Tank company in Bataan

I openly admit JC inspired me to look at this and now I share what I found.
It's website is Company C, 194th Tank Battalion in the Philippines, 1941-42

California State Military Department [SIZE=+3]The California State Military Museum[/SIZE] [SIZE=+1]A United States Army Museum Activity[/SIZE] Preserving California's Military Heritage [SIZE=+2]California Militia and National Guard Unit Histories[/SIZE] [SIZE=+3]Company C, 194th Tank Battalion in the Philippines, 1941-42[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]At a Roadblock on the Road to Bataan[/SIZE] Employing an Armor Quick Reaction Force in the Area Defense: The 194th Tank Battalion in Action During the Luzon Defensive Campaign 1941-42 Company C, 194th Tank Battalion in the Philippines, 1941-42 The Bataan Memorial, Camp San Luis Obispo [SIZE=+1]Employing an Armor Quick Reaction Force in the Area Defense: The 194th Tank Battalion in Action During the Luzon Defensive Campaign 1941-42[/SIZE]
by Major William J. Van den Bergh This article was originally published in the March-April 2004 issue of Armor Magazine, US Army Armor Center and School.

"Area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. The bulk of defending forces combine static defensive positions, engagement areas, and a small mobile reserve to block enemy forces. The reserve has a priority to the counterattack ... but may also perform limited security force missions." (1)
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U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0 As the United States' participation in the Second World War loomed in 1941, much of America's early fighting strength came from the Army National Guard. The 194th Tank Battalion had been organized from three National Guard tank companies, Company A from Brainerd, Minnesota; Company B from Saint Joseph, Missouri; and Company C from Salinas, California. The 194th Tank Battalion had deployed to the Philippines during the fall of 1941 in support of its defense from a possible Japanese attack.
The American defensive plan had been set for several years. The task of the Philippine and U.S. Army ultimately would be to defend Manila Bay with the purpose of denying the Japanese its use, and to allow for reinforcement from the Territory of Hawaii. (2) Manila Bay could only be denied to the Japanese by occupying the Bataan Peninsula and the Island of Corregidor, which guarded the harbor. (3) Retention of the Bataan Peninsula was the center of gravity for the entire Luzon Defensive Campaign. The plan was to defend for up to 6 months, until relieved by the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor.
Initial Japanese landings on Luzon occurred between 9 and 10 December 1941. (4) Unable to introduce combat power against these remote sites and unwilling to divide forces, U.S. forces could do nothing but wait for Japanese troops to arrive.
The 194th Tank Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Ernest B. Miller and was comprised of M3 tanks, half-tracks, jeeps, and motorcycles. For nearly a month, the 194th Tank Battalion had fought along a series of phase, obstacle, and holding lines, executing a retrograde delay from both North and South Luzon. It had fought a number of sharp actions and contributed significantly to the success of the orderly delay of American and Filipino forces back to the Bataan Peninsula. (Map 1)
The peninsula of Bataan is 20 miles wide and 25 miles long. Its existence is owed to two large extinct volcanoes, Mount Natib in the north and Mount Bataan in the south. They tower 4,222 and 4,722 feet respectively. (5) From the volcanoes, scores of streams race through the jungle down deep ravines. The jungle cover is so thick that Japanese reconnaissance from the air was nearly impossible. Bataan had numerous trails that, with lack of use, quickly grew over and road systems were few and undeveloped. (6) In the north, traveling from west to east was Highway 7. In the east, Highway 110 began far to the north and followed the coast south, then west and north to Moron. The west side of Highway 110 was designated as West Road, the east side as East Road. In the center of the Bataan Peninsula was the Pilar-Bagac Road. It cut directly across the center, providing the only lateral route. (7) The final defensive battles occurred on the Bataan Peninsula. The first line was known as the Abucay-Hacienda Line. (8) (Map 2) Along this defensive line were two higher headquarters, I and II Corps. I Corps had been the North Luzon Force and II Corps was the former South Luzon Force. The 194th Tank Battalion was allocated to II Corps in the east. The II Corps front was 15,000 meters long from Manila Bay to Mount Natib. (9)
By 10 January, the 194th Tank Battalion was well rested and ready for action. The morning began with the main Japanese attack within II Corps' area of operation (AO) near Abucay. Here, the 194th Tank Battalion moved forward to support the 57th Infantry (PS). The 57th Infantry was opposed by the Japanese 1st and 2d Battalion, 142d Infantry, 65th Brigade. (10)
As the battalion fulfilled its mission, Miller received a desperate early morning call. The Japanese had attacked in the I Corps and made a deep incursion. Captain Fred C. Moffitt and his Company C was sent into action. Lieutenant General (LTG) Jonathan M. Wainwright met Moffitt personally. Wainwright directed the company to attack north along a small trail. The Japanese 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry had successfully infiltrated south from Mount Silanganan using the deep gullies and streams to mask their movement. Now they established defensive positions just to the north. (11)
Wainwright's plan had the scouts (dismounted for the attack) from the 26th Cavalry clear the route ahead of time but no infantry was available to support the tank movement. Moffitt quickly identified the need for a leader's reconnaissance and additional infantry support to walk next to the tanks to deny the Japanese the ability to ambush them or employ the deadly model 93 antitank mines. Wainwright grew impatient and Moffitt was ordered to proceed. In short order, the lead platoon left its attack position and moved in column forward. The platoon had progressed only a short way when Moffitt heard an explosion. The two lead tanks had hit a minefield. As the company evacuated the two tanks, Japanese infantrymen crawled away and made good their exfiltration. From concealed positions, the Japanese fired their lightweight model 11, 37mm guns. Because of the thick vegetation, both sides had difficulty targeting. With some difficulty, the remaining tanks provided cover fire, as the two lead tanks were evacuated. (12)
Moffitt's executive officer sent back a contact report to Miller who reciprocated by draining the battalion's maintenance section of its last track links and idlers. Wainwright finally accepted the need for more infantry and moved forward the 3rd Battalion, 72nd Infantry, along with a motorized squadron from the 26th Cavalry. (13) From there, the American infantry reformed the line correctly and advanced north, checking the Japanese incursion and restoring their previous positions.
Later that evening, Brigadier General (BG) James R. N. Weaver, commander, 1st Provisional Tank Group, called a commander's huddle with both the 192d and 194th Tank Battalion commanders. The main body of front line troops would exfiltrate rearward that night leaving behind a small covering force. By 0300 hours the next morning, the covering force would also withdraw to positions north of the Orion-Bagac line near the town of Pilar. Here, the covering force would continue its mission, allowing the main body time to re-establish a coherent defense. Miller was pleased with the plan and was impressed with the learning that had occurred at the higher level. (14)
By 1800 hours, the withdrawal was underway. The undertrained Filipino troops attempted an orderly movement, but it quickly degenerated into a mob movement. Miller and a number of trained Filipino soldiers attempted to instill discipline, but the task was difficult. By 1900 hours, the Japanese sensed these movements and their attack began.
The II Corps' line in this sector was comprised of the 31st and 45th Infantry Regiments. (15) The 31st and 45th Infantry coveting forces fought savagely through the night, but by 0100 hours, it became apparent that their combat power was rapidly dwindling. Their successful withdrawal to new positions within a few hours and stabilizing the line over the next two-and-a-half days of fighting would determine whether the new defensive line would hold. (16)
As the 194th Tank Battalion provided the covering force for the 31st and 45th Infantry, Miller took some desperate radio traffic from Weaver. The left flank of II Corps was threatened with collapse and additional combat power was needed. Moving slowly west along a small trail, the tanks and halftracks approached their positions. It was during this movement that one of Company A's tanks, commanded by Sergeant Bernie FitzPatrick, ran partly off the side of a bridge and became stuck. (17) With little time to effect a recovery, Miller ordered it destroyed. A single 37mm round from another M3 set the tank on fire. It was quickly pushed into the stream. The move had to be made before the moon rose, but this aided in their concealment. The tanks and half-tracks were set into position and opened fire. A deadly massing of 37mm fire from the M3s and 75mm fire from the half-tracks stopped the Japanese attack cold. The infantry covering force withdrew and mounted buses that took them to safety. By 0300 hours, the operation was complete. (18)
By 26 January, the 194th Tank Battalion was positioned just south of the Orion-Bagac defensive line. (19) (Map 3) It was arrayed from north to south, along Back Road. As 1030 hours approached, several half-tracks, performing their security mission, sighted a Japanese officer and soldier as they crawled out of the jungle and walked to the south toward the intersection of the Back and Banibani Roads. Private Nordstrom manned the half-track's .30-caliber machine gun. A well-placed burst of his .30-caliber machine gun tore the two apart. Within a matter of minutes, the entire defensive line opened fire and a new battle began. The half-tracks replied by opening fire with their 75mm guns.
Prior to the battle, the gunners had identified several gullies and pieces of low ground that provided concealed and covered infiltration routes. As the battle began, the 75mm guns poured their fire into the gullies with devastating effect. (20) As the Japanese made it out of the smoke, dazed and suffering from the concussions, they were greeted with machine gun fire that succeeded in killing many of the survivors. Action was hot all along the road. From the north to the south, the battalion replied to the attack with deadly fire. Several times their positions were almost overrun, defended only by the 194th Tank Battalion support troops manning Thompson submachine guns and .45-caliber pistols. (21)
By 1130 hours, the Japanese artillery and mortar fire was zeroing in on the battalion's position. (22) At 1200 hours, Miller was forced to order a retreat behind the main line of resistance. The battalion's withdrawal was met by a determined Japanese air attack on the convoy. (23) The .50- and .30-caliber machine guns that were mounted on tanks and half-tracks met the attack the best they could. Accuracy for both the Japanese and the Americans was difficult, as the tanks and half-tracks were moving down the dirt road so quickly that the gunners and enemy pilots had great difficulty seeing through the dust. (24)
Weaver was quick to issue the 192d and 194th Tank Battalions a fragmentary order. The 194th Tank Battalion was to continue to provide an armor reserve for II Corps, while it gained an on-order mission to defend the beaches from the front line in the north to the town of Cabcaben in the south. Miller was frustrated with the command arrangement, as Weaver directed him to take orders only from Tank Group Headquarters rather than a more simplified chain of command directly from II Corps Headquarters. To facilitate better liaison, Miller complied with the orders but sent his reconnaissance platoon leader, Lieutenant Ted Spaulding, to Corps Headquarters as the battalion's liaison officer. (25)
General Masaharu Homma, commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, met with his 14th Army staff on 8 February. All attempts at reducing the American position had failed miserably. Now, with his attack force spent, he looked at new options for victory. (26) The original Japanese plan had contemplated an order of battle that included the elite 48th Division attacking at Linagayen Gulf, the 16th Division at Lamon Bay, and reinforcement at Linagayen by the 65th Brigade. (27) The campaign would last 50 days at most.
As early as January, Homma had received word from the Southern Army that the 48th Division was to be withdrawn to support operations in Java. The fight for Bataan began with only the 16th Division, the 7th Tank Regiment, and the 65th Brigade. Neither unit had a very good reputation after the first battles for Bataan. (28) Homma was overwhelmed by a sense of private and international humiliation. Here, for the first time during World War II, the Japanese had been stopped cold in their tracks with no hope for victory without reinforcement.
Meanwhile, significant work was completed in the preparation of the Pilar-Bagac line. (29) Fighting positions with overhead cover were built. Mines were laid to cover dead space that rifle fire could not cover. Time was found to further train the remaining Filipino troops and Miller ordered classes for the tankers on how to support the infantry. (30)
The morale of the troops was very high. The Japanese had been fought to an utter standstill. Desertions and discharges on the part of the Philippine Army had helped to reduce the unmanageable size of the force on Bataan. Combat effectiveness had increased markedly as combat experience weeded out the weak and brought forward the soldiers with leadership potential.
It was during this time that the II Corps G2 section detected a massive build up of Japanese forces. The Japanese 4th Division had arrived from Shanghai. The 21st Regiment (part of the 21st Division) had been diverted in route to Indo-China. Finally, several thousand replacements arrived to revitalize the 16th Division and the 65th Brigade. (31) Japanese air attacks became progressively larger reaching a total of 77 bomber sorties in just one day. The Japanese set up artillery across Manila Bay and fired accurately with the help of highflying aerial observers. (32)
As the tankers dug in, dengue fever, malaria, diarrhea, and dysentery afflicted many of the soldiers. Men became prone to dizziness as black spots raced across their view. Captain Leo Schneider, senior medical officer of the 194th, and Lieutenant Hickman, junior medic, set up an infirmary in the rear echelon as they now had a number who were sick. The inadequate amounts of medicine available only amplified the severity of what would have been very treatable afflictions. (33) During the first week of March 1942, soldiers began to be issued quarter rations. (34) Not long after this, General Douglas MacArthur left the Philippines and Major General Edward P. King Jr., was given command of Luzon. (35)
