Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by DogFather, Jun 11, 2010.
That's because we didn't have any information that justified it. We didn't think Pearl was a target.
Thank you for your note. Here is what Admiral Kimmel did do to prepare:
What Kimmel Did After Receipt of the 27 November War Warning Excerpted from PEAL HARBOR BETRAYED by Michael Gannon, pp.164-67
What Kimmel did do after receipt of the 27 November warning dispatch was the following: He maintained in force the tightened readiness measures he had taken after the 16 October warning. He issued new orders for "full security measures" to be taken by ships in operating areas and at sea.113 in Pearl Harbor proper he and Bloch warned all antisubmarine patrol forces to take additional security measures against submarines.114 He issued orders to the fleet to "exercise extreme vigilance" against submarines in operating areas and to depth-charge all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.115 He gave the depth-charge order despite Stark's previous resistance, dating from 23 September, to such an order. Stark had told Kimmel that "if conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory," a "strong warning" should be sent to Japan. But Kimmel decided on his own to give the "bomb on contact" order, and so informed Stark, who made no reply.ll6 (There would be no conclusive evidence until 7 December.) "The Pearl Harbor operating area was some 2,000 miles from the nearest Japanese possession," Kimmel reasoned. "I knew that if we sent any submarines into a Japanese operating area they wouldn't hesitate a moment to bomb them."117 Kimmel's estimate of Japanese intentions after receipt of the 27 November dispatch was that if an attack was made against the Philippines, then
there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area. I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility, and I did not expect an air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at this time due to the tenor of the dispatches, the other information available to me, the difficulties of making such an attack, and the latest information I had from the Navy Department and other sources was that the greater portion of the carrier forces were located in home waters.118
He issued orders for Task Forces 8 (departing 28 November) and 12 (departing 5 December) taking Marine F4F fighters 2,004 nautical miles to Wake and 1,300 miles to Midway, respectively, to conduct en route morning and afternoon air searches out to 300 miles from their positions for any sign of hostile shipping. Thus, Kimmel did have distant air reconnaissance in the western and northwestern sectors, and to a greater distance than could have been achieved by patrol planes based on Oahu. Furthermore, he ordered a patrol plane squadron to proceed from Midway to Wake and to search the ocean en route; and while at Wake, to search varying sectors on 2 and 3 December to a distance of 525 miles. He ordered another squadron from Oahu to replace the squadron that went from Midway to Wake. It proceeded by way of Johnston Island, 700 miles to the southwest, making a reconnaissance sweep along both legs. After reaching Midway, that squadron flew distant searches of varying sectors of not less than 500 miles on 3, 4, 5, and 6 December. On the seventh, five of that squadron's PBYs were searching the sector from 120 to 170 degrees from Midway to a distance of 450 miles. Another two PBYs of that squadron flew a sweep on the seventh while rendezvousing with the Lexington 400 miles from Midway. Four others remained at Midway, each loaded with depth charges, on ten-minute notice. 119 As Kimmel testified before the JCC:
In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway, and Midway to Pearl Harbor, covered a total distance of nearly 5,000 miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area.120
At the same time, on and after 27 November, Kimmel maintained surface patrols of varying ocean sectors by two submarines out of Wake and two out of Midway. 121
Nor were the PBYs on Oahu standing idle. In addition to daily employment in expansion training, PBYs flew scout training missions on 1, 2, 3, and 4 December northward and northwestward of Oahu to a distance of about 400 miles. While these flights did not constitute distant reconnaissance as such, it is worth remarking that they exceeded in distance the flights conducted by Admiral Richardson after the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940. On the fifth, the PBYs held ground arming drills with live bombs. On the sixth and seventh the PBYs that flew the scout training missions were down for maintenance and upkeep, "In order not to depreciate the material readiness of the planes," said Lt. Comdr. (In 1941) Logan Ramsey, who drew up the wing tactical exercises for Patrol Wing 2.122 Moreover, since 15 November and continuing each day of the week preceding the Japanese attack, including the seventh, three PBYs flew a dawn patrol over the operating area south of Oahu.123 Lifting off the water at Kaneohe Bay at just after 0600, the Catalinas each flew, with tanks topped off with 1,000 gallons of gasoline, with two depth charges on wing racks, and with all machine guns armed, pie-shaped sectors over the fleet operating area south of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles. 124 It was on the dawn patrol flown on the seventh, as will be shown, that Catalina 14Pl sighted and attacked a Japanese submarine. In addition, on the morning of the seventh, four other Catalinas were near Lahaina Roads off Maui Island to the east conducting exercises with U.S. submarines in Inter-type tactics for communication and recognition.
