Senate vote, Pearl Harbor, FDR, Kimmel, Short & Marshall

Both, although the US Navy was doing a very poor job of it with their aircraft. The US Army airpower was responsible out to some 20 miles offshore, the US Navy was supposed to be covering out to 700 miles. Although Kimmel never informed Short that the US Navy wasn't doing its job. Kimmel never asked for US Army aircraft to help out, and Kimmel never asked for Short to keep the radar stations manned 24/7. While Tom Kimmel would have us believe that Washington was not giving Admiral Kimmel all the facts, he never once mentions all the information Kimmel was withholding from Short.

Yes, both Richardson and Kimmel considered using anti-torpedo netting. However, they both figured it would do more harm than good, considering the crowded harbor and how the netting hampered ship movement within.

Silly does not even begin to describe the Americans belief in their superiority. Think along the lines of inconcieveable or unfathomable.

I don't think it was studied in great detail. While the attack may have seemed impressive, The Med is a swimming hole compared to the Pacific. At the time the Americans did not know that the Japanese were capable of underway refueling, even still the Soryu, Hiryu, Tone, and Chikuma all carried many fuel oil barrels stashed any place extra space could be found to help improve their ranges. So, right there is one strike against the Japanese attacking. Another strike is American racism against the Japanese in that they thought Japan could never conceive of such a plan, let alone carry it out. A third strike is the American overestimation of their own defences, and that such a raid would surely be detected well before it got within striking range of the Hawaiian islands, and when detected American forces would surely destroy it. Oh, let's not for get the Japanese invasion force, that was under US and British observation, moving towards Malaya. This focused US attention there and not closer to home, this was the long held American belief was that the blow would fall on the Philippines, Guam, Wake, etc.

 

Mr. Kimmel,

Perhaps you have heard of the saying "People who live in glass houses should not throw stones."

For if you do believe Admiral Burke's statement

Then you are forced to admit that Admiral Kimmel is guilty and should accept responsibility for his decisions.

Have you read "Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement" by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee? I don't think so, for if you have, then you would know that Clausen proves, on pages 231-245, that Kimmel withheld 11 vital pieces of information from General Short.

To summarize:
1. Japanese carriers in the Marshall Islands - On Nov. 28, Adm. Bloch believed a strong Japanese concetration of carriers and submarines was in the Marshall Islands. Kimmel did not discuss this potential threat with Gen. Short.
2. Long-range reconnaissance - Kimmel never told Short that he had decided, on his own, not to conduct long-range reconnaissance flights.
3. Kimmel and the Winds Code - Kimmel never discusses the creation of the Winds Code with Short.
4. More Winds Code - Kimmel has the frequencies on which the Winds execute is to be broadcast, and again never mentions this to Short.
5. If war breaks out.. - Kimmel never sends a copy of his "Steps to Be Taken in Case of Japanese-American War Within the Next 24 Hours." to Short
6. Tokyo orders its diplomats to destroy their codes and code machines - Kimmel receives not one, but two messages about this. Yet, he never informs Short. Kimmel's reasoning for this was "I didn't consider that being of vital importance when I received it."
7. Washington orders Guam to destroy its codes - Kimmel never informs Short that Guam has been told to destroy all its secret and confidential publications and other classified material.
8. Tell your outlying commands to destroy their codes - Kimmel never tells Short that the outlying islands of his command have been ordered to destroy their secret and confidential documents.
9. Kimmel wants his fleet at sea - Kimmel never tells Short that he is worried about war breaking out and is considering sending the fleet out to sea.
10. The Navy attacks an enemy submarine - Short is never told by Kimmel or Bloch about the USS Ward firing on an enemy submarine.
11. Where are the Japanese carriers - Kimmel does not know the location of Japanese carriers and never informs Short that the Navy has "lost" the Japanese carriers.

These have all been proven in the Pearl Harbor investigations.

Now, Mr. Kimmel, would would you say is guilty of withholding information from whom?

 

Takao, I'm not disagreeing with you or critiquing your observations. I'm trying to make my point about why I believe that Adm. Kimmel should not be reconsidered for his Fourth Star. He was obviously a fine choice for another era. Not this one.
The Second World War was going to require talent for a new era. It required more integration between services than could be understood at the time. And it availed serious consequences. Better choices were available to direct the efforts during the war.