The build up of Japanese troops was completed 2 weeks later. (Map 4) The stalemate continued until the final Japanese assault on 3 April 1942. Arrayed against I Corps from west to east, were the Japanese 65th Brigade, the 4th Division, and a regimental team from the 21st Division (Nagano Det). (36) The fighting began at 1500 hours with a massive barrage of indirect fire from over 150 artillery pieces and mortars, quickly backed up by tank and antitank gun direct fire. The artillery fire was so intense that much of the north face of Mount Samat became engulfed in an uncontrollable forest fire. Entire units were destroyed. American and Filipino soldiers, already weakened from malnourishment, simply had no energy to retreat. (37) The focus of the attack was the west flank of the II Corps sector. (38) As American artillery exposed itself by returning counter battery fire, highflying Japanese dive-bombers dropped their bombs, one by one, taking them out. Action occurred in the south as well. Company A, 194th Tank Battalion had received the on-order mission to defend the coastline and was in position that evening when several Japanese barges, armed with 75mm field guns, fired at the shoreline. Company A returned fire and the Japanese decided to retreat. (39)
On 4 April, Miller was summoned to Tank Group Headquarters. Weaver detailed the plan that II Corps was preparing to counterattack and needed one tank company for support. Additionally, one company from the 192d Tank Battalion would replace Company A in their defend mission. Miller returned to battalion headquarters to conduct an abbreviated military decisionmaking process. Company C, followed by the battalion tactical command post (TAC), would head north. The TAC would be comprised of Miller and Captain Spoor, the S2, operating out of a jeep. Major L.E. Johnson, the S3, would take charge of the remaining combat units while Major Charles Canby, the XO, commanded the field trains. (40)
After a wild ride up the narrow trail, Miller and the TAC located the Philippine division headquarters. The plan was for the 45th Infantry Regiment (on loan from I Corps) to attack north along Trail 29. They would flank the Japanese to the right, forcing a withdrawal. Company C would move its tanks on mountain trails to join the 45th Infantry in the attack. The plan was simple, but the men were worn out.
By 1600 hours on 6 April 1942, the TAC arrived at the south end of Trail 29. On arrival, they met Colonel Thomas W. Doyle, the commanding officer of the 45th Infantry. After much discussion and a reconnaissance, the TAC departed at 1900 hours to bring up Company C who was still occupying its tactical assembly area to the south. (41)
The trail to the south was jammed with confused traffic. Wounded soldiers were being evacuated, and broken down vehicles littered the battlefield creating massive traffic jams. The ride north would be even more harrowing. The battalion TAC led the way up the trail. At every turn it would find a wreck or obstacle that required evacuation from the route. Precious time was spent dismounting tanks and assessing the best way to deal with the wrecks. Company C tanks would push and pull the wrecks off the trail and then push and pull each other up and down the route. (42)
Company C arrived at Trail 29 at 0610 hours that morning. They were 10 minutes late in supporting the attack. The 45th Infantry had just begun its movement to contact, allowing the tankers time to quickly catch up. Progress was slow as thick jungle met the trail on either side. The only place to maneuver the tanks was on the trail. This made Miller very uneasy. The infantry and armor advanced cautiously and did not make contact with the Japanese until 0900 hours. After a series of minor engagements, Doyle became worried. It was now 1530 hours and his troops had lost contact with I Corps to his left and the troops to his right. (43) This suggested to Miller and Doyle that the enemy had infiltrated to the southeast of their area. What they did not know for certain is how far south. (44)
As the two met, a report from Philippine scouts was received and described Japanese troops preparing defensive positions just a short distance to the north. Doyle mulled over several attack options. All his regiment had left for indirect fire was a single 81mm mortar with 10 rounds. Five of the 10 shells were fired expertly, bringing significant damage to the partially prepared Japanese positions. The 45th Infantry and Company C followed up with a short, hasty attack. The Japanese were so surprised that they abandoned their artillery, mortars, and rifles, running and screaming wildly into the jungle. As night approached, Miller and Spoor inspected the Japanese positions and discovered a well-prepared minefield located on Trail 29 next to the positions. The area had been seeded with the deadly model 93 mine that had brought Company C many casualties earlier in the campaign. Once again, luck and circumstance had intervened in their favor. (45)
Later that evening, Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Wright, the 45th Infantry's XO, headed back 2 miles south to re-establish contact with the regimental field trains. The situation was desperate. After arriving at the field trains, Miller and Wright were quickly apprised of the enemy situation. The Japanese main effort had indeed advanced to the east and south of their advance north. Thus, the Japanese had made a considerable penetration south all the way to the Philippine division headquarters. The division sent the 45th Infantry and Company C new orders. The two units would advance over the mountains to the east, arriving at the intersection of Trails 6 and 8. Here, they would set up defensive positions along a ridgeline north of Trail 8. (46)
The officers returned to their units and began their movement south along Trail 29. As they reached the intersection of Trails 29 and 8, Company C met the Philippine division commander, Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough. He informed Miller that he was aware of the original orders, but that his G2 had informed him that the area along Trail 8 was no longer under American or Philippine control.
The column of infantry and tanks cautiously began their movement along Trail 8. Miller and Lough organized an advanced guard for the 45th Infantry and Company C. In the lend was a squad of Philippine scouts, followed by two of Company C's M3 tanks. Miller, Wright, and Spoor trailed in a jeep. Movement occurred without incident for some 50 minutes until the advanced guard stopped for a 10-minute rest. Just as the tanks stopped, Miller's jeep accelerated and swung quickly to the right. As they halted, the scouts could be seen passing the first tank calling out, "Japs!" (47)
The Japanese 65th Brigade had beaten them to the area. At that moment, a Japanese 75mm model 95 antitank gun opened fire. Leaves and branches fell to the ground as heavy machine gun fire cut a swath of destruction on the two lead tanks. Lieutenant Frank Riley, the tank commander, attempted to return fire only to receive a direct hit in the turret from an armor-piercing round from the model 95. Luck was on his side that day as the round sliced through the side of the turret, missing his head by inches. Blood ran through his shaking fingers from the small pieces of shrapnel that had been imbedded in his eyes and face. To Riley's rear, the scouts had re-established a hasty defense and, with Tommy guns blazing, returned a murderous coveting fire. Miller and Spoor low crawled along the trail back to the scouts. Japanese bullets were striking the ground to their left and right, blowing rocks and sand into their skin. (48)
The second tank escaped destruction by being in a hull-defilade position in a depression. Several accurate shots from the Japanese 75ram antitank gun succeeded in hitting the turret, though. Fortunately, the rounds bounced off harmlessly and the tank, along with Riley's crew, made good their retreat. The advanced guard consolidated and treated their casualties. Miller could see that smoke was pouring from his jeep. It had received a direct hit from the Japanese 75mm gun. Wright, who had occupied the rear seat, was never heard from again. The surviving M3 tank, along with the scouts, began movement back to the main body of the 45th Infantry. (49)
Vehicle movement was slow as their column neared physical and mental exhaustion. By 0800 hours on 7 April, they had made it back to their original start point, the intersection of Trails 8 and 29. Moffitt explained that life had not been boring for Company C. Earlier that morning, a column of Japanese model 89A tanks from the Japanese 7th Tank Regiment had attempted an attack from the north along Trail 29. Two were destroyed and the Japanese column beat a hasty retreat. (50)
Lough sent orders for Company C tankers to secure the intersection at Trail 8 and 29. The 45th Infantry evacuated the immediate area and moved a short distance south. Miller then received orders from Tank Group Headquarters to return to his battalion. Miller let Doyle know his orders, asked him to take care of Company C, and departed. After a quick stop at Tank Group Headquarters, Miller and Spoor mounted a new jeep and headed south. The battalion field trains had been obliged to move south into a new position due to heavy Japanese artillery fire. Miller rolled into the new location at 0400 hours on 8 April. The trains had set up directly west of the town of Cabcaben. (51)
By this time, the defensive line was disintegrating. The Japanese 8th Infantry (4th Division) and the Nagano Det were bearing down hard on II Corps. The Japanese progressed from Limay to Lamao on 8 April alone. (52) II Corps tasked the 194th Tank Battalion with supporting a new deliberate attack on the Japanese. Company D, commanded by Captain Jack Altman, was being readied when events began to surpass the II Corps staff's ability to assess and react.
Altman attempted to introduce his tanks against the Japanese by providing general support along the defensive line where they could. Company D's attack degenerated quickly. Artillery rained down on the company destroying several M3s. Tanks attempted to negotiate through the retreating traffic, but to little avail. As tanks tried to bypass wrecks, they became stuck in the swampy bogs. (53)
To the south, Company A, 192d Tank Battalion and the entire 194th Tank Battalion were in defensive positions facing northeast along the coast, directly blocking the Japanese advance. Additional half-tracks were positioned along Trail 10, providing significant information to both the battalion and II Corps headquarters until the fighting ended. That morning, 8 April 1942, the Japanese assembled a motley collection of canoes, fishing boats, and small barges and attempted a half-hearted amphibious landing directly in front of their positions. The Japanese artillery also attempted to fire smoke into the two tank companies to provide obscuration against the tankers. Instead, the rounds fell just short, landed on the beaches, and added insurmountable confusion to the Japanese landing. The Japanese withdrew. (54)
That afternoon, a battalion ammunition truck pulled up next to Company A, 194th Tank Battalion. Before the company could receive their ammunition, the roar of an approaching Japanese zero could be heard. Soldiers took cover as the fighter's machine guns tore apart the truck loaded with ammo. Shells exploded in all directions, causing the ground to shake and dirt to fly. No sooner than it had started, it was over. The driver of the truck stood up from the trench where he had taken cover and dusted himself off. He grinned out of his sun burnt, dirty face and said, "When they ask me where I was at the time of surrender, I can always say I was where the shells were the thickest." (55)
As the afternoon approached, orders were received from Tank Group Headquarters to have the battalion move further south. Companies A and D, 194th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, began movement. The trip was slow and arduous. Military police had to stop them several times as ammunition dumps were blown to prevent capture. That evening, the remaining tanks formed a defensive tactical assembly area and waited. The battalion commander's radio operator waited for the code word "blast" on the radio. This would be the signal to destroy all remaining equipment. (56)
Around 0630 hours on 9 April 42, Company C returned to the battalion. At 0700 hours, "blast" was finally received. The tankers worked feverishly to destroy their equipment. One tank fired its remaining rounds into the other tanks and several trucks from the field trains. Gasoline was poured on every major item and lit. Food was evenly redistributed and the men prepared for the unknown. (57) That night, the men ate corn beef hash and peaches and thought of home. Few could imagine the horrors that awaited them on the death march and internment, but most just wrapped up in a blanket and went to sleep. (58)
The Philippines now began a brutal occupation that came to an end with the return of U.S. forces in October 1944. The lineage of the 194th Tank Battalion is perpetuated by the 1st and 2d Battalion, 194th Armor (Minnesota Army National Guard) and Company C, 1st Battalion, 149th Armor (California Army National Guard).
Footnotes (1) U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2001), p, 85.
(2) Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines--United States Army in World War II, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 61.
(3) David Smurthwaite, The Pacific War Atlas, Mirabel Books Ltd., London, 1995, p. 34.
(4) LTC Mariano Villarin, We Remember Bataan and Corregidor, Gateway Press, Baltimore, MD, 1990, p. 37,
(5) John Keegan, Atlas of the Second World War, Harper Collins, London, 1997, p. 73.
(6) Paul Ashton, Bataan Diary, Military Historical Society of Minnesota, Little Falls. MN, 1984, p. 101.
(7) Ibid., p. 100.
(8) Ibid., p. 93.
(9) Ibid., p. l01.
(10) Morton, 267.
(11) Ernest B, Miller, Bataan Uncensored, Hart Publications, Long Prairie, MN. 1949, p. 148.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Morton, p. 283.
(14) Miller, p 154.
(15) Ashton, pp. 106, 107.
(16) Villarin, pp. 65-70.
(17) Bernard T. Fitzpatrick, The Hike into the Sun, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, 19931, p. 39.
(18) Ibid. p. 40.
(19 Miller, p 160.
(20) Morton, p. 294.
(21) Miller, pp. 165, 167.
(22) Morton, p. 294.
(23) Ted Spaulding, Itchy Feet, unpublished, South Dakota, 1999, p. 109.
(24) Miller, p. 168.
(25) Spaulding, p. 109.
(26) FitzPatrick, p. 42.
(27) Villarin, p. 26.
(28) Ibid., p. 59.
(29) Ashton. p. 112.
(30) Miller, p. 184.
(31) Morton, p, 413.
(32) Ibid., p 493.
(33) Miller, p 179.
(34) Ibid., p. 186.
(35) Morton, 405, 406.
(36) Ashton, p. 112.
(37) Villarin, p. 87.
(38) Morton, p. 415.
(39) FitzPatrick, p. 51.
(40) Miller, pp 196. 197.
(41) Ibid., p. 198.
(42) Ibid., p 199.
(43) Ibid., p. 199
(44) Morton, p. 415.
(45) Miller, pp, 200, 201.
(46) Ibid., p, 202.
(47) Ibid, p. 204.
(48) Ibid., pp. 204, 205.
(49) Ibid., p. 205.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Ibid., p 206.
(52) Morton, pp 442, 443.
(53) Miller, p. 206.
(54) Ibid. p. 208.
(55) FitzPatrick, p. 52.
(56) Miller. p. 208.
(57) Ibid., p 209.
(58) FitzPatrick, p. 53.
About the Author Major William J. Van den Bergh is currently assigned to J3 Operations, Joint Task Force Headquarters-Minnesota, Minnesota Army National Guard. He received a B.A. from the University of Minnesota and an M.A. from Saint Cloud University He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 6th Infantry Division; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 194th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division; S3, 1st Battalion, 194th Infantry Regiment; and operations officer, Mobilization Readiness Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Minnesota Army National Guard.
[SIZE=+1]The Bataan Memorial, Camp San Luis Obispo[/SIZE] [SIZE=+1]Company C, 194th Tank Battalion in the Philippines, 1941-42[/SIZE] by Burton Anderson
This article was originally published in the May-June 1996 issue of Armor Magazine, US Army Armor Center and School. The author wishes to thank the following Company C
Bataan survivors for their input into this article: CWO Ero Saccone, USA, Ret.; Frank L Muther; Leon A. Elliott, Roy L. Diaz, Thomas J. Hicks, and Glenn D. Brokaw.