Finally, Kimmel activated certain features of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Including an Inshore and offshore patrol of the immediate Oahu perimeter by ship; activation of the harbor control post; deployment of sonobuoys to detect enemy submarines; operation of torpedo nets at the entrance to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu; and daily sweeping of channels. Furthermore, beginning 30 November, he kept and updated a daily memorandum entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours." (The last issue of the preparedness memorandum, dated 6 December, was presented to the JCC on 15 January 1946.) And he directed his war plans officer Soc McMorris, to draw up a memorandum of "Recommended steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next forty-eight hours" (completed on 5 December).125
113. KC, Roll 20, "Additional Security Measures Taken November 27, 1941 and Thereafter," p. 1.
115. PHA, Pt. 6, p. 2537.
116. Ibid., p. 2538. The order was issued on the twenty-eighth with a copy sent to OpNav on that date. On 2 December Kimmel personally wrote Stark: "You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area;" NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 29, Kimmel to Betty, 2 December 1941. Cf., Pt. 6, p. 2662.
117. KC, Roll 20, "Additional Security Measures," p. 2.
118. Ibid., p. 2.
119. PHA; Pt. 6, p. 2532.
121. KC, Roll 20, "Additional Security Measures," p. 1.
122. See exchange of letters, Kimmel to Ramsey, 6 December 1945, and then Captain Ramsey to Kimmel, 25 December 1945, in KC, Roll 28.
123. PHA, Pt. 6, p. 2534. Also see Lt. Comdr. Baecher to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, 4 April 1946, communicating Operation Plan No.9-I, Section (a), Search Squadron, dated 15 November 1941, signed by Bellinger. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 18.
124. An oral report presented to the JCC on 15 November 1945 by Rear Admiral T. B. Inglis, who had never been stationed at Pearl Harbor, contained the statement that these three patrol planes were scheduled to take off at 0527 but did not take off until 0640. PHA, Pt. 1, pp. 37 and 41. But the group leader of that flight, Ensign William P. Tanner, stated that "It was just after 0600 when we got up on the step and lifted off the water in Kaneohe Bay." Quoted in Mel Crocker, Black Cats and Dumbos: WWII's FightIng PBYs (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books, Inc., 1987), p. 2.
125. PHA, Pt. 36, p. 550; Pt. 6, p. 2530. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Statement of Evidence, pp. 578-80. From the immediately foregoing paragraphs in this chapter 6, it would he difficult to sustain a charge that Kimmel did nothing by way of stiffening his defenses after 27 November. Such a charge was made at a Colloquium on Pearl Harbor and the Kimmel Controversy, held in Washington, D.C., on 7 December 1999, by professor of history Robert W. Love, of the U.S. Naval Academy. "Why was Kimmel unready?" Love asked, when other commanders in the Asiatic Fleet, the Philippines, the Western Defense Command, Alaska, and the Caribbean Defense Command put their forces on alert or took other defensive measures. "Kimmel's counterparts moved," Love asserted. "They acted, whereas in Gordon Prange's memorable phrase, Kimmel failed to cease polishing the sword and pick up the shield." (Audio tape with the writer.) The evidence is to the contrary.
Question: Yamamoto guaranteed that the attack would have a good bag based on the information that the fleet was out on the weekdays and in on the weekends. Who would you say is ultimately responsible for preventing the enemy from being able to predict our movements to the point where they could do a "hail mary" attack like this?
