Rommel...D-Day

I tried a Rommel search...but that brings up a lot of stuff.My question is about his theory...or so I have heard...about "stopping" the enemy on the beach.
The Longest Day so to speak.

1. Was that kind of what Rommel said.?

2. Was it literal.?
Did he mean that The Allies had to be stopped at the beaches...to not even let them get 1 mile inland.?
Was his thinking that if The Allies had a beach head, then The War would be pretty much lost.?
Thank You

 

Rommel knew that the Allies would have total air superiority which would isolate the battle area and make day movement and resupply very "iffy". He realized that for every kilometer the Allies advanced inland they would be able to then land even more men, tanks, guns, and supplies. Therefore, stopping the Allied assault as close the waterline as possible was his goal and he had to this with the forces at the point of the landing(s) as soon as possible. The narrower the beach head, the more vulnerable it was to counter-attack. Conversely, the deeper the penetration, the better the chances of the invasion's success. So while stopping the assault literally in the beach sand was his ideal, it was hoped that at worse the beach head would be very narrow when he threw in the armored counter attack. While his thinking was I believe correct, in order to make this work his defenses would have had to be much deeper than they were. Literally, his defense line (such as it was) was on the beaches so if they weren't stopped there then there was little he could do to defeat the invasion. If he had gotten enough infantry to have more defense in depth then it may have been possible to keep the invasion in such a narrow space that it could be defeated. So, because of a paucity of resources he literally had to defeat them right on the beaches. He didn't have enough infantry on hand to defend much after the beach defenses had been defeated. This might not have mattered if he had total control of the armor in his sector and had some for immediate counter-attack--like on the morning of D-Day! So, my answer to your question is: Yes, literally on the beaches.

I find it interesting that while Rommel understood the implications of Allied control of the air better than many German generals, he didn't understand just how potent naval gunfire was.

 

Gotcha...Thanks.
I guess he did not have much experience with Navy stuff...and the German Navy never had the awesome firepower and numbers that the Allies did. Must have been depressing for him to witness that...from the 0-20 miles inland range.
Thanks Again

 

True. However the cynic in me wonders how much of this omission was a convenient piece of self delusion that was part of his appointment as inspector of the Atlantic Wall and Commander Army Group B.

Rommel was an ambitious man, and every bit as much an egotist as Montgomery, Patton or Macarthur. After the loss of North Africa, he had taken a pessimistic view of the defence of Italy and been rewarded with a non-job commanding an army group doing nothing.

In Autumn 1943 OB West had written a paper explaining that no one in history had ever defeated an opposed crossing on the river bank and the Atlantic wall was a folly, not least because of the power of Naval gunfire. Rommel stepped forwards and agreed with Hitler and OKW's assessment that the invasion could be stopped on the beaches, because in his view, allied airpower would prevent the Germans from winning an inland mobile battle. Amnesia about allied naval artillery may have been part of the candidate specification for OKW's candidate for command on the Atlantic Wall.

 

I think Rommel was realist, remember he was at least sympathetic to the plotters of July. He knew the war was lost, he was simply stating the obvious. Germany had one small chance of beating an invasion and that was to throw everything on the beach, because allied airpower would overwhelm any resistance off of them.
By the way OB west and the Soviets both wrongly believed the channel crossing was no more then a river operation, it wasn't. It was a full scale naval exercise, something neither the Germans or Soviets had any idea of the magnitude or challenge.

 

Two questions:-

1. Do you have any evidence that Rommel had any contact with the July 1944 plotters before June 1944? An argument that the Heer threw the battle of Normandy is close to the neo nazi "dolchstoss" explanation of defeat in the west.

2. Regardless of whether OB West was correct or incorrect to regard the Channel as a big river, can you offer any counter examples of a serious attempt to establish a land force from the sea being defeated at the waters edge?

 

Sheldrake,

I hope you don't mind me jumping in here.

1. Of course Rommel had contact with the plotters. His own chief of staff, Speidel, was a plotter. From what I've read Rommel was approached at some point. His feeling was that any bunch of plotters who bumped off Hitler would not have the consent of the governed. Given the response of most Germans after the July 20th attempt it can be seen that he was correct. He thought the best course of action was to try Hitler and thus show his crimes to the Germans. There is also some evidence that he was preparing to open up the Western Front to the Allies in the hope that they would reach Berlin before the Soviets. This was just before he was injured when his car was attacked by British fighter-bombers.

2. Gallipoli is the best example. However it doesn't mean it couldn't be done. I think that if the Germans had enough infantry to get good defenses in depth it may have just been possible.

 

Hitler had enough suspicion that he was willing to place Rommel before a tribunal if he was not willing to commit suicide.
the initial attempt at Wake was defeated even before the landing began.

