Stalin's Aggressive Plan in 1941

Well, don't mind me, I'm sitting here watching you attack that tank with a wet piece of toilet paper.

 

Without reading all the posts - of course Stalin had aggressive plans. But imho not in 1941 (he wanted only small nations that offer not much resisistance like part of Romania, eastern Poland, Lituhania etc.). His plan was that the capitalistic nations (he viewed also Nazi-Ger as capitalistic) destroy themselfes in wars, while USSR could wait until the nations are weakened enough. It may be that USSR had already plans in 41 to march west, but I doubt it....

 

Am not going to nit-pick on exact numbers, because different sources give different numbers. The point was, that the soviets were not underdogs in the numbers of "modern" tanks in the early phase of "Barbarossa". Not even many of the so-called out-dated soviet tanks were really not totally useless as tanks in 1941, but of course the usage of them was well under the par.

It was you, who brought up the ATW...

 

That was his original plan. Personally I believe that he found out, the he had to attack already on 1941, but obviously was a bit late - by half a month, one month or perhaps two.

 

It may be but there is no proof, maybe the remark of Shukov (he said something that the facists "pre-emted" them) or the concentration of so much force in the western districts of USSR are indications of it. But I read somewhere that 42 was the year after capitalist countries are weakened and he could collect the ashes without huge losses. Also for 41 Russian staff viewed army not quite ready (even if they had the biggest in the world and more tanks than all others combined)

 

Don't think there ever will be enough proof, since the evidence is in the Russian archives never to be released.

Surely the sovies were not ready by June 1941, but what the staff thought and what Stalin decided were two different things. I think Stalin knew the German attack was coming and thought he still had time to hit first. Stalin did not believe in German attack in 22nd June, since he could not believe Germany was already ready for it.

For me the evidence shown so far is enough: the soviet positions only fit for attack, the concentration of overwhelming numbers of troops, the attack plans, the lack of soviet maps, the soviet-German dictionaries etc.

 

No : there was no concentration of overwhelming numbers of troops: the SU was still not mobilised .
And,THE proof against the theory of the Soviet preventive attack (Suvurov) is that the standing Soviet forces were even not capable to stop the German attacks : on 22 june, the Soviet force located in Western Russie far away from the frontier,received the order to go to the border : they never succeeded,most of the Soviet forces fell apart without ever having seen ONE German : it was the usual Potemkin village ..It was all front,but behind the front,reality was destructive .

 

The Soviets considered their BT tanks outdated because of the T34 coming up so they stopped making parts for the BT tanks.
Salin's failure in dealing with Hitler was in assuming like Chamberlain did that Hitler would act in a rational way. Stalin thought Hitler would make demands for territory first and launch small attacks. Stalin's big fear was like Roosevelt's in appearing in being the aggressor so he wanted Hitler to make the first move.

 

Stalin didn't speak for over a week and even though they received warnings from England and the US warning of a German attack, they were still dumbfounded. Stalin thought the West was trying to provoke him to mobilize so Hitler would attack.

 

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/divis.htm#tank

Tank Strength of Panzer Divisions



1939/1940

324

1941/1942

150-200

1943

170

1944

120-140


Also:

http://books.google.fi/books?id=jPvlnmwrg4QC&pg=PT19&lpg=PT19&dq=hitler%C2%B4sorder+and+panzer+divisions+and+1940&source=bl&ots=k0kV61eo-i&sig=21Jn7pjHl9YgDhwDPS9Wse7Jorc&hl=fi&sa=X&ei=hW7jU4aFDofqyQOG84CQCw&ved=0CDQQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=hitler%C2%B4sorder%20and%20panzer%20divisions%20and%201940&f=false

 

I've also read that Hitler planned on eventually going to war with England and France around 1943 or 1944 when the Navy Plan Z was almost complete and his armaments and troops were even more built. Richard Overy wrote that from the book the Road to War. That's similar to Stalin's plan of aggression, but both could also be speculation or hearsay.

 

The soviet mobilization was already on. More troops were on their way already/still on 22nd June.

The soviet troops indeed were not capable to stop the German attack. Their positions were not fit for defence, the soviets hadn't been training for defence and so on. But they were almost ready to attack themselves, which they had been training for and which their positions were perfect for.

Surely the soviet BTs were outdated compered to T34; everything was in 1941. Still they would have been totally capable against the Germans, had they been maintained and used properly.

Don't think Stalin cared much for appearing to look like an aggressor. After all he could have done what the soviets/Russians had/have always done - staged an incident which the Germans would have been blamed for. That's exactly what he did e.g. against Finland on 36th November 1939 - and attacked four days later.

The USSR was already mobilizing.

Think Stalin could not believe, that Germany could be able to attack so soon. He thought he would have had more time for the soviet preparations.

 

cancelled

 

cancelled

 

Stalin was working from the first day on (10 hours a day)and the warnings from Britain and the US were worthless.

 

The red army in 1941 was getting it's act together after the purges and two major doctrine shifts, it was basically unready for any sort of large scale action. Stalin was not a risk taker like Hitler and communist dogma was that time was working on his side, an attack was likely to result in a two front war, as Hitler could invoke the anti comintern pact to demand a Japanese entry.

Soviet tank production is misleading, the "heavy industry first" doctrine dovetailed nicely with massive tank production, a lot less with setting up the decentralized logistics keeping them in running order (and in some instances even providing them with adequate ammo) would have required.

 

1. The soviet military strength (without e.g. NKVD troops) was 2.000.000 on 19th Aug 1939, 4.207.000 on 1st Jan 1941 and 5.500.000 on 21st Jun 1941. During first seven days of the "Barbarossa" 96 new divisions (5.300.000 men) were founded. It's obvious the orders had to have been given before the "Barbarossa".

I'd call that as mobilization.

2. The orders on 22nd June/later were too late. The soviets were not able to attack any more, since they were already on defence. I agree, that the soviets were not ready to attack on 22nd June. After three more weeks, or maybe even more, the situation would have been very different.

The summer 1941 was already several years after the purges.

Agree that summer 1941 was propably not the moment Stalin had originally thougth as the perfect time for his major attack. Still I think that the situation and pressure from Germany made it a necessity for him to try to advance his plans. After all for the soviets/Russians the best defence was/is an attack!

 

Stalin violated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by invading Bukovina on 28 June 1940.

 

Suddenly exact dates become important?