It has been over 50 years (as of this writing) since the surviving members of Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, were liberated from Japanese prison camps. In honor of those indomitable men, I am writing a three-part history of the company in peace and war. It is also a tribute to those fallen Company C tankers who died during World War II in the service of their country; in combat and their brutal prisoner of war ordeal. The Salinas company was organized as Troop C, Cavalry, National Guard of California on August 5, 1895. It was the first guard unit formed in the Central Coast region and was headquartered in the new brick armory at the corner of Salinas and Alisal Streets in Salinas, California. The commanding officer was Captain Michael J. Burke, assisted by 1st Lieutenant J.L. Matthews and 2nd Lieutenant E.W. Winham. the armory was dedicated on August 15, 1896 and housed the company's equipment including supplies, ammunition and its single shot Springfield 45-70 carbines left over from the Indian Wars.
Other than routine training with its horses, the troop wasn't called into active duty until April 1906, after the San Francisco earthquake, when it was deployed to the city and bivouacked in Golden Gate Park. the troop facilitated law and order in the devastated area for a month and one day. After the crisis was over the troop returned to Salinas and resumed its normal operations.
On May 1, 1911 the National Guard of California integrated Troop C into the 1st Squadron of California Cavalry; the other troops in the squadron were A Bakersfield, B Sacramento and D Los Angeles.
The next duty involving Troop C occurred as a result of Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, March 9, 1916. President Wilson immediately sent U.S. Regular troops into Mexico in pursuit of Villa. He later called 75,000 National Guard troops into federal service, including the entire 1st Squadron of Cavalry to patrol and secure the U.S. Mexican border. On June 24, 1916 Troop C marched up Main Street to the Southern Pacific depot to entrain for mobilization at Sacramento. The troop's horses, wagons, and equipment were loaded on a freight train leaving simultaneously. After assembly at Sacramento, Troop C was shipped to Nogales, Arizona where it performed patrol and guard duty. The troop didn't encounter any hostile action but in performing its duties it endured many hardships, notably from heat and fatigue while carrying out countless hours of surveillance. After the punitive expedition terminated, Troop C was released from federal service and returned to Salinas on November 18, 1916, with just a few of its horses.
The Troopers barely had time to resume their civilian occupations when the United States declared war on Germany, April 6, 1917. On August 12, Troop C was again inducted into the army and entrained with its horses, wagons and equipment for assembly at Arcadia, California and then onto Camp Kearney, San Diego County. At Kearney the cavalry was dismounted and converted to Company B, 145th Machine Gun battalion in the 40th Infantry (Sunrise) Division. The reason for the change was that the introduction and use of machine guns on the Western Front had inflicted unbearable slaughter on infantry and cavalry, thereby rendering horse cavalry obsolete and drastically changing infantry tactics. The company trained until August 1918 when they were shipped to France with the 40th Division. The war was over before the 40th saw any action and it was returned to the U.S. in March 1919. Company B was released from federal service May 20, 1919 and returned to Salinas and deactivated.
In 1920 the U.S. Army underwent a reorganization and the National Guard became a permanent part of the Army Reserve. Due to the success of tanks in World War I, the Army organized one tank company in each of the 18 National Guard Infantry divisions scattered across the United States. Salinas was selected as the site of one of these tank companies and on June 18, 1924 the 40th Tank Company was authorized and equipped with eight light tanks of French Renault-design left over from World War I. The 40th became the first tank company formulated in California and recruited men from the surrounding cities and counties as far away as Watsonville, Hollister and King City.
The old armory was inadequate for a mechanized outfit and was vacated by the guard and converted to other uses. In 1924 the new 40th Tank company occupied the Lacey Building at the corner of Market and Monterey Streets in Salinas. Later in the decade the 40th moved to another building in the 100 block of Monterey Street that eventually became the home of the Salinas Index Journal.
The need for a permanent armory became compelling and the city council and various community organizations launched a campaign to construct a new armory between Salinas Street and Lincoln Avenue. Seeded by the city's purchase of the land for $40,000 and $10,000 in cash from the community, the federal government and the state provided the balance of funds to construct the building at a total cost of $250,000. The tank company moved in November 1, 1932 and at that time consisted of 65 officers and men commanded by Captain Frank E. Heple; assisted by 1st Lieutenant Harry J. King, 1st Lieutenant L.E. Johnson, 2nd Lieutenant Fred E. Moffit. The 40th continued to be equipped with the six-ton Renault tanks, three of which were in Salinas and five at Camp San Luis Obispo where their annual two week training was carried out.
The next call to duty for the guard came in July, 1934 when the 40th Tank Company was mobilized for duty during the Longshoreman's strike on the San Francisco waterfront. The strike had turned violent and Governor Rolph sent in the National Guard. The 40th spent eight days in San Francisco and was then immediately sent to Camp San Luis Obispo for their annual two week field duty.
In 1937 the tank company received the new M2A2 light tank which was to serve during the remainder of peace time and during training at Fort Lewis, after its induction into federal service.
The spectacular success of the German Panzer Divisions in the fall of France and Belgium caused the Army to form four tank battalions, from the 18 scattered National Guard tank companies, numbered 191, 192, 193, and 194. On September 8, 1940, the old 40th Tank Company became Company C, 194th Tank Battalion and was alerted for possible call-up. It didn't take the Army long to decide to induct various National Guard units into federal service, and on February 10, 1941, Company C was federalized and ordered to Fort Lewis, Washington, for training. At Fort Lewis, the Salinas company joined with Company A from Brainerd, Minnesota, and Company B, from St. Joseph, Missouri, to form the 194th Tank Battalion with Major E.B. Miller as commanding officer.
At Fort Lewis, it seemed that everything that could go wrong, did go wrong, from lack of uniforms to shortages of tanks and equipment. In addition, the Regular Army general at Fort
Lewis viewed "latter day" soldiers with contempt, which made life even more difficult. In spite of all this, the 194th was rated among the best tank battalions in the Army and was shipped out from San Francisco on September 8, 1941, with 54 new Stuart M3 light tanks, bound for Manila. The unit had the distinction of being the first U.S. armored unit overseas in what was to become World War II.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the shortage of supplies, especially gasoline and spare parts, hampered the battalion's training exercises, even though there were adequate supplies in the quartermaster warehouses in Manila. It was so bad that a request for spare parts often took 30 days to navigate the Army red tape. More critical was the fact that live ammunition wasn't issued until December 2, and the 37-mm tank guns had never been fired. The 37-mm High Explosive (HE) ammo was never shipped to the Philippines; Ordnance finally improvised some HE ammo during the campaign.
On November 20, the 192nd Tank Battalion arrived in Manila and Company D, which was on board, was assigned to the 194th to replace Company B (from St. Joseph, Missouri) which had been detached at Fort Lewis and sent to Alaska. (Note: Additional historical research has indicated that Company D, 192nd Tank Battalion may not have been attached to the 194th as planned.) Colonel R.N. Weaver, a Regular Army officer, was placed in command of the Provisional Tank Group, consisting of the 192nd and 194th Tank Battalions, which was under the direct control of the U.S. Army Forces Far East (MacArthur), bypassing MG Wainwright, the ground forces commander. This split command structure was to cause many problems in the defense of Luzon.
When the Japanese struck Clark Field December 8, 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor, Company C tankers were in defensive positions around the perimeter of the field. They had just finished lunch and were cleaning their mess kits when they saw an approaching formation of bombers and assumed they were U.S. bombers until the bombs started falling. The attacking force consisted of 53 bombers followed by 34 fighters. C Company soldiers ran to their tanks and half-tracks and commenced firing in spite of the bombs falling all around them. The enemy bombers smashed the neat rows of B-17s and P-40s lined up on the runway and then the fighters strafed everything that was left. At the end of the raid some 40 minutes later, half the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force was destroyed. In all, 55 men were killed and over 100 wounded, but miraculously, Company C suffered no casualties even though its soldiers were firing from exposed positions.
The fighters flew so low that it seemed a shotgun could bring one down. At that point, a "green" Regular Army lieutenant grabbed a private first class's arm and yelled that shooting at the planes would give away their position - as if it mattered at that point. The GIs blazed away with everything they had, and Private Earl G. Smith of Company C was credited with downing one of the nine enemy fighters shot down that day.
After the raid, the company spent the night loading machine gun belts from Springfield rifle clips because they had fired all their belted ammo. The next day, the company was split off from the battalion and bivouacked two miles northeast of Clark Field. It remained there until December 12, when it was detached from the 194th and ordered to join the South Luzon Force under the command of Brigadier General Albert M. Jones. They marched south at night, about 40 miles, and then made a daylight dash to Muntinlupa and on to Tagatay Ridge on the 14th. The company remained in this area from the 14th to the 24th and conducted reconnaissance patrols, hunting presumed fifth columnists who were flashing mirrors by day and setting off flares at night near our ammo dumps. No one was ever captured, but after C Company shot up some suspected native huts, the suspicious activities ceased.