 

Don't worry nevarinemex,

As I stated they are from Henry C. Clausen, I was just summarizing, because I did not want to type several pages of text. His book explains them in greater detail than I did. Since your main points revolve around #1 & #2 I will answer those. Feel free to disagree or critique as necessary, this would not be much of a discussion board if we all agreed on everything.

1.

Not according to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN
The task fell upon both the Army and Navy to do their utmost to defend Hawaii. A Japanese raiding force in the Marianas was not just a Navy problem, specifically from the defense plan

So, it is both an Army and Navy issue, although what actually transpired was completely different than what was written out in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.


2.

Agreed. However, I don't know if outdated is the right term maybe stubborn, obstinate, inflexible, unyielding, etc. Kimmel and Stark were out playing golf when they should have been sitting down at the office discussing matters more important than who had the better lie on the fairway.

 

On number 1 I was inferring that specific tasks were still being delineated
into the realm of subordinates. Let Gen. Short and Adm Bloch argue it out
until they reach agreement? Better that Adm. Kimmel delegate it, "Damn
the preliminary steps, Clear decks for action." I'm not sure that he had that authority...and he was trying to be collegial about it.
I believe that it was worked out better later when it became PacCom, so to speak.

 

DF,
Here is what Marshall gave as a reason he did not make the phone call:
General Marshall testimony to the JCC
“Alerting the garrison could be construed as a hostile act."
3PHA237
And, yes, he got away with that.
Regards,
tk

 

I must say Mr. Kimmel, I find your review to be rather childish and self-serving. For instance, under the heading "The Proximate Cause for the Disaster at Pearl Harbor" you quote from page 300,

Yet, the FULL SENTENCE QUOTE (Note there is a comma, not a period after intelligence) is

Mr. Kimmel, selective quoting is for the tabloids, and will earn you no points in this arena. The fact that you left out the part of the sentence that is harmful to your case of absolving Admiral Kimmel of guilt shows how low you will stoop to achieve this goal. Shame on you Mr. Kimmel, I had expected better from you. Because, as we know, Admiral Kimmel was VERY GUILTY of withholding information. Earlier, I have pointed out the 11 instances of where Kimmel withheld information from Short, and I have noticed you have never contested those points, So, therefore you must admit that they are true.

You next write

Yet, on page 226-227, Clausen lists the findings of his report, these point clearly show that Short was aware of his responsibilities, adequately informed of the impending break in Japanese-American relations, and his failures to adequately prepare a defensive measures. Further you write

As I have already listed the failures of Kimmel to pass on intelligence to Short, thus Admiral Kimmel is part of the problem with military intelligence. I will move on to this sentence on page 244.

So here, we see that while military intelligence was not the dominate cause, but Kimmel's arrogance. Remove that, then Kimmel will be passing all information to Short, and not what Kimmel thought Short should receive. I reiterate, you also fail to grasp the fact that Kimmel was a major part of the failure of military intelligence, because he was withholding vital information from Short.

Since you talk of logic, Mr. Kimmel, that is why you have failed to get Admiral Kimmel restored to his temporary rank. Your argument fails the "sniff test," because it stinks, badly. You claim that information was withheld from Admiral Kimmel thus he should be absolved from guilt, yet the rest of us know that Kimmel was withholding information from Short, thus his guilt is confirmed.

Kimmel was part of the problem, not the solution.

 

OP,
Thank you again for your opinions on relevancy and reality.

Here is some more grist for you:
PRANGE, GOLDSTEIN, AT DAWN WE SLEPT, 1981
“The prime error. . .lay in keeping from the Hawaiian commanders the contents of the consular messages [i.e., the spy messages], especially the ‘bomb plot’ series. The fact that Washington did not evaluate this information at its real worth is inexcusable. No attempt to explain away or minimize these messages stands up before their content.”
p.735.

