jack Shea, who was with the 14th from Jan. 5th to 12th, 1945. Much of Hills research counters some of the official histories of the battle. Novice or pro...historians always need to cross check assertions and claims. Hill, as far as I know, had no
motive to "defend" the 14th. Cav. In his research he found that some of the mainstream claims were inaccurate.

 

I don't understand? Why this picture reference?

What is your point???? Yes it is a 3 inch. If you read correctly: what I said about Hasbrouck was that he made reference to 8" howitzers being left behind. These are not 8" howitzers.

And it was not this location where he was making reference to 8" how. being left.

 

The 106th ID of course shares blame here too. But, I can be a bit more forgiving of their position. The 106th had only recently arrived in theater a mere 10 days earlier. They had been in training states side much longer than some of the other infantry divisions raised at that time due to two cadre draws on their manpower during training. These draws were to pull fully trained men out of the division for replacements and for standing up other units. Their untrained replacements disrupted the training cycles badly forcing a longer training overall.
The 106th had been in their positions exactly 5 days before the Germans struck. The unit had (obviously) not seen any combat nor were many of the officers experianced in combat themselves.
If you look at the 106th's position they were under attack at the same time as the 14th cavalry by portions of the 18th VG, 62nd VG, portions of the 116th Panzer, protions of the 560th VG, and the Fuhrer Beiglet Brigade.
The 106th made a number of errors mostly out of inexperiance. The biggest was the rapid loss of communications between the infantry regiments and the division HQ and artillery. Radios failed due to lack of batteries. Field telephone lines succumb to artillery fire. A more veteran unit would have known better and had this problem covered. The 106th didn't.
General Jones, made errors of command both from inexperiance and from the confusion resulting from the muddled communications. Once the flank of the 422nd IR had been exposed due to the pullback of the 18th Cavalry to the Holzeld - Andler line they were more busy trying to cover their own exposed flank than trying to attack anywhere.
But, I can excuse an extremely green unit more easily than a more veteran one for their blunders.

http://www.ranger95.com/military_history/battle_bulge/chapter7_breakthru_schnee_eifel.html


The 14th Cavalry Group had been in theater for months. It was an experianced unit that had seen at least some combat up to that time. The 7th Armored that went in to plug the line in that sector had its share of problems too. So did VIII corps. Like I said there is lots of blame to go around.

 

At Krewinkel, the 14th had not had a whole heck of a lot of action. Patrols, a few prisoners captured here and there. Germans sent scattered patrols through but not much. A periodic German mortar round, maybe something larger. A few scattered fire fights...

Yes, more time there...mid October..than the 106. Absolutely...106 was green as you said. Did the 14th prior to this have any kind of large scale engagements or see this level of artillery on the morning of the 16th...no.

With their level of experience...do we infer they should have held?

 

I have no idea what the reference to "8" howitzers" is about. There were none of these in the VIII Corps sector we are discussing at the time. VIII Corps artillery included the 333rd FA (155 how), 771st FA (4.5" gun), 770th (4.5" gun), 965th FA (155 How), and 969th (155 how). These were between St. Vith and Vieslalm. The 275th (105mm SP) was attached to 14th Cavalry as their general artillery support.
The only VIII Corps 8" guns are further South supporting the 28th Division: 578th FA (8") and 740th (8"). These were Northeast of Houffalize and nowhere near the 14th Cavalry Group.

 

And, that was their undoing. They were never seriously tested up to that point. The weaknesses in their command went undetected. That isn't uncommon either. Actually, the best that might have been expected of them had everything gone just right for the unit was they might have held the first day and then had to withdraw that night or by morning under mounting pressure.
Having both squadrons up front and the tank destroyers mixed in likely would have saved more of both units from destruction (the 18th got beaten up pretty badly right off). A better command staff would have also helped immensely.