Oh, and I'm still waiting for the MAGIC messages that said Pearl was going to be attacked. Whatcha got?
Once again thank you for your note. You bring up a good point: Gannon, p. 195, as follows,
An Army Chief of Staff orders that no operational Intelligence drawn from Magic be sent to his menaced commander in Hawaii, then later states that he was unaware that enemy Intelligence was denied him ... An Army Intelligence chief, representing the service specifically charged with defending the fleet at Pearl, punts on the grounds that fleet ships, after all, belong to the Navy .... A Navy war plans chief states that any transmission of operational Intelligence of this kind should have been sent out by ONI, something he himself never permitted to happen .... A director of naval Intelligence discerns in bomb plot messages no more than Japanese curiosity and "nicety" of detail about the time required for ships to sortie from harbor .... And a CNO, as uninformed at the time on this espionage as was the Army Chief of Staff, states four years later that ONI should have sent the Information to Kimmel--In direct violation of restraints that his own OpNav office had placed on ONI. ... Surely, if ever there was a "fog of pre-war:' it hung low over Washington in the fall of' 41.
Quoting Gannon's opinions isn't helpful here. You have actual evidence that we thought Pearl was a target?
Some good info, but none of which seems to answer my question. In a sea of reports and various other information that Kimmel had to sift through, what changes with this one thing. Again, Kimmel had a war warning, and he was informed on 2 Dec that we had no idea where the Japanese carriers, and their escorts, were located. As far as I can tell, he did nothing else with this information. So what changes with something that seems to point to either sabotage or submarine attack (which came with the raid) rather than a carrier raid.
And let's give the Japanese a bit of credit where credit is due. To assume that Pearl Harbor was the disaster it was only because Americans were ill prepared is asinine. It was a brilliant plan, and masterfully executed. The Japanese may have gotten the idea out of Taranto but do do something similar with six carriers launching a raid with 300+ planes, after crossing the Pacific, all under complete radio silence, was at that time inconceivable.
With regards to your post ,#162, Mr. Gannon seems to be devoting a lot of ink in contradicting himself. As per the paper posted on your website, entitled "Gannon - Kimmel Aerial Reconnaissance" http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com/docs/GANNON-Kimmel_Aerial_Reconnaissance.pdf , Gannon clearly states in the first paragraph, second sentence,
Yet, in the book quote you posted, Gannon spends a good deal of effort to show that Kimmel was undertaking distant air reconnaissance, as you have highlighted,
Also, in the article Mr. Gannon devotes a good deal of effort to show why the PBYs were not flying at Oahu, broken planes, lack of mechanics, no spare parts, etc. Yet in the book quote, Mr. Gannon goes to extreme pains to show that the PBYs were not sitting idle, and were quite busy.
Seeing the two completely different views from the same source, it seems that Mr. Gannon is flip-flopping on this issue. He either has no clue as to what happened, or is changing his viewpoint to suit the needs of others and make a quick buck.
Now, I say to you Mr. Kimmel, you should consult with Mr. Gannon and get your stories straight, and then post the one you consider most correct. If the article posted on your website is not considered correct than it should be taken down.
P.S. Also, dates on Mr. Gannon's papers on your website would be nice. So we can see what Mr. Gannon's "current" position is.
Well it is fairly clear that Short thought Hawaii was a target but quite rationally he thought the attack would be via sabotage.
I'm more of the impression that he considered that he had to do something and that something was the anti-sabotage measures. I wish he had lived longer after the war.
Well base on what they knew at the time wasn't that the most likely threat? Well I guess they could expect some subs to show up but Short didn't have much of a role there did he? In any case the navy covered that one prett well as is.
Concur on Short.
Oh, I agree that it would be considered the primary threat. There were about 160,000 people of Japanese heritage on the island. However, the fear of sabotage was not founded in reality. It was something Short could focus on. The troops were ready, I think, and the Navy was covering the approaches, so Short's contribution was to implement the anti-sabotage measures.
