Rommel's reputation - deserved or political ploy?

Guderian was similar in his neglect of logistics, he loved to brag about how he could advanced so much farther, yet he never explains how his logistic tail was to keep up, since so much of it was horse drawn and the more forces left behind the more dangerous it was for the support troops.

 

Whole German army neglected logistics (as well intelligence btw.) it seems.

 

Well, the propaganda worked pretty well, must say...

Auchinleck, Rommel’s opposite until his sacking by Churchill, sent a memo to his senior commanders in North Africa, to state that it was their responsibility to ensure that their men thought less of Rommel as a ‘super military leader’ and more of him as a normal German commander.



"…(you must) dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents anything other than the ordinary German general……….PS, I’m not jealous of Rommel."
Auchinleck

 

I've come across two versions of this memo - one containing the postscript and the other without it. The more reputable sources tend to leave it out. Thoughts on this? Did Auchinleck in fact sign this memo off with 'P.S. I'm not jealous of Rommel'? Seems nonsensical to me.

 

The last pasrt could well be added by someone else. Perhaps somebody has a photo copy of the original memo?

Also:


Opponents' view
Ironically, one of the reasons for his towering reputation was due to his opponents. While most enemy generals had only ever received short shrift from British leaders, the British built up a myth around this man as a 'genius'. Churchill even went so far as to name him in the House of Commons.
At one point, Auchinleck became so frustrated by what he considered the Rommel 'bogeyman' that he forbade his troops to mention the German commander. Not surprisingly, such an order simply increased Rommel's status in the eyes of British soldiers.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/rommel_desert_01.shtml

 

I've been wondering the same thing. Admittedly, Rommel's performance in France was nothing short of amazing, I mean, how often does someone capture a million prisoners but in Africa I don't really see much to brag about. Of course in Africa he had far fewer resources but I'm still scratching my head as to what all the hoopla was about.

 

If you look at his performance in WWI and his work on tactics in the inter war years as well as his early efforts I think it supports the view of him as a very capable tactician. Indeed that is probably understateing it. However his talents in operations and particularly strategy do not seem to have been at the same level. So in the desert he's coming off of performances that played to his strength and didn't really run into circumstances that tended to stress his weaknesses until later in that campaign.

 

1) Rommel did not capture 1 million of prisoners in 1940

2) He did not have fewer resources in Africa

 

Crap, for once I have to agree with LJAd. Hope it isn't a trend.

 

Agree on point 1, On the second point relating to supplies, While he had a greater amount of supplies sent you also need to take into account the fact that it was spread out amongst a larger force thus 'possibly' reducing the supplies per a person not to mention a good chunk was chewed up just moving the supplies to the front line.

cant say for certain which way the supply issue could be as i don't have the actual numbers but if some one has the numbers for supplies Rommel received in France and his troop strength along with supplies he received in NA and the troop strength (Month by month if possible).

 

France was much shorter than North Africa and the supply lines were much shorter and more robust as well. Of course he had a division in France and a Corp in Africa so I guess you could make a case for more resources. Clearly however the supply problem was much greater in Africa than it was in France.

 

IIRC,the supply figures for NA have already been posted .

 

From "War Statistics" : monthly axis supplies for NA .(in 1000 of tons delivered,NOT sent)

Caveat : different sources will give different figures .

The following ones are for the Axis = Italian army,navy,air force,German army,navy,air force,AND civilians and economy .

But, I am not sure if they included all supplies = if the supplies sent from Crete are included .

Whatever,here we go (the months are numbered)

1941

1: 49

2 : 79

3 : 92

4: 81

5 : 69

6 : 125

7 : 62

8 : 83

9 : 67

10 :73

11 : 29

12 : 39

Total :848


1942 :

66

58

47

150

86

32

91

51

77

46

97

66

Total : 867

1943 :

70

60

49

28

3

Total 210

 

Delivered to North Africa does not mean delivered to the fighting forces. In France Romel was never more than a couple hundred miles from his source of supply (Germany) and the logistical infrastructure between him and Germany was well developed. Futhermore due to the duration of the battle relativly few units of supply were consumed. The situation was significantly different in North Africa.

