Rommel and Monty´s trap....

Alam el Halfa

Rommel would have to capture the high ground. Montgomery’s plan was to put his forces on the ridge and site his anti-tank guns. Rommel would break through and discover these forces, but then what would he do?

In the desert, there are two types of ground…hard going…packed sand and rock suitable for tank travel… and soft sand. Jasper Maskelyne was ordered to prepare a map.

German forward observers saw a British armored car driving toward them … driving directly into a minefield. Moments later, there was a terrific explosion. In the destroyed car was one dead major…now restored to honor…and a briefcase with a map.

On August 30 Rommel’s 15th and 21st Panzers drove south with the Italian Ariete Division. They breached the first minefields and drove the British back.

As the Panzers drove toward Alam Halfa ridge, hidden guns erupted. Rommel turned toward the region marked “hard going” on the map. The Panzers were suddenly up to their hulls in soft sand. As they wallowed helplessly, pre-sited guns and a bomber attack destroyed them. Rommel had fallen into Monty’s trap.

among other sources:

http://www.gaiaselene.com/Scripts/rommel.htm

 

Perfidious Albion

 

Yes, I know, it´s hard to believe it was Monty doing this, really...

 

While the planting of a map in a destroyed vehicle is a true event, the story that a British officer deliberately drove his vehicle into the minefield in order to regain his 'honour' is pure myth.

 

This is an exaggeration in that "Rommel" had not fallen into the trap, nor was it "Monty's" trap. Rommel was not with the DAK and such spur of the moment decisions as where to turn when the planned axis of advance was blocked were left to the commander on the scene, which in this case was the commander of the DAK, Walther Nehring (who was to be wounded the next day during a British air attack). And it was not "Monty's" trap, because Monty had absolutely nothing to do with developing that little bit misinformation. It was Jasper Maskelyn who did that. At that point Monty was still trying to get a handle on morale problems in his army, having only assumed command 2 weeks earlier and still out making personal visits to units all over the place. This is also why Monty was completely unprepared with any plan to exploit the victory by following up the German retreat, for which he was roundly criticized at the time. Since he had not planned any such action in advance he wisely chose not to pursue them in an impromptu manner, which he knew would be playing to his own forces weaknesses and to the Germans' strength.

 

Actually I always thought that this was Rommel´s decision because it was
" his last chance " to make a breakthrough and "win" before the Allied would get tanks etc which would definitely make life hard for Rommel. And if Rommel had known the real truth, that the ground was soft and the defence line was ready for his tanks, he might not have attacked this route at all, then again it could be there was no alternative but to attack which would mean that Rommel had lost before he started (??!).

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Alam_Halfa


The British Eighth Army, since August 13, had passed under the command of General(later Field Marshal) Montgomery. An Axis attack was expected but Montgomery after visiting the front lines, devised a new plan for meeting it. Realising the featureless southern sector was undefendable, he chose the Alma El Halfa ridge well in the rear of the Eighth Army's front, as his main defensive position. This East-West ridge blocked any enveloping movement from the South. Later on, Enigma intercepts confirmed to British intelligence the direction of Rommel's attack.

Montgomery's plan was simple. He chose to entrench his tanks and anti-tank units on the Alam Halfa ridge and await the Axis attack there. The front lines would be only lightly held, allowing the enemy tanks through, only to stop them in a more favourable sector.


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Like said before I "prefer" Rommel but then again this was not the first time he was trying the impossible but this time he burnt his fingers, I think.

 

There is no indication that the softness of the ground had any effect on the battle.
The problem for the axis was the British were in well dug-in positions and were now equipped with a large number of the excellent 6 pdr A/T guns which meant the German armoured forces could no longer engage the British forces at a range which the British couldn't reply effectively.
Also Monty ensured that his tank forces were kept on a tight rein, so they wouldn't engage in any of the rash charges against the enemy which always led to their destruction.

Alam Halfa was a very worrying battle for Rommel, the new British general showed that he wasn't going to play by the old rules Rommel wanted him to play by, he had his own set of new rules

 

Any info on the AT weapon Hurricanes or other aeroplanes attacking the German tanks? I recently watched a DVD ( Battlefield series ) that claimed that many of the losses at halfa were also due to the Hurricanes??

 

Actually almost no tank losses in this period were due to direct air attack, the majority of damage to the Axis in this period came from medium bomber attacks on field positions, fuel, ammo dumps, and ports.

 

OK. Thanx Redcoat! I guess they twisted the truth a little bit on that DVD.