Does that mean patrolling by the destroyers and the air patrol?
Did the Navy ever consider using torpedo netting? Or, if they did (not accounting for bombs dropped), would it make much of a difference for the battleships outboard from Ford Island?
Or was an attack so unbelievable by carriers that they thought this might be silly?
I have always watched Tora Tora Tora with that scene where Richadson is talking to Kimmel about Toranto being attacked.
Was that attack really studied or taken serious by anyone in the Navy department? Or was it something that was paid attention to more after PH?
Tom, what information do you think was withheld that Kimmel could have used to do his job better and why do you think that?
The Navy was covering the approaches because the Army couldn't. Kimmel knew the Army couldn't fly very far from land, this was one reason Army aircraft were vetoed for Wake and Midway. Short believed the Navy was keeping an eye on every likely approach to the islands.
Letter from CNO to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Letter from Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
And Letter from CNO to all District Commanders
Regarding Anti-torpedo baffles (nets) for protection against torpedo planes.
(Hart Exhibits #17, 18, and 19).
The links above show the thinking of the time. Taranto was ~75 feet deep, Pearl was 35-40 feet deep. The Japanese didn't, IIRC, have torpedo plane that could fly as slowly as the Fairey Swordfish. So it was believed that torpedoes couldn't be used in the harbor at Pearl. The Japanese came up with a simple, effective means of controlling "porpoising" by attaching wooden fins to the torpedo to keep it leveler in the air, thereby reducing the "nose down" attitude when it entered the water.
Thanks for your note, but who cares what I think? Here is what [FONT="]former CNO and C/JCS Admiral Arleigh Burke thought about the matter, when he recommended Kimmel's posthumous advancement to SECDEF Cheney (at Cheney's specific request to him):
“I have always been of the firm opinion that those who decide not to furnish important information should bear the responsibility for that decision.”
Admiral Burke letter to SECDEF Cheney 7/24/91
PS--Burke also wrote to Cheney that this matter of advancement of Kimmel is important not[/FONT][FONT="] because of its importance to the Kimmel family, but because of its importance to the Navy as an institution.[/FONT][FONT="]
PPS--Failure to furnish important information became the proximate cause for the success of the 9/11 attacks just as it did for the Pearl Harbor attack.
Ah, dodging I see.
And to answer your question:
Thanks for your note. Here are three examples of generals allowed to retire at their highest held temporary rank without, apparent, "need to do an extra good job."
Allowed to retire at their highest held temporary ranks were:
1. M/Gen John Lucas—Anzio
2. M/Gen Henry Miller—Claridges
3. M/Gen Lloyd Fredenhall—Kasserine Pass
Lucas' superiors expected some kind of offensive action from him at Anzio. Lucas instead strengthened his defenses. Churchill—“I had hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale.” John Keegan—Lucas's actions "achieved the worst of both worlds, exposing his forces to risk without imposing any on the enemy."
Lucas was relieved of his command on 2/23/43 replaced by General Lucian Truscott.
7 weeks before D-Day Gen Miller, a member of General Spaatz’s AAC staff, had gotten drunk at a nightclub in London, Claridges, and had proceeded to take bets that the D-Day invasion would occur before 6/15. Spaatz placed Miller under house arrest.Eisenhower demoted Miller to colonel and returned him to the States. D-Day was 6/6/44.
“II Corps commander, proved to be utterly incompetent, remaining in his headquarters some 80 miles from the front and failing even once to visit front line units prior to the German attack.” Fredenhall was relieved and replaced by Patton. Kasserine Pass cost the Germans 2,000 men and the Allies about 10,000 men, of which 6,500 were Americans.
See Eisenhower A Soldier’s Life, Carlo D’este, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2002, pp. 394-400.
That's weak. "He got to do it, why can't I?" Third grade material.
So tell me, Tom, why didn't gramps ask for the courtmartial to clear his name?