The Connaughton Report
In 1977--thirty-one years after the attack, Radio Intelligence Publication 87Z (RIP 87Z), "The Diplomatic Background to Pearl Harbor", also known as, "The Connaughton Report," dated September 1, 1942[1], was declassified. The Report highlighted, among many other things, the importance of the 147 ships-in-harbor spy reports of which 55 applied to Manila and 68 applied to Pearl Harbor--both locations were attacked. Eighteen ships-in-harbor reports applied to Panama and six applied to Seattle--both locations were not attacked. All of the 147 ships-in-harbor spy reports were available to the Army and the Navy Departments in Washington, and were available to Admiral Hart and to General MacArthur in the Philippines. None of the 147 ships-in-harbor spy reports was available to Admiral Kimmel or to General Short in Pearl Harbor. The 182 page "Connaughton Report" was a critical study by the Navy of the Navy's intelligence performance. It was not provided to Kimmel or to Short. It went to the heart of their defense.
[1] Pearl Harbor Liaison Office File, Box 21, Folders 1&2, Archives II, author's file 179.


The Uniqueness of Hawaii MAGIC
In 1941 Japanese spies in Hawaii communicated with their Japanese masters in Tokyo 68 times in messages intercepted by United States cryptographers.[1] During these exchanges Tokyo issued the following unique orders to its spies in Hawaii and no where else: 9/24/41: Tokyo ordered Hawaii spies to report ship movements in accordance with parameters specified in what would later be styled as the “Bomb-Plot Message;”[2]

11/15/41: Tokyo ordered Hawaii spies to report ship movements twice per week;[3]
11/29/41: Tokyo ordered Hawaii spies to report even when there was no ship movement;[4]
12/2/41: Tokyo ordered Hawaii spies to report on ships day-by-day; also to report on barrage balloons & mine nets use;[5]
12/6/41: Tokyo ordered Hawaii spies to report immediately movements of the fleet subsequent to the 4th.[6]
On the basis of the preceding orders from Tokyo and without any knowledge from the PURPLE MAGIC code,[7] as the Japanese in Hawaii did not have access to a PURPLE MAGIC machine, Japanese spies, apparently, figured out the plan for themselves as indicated in two spy reports back to Tokyo on December 6th as follows,
I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places . . . Pearl Harbor, Hickham, Ford, and Ewa . . . . In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets . . . . It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.[8]

[1] See the Navy’s RIP 87Z, dated 1 Sept 1942, “Prelude to Pearl Harbor,” aka., “The Connaughton Report,” p.166, declassified in 1977. “Diplomatic Background to Pearl Harbor,” Special Research History (SRH) 012, Record Group 457, National Archives Washington (NAW). John Costello, Days of Infamy, 1994, p.183.

[2] 12PHA261.

[3] 12PHA262.

[4] 12PHA263.

[5] 12PHA266.

[6] 12PHA269.

[7] MAGIC was a codeword for the secret American decoding of Japanese diplomatic and spy communications prior to the Pearl Harbor attack which gave indications of the time, place, reason and deceit plan to cover the attack. Kimmel and Short did not receive the vital MAGIC intelligence, PURPLE, or otherwise. PURPLE MAGIC was a species of the generic term MAGIC, which required a specialized machine to encode and decode. The Japanese in Hawaii did not have a PURPLE machine, accordingly, had to use other MAGIC codes, such as J-19, and PA-K2, but all of the codes were referred to generically as MAGIC by many to include Admiral Edwin T. Layton, and Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey—see Admiral Edwin Layton, And I Was There, Morrow, 1985, p. 81; and Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey’s foreword to Admiral Robert A. Theobald, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, Devin-Adair, 1954, pp vii, viii.

[8] 12PHA269-70. Honolulu to Tokyo # 253 and # 254.

Regards,
tk

 

OP,
Thank you for your question.

NO LAWYER can claim that he undertook the defense of Admiral Kimmel. Counsel merely furnished the legal auxiliaries in the Admiral's unremitting quest that history record the truth about Pearl Harbor. When one compares the copious data now available with respect to that historic occurrence, with the sparse and garbled information in the public domain in the years immediately following the attack, one must conclude that Admiral Kimmel's determined effort to preserve for posterity as much of the evidence as could be unearthed has been productive.