The Japanese landed 7,000 troops at Lamon Bay at 0200 on December 24 and proceeded inland in the direction of Lucban. Meanwhile, Company C moved into position on Christmas Eve to assist the Filipino 1st Infantry Regiment. During Christmas Day, Brigadier General Jones personally conducted a reconnaissance down a narrow road toward the enemy, escorted by a Company C halftrack manned by Sergeant Keith Lewis, Sergeant Leon Elliott, Private First Class Jim Hicks, Private William Hennessey, and Private Fred Yeager. They were reconnoitering north of Piis, Luzon, when they came under fire from an enemy advance guard. The halftrack, in attempting to turn around, fell into a ditch, but the crew was able to remove their guns and provide covering fire as they retreated, enabling General Jones and his driver to escape unharmed. For this action, General Jones recommended the crew for the Distinguished Service Cross, but no action was taken until April 1946, and then the recommendation was denied.Instead, the five crew members were awarded the Silver Star, but by then, only Sergeant Leon Elliott was still alive.
On December 26, the 2nd platoon was ordered by a Filipino major to move down a narrow mountain trail, firing as they went to impress the Filipino troops. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Needham, protested the order and suggested they do a reconnaissance first to see what was out in front, but the major assured him that the enemy only possessed small arms and ordered the platoon to carry out the mission. The tankers set out and promptly ran into an antitank gun and some concealed field pieces. The lead tank was hit, mortally wounding Lieutenant Needham and Private First Class Robert Bales. Staff Sergeant Emil S. Morello, in the second tank, drove around the disabled tank and ran over the antitank gun. (see painting above) Sergeant Morello's tank was also hit, wounding Private Eddie DiBenedetti, who was hit in the neck by a flying rivet. (This incident prompted the War Department to change from riveted to welded construction in new tank production.) Another tank, commanded by Sergeant Glenn Brokaw, was hit and Privates First Class Jim Hicks, McLeod, and Seifort were killed and Brokaw seriously wounded. (Ironically, Hicks had volunteered to drive Brokaw's tank when the regular driver became ill.)
In all, five tanks were hit and immobilized. Sergeant Morello and four wounded stayed buttoned up inside their tanks, not daring to move because the Japanese had camped for the night alongside the tanks, unaware that anyone inside was alive. In the morning, the enemy left, and Sergeant Morello began tending the casualties. He gathered up five wounded, and they escaped through coconut groves and rice paddies.
With the help of Filipino guides they hired, Sergeant Morello and the wounded soldiers all showed up in Manila five days later after fleeing through enemy territory. He left DiBenedetti in a Catholic Hospital in Manila and, with the other wounded, made his way by Banca to Corregidor. Later, during February, Sergeant Morello was able to rejoin the company on Bataan. For this action, Sergeant Morello was awarded the Silver Star.
The action described above resulted in the loss of an entire platoon of tanks and five soldiers, and was a grim lesson about the consequences when reconnaissance is ignored and tanks are sent out on a mission, essentially blind.
Manila was declared an open city on December 24, and, on the 25th, General MacArthur ordered the implementation of Orange Plan-3, which provided for the withdrawal of all Philippine and U.S. forces into Bataan as a last defensive position. In compliance with the order, Company C withdrew from South Luzon on December 29, acting as a rear guard for General Jones's troops. They moved to Tagatay Ridge on the 31st and made a sleepless 100-mile night dash to Bocaue where they rejoined the rest of the 194th Tank Battalion.
On the march North, the troops were to bypass Manila because it had been declared an open city; however, the rear guard, led by First Sergeant Ero "Ben" Saccone, was unsure of the route around the city. They decided to go through central Manila (the only maps they had were Atlantic Richfield service station maps) and it didn't seem to matter that the city was off limits.In the dark, one of Company C's tanks hit the Jose Rizall statue while trying to avoid hordes of fleeing civilians. The tank threw a track on impact and bent an idler. The crew worked all night trying to repair it, but by daylight, they saw it was hopeless. They disabled the tank and tried to hitch a ride with some Filipino troops in Bren Gun carriers. None would stop until the tankers leveled their .45 cal Thompson submachine guns at the convoy. Then they got a lift; they were the last armored troops out of Manila.
From Bocaue, the company headed for the Calumpit Bridge over the Pampanga River on Route 3. This was a vital structure, since all traffic fleeing Manila toward Bataan had to pass over this bridge. It was here that C Company witnessed 100-150 empty Filipino trucks in headlong flight from Manila, where there were ample supplies in the warehouses. Had these supplies been moved while there was still time, the U.S. and Filipino forces on Bataan could have conceivably held out longer and with far less suffering. Also, had these supplies been moved prior to the outbreak of hostilities, as called for in Orange Plan-3, the troops wouldn't have nearly starved to death. Perhaps the inaction was due to General MacArthur's belief that war would not break out until April 1942.
All the South Luzon forces were across the Calumpit Bridge by 0230 January 1, followed by C Company in the rear guard. Then the bridge was blown up. From there, the tanks moved through San Fernando at the critical junction of Route 3 and Route 7 from North Luzon. Again, the tankers formed successive road blocks on Route 7 during the next three days.
At 1600 on January 5, Captain Fred Moffitt, commanding officer, C Company, leading two tanks and two halftracks, assisted by four self-propelled 75-mm guns and the 31st Infantry, ambushed 750-800 enemy troops. Our forces inflicted 50 percent casualties on the Japanese and left the town of Lubao in flames. Had they not stopped the enemy troops there, our retreat into Bataan would have been cut off.
Moving toward Bataan on January 6, another night battle took place near Remulus. Captain Moffitt's halftrack took a direct hit from an enemy shell that took off Private William Hennessey's left foot and wounded Private First Class Walter Martella. Both died of their wounds, Martella within a few days due to gas gangrene, and Hennessey at Camp O'Donnell after the surrender on Bataan. In the same battle, Staff Sergeant Carl F. Abbott scored a direct hit on an enemy tank before his tank was hit and disabled; however, he escaped injury and the tank was retrieved the next day.
The withdrawal toward Bataan continued, and by January 7th, Company C was at the Culo River, guarding the left flank of the Layac Bridge, which was the gateway to Bataan. As soon as all forces were across, the tankers withdrew and the bridge was blown up, temporarily sealing off the Bataan Peninsula. The blowing of bridges had become of critical importance, and the commanding officer of the 194th had to give his personal order before a bridge could be demolished. This order came about because of the loss of six tanks by the 192nd at the Agno River in Northern Luzon, when panicky Filipino troops blew a bridge and stranded the tanks on the enemy side.
The withdrawal into Bataan to a bivouac south of the Abucay Main Battle Line afforded the troops a slight lull from battle. They had been in action for 30 consecutive days and were exhausted. To add to their misery, MG Wainwright ordered the food ration cut in half, to only 30 ounces per man per day. In the first month of combat, Company C had lost seven tanks and six men killed in action. The losses necessitated reorganizing the company into three platoons of three tanks each, plus one command tank (prewar strength was five tanks to a platoon plus the CO and XO tanks, for a total of seventeen). The remaining tanks were long past the 400-hour scheduled maintenance and had been run so hard the rubber track plates had been worn down to the metal. Fortunately, some replacement parts were available from the Service Command Area in southern Bataan.
The next significant action involving a platoon of C Company was after General Wainwright sent three tanks to Bagac, on the west coast of Bataan. The following day, they were ordered to advance north to reopen the coastal highway to Moron. The tanks were moving in advance of the main body and as they rounded a curve, the lead tank (Staff Sergeant Frank Muther) was fired on at point-blank range by an antitank gun. Incredibly, the round went right over the turret, and in returning fire, the tank knocked out the enemy gun. Two tanks following 600 yards back hit land mines placed by the Japanese after the lead tank went by. This use of land mines was a favorite tactic of the Japanese. Muther's tank was able to turn around and withdraw past the disabled tanks, and the platoon got out without any personnel casualties. The disabled tanks were towed out the next day and used for spare parts.
This incident was another case where an order to send tanks out alone, ahead of infantry, nearly became a suicide mission. Throughout the campaign, tanks were not used properly. The generals regarded them as mobile pill boxes. They also tended to send only a platoon when a full company was needed. Conflicting orders from the Provisional Tank Group Commander (Colonel Weaver) and General Wainwright kept the tank battalion commanders in constant turmoil, and often they had to rely on their own judgment. The tanks were often assigned piecemeal to various units by Tank Group or by Wainwright's ground commanders, thereby losing the advantage of combined arms protection. In addition, few senior officers had any experience with tanks, and they did not know how to employ armor to the best advantage.
By the middle of January, lack of food and medicine caused malaria, dengue (dengue fever), and dysentery, which took a heavy toll on the malnourished troops. Especially critical was a shortage of quinine to treat a virulent form of malaria prevalent on the Bataan Peninsula. The constant hordes of flies and mosquitoes made their problems worse. The troops had not received any mail since the war started. Occasionally, they could get some news via short-wave radio from San Francisco, but otherwise listened to Tokyo Rose for entertainment.
On January 26th, C/194 covered the withdrawal from the Abucay Main Battle Line toward the next defensive position at the Pilar-Bagac Road. (The only satisfactory road across Bataan.) As Company C was moving across an area called Hacienda Flats, the U.S. forces inflicted at least 1,500 casualties. The Japanese retaliated with a heavy bombing attack. A dud bomb went though the fender of Muther's tank but didn't explode. Another tank stalled on a bridge and had to be pushed over the side to prevent a roadblock. Captain Moffitt was wounded in the leg by a flying timber while crossing a bridge just as it was blown up.
By February 8, the U.S. and Philippine forces had fought the enemy to a standstill in spite of their supply, disease, and malnutrition problems. There was a lull in infantry action, but theJapanese kept up the relentless shelling and bombing of our lines. Company C was on the east coast of Bataan and used mainly for beach defense, to ward off any attempt by the enemy to invade Bataan from Manila Bay. During an aerial attack near Lamao, a .50 cal machine gunner from C Company hit a Japanese plane that was last seen smoking and diving toward Manila Bay, a fact confirmed by Sergeant Lewis. The company was split up into various beach positions, and some of the locations were near enough to Japanese lines that 14-inch mortar fire from U.S. guns on Corregidor landed uncomfortably close to our tanks.
By the middle of March, the food ration was cut again, down to 15 ounces per man per day. The troops subsisted mainly on rice, supplemented by anything they could scrounge, including worms, snakes, monkeys, and an occasional native caribou. General Wainwright, an old cavalry man, had to order the slaughter of 250 horses and 42 mules from his beloved 26th Cavalry Regiment to ward off starvation. In spite of the extra meat, the Bataan forces were in dire straits, with one fourth of the troops in the hospital with disabilities associated with disease and malnutrition.
Toward the end of March, the Japanese resumed their offensive after being reinforced by Imperial Marines released after the fall of Singapore. On April 3, the enemy began an all-out offensive, accompanied by constant bombing and shelling. Major General Edward E King (in command after Wainwright moved to Corregidor) made one last effort to stop the enemy
across Southern Bataan.
Four tanks from the 2nd platoon were sent from Lamao, on April 6, over mountain trails to the vicinity of Mount Samat in south central Bataan. The tanks were to support the Philippine 45th and 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, who were opposing the enemy coming down Trail 29. On the morning of April 7, the Filipinos were in headlong flight, and the tanks moved down Trail 8 to try and stem the tide. At the junction of Trail 6, the lead tank encountered antitank fire, which blasted it off the trail, knocking out the tank commander. Corporal Ray Peoples took over command, and with the other tanks covered the withdrawal under intense enemy fire. The retreat was made more difficult by the hundreds of troops and vehicles clogging the trail.
The platoon managed to regain its starting point without further casualties. However, Sergeant Morello's tank, which suffered an engine lockup, had to be towed to the shop at Cabcaben.
Meanwhile, the 3rd platoon, under the command of First Sergeant "Ben" Saccone, with two tanks and two halftracks, was ordered to attempt an enveloping maneuver by moving to the west coast of Bataan via the coast road to Mariveles and on to the Pilar-Bagac Road. They were in the vicinity of Mount Samat where they encountered fierce resistance at an enemy road block. (It was virtually impossible for the tanks to get off the trails because of the thick jungle and trees. This was a constant problem during the entire campaign. The platoon was out of radio contact with battalion headquarters and was unable to assess the situation, so it reversed its march and made it back to Mariveles, where it rejoined the remnants of the company. These two actions were the last for Company C, which by April 8 had been in combat for four months, lost ten tanks, and had six men killed in action.
General King, on April 8, acknowledged that the situation was critical and that further resistance would result in the massacre of his troops, including 6,000 sick and wounded and 40,000 refugees. The troops still on the line were less than 25 percent effective and couldn't last for more than a day. Consequently, he ordered the troops to cease fire and to destroy their equipment when the code word "Blast" was given. This occurred at 0700 April 9, 1942, and hostilities on Bataan ceased. As it turned out, the U.S. and Philippine troops were doomed from the start of the war by the lack of air power, supplies, and reinforcements. However, due to the heroic efforts of units like C/194th Tank Battalion, the Japanese advance was critically slowed.
General Homma had expected to take the Philippines in three months, but instead it took five, and the U.S. gained precious time needed to go on the offensive in the Pacific.
Company C, 194th Tank Battalion was officially inactivated April 2, 1946, in the Philippines, and the chapter closed on a courageous outfit. The combat and prisoner of war ordeal had taken a heavy toll on the company and out of 105 men who left Salinas, February 18, 1941, only 47 returned. During the time the company was in combat, it earned three Presidential Unit Citations (Defense of the Philippines, Luzon, and Bataan) and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation for service from December 7, 1941 to May 10, 1942. In Company C, there were six Silver Stars awarded to tankers, and the entire company received the Bronze Star. Unfortunately, this didn't happen until well after the war, and by then, many medals were given posthumously. It took tireless effort by men such as Chief Warrant Officer Ero "Ben" Saccone to enable these men to receive their well-merited medals.
In 1947, Salinas again had a tank company when the 149th Tank Battalion was activated. Since that time, the company has been assigned to various units. At present, it is Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 149th Armor Regiment. Its unofficial motto is "Remember the Road to Bataan," a lasting tribute to the men of Company C, 194th Tank Battalion.
[SIZE=+1]Selected Source Material[/SIZE] Ashton, Paul, Bataan Diary, Privately Printed, 1984.
Miller, E.B. Colonel, Bataan Uncensored, Hart Publishing Inc., Long Prairie, Minn., 1949.
Morris, Eric, Corregidor, The End of the Line, Stein and Day, New York, 1981.
U.S. Army, Operations of the Provisional Tank Group, United States Army Forces in the Far East 1941-1942.
[SIZE=+1]The Author[/SIZE] Burton Anderson served as an ensign aboard the heavy cruiser USS Pensacola during World War II and during the Bikini atom bomb tests in 1946. He graduated from the University of California at Berkeley in 1949 and joined a firm in the lettuce business. He retired in 1985 after spending 36 years with the company, rising from ranch manager to executive. Currently, he is an independent agricultural consultant and is staff historian for the Coastal Grower magazine. He has written numerous articles on agriculture and Salinas Valley history.

 

Here are some pics I found on the subject.
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This drawing depicts the "Battle of Toul Pocket." After the Japanese landed troops behind the main defensive line on Bataan, tanks of the 192nd Tank Battalion were called upon to wipe out the Japanese caught in this pocket.​

Courtesy of Albert Allen​

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A Japanese soldier leans on one of four captured American tanks somewhere on Luzon. Even though an order to destroy all their equipment was given to American tank crews, not all the tanks on Bataan were destroyed.​

Courtesy of Albert Allen​

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This picture taken during the liberation of the Philippines shows a stripped down American tank re-marked by the Japanese.
Courtesy of Albert Allen​

 

Found more stuff about this subject. Below is the official US Army report on the USAFFE's tanks in Bataan.

