In my opinion it was so important because it was the triumph of the Soviet soldier over the German soldier and because it was the point where Hitler became desperate. He would not believe that his forces could be stopped, let alone that they would surrender. Stopping the Germans from eliminating the Soviet position on the western side of the Volga was a feat of determination more than a feat of arms. It was a triumph of a determined people in their own country fighting for their very life. The feat of arms was the encirclement that came after the Germans were stopped. The use of maneuver and force to capture an enemy and prevent them from escaping or being sustained, that showed that the Soviets had learned. That is why I think it is so important.
Moscow had showed the Soviets they could stop the invaders, Stalingrad showed them at long last they could win a major battle. By November 42 a good 90% of the city was in German hands. The soviets just hung on to the west side of the Volga River, an average life span of a Soviet private soldier was less than 24 hours that’s shows what a brutal battle it was. By Feb 43 the last pockets of the 6th Army were destroyed, the battle of Stalingrad had showed the Soviets they could take the fight to their enemies. For the Germans the lost of a veteran army was a blow.
At the end of the battle of stalingrad what state was the south army group in after losing at stalngrad
That is something you cannot answer with a couple of sentences really. But I can recommend this Last Victory in Russia: The SS-Panzerkorps and Manstein's Kharkov Counteroffensive, February-March 1943 by George M. Nipe http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0764311867/103-2228965-4305417?v=glance&n=283155 By the end of January of 1943, Hitler's armies had been dealt a series of defeats by the Russians, beginning with the disaster at Stalingrad. Successive Soviet offensives had destroyed the German 6. Armee and annihilated the armies of Germany's Axis allies, Italy, Rumania and Hungary. Stalin and the Russian high command believed that the war could be won with just one more great effort. Accordingly, they planned and launched two offensives, designated Operations "Star" and "Gallop." The focal points of the two offensives included the recapture of Kharkov, the industrial heart of the Ukraine and the destruction of Armeeabteilung Hollidt, 4. Panzerarmee and 2. Armee.... "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich" participated in the defense of Kharkov, along with the elite Army division "Grossdeutschland" supported by three weak infantry divisions. This handful of divisions was attacked by four Soviet armies, but under command of Armeeabteilung Lanz, was able to hold the city for two weeks. On 14 February, 1943 the SS-Panzerkorps and the rest of Armeeabteilung Lanz withdrew from Kharkov under disputed circumstances that involved Hausser and his violation of a direct order from Hitler....
Yes, Kai, but that was the usual result when Uncle Joe got overconfident and demanded unrealistic objectives from his commanders.
If there had been no "Grossdeutschland" or the SS divisions Uncle Joe might have got really far, I think.... Or if Häusser had not withdrawn the troops from Kharkov in time. I think Manstein never ordered the troops out of Kharkov so his backhand slap would have been a total flop without Häusser´s decision to do against Hitler´s order.
Haussers decision to withdraw the SS Panzer Korps was one of the ballsiest made by a German Commander during the war , it was a decision that Manstein would not make himself even though he later tried to take credit for it in Lost Victories and Hausser hardly got a mention !! Have interviewed a number of Waffen SS Vets about this and all praised Hausser highly for this order after this they would follow Papa Hausser anywhere !! Most concluded that Kharkov was the greatest victory of the Waffen SS in Russia. On the strategic front if he hadn't withdrawn the SS Panzer Korps Kharkov would have been lost and possibly the whole of Southern Russia. PS Last Victory in Russia is a fantastic piece of work and well worth the money, Paul
Good info above. Now one might begin to wonder at why I have such a passion for collecting German rank insignias. The 1st Gebirgs Div was commanded by Genmaj or GenLt? Lanz, to which the 98th and 99th Gebirgsjager Regiments took a very active part in the defense of Kharkov. I need to bone-up on my stuff dealing with the Grossdeutschland Div. I have a nice pair of Olt's boards from the 1st Pz Battalion.
The German Summer 42 offensive and Stalingrad really showed two things both of which were severly negative for Germany: First, it showed that the Wehrmacht had pushed itself beyond its capacity and was extremely vulnerable as a result. The Germans launched the whole AGS Caucausus / Southern Russia campaign on a shoestring. They were nowhere near prepared logistically nor did they even do a good job in setting up their logistics for it. The units to be involved were not fully manned and equipped in part due to shortages in the replacement system and in part due to stupid choices on how resources were being allocated. Second, this campaign showed that the Red Army was capable of planning and carrying out a strategic operation successfully. Unlike Zhukov's offensives against AGC south of Moscow that were disasterous failures the operation against AGS took full advantage of that army's weaknesses and exploited them to the full. It meant that the Soviets were learning and had reached a point where the Germans needed to worry much more than they were that their own military was no longer capable of running rampant across Russia.
In terms of attrition the defeats in the winter of 1942-43 included severe losses in manpower and equipment the Axis nations could not afford. Perhps if the Soviet forces had been defeated and significant stratigic gains occured for the Axis the loss could (maybe) been justified. But, the losses were taken with no gain in stratigic resources or decisive losses by the Soviet air and ground forces.
