Takeo Kurita off Samar---a Victory Bungled

I just finished reading "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors". WOW. Can't say enough good things about that book. EXCELLENT account of the battle, with fine illustrations of the relative positions of the ships involved (on both sides).

OK, I *KNOW* Kurita was fished out of the water from his sunken cruiser flagship, and was probably sleep-deprived and numb from the Sibuyan Sea air attacks when he came within gun range of "Taffy 3's" group, but...

The window of opportunity the Japanese sought to actually disrupt the landings on Leyte had passed, so nothing Kurita could do would "save the day" for the Japanese in the Philippines. However, all the other "characters" in the complex Japanese plan had done their part to give Kurita the chance to earn a significant Japanese naval victory. We know that even if Kurita's ships had annihilated all the little ships he faced, that it would not stem the massive tide of American steel crushing Japan's empire, but...

He was given a *GOLDEN* opportunity to inflict THE greatest defeat the US Navy had ever suffered (worse than Savo Island), *LIKELY* sinking the six US jeep carriers and destroyer/DE escorts of "Taffy 3" (and maybe a few ships of Taffy 2 that were being shelled sporadically). Kurita deployed his ships unwisely, putting his destroyers in the rear, and charging "around in a circle" as Taffy 3 retreated. Like Harwood at the Plate battle, Kurita should have split his forces (gee, think he had enough??) to "hem in" the enemy. Kurita's destroyers should have skirmished with the brave US escorts and taken the torpedo hits instead of the heavy cruisers. Kurita should have turned INTO the torpedoes instead of away from them, losing valuable time/distance in the ill-advised "general chase". Poor communications meant that the cruiser (?) who correctly identified the carriers as NOT the speedy "Essex's" was ignored or...?

I cannot even IMAGINE that a competent American admiral in Kurita's shoes with the same forces would have allowed only ONE CVE to be sunk and a mere three escorts sunk before retreating.

 

I had always gathered the impression from many of the mis-identifcations made on Taffy 3 (DE's=DD's, DD's=CL/CA's, CVE's=CV's) that they were 'spooked' before they ever fired a shot. Lets be honest this was in essance a suicide mission from the get go, but at the first chance to honorably withdraw they did. Very out of charecter for the IJN of the period. (other than Pearl Harbor)

 

The mis-identifications strike me as a red herring by apologists for Kurita's actions. The Japanese gunnery crews were scoring hits in a running battle, so their plots had to have a reasonable estimate of the target speed. The speed differential between a 20 kt CVE and a 33 kt CV is a bit hard to miss.

 

The Japanese sure were off their game that day. The destroyers especially strike me as uncharacteristically passive - eleven of them with two light cruiser leaders let three American DDs attack their cruisers and battleships?? The one time they came close to hemming in Taffy 3, Yahagi and four destroyers let themselves be deterred by the already crippled USS Johnston.

The only really enterprising group were the heavy cruisers, and their "one-handed" attack allowed Taffy 3 to keep turning away; this is why 34-knot cruisers had trouble closing in on 19-knot CVEs.

A potentially effective strategy would have been for the battleships, screened by a destroyer squadron, to stay on course for Leyte Gulf and incidentally get between Taffy 3 and the coast of Samar while the faster cruisers made their sweep on the seaward flank. Before long the CVEs would be caught between two fires, and at least one Japanese group should be well-placed for torpedo attack.

Of course the Japanese were under considerable stress, but they had fought well under challenging conditions many times earlier in the war. Perhaps it was the unspoken recognition that the war was lost whatever they did; Kurita's own briefing was along the lines of "miracles can happen".

 

There were intangibles at play that should be considered. For example, the sheer volume and incessant nature of the air attacks raining down on Kurita must've been more than just disconcerting, the air power displayed by 7th Fleet may have dimmed the fact that he was in reality only facing & chasing CVEs. Also, this was not the IJN of 1941-42. The oil/fuel situation, had already played havock with basing and Fleet dispositions, training schedules had been disrupted, crew standards themselves faced some degradation. Most equate these problems with Japanese aviation, but the surface fleet experienced the same problems to varying degrees, and this was a process that had been going on for 2 years or so already. "Going Italian"? No, that's much too strong, fighting spirit and the need for sacrifice remained and would until the end, but the navies certainly shared some logistic problems that affected them tactically. Just a few thoughts ...