OPERATIONS OF THE PROVISIONAL TANK GROUP​

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST​

1941-1942​

CONTENTS
I. BASIS
II. SUMMARY
III. SITUATION
IV. OPERATIONS: 8 December '41-7 January '42
V. OPERATIONS: BATAAN, 8 JANUARY-JANUARY '42
VI. OPERATIONS: BATAAN, 27 JANUARY-8 APRIL '42
VII. CLOSING PHASE: 9 APRIL-
VIII. CONCLUSIONS.
I. BASIS
1. FOREWARD. No official or original records of the Headquarters of this unit or any of its components have been returned to this country. The following report has been compiled from memory, notes, and information available from survivors contacted. Such records and files in Group Headquarters which were not destroyed officially on 9 April 1942, prior to the surrender, were in the possession of the Group S-1 and Adjutant, Major Robert C. Pettit Jr, 0300166, ADC;(died at sea as a P.O.W., circa 24 Jan 1945). They were buried by him allegedly at Cabanatuan, Nueva Encija Province, Luzon (P.O.W. Camp), prior to his departure from the Philippines for Japan, via Bilibid, the latter part of 1944. No one privy to this action has survived. Of the Group Staff, only the commander (the undersigned), the Surgeon (Major Alvin C. Poweleit, (0-344805), the headquarters commandant (Major Edwin C. Rue, 0-334725), and the communications officer (1st Lt. John H. Allen, 0-660155), survive. The commanding officers of the 194th GHQ Tank Battalion (Colonel Ernest B. Miller, 0-182955), the 192d GHQ Tank Battalion (Colonel Theodore F. Wickord, 0-345291), and the 17th Ordnance Company (armored) (Lt. Colonel Richard C. Kadel, 0-239912) are alive. All executives and/or seconds-in-command, of Group and its units, are dead. With the exception of the two battalion commanders noted above, none of the field officers as of 9 April 1942 survives. Of the captains commanding companies, as of 9 April 1942, the only survivors are Major John C Riley, 0-396950, Major Frederick C. Moffitt, 0-287376, and Lt. Col. Richard Kadel (mentioned above); and of the unit staff captains: Major Ferris G. Spoor,0-347171, Joseph A. Rivak, 0-271285, Lyman E. Johnson, 0-228_16, John S. Muir, 0-187343, and Leo Schneider, 0-264775, M.C. All of the above and the Group Commander have been denuded of all papers of origin (1) prior to the surrender, (2) prior to the removal as P.O.W.'s from the Philippines. In the latter category were the emergency service records compiled by order of the undersigned, from all available sources, at Camps O'Donnell and Cabanatuan, subsequent to 11 April 1942. Excerpts of GO's 5 and 10, Hq the Prov. Tank Gp, 1942 (Silver Star and Purple Heart citations) were sent to the United States by civilian repatriates by the late Major John C. Morley, 0-21731_, of the Group Staff (died at sea enroute to Japan as P.O.W., circa 26 Jan. 1945). Photostats of these were transmitted by the Group Commander to the War Department in the fall of 1945, after his repatriation. No contact with any of his officers as of April, 1942 or those who were present at Camp O'Donnell after the surrender was had from 10 May 1942, (my departure therefrom for Tarlac) until arrival at Mukden, 21 May 1945, when four lieutenants were found there. These officers were immediately charged with the preparation from memory, and with the collaboration of about 35 enlisted men of the Tank Group then present, of lists of unit personnel, emergency service records for personnel present, deaths and places of burial, and any other operational data available. Copies have been promised but to date only one battalion roster has been received. Contact with all the survivors mentioned above except five has been established: Colonel Miller only within the month; his data are fragmentary. The only fairly authentic list received is for the 192d G.H.Q. Tank Battalion, which shows survivors - officers and enlisted - to be 45%.
II. SUMMARY
2. PRE-WAR BRIEF. Any evaluation of the operations of this unit mast take into consideration the precis, (See Addenda "A"), of its movement to the theater on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, its organization 17 days before that, and the consequent lack of mutual acquaintance between the armored personnel and their supported associates, in a strange land and climate, and with weapons new to them, as well as to all present for the war except the Tank Group Commander. It was for this reason that he asked to remain with the Tank Group when division command was proposed on his arrival. In approving on 21 November, General MacArthur stated that he had asked for an armored division, to the command of which the Group Commander would succeed. The nucleus of this division was never augmented; although a medium G.H.Q. Tank Battalion had been completely equipped and was on 48-hour standby for departure for the Philippines when its orders were cancelled on 10 December 1941. ((Another light tank bn had been alerted))
3. POST 8 DECEMBER BRIEF.The recountal of the operations is preceded by a summary of the service of this unit as afforded in the two Presidential Unit Citations,, specifically awarded, in addition to the general citation to all units of both military and naval forces of the United States and the Philippine Governments.
GENERAL ORDER NO. 101, WAR DEPARTMENT, 1945-
"1. The Provisional Tank Group, United States Army Forces in the Far East, Composed of the following units:
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
192d General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light)
194th General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light) (less detachments)
17th Ordnance Company (Armored)
is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action during the defense of the Philippines. Organized late in November 1941, it took battle positions on 1 December in the vicinity of Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg, from which it fought a notable action in the defense of these critical points in the initial hostile attack. In the course of the withdrawal into Bataan, its units were constantly in the field, covering the supporting four divisions of the North Luzon Force, and two of the South Luzon Force, its elements operating initially 150 miles apart. This unit contributed most vitally in all stages and under extraordinary handicaps to the protraction of the operations and the successful withdrawal . Its units were the last out of both North and South Luzon and the last into the Bataan Peninsula, on 7 January 1942.
2. The Provisional Tank Group, United States Army Forces in the Far East, composed of the following units:
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment;
192 General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light);
194th General Headquarters Tank Battalion (Light)(less detachments);
17th Ordnance Company (Armored)
is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action during the defense of the Philippines. During the period from 6 January to 8 March 1942, after covering the withdrawal of the Luzon Forces into the Bataan Peninsula, this group was charged with the support of the I and II Philippine Corps, the cordon defense of the coasts of Bataan, and the defense of three major landing fields. These measures prevented a projected landing of airborne and paratroop enemy, as well as several abortive thrusts across Manila Bay, any one of which would have meant early disaster in Bataan. Under constant air attack, these units, despite heavy losses in men and material, maintained a magnificent defense and through their ability, courage, and devotion to duty contributed in large measure to the prolonged defense of the Bataan Peninsula.
III. SITUATION
4. AT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, 8 December 1941. -- All tanks (108) and half-tracks (about 46) of the 192d and 194th G.H.Q. Tank Battalions (Light) were in battle position; the 192d North and East of Fort Stotsenburg main post; the 194th in the heavy growth and cogan under Watch Hill and the "island" between the two main landing strips at Clark Field. They had been placed in position equipped and ready for action on 1 December 1941, for a night alert in conjunction with Clark Field the night of 1/2 December; and were thereafter maintained there as a precautionary expediency in view of the activities along the same lines by the permanent garrison of Fort Stotsenburg, and the AA troops (200th CA) which had arrived on 26 September concurrently with the 194th Tank Battalion (less one company), and the 17th Ordnance Company (armored), assigned to the Provisional Tank Group USAFFE on 29 November. On that same date the C.O. Air Base Force at Clark Field, Major Daley, the only air officer contacted, told the Group commander that Clark Field had been directed to hold two alerts; one daytime on 30 November; one night, before daylight 2 December; and asked whether the tanks would participate in accordance with the scheme prepared by the tank command for the protection of Clark Field. Although attempted contact was not successful with either the tactical commander at Clark Field or the commanding officer, the 200th CA (AA), the daylight alert was carried out. It was at once obvious that a similar emergency move from the tank parks in darkness would be disastrous, the tank position under Watch Hill being amongst hundreds of standard drums of 100-octane gas and the complete bomb reserve of Clark Field - those items being irregularly scattered throughout the thick cover singly and in twos and threes, and covered with grass and palm fronds. Movement of the tanks even daytime had been fraught with near disaster, both to them and to air and anti-aircraft material, vehicles, and communications, in the occupancy of alert positions and installations. Accordingly, the tanks and half-tracks were again placed in battle position on 1 December with crews remaining with the tanks and half-tracks from then on, and fed from the rear echelon in camp.
5. The warning of 27 November was not received by the Provisional Tank Group, either from USAFFE, or North Luzon Force. There was no indication from the ground commander at Clark Field that he had received that warning. The general change in command consumated after the Tank Group Commander's arrival on 20 November may have contributed to disrupted channels: F.E.A.F, North and South Luzon Forces, the Philippine Division, Clark Field (air and ground), Fort Stotsenburg --- all having new commanders; Hq. North Luzon Force having organized at Fort Stotsenburg after the arrival of General Wainwright shortly before 27 November. Hq. South Luzon Force, in South Luzon, was not set up until 13 December when a Tank Hq. reconnaissance was made to the South and West coasts of South Luzon.
COMMAND. -- The Tank Group, USAFFE, upon organization at Fort Stotsenburg, 21 November, was stationed there as a separate tactical command under the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Far East; for administrative report only being associated with the General Reserve, of which the major unit was the Philippine Division, Brigadier General Lough newly in command. In the initial report to him on 2 December, he was told of the tank dispositions. From his reply, "you'll have me scared yet", the inference is that he was uninformed of the warning message or was deterred from passing it on.
6. SUPPLY AND PREPARATION. -- Restriction on release of tank gas (92-octane) and tank ammunition (37mm, .50, .30,. and .45 caliber), incident either to combat reserve interpretation or the change in command at Fort Stotsenburg and North Luzon Force referred to above -- had operated to prevent shooting -- in the entirely unfamiliar ordnance of the tanks. On 30 November the Group Commander ordered Post Ordnance to issue the ammunition; but up until the opening of hostilities requested range facilities had not been made available. The allocation of tank gas initially made to the 194th Battalion after its arrival on 26 September --- 40,000 gallons -- was enough for less than 200 miles' operation of the 108 tanks. No further allocation could be secured after the arrival of the 192d; nor were the six carloads of spare parts, tracks, engines, etc., made available, until after arrival in Bataan in January '42. (They were stored in the ordnance warehouse there--tanks and half-tracks being ordnance material-- and like the ammunition, held as ordnance reserve unreleased to units in peacetime). Accordingly tank operation was not accomplished to familiarize the personnel--35% new to any kind of tanks, all new to the M-3 tank with its AA gun, fixed guns in sponsons fired by remote control by the driver, and most important, with the new main battery--the 37mm gun. The new tank (M3) weighed a ton more than the tank with which the GHQ battalions had been equipped in the States; and twice as much as the 6 1/2-ton tank of World War I (replaced in 1935, but described as the Tank Group standard equipment in a widely syndicated article),
7. THE M3 EMPLOYMENT CROSS-COUNTRY and on roads and bridges was subject to limitations unfamiliar to the several officers of tank experience and training (all (but one) prior to 1935) who were present in the theater-- a circumstance that became embarrassingly apparent throughout the operations in the small missions requested for minor exploits or adventures, wherein the possible results had to be weighed by the tank command against the certain and irreplaceable losses jeopardizing the overall tank mission, as imposed by USAFFE.
8. FALLACIES OF INDOCTRINATION AND COOPERATION. After the arrival of the first tanks in the Philippines measures were taken with the hearty cooperation of the commanding general at Fort Stotsenburg to familiarize the officers at that garrison with the tanks; but despite that, one was known to have approached a Japanese light tank to talk to the crew near Damortis, thinking it was an American tank; and a few days later American tanks were reported as enemy tanks and fired on. By the arrival in Bataan, troops were familiar with the tanks, particularly after a comprehensive battalion-by-battalion, tank-with-infantry training had been instituted. (After the withdrawal to the Pilar-Bagac line). Tank Headquarters circularized,through USAFFE publication, all headquarters as to certain essentials in cooperative operations and missions; but was unsuccessful in securing ground troops in support while tanks were in front line operation. Crews suffered accordingly from a lack of rest for extended periods, there being no covering troops -- as organic to an armored division. The tanks were mistakenly considered invulnerable, self-sustaining fortress; capable of going anywhere, surmounting extraordinary obstacles; and performing prodigies such as operations against snipers, flushing enemy out of cane fields, patrolling against infiltration--operations stymied by the inherent blindness of the tank, the noise of its operation, and its considerable dead space, permitting approach to it by enemy with mines, grenades, flame throwers--particularly in heavy vegetation, and when the tanks were immobilized by blown tracks or bogging. Supposedly modest requirements for "just two or three tanks" had to be filled with a company if physically possible: - a project wherein tank use was remunerative at all, warranted the use of a company to insure enough power to punch through, give mutual support, and insure the salvage by towing of the inevitable tank casualties. Only a company had the facilities for maintenance, supply, command, reconnaissance, and extended operations.
9. RECONNAISSANCE--Prior to the arrival in the Philippines of the balance of the Tank Group, the 194th had executed reconnaissance, incident to road marches, to Subic Bay, Lingayen Gulf, Mt Arayat, and to a limited degree--to Baguio. Upon the arrival of the 192d and Group Headquarters on 20 November the experience of the 194th was exploited in part. The Tank Group Commander and his headquarters detachment reconnoitered Highway 3 and 13 and the area on the Lingayen Gulf west and north of the Agno River, by half-track and 1/4 ton; the country around Stotsenburg from the ground and air, with particular reference to the possibilities of paratroop drops and landings thereabout and on the half completed field at O'Donnell; but 8 December found the Tank Group still greatly lacking in knowledge of the country, compared to other troops, and in particular to the officers of the established garrison.
IV. OPERATIONS: 8 December -- 7 January 1942
