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Senate vote, Pearl Harbor, FDR, Kimmel, Short & Marshall

Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by DogFather, Jun 11, 2010.

  1. R Leonard

    R Leonard Member

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    You are over-reaching again. The “Bomb Plot” message - which, incidentally, does not contain the any of the words “bomb,” nor “plot” (as in plotting a location on a map, not in as a conspiracy), nor “attack,” nor “December,” see below - was intercepted, decrypted, and translated in late September, early October 1941. Presuming that Kimmel had been given this message, just what do you suggest was in it to cause him to put the Pearl Harbor defenses and the Pacific Fleet in high gear in DECEMBER?

    "Strictly secret.
    Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:
    1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
    Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
    Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
    Area C. East Loch.
    Area D. Middle Loch.
    Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
    2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)”

    I would suspect that there were not just a few denizens of OP-20 who would have been willing to part with significant portions of their anatomy for the same information on IJN vessels parked in the Kure harbor and surrounding roads. While it is interesting that the Japanese were interested IN SEPTEMBER as to what ships were where in Pearl Harbor, which ones were at anchor and which were tied up (and if you are clever you would realize that particular phrase is really the most revealing in the entire message; if I have to explain it, you wouldn’t get it anyway) to buoys or in dock.

    Nevertheless, explain to me just what in an October message, had Kimmel had it, would cause him to have the whole place on alert in December? What could have been in this message which would have had more impact that a message sent him on 27 November, TEN days before the actual attack that begins “This is a war warning . . ."?
     
  2. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    So my source is wrong, Marshall didn't have the option of a phone call?
     
  3. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    This has been answered already.
     
  4. R Leonard

    R Leonard Member

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    "Nov. 10, 1951: Mayor M. Leslie Downing of Englewood, N.J., picked up a telephone and dialed 10 digits. Eighteen seconds later, he reached Mayor Frank Osborne in Alameda, Calif. The mayors made history as they chatted in the first customer-dialed long-distance call, one that introduced area codes."
    http://www.corp.att.com/attlabs/reputation/timeline/51trans.html

    "Manufactured by Submarine Cables Ltd. (2030 nm) and Simplex Wire & Cable Co. (2380 nm), the 1957 telephone cable from California to Hawaii was commissioned by AT&T and the Hawaiian Telephone Co., and was laid by CS Monarch (4) and CS Ocean Layer.
    Monarch commenced laying the cable from Point Arena (San Francisco) on 11 July 1957, and after laying 1900 miles met in mid-ocean with Ocean Layer, which put down the remaining 665 miles of cable into Hanauma Bay on Oahu. The first message through the cable was sent on 3 August 1957, and the ships then laid the eastbound cable, completing the installation in the Autumn of 1957.
    This type of repeatered coaxial cable had been developed in the late 1940s by Bell Labs and Simplex, and was first used commercially for the 1950 Key West - Havana cable. This was a trial run for the design, which was so successful that it was used in 1956 for TAT-1 (the first transatlantic telephone cable), for the 1956 USA to Alaska telephone cable, and in 1957 for HAW-1.
    As the repeaters worked in only one direction, two cables were needed for each route. The cable provided the first direct operator dialing between Hawaii and the mainland, and remained in service until 1989."
    http://www.atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1957HAW1/
     
  5. brndirt1

    brndirt1 Saddle Tramp

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    Yes they had the "right" to do so, but since it was such a vague intercept from the diplomatic codes, that somebody in the chain of command thought that using the "urgent" or "priority" classification would or could cause un-needed panic. And then, one must add in that if you are going to send something "urgent" or "priority", it doesn't make any sense to send it in the "clear", so that would mean encoding and decoding, another time consumer. Remember the problem with the USS Ward? They were just outside the harbor itself, and yet the encoding and decoding put its nebulous sub "sinking" message behind the first of the bombs dropping inside the harbor.

    Then it was standard practice (I believe) to send the same message a number of times to make sure that it was fully understood (if it was encoded) and received and decoded correctly. This wasn't going to be a rapid process in a "non-war" time frame.
     
