Question on the Italian air force

Reading the threads about the Med Theater, it seems the Italian air units were not as effective as they should've been. Because if they were, Axis shipping in the Med would've had an easier time getting through. There would still be losses but more stuff would be arriving at their destinations.

I wonder why? During the years between WWI and II, Italians were among the innovators of aviation. What happened?

 

There are several major problems the Italians faced in this area:

First, they could never produce a sufficent quantity of their best designs. Most aviation units had to soldier on with older obsolesent or obsolete designs putting them at a disadvantage against their opponets.

Next, the Italians faced a fuel shortage greater than the Germans did. This made sustained large scale operations difficult.

Also, their airforces had nearly zero cooperation with their navy. This made both services far less effective in the naval war in the Mediterrainian. At one early battle with the Royal Navy the Italian airforce did show up in strength, half an hour late and then bombing their own ships but they were there....

 

Thanks. It's amazing that interservice rivalry would get that low, especially with a war on. I seem to discern a pattern here. Dictatorships tend to breed such infighting.

 

Anouther problem is their aircraft tended to be very lightly armed compared to German and British designs. From two to four .303 cal machine guns and perhaps a 20mm cannon. Some of the pilots were pretty good and had high kill numbers, espcially the ones who fought on with the axis after Italy surrendered in 1943.
Some of the later fighter designs were very good but they could not get them mass produced. The CR-42 was the back bone of the fighters in general.

 

Thanks. I'd like to share a website I found about Italian aces. Comando Supremo: Aces of the Regia Aeronautica

 

Terry hit it on the nail. The Italian Air Force actually had some aircraft that were very good, good enough that the luftwaffe pressed them into service. The big killer was the lack of fuel. Their fuel supplier was Germany and Italy was treated as a third world country.

 

ITALIAN RAID AT MANAMA (1940)


Introduction

On October 19, 1940, four Savoia Marchetti SM82 special bombers of the Regia Aeronautica Italiana hit the English oil refineries in the Persian Gulf carrying out a long, hard and brilliant war mission.


During World War Two, the Regia Aereonautica Italiana, although lacking in a consistent numbers of strategic bombers, managed to transform several SM82 and SM75 three-engined transport planes into aircrafts able to hit enemy target (airports and industrial plants) which were too far away to be reached by the normal bombers generally employed by the Italian Air Force, such as the Savoia Marchetti SM79, Fiat Br20 and CantZ 1007. Thanks to their first rate reliability and long range, a handful of the modified SM82 and SM75 succeeded in carrying out several missions.

These missions were remarkable, not only because of the damage caused to the enemy, but especially for their strictly technical importance.

From June 1940 to July 1943, the SM82 and SM75 bombers delivered attacks on Gibraltar, Suez, Port Sudan and Bahrain. This also gave an effective propagandistic value. They replaced the four-engine Piaggio P108s, which although were more suitable, were not always available due to their scant numbers.



The SM82 Bomber
Among the brilliant actions carried out by the three-engine Savoia-Marchetti was in late spring 1942, when a special SM75 established a new link with a non-stop flight from Rome to Tokyo. But also the successful raid in mid-October 1940 on the oil refinery of Manama holds a particular interest and meaning.

The English refineries in the Persian Gulf were chosen as the first strategic target at the beginning of summer 1940 when the first models of Savoia-Marchetti were produced by the assembly line. They were transport planes converted into bombers.



The craft belonging to this series were provided with forward/ventral laying devices, a bomb release gear and three Breda-Safat machine-guns. The first SM82 bombers started their activity on July 17, when three aircrafts took off from Rome-Guidonia to raid the English stronghold of Gibraltar (100 and 250 kilogram bombs were dropped during this action). Similar attacks were carried out again on Gibraltar on July 25 (this time the planes took off from the base of Alghero in Sardinia) and on August 20. The results were good (the target was hit, although with a small quantity of explosives and some of the planes were lost or damaged during the mission). At the beginning of October 1940, the command of the Regia Aeronautica decided that five SM82 bombers belonging to the 41st Group led by lieutenant-colonel Ettore Muti should be transferred from Rome-Ciampino to the airport of Gadurrà (Isle of Rhodes).