 

Air Attacks, Crew Standards, et al.:

Marmat, though I would agree in part, we are talking about OVERWHELMING force here, not just a slightly-better force deterred by guts and determination of a SLIGHTLY inferior enemy. Some thirty Japanese ships, faster, armored, torpedo-armed--being turned away by THREE enemy destroyers?? Where were the Mikawas/Tanakas to lead their forces??? One would think that if the CREWS were perhaps green and untested, the commanders of most ships would have been those who had fought in successful actions previously in the War. And whose brainstorm to use armor-piercing ammo on light ships? Even if they were the Essex-class carriers, they really didn't have enough armor to bother with battleship-killing ordnance. Carriers have enough avgas and ordnance to immolate themselves with a few explosions within the ship.

I think the Samar battle does go to show how much mere "strafing" can upset the applecart, but again, we are talking tiny bullets vs. 8-18" guns. The poor disposition and battle direction of the Japanese fleet drew out the battle's timeframe ridiculously and gave an opportunity for additional air attacks. If the Japanese fleet had charged in directly, and/or split forces to "surround" Taffy 3, they would have made quick work of the six carriers and THEN be harrassed by aircraft on the retreat instead of the advance.

My FULL admiration goes out to the American light forces that duly charged into the big guns of the enemy to give their CVE's a fighting chance to escape. That's competent and courageous Navy work. Huzzah!

But I give a "raspberry" to Kurita for imprudence and timidity where a GOLDEN opportunity for a victory was at hand.

 

In essence, I believe you're correct CTB. But I would respectfully disagree about the assertion that GP ammo would have sufficed against Essex class carriers. While it's certainly possible, lucky hits do occur, the Essex class carriers weren't the unarmoured targets you imply. They weren't terribly heavily armoured, but they did have a roughly 4" belt about comparable to interwar heavy cruisers on more than three times the displacement.

Sure, they had avgas and ordinance, but so did every other combatant. (More of the later and less of the former, maybe, but it all goes boom.) There hasn't been a serious warship since before the Spanish Armada that didn't cary things that would burn or explode. (And at all previous points the ships themselves burned quite nicely, thank you very much.)

And some of those treaty "tinclads" took a heck of a lot of punishment. Even bounced AP shells every now and then. (Though not the 14-18" monsters the IJN battle line would have mailed over.) If an Essex had been adequately buttuned down there's every reason to believe you'd have needed AP to sink her. All the important bits were aroured, below the waterline, or both. They burn very nicely indeed if you catch them with their pants down, but not so well if you don't. About like any other ship. Surface combatants tend to burn and explode by the numbers when the crew stores propelant or ready amunition in the corridors.

That said, AP seems a little wasteful against a tin can, but people tend to follow procedures under stress and the procedure may have been: "Target afloat? Load the yellow ones." (Note: I do not know the color codes actually used by the IJN for their shells, though it could be looked up.)

However, you're right, Kurita missed a heck of an opportunity, though it likely would have made little enough difference even if he hadn't, save to the families of the dead. So let's be thankful he didn't take his shot. If I had to guess, I'd say he was getting gun shy and spooked by then. He'd probably seen one too many ships shot out from under flag officers, since he was himself in the thick of the earlier mentioned Guadalcanal campaign.

 

OVERWHELMING force???? Clearly you greatly underestimate the striking power of, what, some 18 CVEs & thier air groups, the CVEs had more aircraft than Kido Butai did at Pearl Harbor.

Actually it was three destroyers, five destroyer escorts, and about 475 AMERICAN AIRCRAFT...

Because of their early successes, Mikawa & Tanaka were viewed as a threat to those Japanese military leaders in positions of power. With both admirals being closely tied to the failed effort to retake Guadalcanal, this provided a convenient excuse to "beach" both of them. Also, more than a few Japanese Army Generals also suffered similar fates.