 

didn't Monty have overwhelming power in most areas, on defense, no less? Rommel was out of supplies for a long push? so Rommel didn't have much to fight with?

 

Montgomery's army was significantly more powerful and as you say vastly better supplied. Montgomery fought on defense at Alam Halfa, then took the offensive at El Alamein (technically Second Alamein).

However steve's comment that "the British kept playing his game until Monty" is still correct and cogent. In numerical or material terms, the British could have decisively beaten Rommel in either Operation Crusader or the battle of Gazala, but they failed to bring all their combat power to bear and allowed themselves to be defeated in detail - precisely the sort of mistakes Montgomery was determined to avoid. Monty also had the self-confidence - ego if you prefer - to come out from two years' service in England and tell Britain's most experienced field army that it needed extensive training, directed by him, before it was ready for a conclusive confrontation with Rommel. He was right; under his leadership 8th Army stopped making silly mistakes and "knocked Rommel for six".

 

--Rommel vastly outnumbered in everything, Brits on good defensive ground, so I don't think Monty had any choice playing the ''game''...Alamein sector not like the rest of NAfrica..Rommel out of gas/supplies unlike before....so, it was not like previous battles, and it wasn't Monty that set down the reason why....Alamein 2 was a bottleneck..no maneuver room for Rommel..Rommel starved of supplies<>Monty getting much supplies= no brainer

 

Speaking of N. Africa and Rommel's reputation: He tried by various means, both direct and indirect, to get his men out of Africa before it was too late. Because of Hitler's refusal to get them out, plus Rommel's experiences with overwhelming Allied air power, he was the first Field Marshal to realize the war was probably lost or certainly could be lost. He has been called "defeatist" because of this, but I would say that he was a "realist".

 

My 2p.

In 1970 I interviewed Auchinleck's sister for a school project. Her damning verdict about Neil Ritchie was that he was a careerist. by that she meant someone who was a little too obviously ntryuing to put his own personal career progress above his other duties. This was anathema to the sensibilities of the british civil and military services based on the creed that public officers get on with the jobs they have been given and put their duty to country, service, animals men and animals first.

Well Rommel' was a 100% careerist of the the kind familiar to observers of modern business dramas.

His self promotional memoirs of the First World War which were set as a text book for his students in the mountain warfare school in the 1930s a la gilderoy Lockhart in Harry Potter.

He was built up by the Nazi propaganda machine. But that was partly because he played the Nazi system well. As an infantyrman with a mountain warfare background he used his posiiton as commander of the Army Guard Regiment to talk his way into commanding a Panzer Division. His cosy re;lationship with the party and government meant that he had one of Goebbels' his spin doctors embedded as a supernumerary on his staff in France - hence lots of PR about the ghost division.

Some fairly sharp elbows in his relationship with his colleagues. One reason why his 7th division did better than the other in corps was because he commandeered the 5th Panzer Divisions bridging columns. There is a whiff of sacrificing others for and trashing their reputations in the Destern desert. His relationship with the Italians he was supposed to be supporting was abysmal, His careerist gamble may have cost Italy the lives of many soldiers and any chance of retaining Libya. He seems to have been a man who stepped on others to get to the top. He was not a team player. His interventions on the Atlantic wall were micromanegemnt of the most annoying sort, cutting across lots of chains of command

The Western Desert campaign was a case in point. The North African campaign was a side show. Pure logistics suggested that the German could never conquer Africa or the Middle east from Tripoili. The idea of a n invasion of Russia Via Persia was ludicrous. Only media hype and Rommels tactical success against an under performing British army made this even a dream. In German;military doctrine there could only be one schwehrpunckt. After June 1941 the point of main effort had to be the defeat of the Soviet Union. Anything else was a distraction. If there wass any possibility of German victory in 1942 the diversion of effort to the Mediterranean destroyed it. The effort to retain Tunisia after Op Torch meant that the aircraft and mechanised troops that might have saved the 6th Army in Stalingrad were instead wasted in Tunisia.