 

Pardon my naivete.
I guess even a few months after D-Day Hitler still had a grip on his underlings.?
Obviously he did.
THAT is one aspect of the war that still confuses me.
Maybe I should start another post, but.....with the exception of the masses who may have been scared to question...and were being plastered with State Radio broadcasts...it is hard for me to think that everybody else in The Reich did not feel The War was lost.
Maybe I am wrong...maybe The Army thought they still had a shot.?
Seems like most of those guys would have been in favor of dousing Hitler and Eva with gasoline in July of 1944.
If you know what mean...I thought a coup would have been much easier than it was.
I guess Hitler had so many higher ups at each other throat...it might have been hard for enough guys to band together to do the job that they "all" wanted to do.

 

The quote is taken from his discussion with Fritz Bayerlein as given in 'The Rommel Papers' (p.455 ) : -

'I therefore consider that an attempt must be made, using every possible expedient, to beat off the enemy landing on the coast and to fight the battle in the more or less strongly fortified coastal strip....the Divisions employed on the coast will have two tasks, to defend the coast against the enemy sea landing forces, and to hold the land front 10 kilometres inland against airborne troops'.

The whole of pp.451-460 is given over to Rommel's thoughts and discussions about the impending invasion.

 

Interesting...Thanks

 

Gallipoli supports OB West's argument rather than Rommel's.

The Turks were unable to prevent the allies landing, even at Cape Helles where the landing beach was absurdly small. The allies created a lodgement area for an army which they held for over six months. The Turks succeeded in repelling the allied invasion by assembling a strong army which opposed the allies inland on the heights which dominated the peninsular. (Chanak Bair)

PS General Leutenant Bodo Zimmermann in the post war interviews (MS B 308) claimed that it was not Rommel, but von Runstedt who beleived that the initial 24 hours was critical..

Foreign Studies Manuscripts B308 quoted in Atlantic Wall to Siegfried Line A STUDY IN COMMAND Volume I EUCOM : HD : OHGB :

 

Denny,
You forget that high treason is very hard thing for professional soldiers to contemplate. The pros knew that it was very unlikely that Germany could win,but most of the rank and file as well as the Volks at home felt that somehow Hitler would somehow pull off something that would save the Reich. Therefore the generals would have to wonder if they would have the loyalty of the troops or the the citizens if they removed Hitler. Of course they would have to remove more than AH. They would have to neutralize the SS and most of the nazi power structure which could mean civil war during an actual war. Then, if the Allies refused to negotiate with the new government and stuck to "unconditional surrender", they would be blamed for losing the war-another "stab in the back" narrative would develope. So it isn't a wonder that the generals didn't act sooner; it's wonder that they didn't turn in the plotters immediately!

 

Yeah...well said.
Not like there was a Vice President waiting to take over that was sympathetic to "the plotters".
How do you get and maintain control after Hitler was dead.?
A huge concern I am sure.
Hard to know who to bribe...trust...talk to...before your plans are given away.

Am I correct...were there something like 3 thousand arrests made.?
Were there THAT many people involved...or was the assassination attempt used as an excuse to clean house of other people as well.?

 

Sheldrake,

Gallipoli was a defeat for the Allies in that none of their strategic aims were met and they had to withdraw after a long fight and heavy casualties. Being tied down in a very narrow beach head was another way the landings could have been defeated.

There were many reasons why the D-Day invasion succeeded but you pointed out one of the main ones: The divided command structure that tied up the panzer reserves during the critical early hours. I pointed out another one: Insufficient infantry forces for the task at hand. There was a third one: Even given their diminished resources, the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine didn't pull their weight.

 

I also have Afrikacorps pics btw

 

One thing that stood out to me about him and D-Day, is that while he was in Germany celebrating his wife's birthday, when he heard about the landings that morning his words were, "How stupid of me."

 

What von Rundstedt and the others said after the war were only the usual attempts to saddle Hitler with the responsability for the success of Overlord and can be discarded .


The presence/absence of Rommel on 6 june had no influence on what happened that day .

 

I believe the only chance Rommel had in defeating the Allied invasion would have been running heavy armor at night against the beaches where darkness would keep the aircraft off his back and making it more difficult for naval gunfire to strike his forces.

Getting the Germans to believe that the main assault would be at another location, to include Norway and Southern France was a stroke of genius. By not releasing all the units available quickly, the Allies had time to consolidate the beach heads in a few days and had the room to land more maneuver units.

If the Germans had gotten wind of where the landings were to take place, that would have been one bloody mess, much worse than it was.

 

Actually, much movement of German forces during Normandy campaign was done in the cover of darkness. Due to the overwhelming advantage of the USAAF and RAF the Germans, along with the before mentioned naval support, had no choice but to prepare defenses and advancement at night. They just didn't have the might and proper alignment of armored forces at the time.