10. The initial attack. -- When word came early the morning of 8 December, of Pearl Harbor, the crews were at the tanks, the tanks were ready for action. At 0830, word came that "hostile planes were forth minutes away". All preparations were made and men stood by. At 1130 the planes which had taken to the air shortly after 0830 came in and landed, lining up convenient to the mess. Tank Headquarters learned subsequently that "the alert had been called off." The Tankers were eating in the vicinity of their tanks, at 1230 when a handsome V formation of 53 planes appeared from the north at between 20 and 23 thousand feet; and almost as soon as discerned began bombing Clark Field. Only the 108 AA guns of the tanks could be brought to bear, but their fire was of no effect at that range. The 108 37mm and 432 .30 cal guns of the tanks other than the AA guns were of no avail until the dive and glide bombing and straffing phase began. The open guns, .50 and .30 caliber, in the half-track proved very useful, although dangerous to serve. That day Technical Sergeant Zamon Bardowski, B/192d, brought down the first enemy plane to the credit of the Armored Force in World War II. The tremendous volume of fire at planes out of range, was largely wasted, except as it deterred the dive and glide bombers and prevented their landing to exploit. No tank was lost or seriously damaged, contrary to the enemy's radio boast subsequently that they had "annihilated the 192d Tank Battalion." The first armored soldier to die in World War II, that day, was Private Brooks of Company D, 194th (192). Lieutenant Burke was found by the Group commander, active and undeterred by a leg wound. Taken to the hospital, he was found a couple of hour later back with his company: "They had too much to do at the hospital". There were two other wounded. The tanks, being hidden and camouflaged, were overlooked initially, in the enemy's concentration on the unconcealed planes conveniently lined up.
11. AFTER THE ATTACK -- which lasted about 40 minutes, the tanks were redisposed, the 194th being moved northeast of Clark Field about three kilometers to the barrier San Joaquin on the Malolos Road, where it had cover and distance; the 192d took hitherto unoccupied positions out of its comparatively exposed positions of the attack, -- this time covering the relatively unbroken south air strip, still under construction at Clark Field, but now become more feasible for subsequent hostile landing. A half-track platoon was sent to O'Donnell Field to guard it from airborne landings. A company of the 192d was moved to Dau to be more accessible to the main highway and railroad there.
12. There were two subsequent attacks on Clark Field -- on the 10th and 13th December; the latter destroying a half-track in the ordnance park and wounding two men of the Group Ordnance Company. The attack of the 13th caused considerable damage at Stotsenburg. During this interim tanks cooperated with units of the 26th Cavalry in an abortive chase of paratroopers alleged to have dropped near Arayat. Tank troops brought in the first prisoners (three aviators - apparently naval) rescued from the Negritoes. They were questioned to no avail at Tank headquarters and eventually turned over to the P.M., Stotsenburg. Tank motorcyclists made a notable rescue of one of our aviators parachuted into the hills. Tank gas was now made available; a cache of 20,000 gallons at Dau, 10,000 gallons at Gerona, 10,000 more at Stotsenburg and 20,000 at Alabang in South Luzon.
13. On the 12th the Group commander was summoned to Manila to Headquarters, USAFFE. A courier plane was sought but none was made available; and 86 minutes after the call, arrival at No. 1 Calle Victoria was effected by motor. Landings were imminent on South Luzon. The 194th, being the most experienced, with seven weeks more service in the Islands, was alerted by 'phone and moved to a bivouac south of San Fernando near the Calumpit Bridge. The headquarters reconnaissance was completed late the 13th, advance agents of the 194th being spotted at Montinlupa, where the 194th was to rendezvous. The reconnaissance was then prosecuted to Nusugbu Bay, Balayan Bay, Batangas Bay, and east and north around Lake Taal, contacting the division commanders of the 41st and 51st Divisions, and securing guides therefrom. The 194th was checked moving into positions early on the morning of the 14th. On the 15th, C/194th moved to a position in readiness on Tagatay Ridge and dispatched reconnaissance parties to Nusugbu, Balangas, and Batangas Bays and their beach areas; also into the Lucena, Paglibo, and Lucban areas. The company was kept busy trying to run down flare activities of fifth columnists presumably operating at night. The company remained in this activity until Christmas Eve, when it moved via the Taal Lake road to Santo Tomas and then near San Pablo to assist in the then developing operations around Lucena, Paglibo, and Lucban, where the South Luzon Force had become engaged-- critical landings being at Mauban and Antimonan. Headquarters The Provisional Tank Group had been ordered to Manila and opened there, at Headquarters USAFFE, on 15 December; the half-tracks of the Headquarters Detachment taking air-defensive positions on top the wall in the southeast angle of the Walled City. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment having no trucks, most of the Headquarters set-up at Stotsenburg had to be left there; as was the property of the 194th, unit and personal.
14. RECOMMENDED TANK MOVE NORTH. -- About mid-December the tank commander urged the move of a battalion to Lingayen Gulf--a company on either side of the Agno mouth, the balance behind the Agno. This was disapproved with the statement that the North Luzon Force "had too much up there already".
15. BREN CARRIERS. - About this time the Group commander was directed to prepare a plan for the utilization of some forty Bren carriers arrived in Manila on a fugitive British ship. The Bren guns were not available. The plans provided for the organization into two companies, the ordnance to install machine guns; the crews to be grounded aviation personnel; the units thus provided to operate with the tanks as much needed reconnaissance, holding, and . This plan was not implemented because of the rapidly developing situation. These vehicles joined the tanks in the field subsequent to the move to the north front of the Group Headquarters--on 24th December. 15 were allotted to each battalion initially, and 10 to the Group Headquarters. They were delivered and driven by air corps personnel and Filipino civilians. The Group S-4, Major Snell, by direction of Group Headquarters, stopped at Stotsenburg where destruction of supplies was in progress; halted long enough to load with high-octane gas in 5-gallon bidons and with small-arms ammunition. The latter with the transporting Bren carriers (about half) were turned over to the divisions and the 26th Cavalry. A few of these had been gunned by the Manila Ordnance Depot. Those retained by the tank units were eventually armed, as machine guns were salvaged from the tank casualties. While their cargo capacity was small, they were very handy in emergency supply, on cross country and on doubtful terrain before committing tanks. It was early discovered that heat-baked ground with every appearance of stability would not support even the Brens because of the high water table, just below the crust, impounded in the diked and terraced fields along the highways, usually paralleled by deep ditches full of water. Bridges except on Highways 3, 5, and 7 would not sustain tank traffic without eventual failure.
16. 21-22 December. - On the evening of 21 December, at a staff conference at Hq, USAFFE, notification was given of a major hostile landing impending between Bauang and Vigan on the west (La Union) coast. It was stated that there were 90 "boats" preparing to land the next morning.The tank commander, from association with the Navy in Fleet Landing Exercises 2 and 3, in '36 and '37, in the Caribbean and Pacific respectively, unwittingly took this literally as landing boats rather than ships. It is not known whether a similar interpretation was made by others, notably the CG, FEAF (a Naval Academy graduate). However he (General Brereton) left the conference about 2230 to radio the air (by then largely in Mindinao and Australia) to be over the hostile landing effort by daylight the 22d. It is presumed the intention was to fly from Mindinao. They did not arrive.
17. The Tank Commander was directed to send a staff officer to contact General Wainwright. This was ordered by telephone about 2300, the commanding officer of the 192d being designated. At the same time, according to the tank commander's recommendation, approved about 2245 by Hq. USAFFE, that battalion (less one company) was ordered to the Lingayen area by daylight for supporting moves as might be directed by the battalion commander after his contact with the commanding general North Luzon Force. Their march into the area and rendezvous therein was prescribed. The excepted company (the one at Dau), with USAFFE's concurrence and direction, was ordered to move at once (by midnight), regas, and refill bidons at Gerona, to regas again at Bauang, and meet the anticipated landing at daylight on the La Union coast to the north. The Group commander and advance party left Manila about midnight for the front.
18. 22 December. - The tank force dispatched to combat the landing was found, out of gas, at Rosario, some thirty miles from Bauang - an no gas to refill there for whatever their destiny was to be. They had been given controverting orders preventing the refill at Gerona, had been diverted on other missions - one allegedly to guard the rear echelon of the 11th P.A. Division. As all the officers of this company are dead, except one last with the company that day, their accounts of that day, and subsequently, to the tank commander are accepted. After the tank commander arrived, the North Luzon Force commander joined. The hostile aviation was active to the west but not in range of the tank half-track .50 caliber machine guns. Two companies of the 11th P.A. Division were engaged toward Damortis, and it was understood--a troop of the 26th Cavalry and a scout-car platoon. The landing had been made. Shortly a squadron of the 26th Cavalry moved out; and almost immediately a report came back from the troops at Damortis that an enemy cyclist or motorized unit was approaching Damortis. It was at this juncture that General Wainwright asked the tank commander what he could do. The tank plight had already been explained to him. The gas had not yet arrived. The resources of the company were pooled, a platoon of tanks was dispatched to meet the enemy threat; Lieutenant Morin, the platoon commander, being instructed to proceed beyond Damortis but not beyond Agoo. This was the platoon that General Wainwright got when he "asked for a company". They were not 6 1/2 ton tanks, as he thought, but 13-ton. There were 17 to a company - not 16; and they had been operative under his orders: Quoting from Colonel Wickord's (Comdg 192d) recountal -- "Starting with your phone call from Manila, Morley and Hanes (Captains) and a reconnaissance group from Hq. Co. went that night to P.A. Hq. of Brougher's Regt. (sic) and then to Damortis. Hanes' unit followed. I left the next day with the battalion following. Twice I received instructions enroute from Lt. Col. Montgomery of Wainwright's staff."
19. The first tank vs. tank action. - Morin's platoon did not encounter the motorized unit approaching Damortis but pushed on to Agoo. There they ran into a counterthrust of hostile light tanks and had a fight with them on the road. The enemy tanks were of low silhouette, no turret, with sides sloped so that an impact close enough to normal to secure a penetration was hard to get. On the other hand, their 47-mm gun, either on the tank or off as an A T gun, was effective against our tanks with their perpendicular surfaces and high profiles--circumstances which had caused their rejection by our Allies before the war. The platoon commander's tank left the road to maneuver out of the trap, was hit, and burned; the first tank lost in World War II. It developed later that the officer and three men of the crew survived and were the first armored force prisoners in World War II. The other four tanks were brought back to Rosario -- all hit; a hit disabling completely the oil system of one; another hit through the main drive. All four tanks had to be towed out and all were lost later in the day by bombing and mishaps during salvage. The assistant driver, Private Henry Deckert, B/192d, of the platoon sergeant's (a Chicago policeman) tank, had been decapitated by a direct hit penetrating the forward deck of the tank at the ball-and-socket joint of the bow-gun mounting. This man was the first armored soldier killed in a tank vs. tank fight in World War II. Enemy tanks were hit but the shots were seen to ricochet off their sloping surfaces.
20. The dash to Damortis. - Hostile action vicinity Damortis in increasing violence made evident need for tank covering action. The tank company commander being a casualty at this juncture, it was necessary to take the 2d in command forward on reconnaissance with the Group Command to just short of Damortis, where the commanding officer of the 26th Cavalry was found in a very exposed position with fire of all types coming in, including very active dive and glide bombing which pinned the command half-track down repeatedly in efforts to turn and get back. After about two hours a start was made and return to Rosario effected, with the unabated attention of hostile planes. The road was cumbered in several places by dead 26th animals in considerable number as a result of bombing as they had moved forward. When the Group commander finally reached Rosario, the gas had just arrived, and the battalion commander. The company was sent into the Damortis position with instructions to cover the withdrawal of the force engaged there--tanks to fall back one by one, "peeling" off from the front successively after the troops had withdrawn. General Wainwright had left, and the Group command got away about 1630 for Manila via Alcala and the CP of the 11th Division, P.A.. The situation in South Luzon was developing fast; but that to the north was more exigent, and the probability of redeployment of tanks from the South was pressing. This reinforcement occurred on the 24th December when the 194th (less C Company) was sent hurriedly north and placed on line with the 192d, extending on the latter's left, just south of the Agno River, west from Carmen (on Route 3).
21. North of the Agno. - after the withdrawal to Rosario on the 22d the tanks were put in position to the west and north thereof later that day; but were ordered out by the 71st Division Commander, to get south of the bridge east of Rosario about to be blown. The tank battalion commander states: "We tried to use the tanks but according to Morley (Staff Captain 192d now dead) Pierce's Ex Officer would not allow it. He supposedly said that it would clutter up their (26th Cavalry) action and insisted that the tanks be removed."
22. On 23-24 December the tank battalion commander, carrying out his orders to keep one company south of the Agno, was told at General Wainwright's headquarters that (quote) "I'm the immediate battle commander and you will take orders from me." And thus that company was sent north. All three of the line companies were operating north of the Agno when the main bridge at Carmen was bombed out. "A" Company's commander, Captain Wright, was killed at Urdaneta the night of 23/24 December. As only two highway bridges remained, the tanks had to make end runs to get south of the Agno on the night of 24/25 December, "A" Company coming out via Malasique and Balambang according to instructions: "If the bridge (highway) was blown-which did occur. They met Jap resistance early in the evening and came out next AM at about 1020." - report of the battalion commander. B/192 received a written order from one division commander to cover his withdrawal, which it did; the action taking it from a key point, when one of the other companies was far better situated to have carried out that particular mission. With his fighting element all north of the Agno in a mass of streams, with his main line of supply and evacuation broken, and the strong prospect of being caught there, with each general officer encountered becoming his "immediate battle commander", the battalion commander needed a free hand to do his best to carry out his mission rather than arbitrary orders. He had now lost a ninth of his tanks and two of his company commanders.
23. Tank Group Headquarters closed at Manila and moved north with the 194th (less C Company, left with the South Luzon Force), arriving with it on Christmas Day. In accordance with USAFFE orders received on the Agno on 25 December to cover the withdrawal of the North Luzon Force on successive phase lines, the south bank of the Agno was to be held 24 hours with withdrawal on the night of 26/27 December to a line: Santa Ignacia--Gerona--Santo Tomas--San Jose; then to withdraw the night of 27/28 December to the line Tarlac--Cabanatuan; then on the night of 28/29, to the south bank of the Bambam River--Gapan; this line was being organized for a protracted defense and was to be held. On 24 December, C/194th moved via the Taal Lake Road to Santo Tomas to bivouac near San Pablo, to assist in the developing operations in the Lucena, Pagbilao, Lucban area.