The passage took place on October 13. The Italian Command intended to employ the special SM82s to bomb the English oil plants of Manama, in the Persian Gulf, in order to show the potential ability of the Italian air force. It was a long and difficult mission involving a 4,000 kilometre flight. Ettore Muti and his comrades spent four days working on a complete revision of the plans and established a complex flight plan.

The Italians decided against the highly dangerous manoeuvre of returning to Rhodes on the same route, as they might have been intercepted by the Royal Air Force based in Cyprus, Palestine and Iraq, and chose another option. After bombing the refineries, the planes would head for the southwest, flying over the immense and scarcely inhabited Arabian desert in order to reach the Red Sea and the Italian colony of Eritrea.



On December 18, at 5.10 pm, after filling both the normal and the supplementary tanks, they loaded three out of four SM82s with 1.5 tons of incendiary and explosive bombs weighing 15, 20 or 50 kilograms. Then the four three-engine bombers took off.

In command of the first aircraft, which gained height with difficulty from the Rhodes- Gadurrà runway because it was overloaded with 19,500 kilograms, was Lieutenant Colonel Muti. He was assisted by Major Giovanni Raina and by Captain Paolo Moci, who had previous experience in flying planes overloaded up to 21 tons.

Lieutenant Colonel Fortunato Federici, Captain Aldo Buzzaca and Lieutenant Emanuele Francesco Ruspoli were on the second aircraft, while Captain Giorgio Meyer, Lieutenant Adolf Rebex and Warrant Officer Aldo Carrera were on the third one. The fourth plane was piloted by Captain Antonio Zanetti assisted by Lieutenant Vittorio Cecconi and Warrant Officer Mario Badii.

The SM82s, after gaining height (a manoeuvre which took remarkable efforts because of the enormous weight of the aircrafts) headed east, flying over Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria, bending to the southeast as they went past Jordan and Iraq until they reached the Persian Gulf. During the very long outward flight, the role of Muti's SM82 pathfinder proved its essential function in leading the squadron. Two huge white rhombuses had been painted purposefully on the upper side of its wings and lighted by two lamps so that the pilots of the other planes could easily see them and follow Muti's craft in the dark.

For security reasons, the commander had decided that all radio communications should be cut off. This measure was rather uncomfortable for the crew but allowed the Italians to keep the precious advantage of surprise.

Regarding the role played by the pathfinder plane, we must point out that its duty was to spot the target and release its bombs so that the others could do the same. Thanks to the help of a rudimentary device, the only bombardier (Major Giovanni Raina) was expected to find the difficult target. At 2.20 am, just before reaching the Bahrain Islands, Lieutenant Colonel Federici's aircraft suddenly lost sight contact with Muti's SM82 and had to drop its bombs on different targets in the vicinity of Manama, while the other planes hit the fixed target.

As bombardier Raina later told "the operation of spotting the target was easy thanks to the total illumination of the extractive and refinery plants" which were partially damaged by the bombs (half a dozen wells and some oil deposits were set on fire). As soon as they perceived the glares of the first explosions, the Italian planes made off along the escape route landing to the Zula runway (Eritrea) at 8 8:40.




The whole Italian formation had flown 2,400 kilometres in 15.30 hours. At the Eritrean airport, along with a small crowd of Italian aviators, the brave pilots found the fourth SM82 squadron which, in the meantime, had come from Rhodes as a support plane on the way back, should one of the crafts make an emergency landing in the desert.

A few days later, the five SM82s of Colonel Muti took off from Zula and with no further problems, arrived at the Rome-Urbe airport. From a strict military point of view, the raid on the oil refineries of Manama was not able (especially because of the few planes employed) to cause severe damages to the enemy. The enterprise led by Muti had, however, a great importance in the technical and propagandistic side. In fact, after the raid, the RAF was compelled to place a squadron of fighters near the refineries and protect the plants with a couple of battalions and some batteries of antiaircraft guns.