  6. brndirt1

    brndirt1 Saddle Tramp

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    Nope, he didn't. Your source is full of "you know what"!
     
  7. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    DogFather,

    Do you see the irony of Kimmel complaining that he did not get all the information from Washington, when in turn, he was withholding information from General Short?


    As for the review of "Scapegoats", since this is a review of the book, and not the actual book, it is hard to judge. But, some things I have noticed.

    First off
    AFAIK, no investigation found them guilty of dereliction of duty, they were charged with it, but, IIRC were never found guilty of the charge. Second, their ranks, as has been stated before were temporary.

    A goat is blameless for the sins of the people. However, Kimmel and Short were not blameless for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. They were them men on the spot and share the blame of Pearl Harbor with others. So, in no way, shape, or form, can they be considered scapegoats.

    Where, when, and by whom were Kimmel and Short informed that the likely direction of attack was from the North, I don't recall reading that?

    It has never been conclusively proven that "Higashi no kaze ami" was actually sent. The Japanese have never admitted to sending it, and most other information on who heard or saw the message has been hearsay. Only two people, that I know of, have claimed to have heard it; Ralph T. Briggs, and Sanematsu Yuzuru.

    Again, this has never been proved. There was plenty of evidence that an attack was coming, most certainly against Malaya, but nothing has ever surfaced that has named a specific target.

    As for Captain Stafford's testimony
    He never names Pearl Harbor as the intended target! Of course Washington knew, that was the reason for all the war warnings, telling Guam to burn their codes, etc. It does nothing to help exonerate Admiral Kimmel. It only serves as a sensationalist tactic to help sell books.



    Well, that is enough for now, I'll continue tomorrow... ​
     
  8. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Thanks OpanaPointer!

    Your site is a lot easier to navigate through than archive.org

    Bookmarked and downloading the ones I have missed.
     
  9. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    I can state positively that the Winds activation message was not sent. Why? Because the conditions that would have initiated the Winds system were not extant. To be activated the Japanese had to think that the normal lines of communication between their embassies and the Gaimudaijin were about to be cut prior to actual start of hostilities. Then, and only then, would the Winds activation message be inserted into the weather reports. Japan had normal communications with all her embassies up to time the reports of the attacks reached the countries concerned.

    Safford's obsession regarding the Winds activation message stems from the fact that message 7001 was not in the files. He was sure he'd heard about the activation message being sent. He couldn't find it in the files. Message 7001 was missing. Therefore 7001 was the one that recorded the activation message. As nobody else had heard it he was rather alone in this idea. Single sourcing strikes again.
     
  10. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Ed Beach and other historians believe that at a secret, late-night White House meeting on the evening before the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt was informed of the most recently intercepted Japanese communication. A Navy officer who was present later testified that upon reading it, Roosevelt exclaimed "This means war!" Beach contends that it was fear of exposing "Magic" that explains Roosevelt's failure to immediately alert Kimmel, Short and other appropriate officials, and even to deny that this late-night White House meeting ever took place.

    So, did this meeting take place or not. Is FDR's "This mean war!" statement correct & made prior to the Pearl Harbor attack? I'm asking
    because, if correct, shouldn't all overseas commanders been informed
    ASAP, so it seems to me. Was there an attempt to deny the meeting took place? Y'now part of the Pearl Harbor disaster cover-up.
     
  11. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Your question has been answered already. Maybe you should get a new one?
     
  12. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Yes I do and this is a good point, that you have made. But had Kimmel
    been given more info, this may well have changed his thinking. He may
    have seen more urgency, because he would have realized PH was a target
    for the Japs.

    Also, I read somewhere, that the British RN had gotten torps to work in as little as 24 feet of water. This info was shared with the USN, but never
    got to Kimmel. This might have also changed his thinking.

    As long as we are talking about all these people. I think Gen Marshall should have been more avaible available, so when Washington Realized
    war was for sure coming, there would have been less delay, in getting
    that info out to Short and Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.
     