24. 25-26 December: This period was spent in organizing the tank defensive and holding position south of the Agno and on the 26th in active defense. As the units of the 192d regained the south bank of the Agno, they were stretched to cover the river from Carmen (on Route 3) to Tayug (NE of San Quentin), with individual tanks at most critical points -- some only in radio contact. Similarly, the two available companies of the 194th were disposed west of Carmen on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. Orders were given both battalion commanders late the 26th to hold that line until 0500, 27th December. The senior, Major Miller (194th), was authorized to order an earlier withdrawal for both if enemy action in force jeopardized the withdrawal to the two axial routes (Highways 3 and 5) - the only exits for tank movement to the next delaying position. Written operation orders for standard operating procedure, in the hands of tank troops by this time, provided for their occupancy of all roads -- side roads to cover minor roads from the north -- and sweep enemy avenues of approach, both by road and cross-country, at the same time being disposed to get out laterally to the axial highways, if egress directly to the South were not possible; platoon commanders to be at critical commanding points on the exterior road net; company commanders at similar points on the axial roads; when required to withdraw to gain the axial road, to do so by tank successively from the front, under cover of the next tank, and to proceed to the rear to the next position. Intensive reconnaissance of each day's successive positions and possibilities was made for tank command, field of fire, ingress and egress, alternate positions, and routes in emergency. Tanks lining the axial roads were particularly charged to stop any mechanized movement, and were instructed to take positions on alternate sides of the road, at turns and angles, to get maximum sweep with minimum exposure during fire and get away. During the afternoon of the 26th the tank commander reconnoitered the next position (Gerona line), which had been ordered held for two/three days by the high command. Tank CP was established the night 26/27 at Rancho Rosario at San Miguel, where USAFFE staff officers visited about midnight.
25. Night 26/27, 194th action, North Luzon. About 2230 Lieutenant Costigan of A/194th arrived at San Miguel with the remnants of his platoon, to report that our lines had withdrawn from the right, that the enemy had come in that way, made a road block with AT guns covering at Carmen; that he had forced his way through, losing two tanks and three men. The other three were badly hit, but were regassed, repaired and sent back to report to the battalion CP at San Manuel on Route 3. He reported the new company commander, Lieutenant Burke and his sergeant apparently dead near the cross road in Carmen. (Burke, wounded the second time since the beginning, actually survived, and was captured--his tank being destroyed). The balance of A/194 made a spectacular dash out, one tank at least going across the whole front, with hostile fire impact and it own return fire making a pyrotechnic spectacle. Lieutenant Petrie, A/194th, "fought his way out and across the river before the bridge was blown, losing but one tank." This was, presumedly, at Bayambang on the Agno. D/194th had to come out cross country reaching Route 3 north of Moncada, about 0800: receiving fire from the highway as they approached, paralleling the railroad embankment running NW-SE. The two bridges at Moncada had been blown by the withdrawing infantry division. The major bridge crossed a stream with high banks, reconnaissance provided no way across and the company commander reluctantly ordered tanks dismantled of guns and radios, and destroyed according to SOP. Fifteen tanks had gotten out and were immobilized by the side of the road, to be reported there later by our air as enemy tanks. One platoon commander could not bring himself to major destruction (by shooting into successive tanks with the 37mm, a grenade in the engine compartment, or a can of gas), and merely pulled the wiring and rheostats, hoping eventually to salvage the tanks. The enemy did; and one of these tanks appeared later north of Baliuag on 31 December '41, and several in Bataan on 9 April '42.
26. Night 26/27, 192d action, North Luzon. - Colonel Rodman, of one of the divisions supported, informed Major Wickord, 192d Tank, that "Headquarters had changed their plan to a straight line: lines Carmen-Umigan." This uncovered the tanks and the river except for tank action. "On the next order you had been informed that the new line would not form until seven or so the next day", writes Wickord. "Again in checking the CPs of the units on line, they all had orders to be on the new line by midnight and were beginning to send people back by bus loads." (These busses might better have been used to salvage supplies throughout.) The tanks destroyed such major part of the 44,000 gallons of drummed 100-octane gas, at the advanced landing field near Carmen, as they could not get out on the 26th; and had reported several caches of 75mm ammunition on Route 3, which they could not move. This had been spotted for the use of the 75mm SPM's supporting the tanks on Route 3. 5 SPM's under Captain Gordon Peck did notable work at the San Manuel roadblock. A 75mm SPM had been in a house at the road junction at Carmen when last seen on the 26th; it had previously pulled out, been intercepted twice, and sent back (Tank Group Commander personal action). It was not there unfortunately when the enemy came in and established his roadblock at Carmen about 2130, the 26th. At 2130 the right element of the 194th (west of Carmen) received a message (written) from the 11th Division, dated 1930, (signed 'Brougher' CG, 11th Div) that the line was pulling back at 1930, uncovering the Carmen-Tayug road; ordering the 192d tanks (in that division zone) to withdraw before the bridges therein, giving egress to the rear, were to be blown at 2330; Hence the disaster to D/194 (Captain Altman). His surviving men crossed the streams (two) at Moncada with the movable weapons, tank and personnel, and some radios, and were reported out to the Group Command at 0230, the 27th. One lieutenant (Hart) and his crew elected to remain on the line instead of coming out cross-country; and later sent a message to Group command by a Filipino reporting himself and his crew on 7 January '42 "continuing sabotage vicinity Stotsenburg". Hart died as a captain of guerillas sometime in '43, according to a Filipino's reporting, post-war........of his assistance to Major Nelson of Group Staff, shot in attempted execution at Camp O'Donnell, 14th or 15th April '42. Nelson crawled out of a mass-burial pit in the night (a rain had deterred the enemy from filling it), and escaped to die later of other contributing causes.
27. 26/27 December, C/194th in South Luzon. - The 1st Platoon defending near San Pablo; the 2d Platoon (Lt. Needham) ........ road in advance of infantry. The lead tanks encountered a road block defended by an AT gun, shot it out, and overran the block; but was disabled by a direct hit from a hidden field gun firing from a distance. This immobilized the tank, took off Lt. Needham's leg, and killed part of his crew. Other tanks, including the rear tank were hit and immobilized. Those capable of moving could not turn around or get out. Lieutenant Needham, realizing his critical condition and the encumbrance he would be, refused evacuation. He remained with his tank, "buttoned in"; but was dead when the last surviving men returned to get him shortly before dawn, (Silver Star awarded posthumously) when Sergeant Emil S. Morello had organized his epic march to Manila by paths through the now enemy-infested country. Guided by a Filipino hired with the pooled resources of the survivors -- a 100 pesos -- Sergeant Morello arrived there with five wounded on 1 January, 1942, just ahead of the enemy; and left Private de Benedetti (SS awarded posthumously) who had a rivet in his throat, at a Catholic hospital. The made his way with others by banca to Corregidor. The enemy had been about the "buttoned up" tanks during the night, but had been too cautious on this, their first close-up, to try to get in; and left before dawn, evidently fearing a trap. Four enlisted men also died in this encounter. General Jones, reconnoitering north of Lucban near Piis, on the road toward Mauban, escorted by a 194th half-track commanded by Sergeant Lewis, was forced to the ground by fire from an enemy advance guard coming from Mauban. Under cover of fire from the half-track, he and his driver escaped. The half-track was immobilized; but the crew degunned it and fought their way out subsequently. They were recommended for DSC's by General Jones (never received).
28. 29/30 December. - On the 29th orders were received for the occupancy and holding of the line behind the Bamban River, the first considerable defensive organization of the ground; with some fire trenches, obstacles - including wire, staked areas, and cleared fields of fire - with extensive leveling of cane crops. The Tank Commander was directed by USAFFE to organize the anti-tank defense of the Bamban line in collaboration with the North Luzon Force commander. The Tarlac line was evacuated that night. The Bamban line was to be held until further orders. North Luzon Force designated Magalang, west of Mount Arayat, as Group command post. This was not practicable, Group Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment consisting of one general officer, two field officers, two captains, and ten enlisted. These had to drive and serve two half-tracks, two 1/4-ton C&R cars, two sedans, two motorcycles, two radios -- both in 24 hour operation, six machine guns. They had no equipment to man a command post, no mess; lived a vagrant hap-hazard, bare existence--almost constantly mobile trying to do what in peacetime had been done for a lesser force by a Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company of 18 officers, 141 enlisted, 14 radios, half-tracks, scout cars, 1/4 and 1/2-ton C&R cars, trucks, etc., and two medium command tanks, aggregating 55 wheeled and track vehicles. The necessity of keeping in touch with tank units now covering four divisions of the North Luzon Force and two of the South Luzon Force, operating over 100 miles apart, with two radios--made imperative the actual contact and constant movement of the Group command, to effect the necessary coordination and cooperation, reconnaissance, and overall supply in this rapidly changing situation. Staging of tank gas, ammunition, and spare parts back from roadside caches constituted a major problem to the limited organic transport of the tank units. Efforts to supplement had been to no avail. The tank radio set-up in Group Headquarters at USAFFE had been abandoned because of last minute denial of a truck to carry headquarters equipment when Tank Headquarters left Manila 24 December. One extra sedan was secured. What could be had to be transported in the vehicles listed above. Group Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, without a mess or any of the supplies or equipment available to the permanent garrison (However lately organized, they came from fixed installations and were familiar with local resources)--were unwelcome pensioners with whatever unit in contact or associated. The Ordnance Company (armored) would have been a proper base company for headquarters but its rearward position (necessary because of its heavy mobile shop equipment, and isolation to permit its constantly increasing maintenance job, which now included the SPM's) prevented.
29. A company of the 192d had to be brought over from east of the Pampanga -- the 192d axis of withdrawal being Route 5 -- to supplement to 20 tanks left the 194th in its zone, of which Route 3 was the axis. East of Concepcion Lieutenant Reed and his sergeant died under a bridge when their half-track was hit - Reed refusing evacuation in favor of other wounded. (29 December)(SS awarded posthumously)
30. 30/31 December.-- Hostile action became more aggressive east of the Pampanga. Tank reconnaissance counted 30 medium hostile tanks of the 35 reported by air, vicinity Cabanatuan, earlier. Later eight of these medium tanks were ambushed by a platoon of C/192 as they lined up north of the stream north of Baliuag waiting the restitution of a destroyed bridge. The remnants withdrew east, and as expected, accomplished a crossing elsewhere, coming into Baliuag at 1700 and engaging two platoons of C/192d in a running fight for two hours back and forth through the town. Our light tank proved its superiority over the enemy medium tank - in contrast to the difficulty in coping with his light tank. Our bag: - eight medium tanks; none of the rest appeared. Had it not been for this tank action, the plight of the 91st Division, would have been desperate, even after it was augmented by units of the 71st Division that date, after it had reported itself reduced to effective strength of 200. The tanks paid for themselves there; although the only credit given them, in a syndicated account, was a statement that "A Company of the 192 was sent in to help". At that time, the 192d, (less one company) was in sector entirely engaged; one company was on the western axis of withdrawal; the 194th (less the company in South Luzon) had been moved by USAFFE orders to a position in readiness at the barrio Apalit, N.W. of the Calumpit Bridge over the Pampanga, to insure the exit of the South Luzon Force, and that part of the North Luzon Force east of the Pampanga. It was prepared by the same order to go to Bacaue if necessary, to reinforce there C/194, which was to hold until the extrication of North and South Luzon Forces was insured. At this juncture also, two batteries of SPM's from Major Babcock's battalion were attached to the tank task force; the order was transmitted, acknowledged,later reduced to one battery (USAFFE order). No evidence of their joining has come to light.
31. 31 December '41-1 January '42. - The Commanding General, South Luzon Force, ordered the tanks out ahead, possible fearing more the enemy tanks known to be in the Pampanga Valley than the enemy following him, which had no tanks. The last of the foot troops came across the Pampanga about 0130, 1 January '42, last of the tanks at 0230. The bridge was blown immediately thereafter. Tanks were disposed to meet possible crossings of the Pampanga and its marshes to the north of Calumpit.
32. 2 January 1942. - The Tank Group was ordered by USAFFE to cover the withdrawal into Bataan to the Lyac Junction Covering Position, and thereafter to proceed to bivouac area. The 192d was passed through the 194th, which had a short respite, although now reduced to about 30 tanks. For the prosecution of the withdrawal into Bataan, the 194th (plus A/192 attached) was assigned Highway 7 as an axis. Its commanding officer, being an engineer in civil life, was considered particularly fitted to cope with the succession of bridges, alternative and emergency crossings in lieu thereof, which in all probability be needed, as this highway crossed many tidal creeks in congested communities. The 192d (less A/192) was sent to cover the right (left?) (north and northwest flanks) via Angeles, Porac, San Jose, and Dinalupihan. At the bridge crossing into Bataan, the 194th force was to cross, covered by the 192d. The Tank Group was then to take position to support the occupancy and initial defense of the Lyac Junction Covering Position as a gratuitous mission beyond its assigned one. The withdrawal was accomplished as planned, there being no longer in question the premature destruction of the bridges, such as were left intact by the vicissitudes of all-out vehicular withdrawal into Bataan after the exodus from North and South Luzon, and from the Manila area: Bridge destruction was controlled by the Tank command; although it was required immediately after the withdrawal of the tanks, and the tanks were still required to withdraw as soon as possible.
33. The withdrawal execution. - The 194th (less C Company) moved initially from its position in readiness at Apalit to vicinity San Fernando to cover the withdrawal of the troops north of Guagua; and by 2 January was in position on Route 7 just southeast of Guagua; C/194th (less a platoon sent to ordnance for rehabilitation of both tanks and men) was northwest of Guagua on the Floridablanca Road. This company (Capt. Moffitt) had on the 26 December covered the withdrawal of our forces in the San Pablo area (South Luzon), then took positions near Santo Tomas, moving from there north to Pasig on the 29th; on the 30th, back to Tagaytay Ridge on Highway 17, arriving at 0100, 31 December; after refueling, moving out at once to vicinity Bocaue, southeast of Calumpit Bridge, arriving 0700, to give final protection for the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force across the Pampanga River. This fast traveling -- nonsleeping company crossed the Pampanga at 0230, 1 January 1942.
34. The 192d moved via Angeles - San Jose - Dinalupihan, A/192 joining the depleted 194th via the Porac -- Santa Rita Road, being denied entrance to Guagua by enemy action. This company, under Lieutenant Bloomfield, (SS awarded posthumously) attempted an abortive counterattack with elements of the 11th Division, which unfortunately mistook our tanks forward of the infantry lines for enemy, and fired on them with mortar fire -- as they did on the Group commander's 1/4-ton, in the course of his movement coordinating this effort. A/192 finally had to move by trail and cross-country to the Floridablanca Road, losing three tanks; but finally covering the withdrawal of the hardpressed 194th on the 5th January, and coming into Route 7 between Guagua and Lubao.