 

Your link supports what I say:

"Contrary to the doctrine and training of mechanized cavalry, the 14th Cavalry Group was committed to a positional defense. Since the cavalry squadron does not have the staying power for defense in depth, and since the width of this front made an interlocking linear defense impossible, the 14th-if hit hard-was at best capable only of delaying action."

Yes, they were hit hard.

You continually attack Devine for not interlocking in with the 106th and the 99th. Yet the source you quote states that on such a wide front this is impossible and only a delaying action is possible. Maybe Devine didn't lock in because it wasn't possible????? Without response from Jones and Hasbrouck sitting in Holland, how long does 14th hold here?

Back to my assertion that to lay it all at the feet of the 14th is absurd...because they were "less" green?

Have you been to the Losheim Gap? Its all about geography.

 

The last time was 1978.

 

Read my comments about Hasbrouck. He accused the 14th of abandoning 8" howitzers in their "disorganized" retreat. The 14th did not even have these weapons. They were some other unit's, not the 14th Cavs. I make reference to this idiotic statement coming from the 7th Armored's general as indicative of so many of the inaccuracies flung at the 14th.

 

2003 for me. Looks the same I'm sure.

My dad was there after '44 in 1974, 1989 and 2003. Hope to get back but he turns 86 in three days.

Obviously my spirited defense of the 14th has a personal motive. Devine committed blunders, I just don't agree that the history is always accurate in nailing him with so much blame.

I teach high school history. Always challenge my students on their assumptions as they challenge me.

 

The 7th was no stellar performer either. You might want to aquaint yourself with a German ace tank commander named Ernst Barkmann who pretty much single handedly routed CCA (about a third of the division!) of that division at Manhay.

 

What Tanks did Kamfgruppe Hansen use?

or was there a seperate division that were in the tanks?

this would be helpful because im trying to make a map for a game based on this battle

thanks

 

I'm a little late with this answer but Kampfgruppe Hansen had no tanks as such. Wijers' book provides the following info that the KG consisted of : -

- 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment
- 1st SS Panzerjaeger Battalion ( 21 Jagdpanzer IVs plus assault guns plus 11 75mm PaK )
- One artillery battalion ( towed 105mm )
- 24 Nebelwerfer

 

I suggest Jean Pallund's book The Battle of the Bulge: Then and Now. He has a detailed map of the actual battle with the position of vehicles, both German and US that had been photographed in it.

 

I've just pushed this thread up because I'm re-reading MacDonald's comprehensive history of the Bulge and have come to the actions before St Vith. The discussion above between Wild Rose and T A Gardner are very interesting to read in conjunction.............

 

Poteau as a battle was rather abrupt and short. What happened was the 14th Cavalry was ordered to retake Born which they had evacuated the previous day. Lt Col Augustine Duggan who had been left in charge by Col. Devine (who with his staff had gone to the 106th Infantry command post) put a ad hoc column together to accomplish this mission.
The column consisted of C, 32nd Cavalry, elements of the 18th Cavalry and, a few of the remaining 3" guns from the 820th Tank Destroyer battalion. Major J. Maynes was put in command of the column and they started out from Poteau early on the morning of Dec 18 for Born.
The column had advanced just a few hundred yards from Poteau when the lead vehicles came under fire and were destroyed by either grenadiers with panzerfaust or pzjr IV of Kg Hansen.
The leading elements of the column were thrown into confusion and the column attempted to withdraw. Some vehicle crews did try to fight initially. Evidence of this is seen in the German photographs and film taken afterwards. There are several M8 with their turrets traversed towards the attacking Germans. A 3" gun was unhitched either to get it into action or to allow the towing halftrack to escape. On at least one jeep in the column there is a .30 machinegun set up to fire on the hood.
Several vehicles clearly show that their driver's / crew tried to get them turned around to retreat. A number of these get variously hung up in the roadside fence or stuck in soft ground trying to do so. Others simply had no room to move.
In all, the German and later photos show a total of 6 M8, 1 M2 and 2 M3 halftracks, 1 3" gun, 8 jeeps, and 3 M5 light tanks either knocked out or abandoned.