Hi, when I read about the British defeat in Singapore I wondered why about 120.000 men could be so easily overwealmed by the Japanese, the Japanese had a best mediocre tanks and horsedrawn artillery and looking at there small arms they had bolt action rifles and machine guns that looked like the French Hotchkiss from WW1. Did the British not have anti-tank weapons and artillery, Singapore is an Island and to be out maneuvered by an enemy who fought on foot seems incredable. The British and Commonwealth forces are usually no push overs, were they let down by there officers or did they run out of supplies.
First the number of Commonwealth troops is misleading, Sinapore was a Major naval base and colonial hub. Not all the personel were ground combat troops. The 'bayonet' strength between opponents was closer. Also the defense was based on a suspected Sea assault, so the best defences were deployed there. There was also issues with the quality of troops. The Japanese were well trained, and lead. The Commonwealth troops were largely either garrisson troops or like the Austrailan division not completely trained or equipped to fight a modern war.
I was looking on Wiki about Singalore and it said that the coastal guns could be turned around and fired inland at the Japanese (some books say they could only fire out to sea) but they hab no HE shells only AP for sinking ships, and the Japanese General was worried that if the battle continude for a few days longer his troops would run out of supplies, so he tried bluffing the British into surrendering and they fell for it.
Some guns could fire inland, but the bulk of money spent on defenses were to prevent a sea attack. Further the Japanese attack force lacked both the support troops and the supplies to fight a long campaign.If you study the Japanese attack here, the Phillipines and elsewhere in december 1941/january 1942 this was a common theme. Bluff, allied mistakes and a lack of will allowed Japanese victories when the contest was if reality much more of a close run enterprise.
It was the absolutely dismal quality of the generals that made the defeat inevitable. They were in the most part, only qualified for peacetime colonial police actions, not for battle.
I bet if thet British and Commonwealth troops knew what they were in for after the surrender, they might have given the Japanese a better run for there money.
The "big guns" were really of no import by the time the IJA threatened the Singapore area, even if they had access to shells other than AP (ship destroyers), and were trained to the north they couldn’t have made the difference. The attack on the Malay Peninsula was made an hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor, remember the International Dateline when looking at the timeline. Percival himself expressed doubt as to taking the command in Singapore; "In going to Malaya I realized that there was the double danger either of being left in an inactive command for some years if war did not break out in the East or, if it did, of finding myself involved in a pretty sticky business with the inadequate forces which are usually to be found in the distant parts of our Empire in the early stages of a war". He doubted this posting was a "good thing", he saw it as either a "dead end" in his career, or the worst possible place to be if war broke out. He had always stated the existing position was flawed in defense of the peninsula from land attack. Sadly his (Percival’s) vacillation when the attack did happen to close on the island itself didn’t make the outcome less likely, but more likely. If you eliminate all the other "things" which contributed to the fall of Singapore, there is one which falls clearly on Percival’s shoulders. That would be in his refusal to allow the construction of fixed defense positions on the north shore of Singapore for reasons of "morale". Much to the dismay of his Chief Engineer Ivan Simson. Percival found himself the nexus of many mistakes, some his own fault, some not under his control. In early December 1941, Japanese troops under the command of General Yamashita landed at Kota Bahru, four hundred miles north of Singapore. Although opposition was fierce, Japanese forces enveloped defending forces more than once and began to chip away at the disorganized British strategy. The Japanese covered the 650 miles from Siam, their starting point, to Singapore in seventy days, thirty less than planned. Relentless day-time bombing of the city filled hospitals. Although initial targets were the docks and military installations such as the air bases, civilian targets included Chinatown and later, as the end approached, the colonial government centers. Four steamers filled with women and children left the city under the cover of night, each reaching their destinations safely. By the time Yamashita’s forces were ready to cross the Jahore Straits, General Percival finally gave the order to Brigadier Simson to fortify the northeast shore. The Japanese invasion, however, came from the northwest shore. Simson, an engineering officer who had repeatedly called for fortifying the entire shore line, attempted to move the fortifications, but it was too late. Singapore fell on Sunday, February 15th at 6:10 PM, when General Percival signed Yamashita’s ultimatum of unconditional surrender. Poor and inadequate planning, leadership vacillation, and an inability by all leaders to work together had contributed to the fall. Additionally, Winston Churchill and Parliamentary leaders failed to grasp the true situation in Singapore in December 1941. Goto: The Fall of Singapore February 15, 1942: Poor Planning and Indecisive Leadership Led to Japanese Victory
As a general rule, individually the commonwealth soldier fought bravely, but was let down by commanders without imagination.