Tactically he was ought fought by Montgomery, who fought a battle which maximised his advantages and avoided giving Rommel the chance to take advantage of his weaknesses. At Alem Halfa and Medenine Montgomery fougth well organised and controlled defensive battles which did not give Rommel a chance to exploit the German superiority in low level mo ble warfare. At El Alamein and in Normandy Montgomery obtained and held the tactical initiative preventing Rommel from massing armour and launching a counter attack at a time and place of his own choosing. German accounts of Normandy are full of concepts for massed tank attacks which were pre-empted by some threat to capture Caen.

Then after his failure ion North Africa (having been too ill to take the blame for the defeat) and his gloomy pessimism over Italy he picks up a plum command in the West. His views conveniently coincide with those of Hitler over the conduct of the defence of France. Von Rundstedt has argued,that the channel Coast was indefensible, based on conventional wisdom backed by the cannon of military history. Rommel chose to buy into the idea that somehow the shore line can be made impenetrable. It wasn't and probably never could have been. However Rommel'e ear for the sound bite ensured that the German failures opmn the Longest day left his reputation intact.


if you want a serious hatchet job on Rommel try David irving's In the Trail of the Fox

 

Too me just sounds like you are heavily biased against Rommel to such an extent that even in situations he has no fault over you lay blame on him.

Yes he may have commandeered asset's from other units and while you may frown upon that in the heat of battle you cant be sitting around waiting for them to just be given to you or permission from command to arrive to little to late, In Blitzkrieg time is everything, Waste time asking and a** kissing and you risk giving away the initiative. So dont have to like it but he did what needed to be done and it payed off.

Yes Rommel wanted to reach the Suez Canal and quiet possibly even advance into the Middle East but I have never ever heard any statement that he wanted to invade Russia through the Middle East but rather in fact he just wanted to destroy the British threat there.

Yes Rommel treated the Italians badly and criticism of him in this aspect is rightly deserved.

You claim the NA campaign was a distraction, True but Rommel wasn't the one in charge, He was put there it was up to Hitler/Mussolini if they stayed there or not. You claim that the forces wasted there could have saved the 6th Army in Stalingrad, Im assuming you have worked out the logistics to transport 250,000+ men and all their tanks, vehicles, planes, artillery, spares, resources etc all the way there? It's one thing to say they could have been better used elsewhere but 1. You need to work out how to get them there and keep them supplied (Hard enough to supply what as already there) and 2. You need to look at who made the top decisions, Last I checked Rommel was not the highest ranking military leader of Germany or the Fuhrer. He got his orders the same as every one else, Yes he bent them but even Rommel was not so good as to be able to bend them and sneak a quarter million troops and their supplies on what would be a 4,000km+ trip.

You mention Normandy, Last I checked Rommel wanted the tanks placed right up along the beaches as he was of the belief (rightly so) that the only way to defeat the allies would be on the beaches. He was able to get panzer divisions moved closer but when the Normandy landings came around they were held back because Hitler refused to allow them to move freely. Hitler didnt allow freedom of movement and Rundstedt wanted them held right back near Paris, Rommel had learnt that with the Allied aerial superiority the Panzers wouldn't have a chance to make any meaningful attribution to the battle when moving over long distances (In fact a lot of German tanks were taken out by allied aircraft while on the move in Normandy), So trying to lay the failure at Normandy squarely on Rommel is just a poor attempt at attacking a man that you apparently just don't like. You say his interventions in the Atlantic wall were micromanagement f the most annoying sort? Funny seeing as he sped up the rate of construction and defenses installed actually reduced the times the Allies could land {Quote by Edward Ellsberg "Rommel had thoroughly muddled our plans. Attacking at high tide as we had intended, we'd never get enough troops in over those obstacles.."}, His involvement actually improved the situation.

Rommel can be criticized for a number of things but attacking him for fighting in North Africa (When ordered to do so), For improving the defenses of the Atlantic wall, For trying to stop the allies on the beach because he knew if they got a foot hold they would not be able to be beaten (By this time the German army was a shadow of its former self, They had limited aerial support and even less young highly trained troops) is just silly, You complain about his micromanagement, If you want to complain about that then look at Hitler, He stopped whole divisions from moving while the allies kept piling up more troops and tanks...