There is a story within the Pearl Harbor story. That is the account of the Admiral's struggle to discover and to preserve the facts. It must be remembered that Admiral Kimmel was never formally charged with dereliction of duty or errors of judgment by any instrumentality or agency of his government under circumstances which afforded him the opportunity of defending his name. The technique adopted was to relegate him to the category of forgotten men with the criticisms of the Robert's Commission hanging over him like a vague indictment whose allegations were never to meet the test of trial.

In the days immediately following the attack the public was led to believe that court martial proceedings were ultimately to be commenced. However, the wartime emergency and public absorption with the crucial tides of battle were advanced as continuing pretexts for not instituting them. Thus matters stood as of December 7, 1943, two years after the attack.

Admiral Kimmel therefore sought the advice of counsel in order to prevent the possibility, then verging on a probability, that he would be permanently deprived of an opportunity to record those facts about Pearl Harbor which were within his knowledge and to have recorded for history all other facts which diligent inquiry might reveal. He was anxious to do everything within his power to insure that the Statute of Limitations applicable to such cases was extended so that its barrier could not be invoked as a pretext tor permanent official inaction in his case. His personal waiver of this defense, cheerfully given, might not cure a jurisdictional defect. Legislation was probably a necessity.

In extending the Statute of Limitations in 1944 Congress added in substance a directive to the Secretaries of War and Navy to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. This was embodied in the legislation with Admiral Kimmel's enthusiastic approval. Indeed the thought originated with him.

The Naval Court of Inquiry which convened in the summer of 1944 as a result of this Congressional directive was the only tribunal of all those investigating Pearl Harbor at whose proceedings the Admiral was permitted the traditional right to have counsel, to introduce testimony, to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The proper scope of an introductory note such as this permits only a sketch of the dramatic developments in the proceedings of the Naval Court. It was there that the Admiral and his counsel first secured authorization for access to the Japanese intercepted messages withheld from the Fleet. One can still recall the shock, amounting almost to physical revulsion, at one's first appreciation of the magnitude of useful intelligence withheld from Admiral Kimmel and General Short. One can still vividly remember the long frustrating days of the hearings when a directive from higher authority prevented the Admirals who were members of the Naval Court from having introduced in evidence before them these vital documents, and the expressions of horrified amazement which came over their countenances when they were finally permitted to read the intercepted messages. It was also during the days of this hearing that Admiral Kimmel received word of the death of his eldest son, a naval officer, in action in the far reaches of the Pacific. Those of us who were with him when this news came wondered whether so tragic a blow would crush his spirit. He carried on.

The findings of the Naval Court constituted a complete vindication of the Admiral and its records preserved for history evidence of lasting importance as to the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor tragedy. Certain of the developments subsequent to the Naval Court hearing were revolting to fair play, substantial justice and human decency. Ex parte secret inquiries were instituted by both services. From the subsequent naval proceedings Admiral Kimmel and his counsel were excluded despite repeated requests that they be allowed to participate.

The Admiral was denied access to the findings of the Naval Court clearing his name. When a part of those findings were finally released for publication along with those of the Army Board, there were so many additional endorsements by "higherauthority" that it was with difficulty one could ascertain what facts had been found and by whom. This unsatisfactory condition in turn led to the Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor where more significant documents and testimony were left as a fruitful legacy for the research of the future historian.

Had Admiral Kimmel accepted passively the assignment of the Pearl Harbor disaster to an obscure footnote in American history, and permitted the early "official" version to go unchallenged, the facts which he now records would probably never have been available to the American people. His unswerving fortitude and determination produced dramatic and startling revelations. It was the privilege of a lifetime to serve an honest and courageous man striving against what seemed overwhelming odds to emerge from the shadows of undeserved humiliation into the light of historic truth.

CHARLES B. RUGG
EDWARD B. HANIFY

November, 1954

Regards,
tk

 

OP,
Thank you for your opinions on golf and church and readiness.