And by politicians who really couldn't afford to help under the circumstances. Winston didn't really have the resources to send, but not sending tanks to Singapore's defenders but sending them to the USSR didn't help. Not sending aircraft didn't help, not sending supplies didn't help. Having an "imagination" or not couldn't reverse the lack of supplies and support by the government. Britain itself was under attack at the time, so the Far East troops were the "red headed step-child" of the UK.
You are correct Clint, but like the Phillipines, the on site command could have done better and cost the Empire far more for their victories than they did actually. The on site commander could do little about what men or equipment they got, but how they used what they had was entirely within their ability to control.
It was a combination of causes. First, the Japanese were far more aggressive in their operations. When you add to this that the British defense planning and preparations were mediocre at best it was a combination for a moral defeat. In addition, virtually all of the troops present were not British per se but rather commonwealth from mostly Australia and India. In both cases the majority of the units were poorly trained and often marginally equipped. The Indian divisions for example had just two brigades and were equipped with antique 3.7" mountian howitzers a design that dated back to the beginning of WW 1. While the Japanese did have a couple of battalions of tanks the British / Commonwealth had none. Half the available Buffalo fighter aircraft went unused for lack of pilots. The best bomber available was the light weight Lockheed Hudson. Training was unrealistic and poor in many circumstances. The top command refused to allow troops to practice in farmer's and plantation fields for fear of damaging corps and getting problems from owners. For the same reason no permanent field defenses were set up on mainland Malaysia. No wire was strung, no mines laid, no entrenchments dug. Worse, there was a certain lethargy at the top command ranks that prevented more being done too. In the opening days of that campaign many Commonwealth units were on the move to their wartime defense positions and if on these were busy digging in and trying desperately to get their defenses up. Most got caught with little or nothing ready. What it comes down to is that the British, particularly after more than 2 years of war should have been prepared in Malaysia. Instead, it became a backwater for the greenest troops, left over equipment, and a place to send generals who had proven incapable elsewhere. Out of sight, out of mind. When the Japanese came they kicked in the door on a house of cards.
it sounds like General Percival did not even want to be there, not building defences for moral purposes, my moral would be more higher if I seen some kind of defence system for me to take cover in and fight back, pity we didnt have a relative of the Duke of Wellington, he would have had a better idea of stopping an attack and counter attacking, I heard that the only Armour available was a couple of Lanchester armoured cars ?.
There were some Morris armored cars there but these are basically worthless as a combat vehicle having a Bren and a Boys for armament and virtually limited to roads.
It didn't help that Churchill was trying to convince the U.S. to defend Singapore. The USN had long since decided to cede the Western Pacific to the Japanese, Singapore and the Philippines alike, until sufficient forces could be built up for a gradual assault, but I'm not at all sure the politicians and Army types had made that completely clear.
I just ran across an excellent article on this subject by accident. Thought I would share it with the group. Goto: What If Singapore Had Not Fallen? » HistoryNet
unfortunately singapore was lost in the 30s defence reviews and although percival was not the best leader in the world..he never ever got the documented fighting battalion numbers that were ever promised in 30s never mind 40s. by that time the other theatres were the priority..id say baldwin lost singapore ..