Welcome to the WWII Forums! Log in or Sign up to interact with the community.

Senate vote, Pearl Harbor, FDR, Kimmel, Short & Marshall

Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by DogFather, Jun 11, 2010.

  1. R Leonard

    R Leonard Member

    Joined:
    Oct 15, 2003
    Messages:
    1,128
    Likes Received:
    780
    Location:
    The Old Dominion
    Basics in US government –

    Constitution of the United States of America –
    “Article II, Section 2, The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; . . .”

    This means that the President exercises control. It does not mean that the President is required to follow the advice of his military commanders. It means that a military commander is required to obey the orders of the President – bearing in mind that nowadays we tend to insert the word “lawful” between “the . . .” and “. . . orders”. If a military commander disagrees with a decision of the President, then he has some choices:

    A. present his advice in opposition to the President’s course, or
    B. not say anything at all

    Regardless of choosing A or B the commander has more choices with varying outcomes, among which are:

    1. Resign in protest

    1. a. resign quietly

    1.b. resign and go public
    1.b.(1.) Executive department simply refers to the former commander as “disgruntled former officer” and is under no obligation to respond.
    1.b.(2.) New commander follows orders without complaint/obstruction

    2. Follow his orders

    2.a. Follows his orders and executes same to best of his ability

    2.b Within channels complain/obstruct the following of his orders
    2.b.(1.) President “sees the light”
    2.b.(1.)(a) Commander has his way
    2.b.(2.) Removed from command
    2.b.(2.)(a) New commander follows orders without complaint/obstruction
    2.b.(2.)(b) Old commander usually retires (it is not a wise career move to challenge the President, win or lose)

    2.c. Goes public with complaints
    2.c.1. Removed from command
    2.c.(1.)(a) New commander follows orders without complaint/obstruction
    2.c.(1.)(b) Old commander retires (one of those “you will be relieved on X date by [new commander], no new assignment for you is under consideration” letters).

    A point that your distaste for FDR seems to be obscuring is that commanders of the Army and Navy work for the President and what the President says goes. The President is under no obligation whatsoever to accept the advice of his commanders, nor is he required to explain himself to them. A casual reading of US history has the Army or the Navy rushing here and there about the world on the orders of the President. They, the Army and the Navy, cannot even make such moves in the absence of instructions to do so by executive command authority. We call this “Civilian Control” and it is a fundamental cornerstone of our constitutional system.

    Another casual reading of US history will show what happens to commanders who defy executive authority . . . these have been pointed out to you before: MacArthur (1951) and Denfield (1949). Let me add the perhaps more recently, in 1990, for example, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Dugan was removed and forced to resign simply because the President thought he spoke out of turn and in words the President thought unacceptable. And just a couple of years ago, 2008, both the SecAF and the AFCoS resigned over handling of nuclear weapons issues. When the President says “Go” you go, either to perform the mission or out to pasture.

    If you think FDR was required to have bowed to the operational complaints of Richardson regardless of what he, the President, believed, right or wrong, to be in the nation’s strategic imperative then you are sadly mistaken. If Richardson, or any other writer, believed that Richardson should have had the final say, then he is, and they are, equally mistaken and, by demonstration of their writing, constitutionally challenged. To stretch FDR’s strategic decisions in conflict with one of his commanders as some sort of conspiracy is not just silly, it is plain stupid.
     
    brndirt1 likes this.
  2. lwd

    lwd Ace

    Joined:
    Jul 24, 2007
    Messages:
    12,322
    Likes Received:
    1,245
    Location:
    Michigan
    The evidence rather indicates you are wrong. If he didn't listen to him why did he fire him? Sounds to me like he listened and decided the problems either weren't as bad as Richarson thought or that strategic issues were more important. At that point Richarson should have either accepted it and moved on or resigned. If he continued bellyacheing then firing was the correct response.
    Source PLS.
    Housing can be and was built. This is a short term issue. Hardly one to be decisive in grand term strategic issues.
    Again short term issue. Dealt with in any case.
    [/quote]
    Richardson was also concerned by ease of attack, by a carrier force.
    At least one other poster has posted just the opposite. Source PLS.
    This one looks like it could be mostly addressed by reasonable security procedures.

    In short you have listed nothing that outways the the strategic issues.
     
  3. lwd

    lwd Ace

    Joined:
    Jul 24, 2007
    Messages:
    12,322
    Likes Received:
    1,245
    Location:
    Michigan
    Things like Magic are kept under pretty tight hold. Look at Enigma and Coventry for example. In any case Japanese agents reporting precise location of ships is hardly unexpected and consistent with Shorts speculations about sabotage as well.
    NO.
    Well given how much I value your opinion I'll need to work overtime to break even.
     