The strafing caused little damage, IIRC combinedfleet.com mentions only that the Kongo's main battery director is disabled, forcing her main batteries to switch to local control, although the strafing did cause several casualties to the men manning the Japanese AA guns.

If you consider the American bombs & torpedoes to be "puny bullets", than you are correct. The Japanese heavy cruisers suffered severe damage to early American aircraft attacks.

The Yamato had nine 18-inchers, not eight, the Nagato had eight 16-inch guns, and the Kongo & Haruna had eight 14-inch guns apiece. However, these would be of little use against the American aircraft & not much better against the "light" American warships.

The Japanese were steaming in a dispersed AA formation, since Kurita thought he had found TF 38, he made a judgment call, in that maintaining surprise was better than taking the time to reform his fleet and attack in a more organized fashion. Thus, Kurita's warships attacked independently, and not in a more coordinated effort. Further, since Kurita thought he was facing a much stronger opponent, it would not be likely that he would divide his forces so that they could then be defeated in detail. Very few admirals or generals have pulled of such a maneuver successfully. Unlike Ozawa's carriers, Kurita's battleships and cruisers were not on a "death ride."

You might want to include the valiant pilots and aircrew of the CVEs in that statement.

I don't see Kurita as being imprudent, quite the opposite, it was his prudence, caution, that decided how he fought the day. He engaged an enemy that he thought was far superior to his own. Further, this enemy, TAFFY, was not the one he was ordered to engage, his main target still remained to be the transports off Leyte Gulf. Thus, after dispersing TAFFY 3, he reformed his forces and proceeded towards Leyte Gulf. By staying around to put "paid" on TAFFY 3, would put his already depleted forces at ever increasing risk of continued air attacks. As I said earlier, this was not a "death ride", by sinking the rest of TAFFY 3, but, quite probably, losing ALL of his ships was not what the admiral had been order to accomplish. For better or worse, Kurita chose to continue with his ordered mission, rather than finishing off TAFFY 3.

 

On a larger scale Samar resembles the Crete era engagement where the cruisers HMS Naiad, HMAS Perth, HMS Carlisle, and HMS Calcutta and destroyers HMS Kandahar, HMS Nubian and HMS Kingston failed to destroy a convoy of 38 sailing vessels escorted by a single Italian torpedo boat (and lots of Luftwaffe planes of course), Admiral King decided to retreat rather than "forcing" the smoke screen, but that engagement was touted as a British victory because the convoy turned back . Admirals under continuous air attack are likely to make bad decisions. Iachino at second Sirte, or Da Zara off Pantelleria (though the two forces were a lot more balanced in that instance) are another instances where a radar less superior fleet failed to close in through a smoke screen because of fear of torpedoes, and long range gunnery is often indecisive.

 

This falls into line with the timidity of the greater majority of japanese admirals in WW2.

Officers like Tanaka were 'thrusting' leaders, but they were the exception to the rule. The IJN demonstrated in WW2 that caution can be the cause of many a defeat, especially when your intelligence services are feeding you the wrong story, or if you do not control the airspace over the engagement area.

The Battle for Savo Island was a classic example of this. Here we have what was the closest thing to a decisive naval victory off Gudalcanal that the IJN ever achieved, and the fruits of that victory were thrown away. The Cruisers should have reformed and pressed on to sink every transport and support vessel then sitting in Ironbottom Sound. This would have isolated the First Marine Division, leading to it's evacuation, and the US Navy would have found itself back at Espiritu Santo. Lack of American presence in the Solomon chain spells doom for Port Moresby, with Coral Sea II seeing Moresby fall easily to amphibious landing.

Japanese naval commanders showed a breathtaking lack of guts throughout the Pacific war. For every 'Tenacious Tanaka', there were several Abe's or Kuritas. Suprising to historians this is, for the IJN was well trained and reasonably well equipped, (except for Radar, which was poorly maintained and operated, stemming from assigning the least motivated crew members to it's use. Most Japanese sailors wanted a more 'traditional' role in the fighting, and viewed such technological toys as having a not very meaningful role).

