Tank and Infantry coordination

How did this come about? I know that the tanks had a communications link with the Armored halftracks, but what about the armored infantry in the even that they dismount?

And how did they coordinate their actions in action without stopping to expose themselves?

And the Soviets had no halftracks..how did they communicate with their tanks without stopping?

 

Primarily a tactic first used by the Germans in 1939-1940. One of the reasons the Poles and French were beaten so quickly was they did not appreciate that armor and infantry were best used as combined arms and not seperately. French armor doctrine had their armor spread out, almost evenly across the Belgian frontier. The result was that their armor could not be massed at any one sector for a decisive blow. General Guderian spent many years studying the best way to apply armor and used tactical principles first discussed by the Englishman Liddell Hart and other foreign theorists in the 1930's. The Germans massed their armor at one point (schwerpunkt)while launching diversion attacks elsewhere and pierced the Anglo-french lines within a matter of weeks.
Also the French had armor and infantry operating seperately and not supporting each other. (The Germans used combined arms forces, the infantry looks out for enemy anti-tank guns that the tanks could not see, and the tank supports the infantry by helping them destroy machine gun nests and other threats. Stukas were used as flying artillery and were called in on artillery emplacements by ground controllers with the infantry and armor.)
Thus while some french infantry and armor units fought well for a while none could have any decisive effect against the Germans attack. The French and British forces were split in multiple parts by the attacing Germans and destroyed piecemeal.

The (German) armored infantry tended to stick close to their half-tracks. They would dismount when a threat to the tanks appeared or their commander wanted a suspicous location checked out. Thus their commander, who more often than not had his own half track, was usually within sight of them. Also all German tanks were supposed to be equipped with radios. This may sound like an obvious point but the fact is that for the early years of the war, most Russian tanks, even the T-34, had NO radio. They might be sent out in a 4 or 5 tank unit and maybe only one of these had a radio. So a Russian tank commander might have to result to using signal flags and hand gestures to signal the other tanks in his unit.

 

I don't know about the Germans, but US tanks did not have a radio that shared a common wave length with the infantry radio. The result was that tank-infantry cooperation in the infantry division was haphazard. Fortunately, the armored infantry's halftracks were on the same wave length with the tanks.

In green infantry divisions combined-arms skills were almost always lacking and they often suffered very heavy casaulties in their initiation to war. Also common is that new partnerships between infantry division on the one hand and independent tank battalion on the other needed time to be broken in, familiarity being an absolute essential for teamwork. For this reason, tank attatchments to infantry divisions often became semi-permanent; commanders were reluctant be break up efficient teams with long histories and collective memories of combined-arms warfare.

Later, infantry phones were wired to the rear of the tank so that the doughs could ring up a buttoned-up crew instead of trying to get its attention by the banging on the hatch and the shouting of profanities. Still, it must be said, standing behind a buttoned up tank in combat can be a major risk to health!

Eventually, the Army distributed dual wave length radios for platoon command leaders and over, sometime after the Battle of Normandy. This allowed direct communication at least between the commanders of the tank-infantry platoons. Of course, this was a choice part of a armored veteran's hoard and any knocked out command tank would be stripped of its radio, among other things...

 

By the way, I totally pulled the above post from memory. If anything is incorrect, please point it out.

 

I've only seen the Sherman with the infantry phone once, and it was in a movie...

How common were they?

 

How often did Tanks find themselves alone, and unknowingly advancing into enemy territory without infantry support?

 

Thanks. SCR-536 is what I am thinking about. Do you know if an improved reliability model is issued?

Very rarely. In a dire emergency or through the force of circumstances maybe. Some action are so vital that the loss of infantry support were accepted. I can think of a couple of actions in which the infantry peeled off to fight and the tanks simply rode on. This can be reckless and sloppy tactics but it happens.

 

BTW, I know Harry Yeides' Tank Killers discussed the difficulties of the TD, which used the tank radio, in coordinating and communicating with the infantry. The solution many adopted was to cram another infantry radio in the company's command vehicle.

 

Initially, the US had problems with tank - infantry commuincations. By shortly after D-Day many veteran units had rigged field telephones on the back of Shermans to allow the accompanying infantry to talk the crew. This became a standard modification due to its success. Where infantry in the ETO, MTO, or PTO had to work in close cooperation with tanks this field telephone arrangement worked very well. All any GI had to do was pick up the hand set on the rear of the tank and talk. It allowed the infantry to become the eyes of the tank and greatly increased its effectiveness especially in close terrain like Hedgerows, woods, or towns.
No other nation managed a similar system during the WW 2 period although this in time became the standard virtually everywhere.

 

There are many accounts of British mass tank attacks in Operation Goodwood with no Infantry support and charging literally blind..

 

Well, does anyone know if the SR-536 was superseded by other more reliable radios or improved for better dependability during the war? If SR-536 remained undependable, I would assume that setting up both infantry and armor radios in the tanks would be a more popular solution.

 

The standard US Infantry to Tank communication was the company level (infantry) SCR300 Walkie Talkie back pack. This could interlink with the AN/VRC 3 unit in the Tank. It was fitted on a need to use basis after D.Day in tanks, in front of the loaders seat. It became standard on the M26E3 Pershing.

The SCR536 Handie-Talkie (often mis named Walkie Talkie),which was AM system could not communicate with most other radios except the SCR284 and SCR506, the SCR506 was mounted in tanks at Batallion level and used by Infantry Batallion level coms. In theory assuming the correct set up- plug in crystal and coils (effectively no tuning on 536 except fine tuning available in the field) it would be possible for SCR536 to comunicate with SCR506 or 284 but it would be unlikely that the Batallion would be able to receive comunications from an SCR536. SCR536s could communicate with each other over short range, especially flat areas such as beaches- hence the use on D.Day, but there is no effective way it could be fitted to a tank.

The SCR300, which was FM could only communicate with SCR609 and SCR610 radios, SCR 609 was a back pack unit used by artillery spotters and SCR610 was fitted to Tank Destroyers, so some useful communications. The SCR300 could communicate with other SCR300 (company level and above) and equiped tanks. They could not communicate with SCR536 or with SCR508, SCR528 or be received by SCR538 tank radios.

SCR508 had one transmiter and two receivers, SCR528 one transmiter and one receiver and SCR538 No Transmiter and one receiver.

The Telephone on the rear of Shermans. The BC1362 external interphone and connected up to the standard intercom system in the tank via a RC 298 extension kit making closed up communication possible. As has been said Lash ups were used until the standardised kit was available.

One other thing with regard to SCR series fitted to Shermans in Southern France some Sherman DD came ashore, equiped only with SCR538 which was a receiver only radio.

The British Started fitting tanks with field telephones in Italy early in 1944.initally fitted in a metal ,303 or ,30 cal ammuniton box.

The Standard British tank radio was the No.19/38 and comprised the twin No.19 tank set AM Mw and VHF frequencies capable of long range MW (A set) and short range VHF (B Set) transmit or receive dual capablity to Squadron and troop level, In addition to the No.19 Tank Set, the No. 38 AFV type AM unit gave a transmit or receive capablity with the standard WS No.38 infantry pack unit which was often carried at platoon level at Normandy.

With regard to Goodwood some tanks out ran their infantry support and were cut up by enemy A/T defence, there are reports however of infantry squads working in support of tanks particularly Churchills eliminating A/T defence which was hidden from the tank vison.