 

Basically you were right when you posited the possibility that Rommel had no choice but to attack. That is precisely the position he was in. He already knew that massive British reinforcements had flooded into Egypt and that an irresistible attack would be forthcoming. However, he was hamstrung by Hitler's order to hold to the last man. This left him three choices:

1. Do nothing and wait for the inevitable onslaught to sweep his army off the map.

2. Attack right then while he still had the forces and fuel to do so, and try to disrupt the enemy's preparations, hopefully buying time for his own forces to receive some reinforcements and improve their positions, and maybe, if he was REALLY lucky, unhinging the British 8th Army and getting them to retreat further into Egypt.

3. Disobey Hitler's orders and retreat his forces from that position, leaving the bulk of his unmotorized Italian infantry behind to be captured, and earning himself a 9mm brain hemorrhage and a long dirt nap in the bargain.

So he chose to go with option #2, knowing that a failure would at worst leave him to face option #1 but that at least there was the hope of a miracle that could save his army.

His biggest handicap in planning the battle was that the British had total air superiority, thus preventing any aerial reconnaissance on his part. He had to work from scanty information on front line enemy dispositions and no information at all on the location or strength of enemy reserves. This forced him to make his plan more broad in nature and leave more of the details to the battlefield commanders once they had engaged and could make better informed decisions. This was, after all, a principal advantage the Germans had over the British: their practice of allowing their unit and sub-unit commanders to exercise initiative within the general framework of the overall battle plan.

 

Any ideas about this Pro_Consul? ( or anyone else here in the Forums? ) Found it back in 2003.

El Alamein:

One final, but key, factor affected the success of British deception plans. Earlier in the desert campaigns, Rommel had quite successfully used wireless intelligence to determine British plans. The commander of Rommel's wireless intelligence was Captain Alfred Seebohm, who had become quite good at determining the British order of battle, dispositions, and intentions. It is fitting that after the British learned of See-bohm's listening post, British wireless intelligence, the Y service, located it.32 On 10 July, an attack was planned on Seebohm's position on a small group of mounds called the "Hills of Jesus." The attack was successful, and most of the intelligence equipment was captured intact. Seebohm himself was mortally wounded and later died in Cairo.

The British learned much about how Rommel had been able to outfox them in previous battles from the equipment found at the Hills of Jesus. They identified areas of poor British wireless security and made changes.

Probably the biggest blow to Rommel's intelligence-collection ability was Seebohm's loss. Rommel replaced the equipment and again began wireless intelligence-collection, but according to Anthony Cave Brown in Bodyguard of Lies, without Seebohm's keen ear for the abnormal, Rommel was "vulnerable to wireless deception."33 Whether or not Seebohm would have detected British deception plans is debatable. What is not debatable is that intelligence played a large and critical role at the Battle of Alam Halfa.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/engl...ug02/smith.asp

 

Interesting story about this.
Captain Seebohm had been criticized just before this by a senior officer, who had accused him of cowardice when he evacuated his unit from near the front line due to fears of a British attack in an earlier battle. Due to this insult, he refused to withdraw his unit from its exposed position, even though a number of RAF recon flights over his position had been spotted and there were fears amongst his men that the British were preparing for an attack on the unit.

 

Actually the head of the Italian wireless intelligence collection service at the El Alamein position warned the German's just before the 2nd Battle of El Alamein that a British attack was imminent, but they just regarded him as another nervous Italian, and took no action.

 

It is true that the British scored a counter-intelligence coup there, but it was really too late to make any difference in the outcome of Alamein and the future of the North African Theater. By this point the British could have given Rommel copies of every document and map in their own HQ, and it would have made no difference to the outcome. The British had a far more massive advantage than ever before in virtually every category, including complete control of the air, and there was no possible plan that was going to bring victory to the Italo-German forces against that.

In fact, Rommel himself has already told OKW that defeat was inevitable and that he should be allowed to retreat his forces as best he could, mount a temporary defence at Gazala to buy some time, then fall back further to defend Tripolitania. But the fact that he said his position was hopeless was all the proof OKW needed to paste the "Defeatist" label on him, at which point reality was no longer a concern in their decision making.

 

in the book the Rommel Papers, edited by B.H. Liddell Hart with assistance of LUCIE-MARIE ROMMEL
MANFRED ROMMEL
AND GENERAL FRITZ BAYERLEIN translated by Paul Findlay...

Rommelstates on page 278...From Afrika Korps H.Q.,where i had begun discussing the situation and our plans with Bayerlein, i drove to the Italian divisions and urged them to hurry.
quote"Meanwhile, the vehicles and tanks of the Afrika Korps were painfully grinding their way through the soft sand covering their line of march." It continues to relay about blowing sandstorms and such...but ends in his thrust with this statement..."Due to the heavy going,the Afrika Korps petrol stocks were soon badly depleted and at 16.00 hours we called off the attack on Hill 132." the sketch of map Rommel had, can't be shown, but in this book it is very interesting...

bf109 Emil