  4. DogFather

    DogFather Member

    Joined:
    Dec 18, 2008
    Messages:
    224
    Likes Received:
    5
    Richardson was right wasn't he? Or are all of you going deny this too?

    I suggest you all think a little. They way you all back each other, seems
    like an example of what is called Group Think. Ignoring the bigger picture
    while focusing on very small details, that aren't really relevant.

    I'm also tried of the "what's your source" question. Look up a source
    that says different, then pass that along.

    Some of my conclusions have come from common sense and a varied life,
    in which I have worked for a goverment entity and in private enterprize.

    Like that others would be hesitant to say anything about problems with
    the fleet being at Pearl Harbor, for fear of being fired.

    FDR did have the right to send the fleet to Pearl. But history has the right
    to an assessment, of his judgement in this decesion.
     
  5. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    Richardson was right that Pearl Harbor was a difficult place to keep the fleet. He wasn't right that it was the wrong place to keep the fleet. That wasn't his decision.
     
  6. lwd

    lwd Ace

    Joined:
    Jul 24, 2007
    Messages:
    12,322
    Likes Received:
    1,245
    Location:
    Michigan
    I suggest you follow your own advice althouth it might not do any good.
    That's one explanation. On the otherhand if you look around the board much you'll find that there are significant disagreements between some of the individuals here. A simpler and more likely correct explanation is that you are so far off base you are not even in the ball park and we recognise that.
    Pott calling kettle.
    Not the way it works here. You are the proponet of an idea it's up to you to back it with fact and logic. Your inability to do so rather implies your idea is less than valid.
    Not that I can see.
    Not really. If they were sure that it would have been that hard they could have backed him before the decision was made. After it was made they could have simply been saluting and carrying forward like they are suppose to. Of course that presupposes that they even had those reservations which you haven't supported either.
    And based on the info he had at the time it seems to me that he made the right decision. Even looking at it with 20:20 hind sight it's hard to critisize that decision with any validity.
     
    ULITHI and brndirt1 like this.
  7. DogFather

    DogFather Member

    Joined:
    Dec 18, 2008
    Messages:
    224
    Likes Received:
    5
    The name calling is also suggestive of Group Think.....CT. I have never
    suggested foreknowledge on the part of FDR, or anyone else. As to the
    exact date and time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

    People resort to name calling, when they don't have any real way to
    discredit someone. This has been happening, big time on this forum.
     
  8. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    DF, if you post stone cold conspiracy theory, people are going to make the natural assumption. We've heard all this stuff before. And as you're just doing copy pasta we really don't have anything of your own to work with, just what you're posting that other people said.
     
  9. freebird

    freebird Member

    Joined:
    Nov 27, 2007
    Messages:
    690
    Likes Received:
    55
    Exactly! It was a political decision, made to show that the US wasn't going to back down, and was ready to engage the Japanese. Withdrawing the fleet to the US mainland would send the wrong message, regardless if it was safer or more comfortable or whatever.

    Remember that the US was leaning heavily on it's Allies to support a strong stand on the embargo, if they saw the US withdrawing it's fleet to saftey they might decline to uphold the embargo.

    Without British & Dutch support the embargo strategy fails
     
  10. DogFather

    DogFather Member

    Joined:
    Dec 18, 2008
    Messages:
    224
    Likes Received:
    5
    I agree it was a political decision, and a very costly political decision.
    This is my point. This decision really hurt the US during the early part
    of the Pacific War, and was part of the reason, we also lost Wake
    Island and other bases in the Pacific. We then had to re-take those
    bases, which created a lot casualties. FDR made a political decision
    and ignored the military problems that went along with it.

    I would think the Two-Ocean Navy Act, which was going to build all
    the stuff below, would suggest a lot of political backbone, on the part
    of the US. It was certainly a lot of naval assets, I would have been very
    concerned about it if were the Japs.

    ( 2 ocean Navy, aka Vinson-Walsh Act of 1940)
    18 aircraft carriers, 15,000 aircraft, 115 destroyers, 27 cruisers, 43 subs,
    2 Iowa class battleships, plus all the needed support ships.

    I'm sorry, but I think if FDR had listen to his commanders and just played
    defense, until all this stuff was ready, we would have had a shorter
    and less costly Pacific War.
     
  11. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    Armchair strategizing is amusement, nothing more.
     
  12. lwd

    lwd Ace

    Joined:
    Jul 24, 2007
    Messages:
    12,322
    Likes Received:
    1,245
    Location:
    Michigan
    I disagree. The decision was a good one. Without the base at Pearl we would have lost the Pacific bases anyway and probably faster and it would have taken longer to retake them. Basing a PH was a good idea. Not anticipating the Japanese attack was the costly mistake but an understandable one.
     