Written by: Alberto Rosselli

http://www.comandosupremo.com/Manama.html

 

Excellent bit of into there JC.

 

Thanks. Sometimes it bothers me about the rep that The Italians had. They actually had some very good troops when properly led and motivated .

 

Regia Aeronautica was pressed into battle two years before it could be ready for it. The "R" Program (fighter arm modernization), inside Badoglio's modernization plans, was scheduled only to be concluded in 1942. In june, 1940, they had no plans or structure to battle on equal terms with french or british opponents. Yet they did fine in a number of occasions such as the first battles in Western Desert and East Africa.

One could only imagine if the 1942 italian fighter development could be achieved without the difficulties of facing a multi-front war.

 

Totally agree. Both in Rommels Diaries and von Mellenthin's book there are references that the Italians performed superb when properly led. There was too much separation between enlisted and officers. Officers got the best rations whereas the men got crap. Difficult to lead men in such situations.

 

Then there is also Italian 10th Flotilla (Decimo MAS).

"That changed dramatically on 19 December. Six frogmen from the elite Italian 10th Flotilla (Decimo MAS) were dropped off from a submarine one and a half miles outside the harbour, each armed with a single torpedo. They were able to enter the harbour while the nets were opened to allow some destroyers into the harbour. They then planted their torpedoes under Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, badly damaging both ships. Admiral Cunningham managed to keep the damage secret, conducting business from the decks of Queen Elizabeth as normal, but for some time there were no British battleships in the eastern Mediterranean."

HMS Queen Elizabeth

 

Excellent article! Fascinating & SO informative!! Thanks so much


Stewie Griffin

 

The American acess I have known based in the Med had pretty terse comments on the Italians' fighting ability. "Their being in the air was usually a non-event. We had no problems with them."

And, "They'd see us and do aerobatics, then we'd shoot them down."

I'll leave those comments as is adding that while they sound rather confident, this is how the Itals were perceived.

 

Regia Aeronautica always had problems with supplies and maintenance, problems that only increased with the use of several different types of fighters, for instance. Their operational rate was quite smaller then that of the Luftwaffe.

The italian air force doctrine was heavily based on aerobatics. This comes from the late 20's, by influence of Rino Corso Fougier (future Generale di Squadra Aerea and commander-in-chief of Regia Aeronautica). So, italian fighter pilots were used to (e.g.) make a perfect loop rather than a tight combat turn. That's also why their aircraft took manouverability above all other qualities such as armament and speed.

 

Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana

In October, 1943, a agreement was reached between Lt. Col Ernesto Botto and Luftwaffe Commander Generalfeldmarchall Wolfram von Richthofen in which Lt. Col Giuseppe Baylon was named head of the Italian Air ministry. This new Air Force would be named the Republican National Air Force (ANR). Initially, it was quite difficult to get an effective air force in action because the Germans captured approximately 1,000 of the Italian aircrafts still remaining in areas controlled by Germany. Towards the end of 1943, a number of C.205 V's were handed back to the Italians to form the Iº Gruppo Caccia, which debuted over Turin on 3 Jan 1944.
Next came the Squadriglia Complementare Montefusco, equippied with G.55's and the IIº Gruppo Caccia, which was formed in April, 1944. IIIº Gruppo Caccia formed in summer 1944, but never achieved combat status.
Losses were very high and the lack of spare parts made it quite difficult to maintain available aircraft. In most situations, the Italian pilots had to be retrained in the use of German BF 109G's due to the high losses of their domestic aircraft.
In August 1944, the Germans tried to disband the ANR to force Italian pilots into the Luftwaffe. The pilots refused and burned their aircraft after their bases were surrounded by SS units. The crisis was resolved when German authorities reversed their decision. During the last year of war in Northern Italy, the ANR had the only Axis aircraft flying in the region. During the period it flew Macchis, the Iº Gruppo Caccia claimed 100 Allied aircraft with the same amount of losses. It downed more aircraft than any other Italian unit of its size.