Professor Michael Gannon: On Admiral Kimmel's
state of military readiness : ​

“For sixty-plus years writers of the Pearl Harbor story have promoted the charge that the Fleet in harbor on December 7th was not in a state of readiness. One recent writer, in the pay of the Navy Department, stated that Kimmel's navy, with many if not most of its enlisted personnel on liberty, was in a "peacetime mode." Another, a Pentagon legal officer, recently stated that Kimmel's navy was in a "peacetime in Hawaii mentality" with "sailors on liberty."

“That is the official line as the Department of Defense continues to deflect any responsibility for the success of the Japanese attack and to maintain Kimmel as a responsible agent. It is a policy sometimes aided by individual historians, such as Gordon W. Prange, the title of whose best-known book, At Dawn We Slept (1981) reflects the widely spawned belief that as the Japanese air fleet bore down on Pearl, Kimmel's crews were mostly ashore or asleep in their bunks. At a symposium on Admiral Kimmel held in this city on December 7, 1999 another historian asserted that no more than 600 of a normal complement of 1400 to 1500 sailors were on board each battleship that fateful morning. That claim, of course, is hard to square with the fact that 1,177 men died on the Arizona, and 357, including the wounded, survived.

“The lesson here is that nothing substitutes for examination of the original documents. If we go to the archives we find that on the battleships five out of eight commanding officers were on board, and that 95% of enlisted personnel were mustered on station. These numbers have not been reported before.

“Comparatively few men were on liberty. And at 0755, attack time on the 7th, and ten minutes after the forenoon watch relieved the morning watch, ship's complements were not asleep, as Prange would have us believe. Their ships were beehives of activity, white-uniformed officers and sailors seen everywhere about their decks and tops, performing their watch-keeping, gunnery, engineering, cleaning and polishing duties. Bands and guards were assembling for morning colors. The morning watch was below chowing down.

“As for the Navy being in a "peacetime mode:" Following the war warning of October 16, 1941 Admiral Kimmel put the Battle Force on 12-hour sailing notice; delayed the sailing of West Virginia to Puget Sound for overhaul; dispatched two submarines to Wake Island; dispatched additional Marines to Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra Islands; dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway; and placed six submarines on short notice for departure to Japanese home waters. That was over a month before alerts were declared by Navy commanders in the Philippines, Alaska, Panama, or the Caribbean.

“Following the November 27th war warning, Kimmel issued orders to the fleet to "exercise extreme vigilance" against submarines in the operating areas and to depth charge all contacts. He gave that attack order in direct violation of a restraining order from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark, dated September 23rd. It was thanks to Kimmel's counter order that USS Ward and PBY14 P1 were able to make their joint attack on the midget submarine outside the entrance channel at 0645 on December 7th.

“Kimmel also dispatched two task forces "under complete war conditions." They were TF8 with the carrier Enterprise under Vice Admiral William F. Halsey to deliver Marine F4F fighters to Wake, and TF12, built around Lexington, under Rear Admiral John H. Newton, to deliver Marine scout bombers to Midway. Both forces were to observe radio silence: to arm all torpedoes and bombs; to sink any submarine sighted or otherwise detected; and to shoot down any aircraft not identified as American. Furthermore, the carrier aircraft were to conduct en route morning and afternoon air searches out to 300 miles from their positions for any sign of hostile ships. Thus, Kimmel did in fact have distant air reconnaissance in the western and northwestern sectors, and to a greater distance than could have been achieved by patrol planes based on Oahu. Add to that the patrol plane searches that Kimmel ordered from Midway to Wake, from Johnston to Midway, and from Midway to Pearl and you have air coverage over some 2-million square miles of ocean.

“At Oahu itself, three PBYs flew armed dawn patrols over the approaches south of Pearl. At Oahu, too, Kimmel established an offshore patrol of the island perimeter by ship; activated the harbor patrol post; deployed sonobuoys to detect submarines; instituted regular sweeping of channels; and updated daily a memorandum entitled "Steps to Be Taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours."

“Today's historian might well ask, does all that sound like a Navy in "peacetime mode?" or, in a ‘peacetime in Hawaii mentality?’

“Does all that sound like a commander-in-chief who was "derelict in his duty?" The terms Kimmel and dereliction, this historian submits, were antithetical.