  13. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    True! Pearl cut thousands of miles out of the round-trip for the subs, and provided an intermediate base for repair of ships and hospital facilities for wounded GIs. That last was worth whatever we put into the place.
     
  14. DogFather

    DogFather Member

    Joined:
    Dec 18, 2008
    Messages:
    224
    Likes Received:
    5
    I don't follow your line of reasoning here. Adm Richardson did not suggest
    not having a "base at Pearl", just not basing the our battle fleet at Pearl.
    Instead keeping the fleet back on the US West Coast, where it would be
    much harder to attack.

    That's a big difference. Richardson also requested more AAA, to better
    defend the island base. Richardson had many concerns about the PH base,
    all of them were legitiment.
     
  15. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    And be less useful to national policy. You keep missing that part.
    Yeah, everybody wanted more of everything. MacArthur was first in the Pacific, as he was on the front lines. Rear eschelon bases came after the guys in the bull's eye.
     
  16. DogFather

    DogFather Member

    Joined:
    Dec 18, 2008
    Messages:
    224
    Likes Received:
    5
    In his 1955 book, Admiral Kimmel's Story, Husband Kimmel summed up his view of the situation:
    The deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a fleet base were well known in the Navy Department. In an interview with Mr. Roosevelt in June 1941, in Washington, I outlined the weaknesses and concluded with the remark that the only answer was to have the fleet at sea if the Japs ever attacked.
    I accepted the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor in the firm belief that the Navy Department would supply me promptly with all pertinent information available and in particular with all information that indicated an attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor.
    ... The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages ["Magic"] was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation.
    ... Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the intercepted Japanese messages was withheld from me. This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

    I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted messages showing that the Japanese government had divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and was seeking minute berthing information as to the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas, which was vitally significant.

    Here is my source: Scapegoats -- A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor (review)
     
  17. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    Kimmel got more than enough information to do what was needed if he'd been interested in doing it.

    The MAGIC line is a dead end, DF. However, if you wish to discuss the matter intelligently, I'm glad to help you get started:

    The "Magic" Background To Pearl Harbor
     
  18. lwd

    lwd Ace

    Joined:
    Jul 24, 2007
    Messages:
    12,322
    Likes Received:
    1,245
    Location:
    Michigan
    It's a chicken and egg sort of thing. Hard to get more of everything if there is little based there. Sending the battle fleet there pretty much required updating a lot of things and certainly uped their priority. Looks to me like Richardson was too mired in the details and couldn't see the bigger picture.
     
  19. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    That Kimmel did not receive all information is irrelevant to the matter. What is relevant is what information he did receive and what he did with it.

    1. Kimmel did know that a sizable Japanese carrier and submarine force was in the Marianas. As is evidenced by a memo sent, on November 26, 1941, by Admiral Bloch to Admiral Stark.

    2. The "War Warning" of November, 27, 1941.

    3. Kimmel knew and failed to inform Gen. Short that the Navy would not be flying long range reconnaissance planes. Had he conferred with General Short the Army, the Army radar stations could have been put to better use.

    4. Kimmel received two dispatches concerning the "Winds Code." These were also not discussed with General Short.

    5. The creation, on November 30, 1941, of a daily memo called "Steps to be taken in case of Japanese-American war within the next 24 hours."

    6. Kimmel received two messages that the Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. The both arrived on December 3, 1941. While the destruction of codes is routine, the destruction of code machines is not. This is probably Kimmel's greatest failure, in that he did not pass this information to General Short. Kimmel's reasoning for this was that he
    did not consider the to be of vital importance.

    7. Kimmel knew that Guam had be ordered to destroy its codes because the Navy Department informed him of such on December 4, 1941.

    8. On December 6, 1941, CNO Admiral Stark cabled Kimmel to have his outlying islands to destroy their codes. Whether Kimmel received this message before or after the attack he could not remember, however, Radio Honolulu logged the message as coming in at 5:54 pm December 6.

    9. Kimmel was worried enough to consider sending the fleet to sea on December 6, 1941, as a precaution. However, he again never informed Short of his worries or intentions.

    DogFather, I would suggest reading through a copy of Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement" by Henry C. Claussen and Bruce Lee.
    or head on over to archive.org and read through the United States. Congress. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack transcripts.
     
  20. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

    Joined:
    Jun 5, 2008
    Messages:
    18,245
    Likes Received:
    5,669
    PDF copies of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings before Congress
     
    Takao likes this.

Share This Page