The US Navy, on the other hand, started off poorly equipped and with a massive amount of 'green' sailors with no experience. But, they were gadget oriented, and the men learnt faster than most services. Radar gunnery was taken up with an enthuiasm not known in the IJN, and by 1944, the US Navy was the most technologically proficient force of it's kind in the world.

Reminds me of Don Greenwood in the seventies commenting on the American serviceman in the US Army,,,,"Nobody learns faster....than the American serviceman."

 

Sadly, this is because we usually have to.

 

... I was actually leaning more towards Operation Vigorous; 2 Littorios, 2 CAs with support vs. Vian's CL, DD force with a convoy/Harwood liability, but your examples work and I won't argue the point.

 

I wonder how much of his decision to retire was based on the fact that his target were transports and not BB, like the IJN had been training for years. Normally transports were beneath a BB's dignity.

 

On carriers, by this stage of the war the United States Navy had perfected damage control procedures to the point that many hits that would have spelt doom in 1942 were inconvenient at worst by 1944. Just look at the difference between the loss of the U.S.S. Lexington at Coral Sea. "Lady Lex" sat for long enough without proper damage control whilst her fuel lines leaked, so that sparks touched off vapours that had collected, resulting in an explosion of epic proportions that guaranteed the loss of the vessel.

Contrast this with the agony of the U.S.S. 'Franklin' in 1944, hit by Kamikazes when readying for a strike, and caught with aircraft on deck and armed; this was supposedly the worst time for a carrier to be hit. But, because of better co-operation by the damage control teams, Franklin survived to be towed back to base with fires that would have struck it off the register in 1942. One has to look at the loss of Japanese carriers at Midway in the same light, for damage control on Japanese carriers was nowhere near as efficient throughout the entire Pacific war. Better equipment and procedures may well have resulted in less than four flat tops going to the bottom.

Regarding 'Franklin', the most tragic loss was all the pilots that were occupying the briefing room at the time of the attack. There exists a photo of a pile of bodies at the door of the room, as desperate pilots and officers tried and failed to get out of the compartment in a classic case of smoke inhalation flooring the lot of them. The best damage control techniques and equipment cannot compensate for the panic factor overcoming them.

 

IIRC in Vigorous the fleets never came into contact, my point was more the paralyzing fear ofthe smokescreen/torperdo combination common to most admirals, there are very few instances of non radar equipped ships braving that. In Vigorous the RN turned back after suffering damage to most mechantmen by air attack, I would agree witth the strategically short of fuel Iachino on turning back as well once the convoy aborted.

 

OK, let's turn the tables a bit. Reverse the situation.

Let's put Kurita in charge of a group of six CVE's---the Unyo, Taiyo, Chuyo, Shinyo, Ryuho, and Kaiyo (forget for a moment that some had already been sunk by US Subs) plus seven destroyers. Up over the horizon comes Admiral Willis Lee with battleships Iowa, Indiana, and South Dakota (no real equivalent existed in the US Navy for the "battlecruisers" of the Kongo class with a mere eight 14" guns--the SoDak alone probably had similar firepower to TWO "Kongos"), four "Baltimore"-class heavy cruisers and two others, then two Nashville CL's and 12 Fletcher-class DD's. Even take away their radar-direction and proximity-fuze shells that added much combat value.

Can you imagine *ANY* other result than total annihilation of the "Japanese Taffy 3" and maybe partial destruction of nearby "Taffy 2" in spite of a vigorous Japanese defense??? Just *TRY* to tell me that Lee (and any superiors) would be "content" with sinking ONE CVE and a few destroyers before retreating!!

Takao, your infatuation with things Japanese has biased your thinking into making excuses for poor judgement. Kurita was presented with an astounding opportunity and BLEW IT!

BTW, I meant 8"-18" guns of the main elements of the Japanese fleet (Cruisers, battlecruisers, Battleships, but of course there would also be 6.1", 4.7", etc. from the smaller ships), not the Yamato herself, and OF COURSE I would include the gallantry of the American airmen, many of whom did dummy runs to draw fire, etc.