“While the primary responsibility for anti-aircraft protection of the naval station and the Fleet was the army's, not the navy's, and while Kimmel thought that a submarine attack was more likely than an air attack, he ordered that all ships must have a sufficient number of officers and men trained for the job in each watch to man all anti-aircraft batteries. Ships were to be moored by sectors in such a way as to provide each a clear arc of fire. And there had to be on board at all times, day and night, a sufficient number of officers and men to repel enemy aircraft, to get the ships underway, to go to sea, and to fight the ship. On the morning of December 7th Admiral Kimmel's navy met all those numbers, and more so.

“Each battleship had two machine guns continuously manned day and night, with two cases of .50-caliber ammunition, and crews standing by two 5-inch AA guns with fifteen rounds of ammunition for each. Kimmel had ignored Navy Regulations and made the critical decision to have "ammo at the guns." The result was that gun action on battleships engaged the enemy within four minutes and Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi, commander of the attacking Japanese force, wrote in his after-action report that ‘the enemy's antiaircraft fire reaction had been so prompt as virtually to nullify the advantage of surprise.’

“As we know, on the 16th of December, Admiral Kimmel was relieved of his command and replaced by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. What was interesting to me about that change of command was my recent discovery in the Kimmel papers at the University of Wyoming of a communication from Nimitz at Pearl to the new Commander-in-Chief United States Navy Admiral Ernest J. King at Washington, dated January 7, 1942, in which Nimitz stated his conviction that the Japanese carriers would return for a second strike, perhaps more. "The attack of 7 December will be followed by others," he wrote King. What was even more interesting was that, in the face of such immediate expectations, Nimitz maintained the same state of readiness that Kimmel had in place on December 7th. Indeed, Nimitz re-issued without change Kimmel's Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter on port security, No. 2CL-41, entitled "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas," dated October 14, 1941.

“The 2CL-41 letter with Kimmel's name on it was re-issued by Nimitz without change as to watches and conditions of readiness, and it remained in force throughout 1942. I mention this because the critic who would skewer Kimmel on his state of readiness must be prepared to take on Admiral Nimitz as well.”

See website: http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com for much more.
Regards,
Tom Kimmel

 

My impression is that Short was a team player out of his league at Hawaii, but not necessarily incompetent by the standards of the US Army at the time. Kimmel was a more complex and highly political character prone to political games.

The withholding of information has little to do with the question of whether Kimmel was incompetent. A district commander such as at Luzon, Hawaii, Alaska or Panama, had to take into account the possibility of attack with no intelligence warning. Kimmel failed to do so, despite having ample means at his disposal to protect his command.
Whether Kimmel should have been cashiered from the Navy on account of an enemy surprise attack is another question. The circumstances by which his command failed were exceptional.

Maybe. Tough to say. Kimmel was an aggressive admiral who might have in the end proven pretty darn good at taking it to the Japanese. He certainly was better equipped than the softer Nimitz to tell MacArthur and King where things were at.
.

 

Destroyers patrolled near the mouth of the harbour itself but there were no standing patrols elsewhere around Oahu until after the attack. Given the paucity of defensive measures, it was theoretically even possible for Japanese battleships to have reached gun range of Pearl Harbour without prior detection. Kimmel's defensive measures were that bad.

The USAAF went through the exceptional trouble of deploying 150 fighters to Oahu because they thought Japanese carrier attack impossible?
And what exactly was a brand new radar station doing on the northernmost tip of Oahu? In looking at a map I see no Japanese air bases north of Oahu, unless these bases were aircraft carriers.

There is the question of the likelihood of an attack and the expected losses to an attack. Sabotage might have been more probable, but the losses would be negligible. OTOH, air attack might be less likely but the losses could potentially be devastating.
Short's job was to weigh the potential damage from each form and plan accordingly.

Halsey maintained his TF at a high level of alert during his voyage to and from Johnston just before the war. It would be intellectually dishonest to suggest he engaged in ‘hindsight’ when his behaviour at the time with the forces under his command suggests the opposite.

 

I don't think that you are correct here. While the istructions might be the same the readiness of both the fleet and the defences of Hawaii were clearly much higher post 7 Dec than before.