I agree with Terry. It did show that the Wehrmacht was reaching beyond its capability to hold onto conquered areas. Even if Stalingrad was taken and held by the Germans, they would not be able to go no further. The Caucasus would have to be abandoned eventually if Hitler would want to hold onto his gains in Southern Russia. Also shows that the Soviet military leadership learned how to fight the Germans and launch offensives successfully. Yes, it was aimed at the weakest point of the front line but isn't that what you want to do. Not only did they launch the offensive to surround the 6th armee but also a second to take Rostov and entrap Army Group A in the Caucasus. Two offensives at the same time. That is a lot of manpower.
Just amazed that Hitler thought that the Red Army was running out of power after learning how much Zhukov did in the AGC area during the whole time of autumn 1942. If there was tanks and men in the Rzhev area Zhukov definitely would have them in the south as well...
Failing to take Stalingrad also denied Hitler the one thing he didnt have that was absolutley essential to the war: oil. As early as 1942 German panzer divisions were reportedly going into battle with their tanks only half full because Hitler didnt have enough oil supplies. The soviet Union had between 2 and 3 times the population that Germany had, and also had heavy industry behind the front that was never harrased or disturbed meaning the Soviets could afford the monsterous casualties they suffered whereas the Germans couldnt. Dont forget that germany didnt even fully mobilize for war untill 1943, by which time it was probably too late to do anything besides prolong the war. By no means were the germans completely whiped out, as they were able to field a huge Army at kursk. But by this time the Soviets had put up immense defensive works pretty much everywhere the Germans could attack, and after Kursk the germans fought a primarily defensive war. In my opinion the german defeat outside Moscow was probably more important, even if the german losses werent as bad as at Stalingrad it denied them their quick victory which was essential since they were fighting a nation that was numerically and industrially superior.
For the Soviets to lose the City to bear the name of the Supreme Soviet would be a devestating moral blow, it had to be held at all cost regardless of losses, Hitler had made a fundamental mistake by splitting Army Group South in two this weakened the German advance, an intact Army Group South should have attacked Stalingrad and then with it's capture then go after Astrakhan and finally the Caucasus oil fields. Stalingrad was the turning point as it eventually showed the absolute weaknes of Germany's allies as a reliable fighting force, Hitler lack of care for the frontline soldier and fluidity of battle and to adjust accordingly. Also that the mighty German war machine was beatable.
Agreed. Also at Moscow it showed the entire world, that the Germans indeed were not invincible. For the Russians this showed that not all was lost and that the Germans could loose battles afterall.
It amazes me that what would have happened if Hitler had not ordered both panzer groups 2 and 3 had not been diverted and that an almost intact Army Group Centre attacked Moscow around mid to late October 41 just after the Vyazma Pocket. Three things could have been achieved and those being. 1, Army Group North with Finnish forces should have launched a direct assault from the outset on Leningrad and not besiege the city. (If anyone has evidence that this did occur can you let me know) 2, Army Group Centre launched an assault on Moscow (as mentioned above) 3, Army Group South (w/ Army Group Antonescu) kept intact and launched a direct infantry assault on Stalingrad (Panzer units to provide flank protection). Also the one thing that puzzles me and that why did Fuhrer Adolf Hitler deny all requests to build a pontoon bridge across the River Volga and to prevent the river traffic, I have been led to believe that either von Paulas or von Rundstedt wanted to build a pontoon bridge to launch assaults into the rear of Stalingrad to stop the reinforcement of Stalingrad but were repeatedly denied by Hitler.
By 18 September, the Ist Panzer and SS Police Divisions finally captured Pushkin and the XXVIII Army Corps captured Slutsk. A final desperate assault by the Ist Panzer Division captured Pulkovo and Aleksandrovka the terminus of the Leningrad southwest tram line, only 12km from the city's centre. However, there, on the southern slopes of Pulkovo Heights, the Ist Panzers's assault faltered when it encountered Soviet tanks that had just rolled off the Kolpino tank factory's assembly line. Although fighting lasted until 30 september, the tenacious Soviet defense at Pulkovo Heights conviced Leeb to halt his attacks, the scheduled departure of the XXXXI Motorized Corps, which he dreaded so much was also an important factor. Despite the spectacular gains it had recorded since crossing the Western Dvina river in early July, Army Group North had suffered 60,000 losses with no reinforcements. On 15th September, Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group began departing for Army Group Centre. Only Schmidt's XXXIX Mototized Corps and, as a later concession the 8th Panzer Division, remained to provide Leeb with armour support. On 24th September, he reported candidly to OKH that the situation had "worsened considerably". He could no longer continue offensive operations toward Leningrad and his forces had no other choice but to go on the defense, a declaration that Hitler would not accept. Even though 2 days earlier a directive had been issued by the Fuhrer, "to erase the city of Leningrad from the map by means of Artillery fire and continuous bombardment from the air." The siege had begun.
Soviets were fast learners of WW2 tactics. At Stalingrad they executed similar enciclement of an army that didn't retreat in time, to which they have been on receiving end in 1941. The significance is that it was demoralising for the Germans to realize that they are facing opponent who is not only fighting hard now, but fighting smart as well and capable of executing these kind of large scale operations successfully.
I'm not sure if Germany knew the Soviets had a one person rifle, next one ammo, but if they did that would have put salt on the wound, because not only are the germans facing less expierenced men but almost half of them basically couldn't shoot.