  13. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    "But had Kimmel been given more info, this may well have changed his thinking."

    What information did he not get that would have changed his thinking, please?

    "He may have seen more urgency, because he would have realized PH was a target
    for the Japs."

    What information did DC have that PH was a target, please?
     
  14. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    I have already discussed this in a past post. You chose to try and confuse
    people by calling it the "bomb plot". I have also already discussed, how
    Kimmel felt he was going to get all avilable relevent info, on what the Japs
    wanted to know about the fleet at Pearl Harbor. He didn't get the relevent
    info, Washington failed in this regard.
     
  15. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    "Bomb plot" is what they called it at the time. I understand you're confused, but that comes from lack of study of the material.

    Still waiting for you to give us the material that pointed out Pearl Harbor specifically as a target.
     
  16. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    I doubt it, since Pearl Harbor is never mentioned as a target in any intercept. He might have felt an increased sense as to the gravity of the situation, but I doubt that too. Perhaps, if a courier was sent with a sledgehammer to be applied, rapidly and often, to Kimmel's forehead...

    As for any increased sense of urgency to the situation at hand, what more did Kimmel need? US submarines were conduction simulated war patrols carrying live warheads, several war warnings had been issued, etc. Much of what is going on in and around Pearl Harbor shows that war was imminent. However, no one had expected that Pearl Harbor was a target.

    You probably read it at Tim Kimmel's website The Story Within The Pearl Harbor Story , there is a short pdf http://pearlharbor911attacks.com/docs/GANNON_PAPER_SHALLOW_WATER_TORPEDOES.pdf that mentions this fact. However, Michael Gannon's articles are mostly unsourced, or a source is referred to but not mentioned specifically. As in the mentioning of the 24 foot depth of the British torpedoes, Gannon mentions only
    Gannon's papers also have several inaccuracies contained within them. Since Gannon is a historian of some repute, why these papers are poorly written cannot be easily explained. Perhaps, they were non-professional magazine articles, which are usually unsourced.

    Still, this is all speculation as to what Kimmel may or may not have done.

    Henry Clausen deals with this in his book "Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement" pg 280-81
     
  17. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    "You probably read it at Tim Kimmel's website": You are right about where I read it.

    At this point all I have to say, is that this is just a hobby. I don't think I
    am able to differentiate, between good historians and not so good historians. I generally do not check sources, for published material, I
    look to see if it's sourced, but I don't go beyond that.

    So let me ask this, books published in say 1981, prior to release of previously classified documents, in say 1994. Doesn't that put some of
    those books as sources into question? I think it does, because conclusions were made, on less complete info.
     
  18. brndirt1

    brndirt1 Saddle Tramp

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    I'm going to put in one final post here, and then leave this thread to OpanaPointer and others. First off, let’s remember that a war warning to Kimmel had an entirely different meaning than one to Short due to the disparate scopes of their respective commands.

    As for Short's interpretation, it was that he was to prepare to defend against sabotage, the addendum to his copy of the war warning of Nov. 27th was to the effect that his preparations should be made in a way that would not alarm the public, keeping in mind it's large Japanese contingent. About a third of the population on the Hawaiian Islands were of direct Japanese decent.

    Quite naturally, he communicated his actions and preparations to Washington and received no negative response which might have altered his plans somewhat if they had different information as to what he should prepare for. Complicate that with the Navy was originally supposed to protect the harbor, the ships within it, and the sea surrounding the islands. The islands themselves were the US Army and Air Corps (Force) responsibility. Two really weird things evolved out of this set-up:

    First; the USAAC (it was still the Air Corps) was forbidden to fly beyond sight of land on scouting missions, for fear they would get lost and have to be rescued by Navy ships and personnel, costing time and money. This policy was changed immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack.

    Second; they didn’t have shared communications abilities, the Navy radio system was slightly higher powered than the Army's, but only slightly less susceptible to atmospheric interference, and they didn’t share messages between the two services.