Comando Supremo: Repubblica Sociale Italiana

 

AERONAUTICA NAZIONALE REPUBBLICANA

Contrary to the behaviour of the Navy, the Air Force went almost entirely North, except for a few training and bomber units. This is not surprising, considering that the former Italian Regia Aeronautica was the most Fascist of the Italian armed forces (Much like the Luftwaffe in the German Wehrmacht). The core of the Republican Air Force were its fighter units that operated against Allied heavy bombers. At first Italian aircraft were used, such as the MC205 and the outstanding G55 and Re2005, but these were later largely replaced with German- made Bf109s. At the end of the war a small group of Italian pilots was located in Germany ready to begin training on the Me163 and Me262, but the war ended before they started the actual training. The Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana was organized as follows:


Air Force Headquarters
Torpedo-Bombers Command
Fighter Command
Transport Command
Anti-Air Artillery Command
Air Force Academy (courses "Zodiaco" and "Aquila 2nd")
Fighter Training Flight
5 x recruits Bns
9 x anti-parachutists Bns
Reggimento Arditi Paracadutisti "Folgore"
1st Parachutist Bn "Folgore" (lightning)
2nd Parachutist Bn "Nembo" (storm-cloud)
3rd Parachutist Bn "Azzurro" (Bright Blue)
1st Fighter Squadron
1st Flight "Larismont" (an Airforce hero, as per the other flights names)
2nd Flight "Guido Bobba"
3rd Flight "Dante Ocarso"
2nd Fighter Squadron
1st Flight "Gigi Caneppelle"
2nd Flight "Nicola Magaldi"
3rd Flight "Gianni Graffer"
3rd Fighter Squadron
101st Indipendent Fighter Squadron
Independent Fighter Flight "Montefusco"
Training Flight "Francesco Baracca"
Torpedo-bomber Squadron "Faggioni & Buscaglia"
Air Transport Squadron "Terracciano"
Air Transport Squadron "Trabucchi"
Air Liason Flight
1st Bomber Flight "Ettore Muti"
Gliders Flight

Even if officially entitled with the names of Airforce heroes, each fighter flight was usually called by its nickname, based on the flight's insigna, as follows. The 1st Squadron's flights had the following: 1/1 "Asso di Bastoni" (cludgel ace - from the traditonal Italian paying cards, that have different symbols from the "international" ones), 2/1 "Vespa Incacchiata" (pissed-off wasp), 3/1 "Incocca, tende, scaglia" ("Notch, Pull, Loose", the three actions to launch an arrow from a bow). The 2nd Squadron's flights had the following: 1/2 "Gigi tre Osei" (Gigi with three birds. The ace Gigi Caneppelle was a pre-war Top Grade glider pilot - entitled to wear a blue badge with three white birds. But "bird" is also the Italian slang for penis...), 2/2 "Diavoli Rossi" (red devils), 3/2 "Gamba di Ferro" (iron leg, the nickname of Cpt.Botto, one of the most charismatic WWII Italian fighter pilots).

http://www.feldgrau.com/rsi.html

 

That's not correct. ANR was the only FIGHTER unit during that last year (more specifically from Sep 44 to May 45) with the departure of Stab JG.77 to Germany. But the Luftwaffe kept present in the italian theather until the final surrender with night-attack and reconnaissance units. In the last months even a Arado Ar 234 unit (Sonderkommando Sommer) operated there, from Villafranca.

 

Thats probably what they author meant . What I do find more intersting is this,

" At the end of the war a small group of Italian pilots was located in Germany ready to begin training on the Me163 and Me262, but the war ended before they started the actual training."

 

Actually JC, there was in Germany a group of pilots (lead by ace Giuseppe Robetto) that iniciated glider training for the Me 163, but no pilots where sent there to train in the Me 262. The only document that linked the jet fighter to ANR was a memorandum of RLM suggesting the re-equipment of 1º Gruppo Caccia with the Me 262. Unfortunately, no further steps were taken in this direction.

But interesting anyway!