Soviet Entry into the War Against Japan: Military Planning, 1941-1945

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Many thanks for posting!

 

W000t!

Thanx!

 

The key to the whole debate is that there was no assurance the bomb would have the effect of bringing the Japanese to the negotiation table, which is why the comparison of the quarter of a million killed by the bombs with "possible" costs on an invasion of the Japanese mainland makes no sense.
Obviously a "plan B" involving a Soviet invasion of Manchuria looked like a very good idea to the military as it would, at worse prevent any reinforcement from there and at best bring the Japanese to the negotioation table without need of a costly inavsion.

Don't think the bombs are something to apologize for, thoughh doing so would would put some much needed moral high ground in NPT efforts, but there is a huge gap between "not something to apologize fo" and "the right thing to do".

 

I think Russians were hypocrites in wanting a second front ASAP, but they did not attack Japanese forces

 

It was probably more important, at least until Germany surrendered, to assure the flow of material to the USSR was unhindered in the Pacfic. Once the war with Germany was over Stalin refocussed fairly quickly considering the logistics required. I'm not sure that there was a huge rush either. The US would have wanted the Soviet attack to come well before the invasion of Japan but it did so and by the time it came from what I've read the US was having some second thoughts with regards to Soviet participation.

 

As far as I know, we did not want the Russians to become engaged with the Japanese until the European war was over. We needed them to continue fighting the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and as lwd noted, amost half of the Lend-Lease we provided in order to support that effort went via Vladivostok and could easily have been cut off by the Japanese even late in the war.

Again AFAIK, we never discussed with the Russians the possibility of them opening a "Second Front" against Japan before Germany was defeated. The understanding FDR sought at Yalta, which Truman wanted to confirm at Potsdam, was that the Soviets would attack in the east approximately three months after German defeat, which they did.

 

was this pre 1944??

 

From some of the other posts above it's pretty clear that they weren't being asked to do so either. Having to reroute or protect the supplies going to the USSR via the Pacific route especially when the Soviets couldn't really commit that much in the east was viewed as counter productive at least from what I've read.

 

very good point...sounds logical that they would put their max effort to Germany......however, I'm no expert at all, but I thought I read where the Russians kept many divisions on that front, just sat there doing nothing?? but if they didn't have the supplies, I can see where they would not want to attack

 

Here's something that was posted on the old History Channel website some years ago:

Soviet troops in the Far East on 22 June 1941:

17 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, and 12 fortified regions organized into five rifle corps and four rifle armies.

Soviet troops in the Far East on 1 January 1942:

19 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 2 cavalry regiments, 1 rifle regiment, and 12 fortified regions organized into four rifle corps and five rifle armies.

Apparently, units sent west were replaced by new formations, so the Soviets didn't really let down their guard vis-a-vis Japan. There are also artillery and tank units listed in the order of battle, what is listed above are the major combat formations, and does not include units assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front.

Source for the data is:

http://www.tashv.nm.ru/BoevojSostavSA/

It's often suggested that the Soviets denuded their forces in the Far East in 1941 to provide reinforcements for Moscow, and that therefore the Japanese missed an opportunity to strike north and win the war for the Axis, but as you see that's not accurate. The Soviets also had the support of some 80,000 Mongolian Peoples' Republic troops.

Of course adequate forces for defense may not be adequate for offense. After the defeat of Germany, the Soviets shifted significant forces including armored units to the East; you could wiki the order of battle for the Mongolian campaign for the details.

 

It's also been suggested that most of the troops that remained in the Far East were green. I've also seen it suggested (on these forums I beleive) that the numbers remaining in the Far East could have been fudged a bit. Certainly the Soviets wouldn't be adverse to giving the Japanese the impression that they were too strong to make an attack on them worthwhile even if they weren't. The Soviets were rather good at deceptive ops especially as the war went on.