    The messages sent to both men on Dec. 7th, were sent by commercial radio-telegram, because of atmospheric interference with their internal military systems. The telegram system was completely commercially owned, as was the trans-Pacific undersea cable. Even Western Union had to buy time on the cable since it was owned by another company, and none of the cables had been nationalized until well after war was declared, sometime in early 1942.

    General Short took the late November war warning as getting ready to defend the island, but focused on sabotage since so much of the population were of Japanese decent (1/3 ?). Adm. Kimmel brought his ships back into port after a training mission as per usual, but not only began topping off the fuel, and re-supplying any depleted ammunition, had also begun welding portholes shut in anticipation of a blue water big ship confrontation a’la Jutland. Which is why the Arizona was moored beside the Vestal repair ship, she was in the process of getting her portholes welded shut, and was one of the last in line for this procedure.

    Another mis-conception is that Kimmel and Short were out there twiddling their thumbs and planning golf excursions and bridge parties up until the attack. Kimmel's primary duty was to prepare the Fleet for its offensive assignment under WP-46Pac which involved raids on the islands of the Japanese mandate. He was also training PBY crews in both anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and search and rescue operations, and increasing the air power and fuel deposits on the outlying islands of Midway and Guam. His defensive preparations as he interpretted them for the Fleet were in place when the attack came. Analysis of logs has indicated that all major ships commenced firing within two minutes of the beginning of the attack and the surviving Japanese pilot's logs confirmed this after the war.

    Contrary to Hollywood and popular belief, wholesale liberty was not granted. The larger ships were on port and starboard liberty (alternating between ships) and the smaller ships varied somewhat because the idea was to make sure that everyone got liberty to unwind after the previous tough few weeks of training. On the larger ships, duty gun crews slept at their AA guns, and ammunition was kept ready at all guns (not just stored in lockers). Overall, more than 80% of enlisted personnel and more than 50% of officers were aboard when the attack came. This situation accounts for the extremely high casualties on Arizona.

    Gen. Short built up his fortifications prepared to combat sabotage, set up the then experimental radar (after being denied his first choices for location by the U S Parks Service and civilian private owner groups) sets he had been sent. He also agreed with the Navy's proposition to be jointly responsible for harbor defense at Pearl itself.

    Both officers were in frequent radio and telegraphy communication with Washington and were assured they were receiving ALL available intelligence information. Admiral Turner was caught in a lie regarding this point later at one of the Congressional hearings.

    This is not to say that they or D.C. had no responsibility for what happened. Inter-service communications both in D.C. and Hawaii failed. This was amplified by inter-service rivalry for both funding and prestige.

    In one example of communication confusion, the Army and Navy each set up its own system of numbered alert levels. Unfortunately, the one system went from 1 (lowest), to 3 (highest); and, the other went from 3 (lowest), to 1 (highest), is it any wonder we use colors now?

    As a result, one Navy officer (Cpt. Layton?) was aghast to see the Army towing its AA guns away when the Navy had just raised its alert level to HIGHEST.
     
    mikebatzel, nevarinemex and syscom3 like this.
  19. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Do you go into battle with an unloaded gun? You admit you're arguing points you haven't researched, just copy pasta in most cases. So whay are you wasting everybody's time with this? Do you have an agenda beyond the facts of the matter?
    So far as the information released in 1994 updates what was known in 1981, MAYBE. But the material would have to showt hat the 1981 conclusions were incorrect. You haven't read either block of material, so you don't know.
     
  20. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    DogFather,

    Why don't you just come out as state clearly that you mean "At Dawn We Slept" by Gordon W. Prange, rather than obliquely refer to "books published in say 1981," I have read "At Dawn We Slept," however, I have not read Beach's "Scapegoats". Having said that I see ADWS as being a very informative work, well written and well researched. I think ADWS has held up well over the years, and there are few faults with Prange's work.

    Now I return the question. Are you more inclined to believe an, more or less, impartial work or one that is clearly biased?
     

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