35. The 194th was under fire of various types all through the 4th and 5th January, on the southern outskirts of Guagua; its half-tracks operating at critical points in the town and on the road net surrounding. Guagua was burning fiercely on the night of the 4/5 January; but Captain Beck of Major Ganahl's battalion of SPM's supporting the tanks, was still directing fire from the church tower when last seen by the Group Commander. The latter went into the town about 2300 as far as the public square and did not find the enemy reported there several hours before. By this time, however, neither tanks nor half-tracks could get in, because of the general fire. The 194th was forced to start its withdrawal by the standard method, peeling off from the front, tank by tank, on the afternoon of 5 January - mission accomplished. Enemy rifle, machine gun, artillery and mortar fire throughout, was thickened by very active dive and glide bombing by day. At 1600, 5 January, C/194 moved into position on the road between Sexmoan and Lubao, where, on the outskirts of Lubao, it ambushed an enemy force estimated at 750 to 800 supported by artillery, machine guns, and mortars. This force was led by three Filipinos carrying white flags and presumably under duress. This force, bent on cutting the highway, lost 50% in the action. Had the result been different, disaster to our eventual withdrawal would have been inevitable. Four SPM's under Captain Gordon H. Peck supported the tanks in this fight with distinguished gallantry. This was the same battery which Captain Peck employed and withdrew successfully across country south of the Agno, 26/27 December, contributing notably to the defense of the road block established by the 194th commander, at San Manuel. For both of these exploits Captain Peck was cited. Lubao was also burning as the tanks cleared it. Tank troops assisted in separating ammunition cars sidetracked there, and isolated their effect as they subsequently blew up. Problems of retrieving tank gas in caches along this road were continuous.
36. The successive retirements continued to Remlus on the 6th. At 0230 6 January, hostile troops attacked at Remlus in force using smoke for the first time. The heavy action continued until 0500 when the enemy withdrew because of daylight and losses. There were a number of casualties, including Lieutenant Petrie, who had distinguished himself at the Agno by fighting his way across the river before the bridge was blown, with the loss of but one tank. He died of his wounds, as did Private Martella (SS awarded posthumously), who shielded his captain and took the shell fragment that would have gotten him. Two brothers were killed in one company about this time, Private Hennessey, who lost his lower leg in the fight survived to die at Cabanatuan as a prisoner. This fight was considered an all-out attempt to destroy the tank force at a particularly critical time.
37. The withdrawal across the river at Culia, into Bataan, was effected the night 6/7 January -- the 192d covering the 194th, and A/192d joining the 192d thereupon; the tanks going into position on readiness in the Lyac Junction Covering Position, the 194th on the left. The 192d was the last of the American forces to cross the bridge before it was blown. There was no immediate enemy pressure or follow-up the night of 6/7 January. The provisions of a long-existent plan had been accomplished a month after the beginning of hostilities; we were in Bataan.
V. OPERATIONS: BATAAN, 8 JANUARY - 26 JANUARY, 1942.
38. The first covering position in Bataan lay between Culo and Hermosa, with entry by the latter, over a road that soon became worse than none. Half-track rubber tracks were thrown repeatedly, making dangerous work for the ordnance detachments with each battalion--for they alone were equipped to retrack these ponderous vehicles; and shortly after daylight on the 8th enemy artillery fire was falling promiscuously all through the area, access to which to artillery observation on several considerable stretches. In the position-in-readiness tanks were well scattered, but the artillery fire was so general as to make all spots equally vulnerable. The artillery commander for the 71st Division (CP of which was to our right rear by about 3/4 mile) stated to the Tank commander that he was out of gun crews, that the infantry (31st) had broken in our front. It became obvious that it was idle to remain in this position, egress from which would soon be impossible; and use of the tanks to the front from their then position, equally impossible. Orders were given for a composite company (192d) under Captain Hanes to move out and cover the East Coast Road north of Hermosa, which had, it was feared, inadequate defense. It was vital that enemy mechanized be kept from overrunning it. The integrity of the bridges, in great number in the vicinity of Orani, was, dubious. The CP 71st Division was under fire and already in the process of displacement. Orders were given for the tanks to move under their covering detachment, as above, at dark, to a bivouac area south of the Abucay--Abucay Hacienda Road. Both tanks and men were in desperate need of rehabilitation. Tracks had been worn down to the metal. The great radial aviation type motors were long past their essential 400 hour overhaul. In the course of the months operation it had been necessary on the constant movement, or anticipated movement, to keep motors running or idling for protracted periods. Batteries were in a perilous state. If the tanks were to survive they had to have maintenance. The same applied to the officers and men. And with half-rations, of a sort-- mostly Filipino, beginning the 6th of January, the men were already feeling the loss of food. Eyesight was notably impaired.
39. The move south again was precipitated by threatened bridge blowing by the division in whose area the tanks were; and the tanks were ordered out, by non-tank direction (at the time this was written the move had been ascribed to General's Selleck's orders. It was however, communicated to Captain Hanes by radio and originated with Lt Col Miller), about 2100 (including the composite company); and despite the presence of the Group executive there to prevent such a contingency. The tanks were being continuously shelled, but not by observed fire. Their removal was warranted; but the withdrawal of the composite company placed to guard the East Coast Road might have been a catastrophe. However, as before and subsequently, the enemy's follow through was either very slow or very dumb; and all that was lost by the precipitant move was possible opportunity to score.
40. Respite. - In the bivouac just south of the Pilar-Bagac Road and about two kilometers from the East Coast Road, the tank units were reorganized, companies from the 194th being reduced from 17 to 10 tanks; platoons from 5 tanks to 3--a reduction shortly imposed on the 192d, which up to this point had lost about 10 tanks,to the 194th's 26. Extensive overhaul with turning or replacement of tracks and rehabilitation of power plants, communications, and weapons was expedited, the 17th Ordnance Company (armored) going into high gear on 3rd and 4th echelon work and bringing up long needed spare parts, tracks, motors, batteries, radios from the stores on South Bataan. For the first time since the beginning tank crews were fed at their kitchens, and a relatively normal field existence was enjoyed.
41. Support of II Corps, P. A., on the Abucay-Hacienda Main Battle Position. --On the 12th January C and D/194, under Captain Moffitt, were moved forward to the Cadre Road, to a position in readiness, to facilitate familiarization of the personnel with the roads and trails, and action positions and routes. Some hope for a chance to execute a foray through the Main Battle Position was dissipated when it was found its organization and mined areas gave no opportunities for tanks to get through. (Improved tank mines had been laid by PA troops in a belt in front of their positions and time, nor experience, had permitted any mapping of these. The enemy dispositions were such as to afford no remunerative tank mission warranting the inevitable losses that would have resulted in crossing the minefields.) Two ammunition dumps, the farthest 135 yards away, were blown in the course of heavy bombing and artillery fire on the area in which the tanks were -- continuing from 0700 to 1500. After dark these two companies moved back to the Bani Road; and on the 13th back to the Battalion bivouac area.
42. First action on West Coast. - 16 January, C/194 was sent to Bagac on a request from General Wainwright for a platoon to assist in opening the Moron Highway where General Segunda's forces had been denied movements south, by road, by hostile activities there on. The enemy had come from Moron, which had been cleared once by an infantry battalion and a troop of cavalry. The enemy reentering, General Wainwright previously had proposed moving two or three tanks along the beach and across a coastal creek, to overrun the town. Reconnaissance developed an AT gun sited to sweep the beach, with a strong likelihood of more; and the certainty of tanks bogging down. The Group commander said it would take a company and the loss of a platoon. The project was abandoned. On the next occasion (16 Jan) the Group executive went along to secure proper employment of the tanks; but unfortunately, while the company was moved to an assault position at 0600 on the Moron Highway at Road Junction 159, only a platoon was desired for the attack with the infantry. The platoon (three tanks) moved forward from the conference point at Road Junction 162 but a few yards, before running into fire from an anti-tank gun. This was silenced, but the road block had to be reduced and cleared by the infantry. The platoon then proceeded about 600 yards, where land mines in the road disabled two tanks, thus blocking the road. They were finally towed out. Here was an instance where the entire tank company should have been used. The Group executive reported they were held for an organized attack planned to include the cavalry. The cavalry arrived about 0200 that night, four hours after the projected attack, which was not made. Segunda's force had to escape via the coast line, losing the bulk of its heavy equipment, most of it destroyed to prevent enemy use. Hostile air sought the tanks, to no avail the next day. 20 January an urgent call for a few tanks to save the 31 Division CP (west of the Bani Bani Road) reported encircled, was answered by sending a company. The message said a counterattack was being launched in twenty minutes. As this interim was over before the message came in, tank participation in another attack was planned. However, no attack was made nor necessary. The tanks were asked to cruise through neighboring standing sugar cane, but neither flushed anyone out or ran them down, so far as they could discern in the over-whelming dust. Another occasion for possible tank use having developed, the Group commander went back to take this company on the second mission. However, it had been ordered back and away by the Division Commander who, in common with many others, did not want tanks around unless the need was critical -- they drew too much artillery fire and bombing. The most incongruous call for tank use was their proposed employment against snipers north of the Abucay-Hacienda Line. Besides their inherent blindness, their only chance to get at snipers--by movement and search-- was precluded by lack of exit through the wire, ditches, mine fields in the area concerned. To trade a tank with crew for one sniper was not remunerative or permissible. 20 January D/194th was sent forward to the Hacienda Road on a chance for a move around the left (west) flank of the enemy, but was again stopped by mined areas. By the 24th the entire 194th (less Hq Co) had been placed in the Hacienda Road area to support troops there. Company D had a short engagement on the left flank. Meanwhile the 192d, on USAFFE orders, has been charged with East Coast security south from Magalang, at the eastern extremity of the main battle position: This was accomplished by tanks in alert position, but more generally by half-track patrols, all in the radio net.
43. Withdrawal from the Abucay-Hacienda Battle Position. - The 194th was charged with covering the withdrawal on the axis of the Back Road; the 192d on the axis of the East Coast Road, which was in its zone of responsibility for beach defense. The bulk of the withdrawal was to be by the inevitable bus; the screens in some parts straight back, the busses by the East Coast Road. In addition to the officers of the II Corps checking on the completeness of the withdrawal, the Tank Group established supplementary check points at the Abucay (Gen. Weaver), at the junction of the Hacienda--Back Roads (Lt Col Smyth), and of the Bani-Back Roads (Lt Col Miller). The 192d lined the East Coast Road in its conventional covering position; the 194th, in the middle Hacienda Road area, prepared to cover the withdrawal via the Back Road. The covering positions, to be occupied by the tanks at daybreak the 25th, were generally the line: Balanga--the Cadre Road--the Bani Bani Road. The withdrawal was to start at midnight, screens out by 0200. Though the Corps checking officers reported all out, the Tank Group executive, Lt. Colonel Smyth (the only Regular in the Group besides the Commanding General) made memorable solitary checks, finding as many as 200 Filipinos in a group, lost, without officers, and steering them out to one or other of the axial roads. It was broad daylight before the Group Commander, at Abucay, could give the word for the tanks to pull back, the ubiquitous busses still being on the roads. It looked likely that the instructions to the tanks,SOP withdrawal, delaying,would be invoked again; namely:--"Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety or expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay." (Gen. Weaver's written orders).
44. Group withdrawal order provided for the tanks to continue in the covering position area during the 26th and the night of 26/27, taking ambush positions in the heavy brush and on side roads to exploit the enemy's usually delayed and then incautious advance. The usual bug-a-boo of bridge and defile was not present except at Balanga. However II Corps notified that all elements in the Corps area would be behind the new main battle position--roughly the Pilar-Bagac Road--by daybreak the 26th, to permit artillery covering fire.
45. 25/26 January, in covering position. - The enemy seemed to make no move to follow on the 25th, his artillery fire did not come down until after the tanks were all back in the covering position, about 1000 in the 192d sector, when a bridge at Balanga was hit and destroyed, making the 192d's subsequent withdrawal circuitous by the secondary roads to the west around the town. Bombing and heavy artillery fire started in earnest about 1100, making the Tank Group OP in the church tower untenable. Stragglers continued to come in until almost noon. The night 25/26th passed without untoward incident except for the "homeless" and empty plight of the Group Headquarters; radishes and a can of sardines for breakfast the 26th broke a long fast. Again the covering screens were slow in getting out. The tanks in the 194th sector were still in a covering position about a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road at about 0945 when a Filipino civilian came through the lines with the information that a considerable body of the enemy, in several columns, was approaching. Our troops were all behind the Bani Bani Road by 0400; but two of our tanks were lost through a bridge and by bombing and had not yet been salvaged. Major Ganahl's four SPM's were with the 194th, stationed on the flanks. When the enemy columns appeared through the brush every weapon, unit and personal, was brought to bear on the column in close formation. Of an estimated 1200, at least 500 were casualties. The fight and the following fire, as the enemy abandoned its mission and fled, lasted 45 minutes. (Lt Col Miller was in charge of this momentous action. Subsequently recommended for DSC. Got the LM-maybe SS) Had this force hit the scarcely occupied, let alone organized, main battle position at this time, there is little likelihood that they could have been stopped. Their air retaliation came promptly, hitting the tanks' withdrawal as it was on the Orion Cut-off south of the Pilar-Bagac Road. Their bombing was wild and their straffing gingerly executed--both with small effect. Two tanks were hit by bombs but not put out of commission. Captain Moffitt was wounded as the bridge over the Pilar River was blown when his vehicle started over it, by the battalion commander--the latter thinking he had been the last to cross. Again the tanks went into a well earned bivouac and long denied access to rear echelons and kitchens, The 194th, after a brief stay in a temporary bivouac, moved to KP 148, East Coast Road (Bataan), where its Hq and Hq Co stayed until 7 April.
VI. OPERATIONS: BATAAN, 27 JANUARY - 8 APRIL 1942.
48. Beach defense was assumed 28 January and continued throughout active operations as primary and contingent missions; 192d from Pandan Point to Limay, 194th from Limay exclusive to Cabcaben. 192d had a contingent mission to support subsectors A and B; 194th, Subsectors C and D. Instructions were, for beach defense: - tanks to be moved from covered positions (platoon) at dark to covering positions (tank), intervals to be patrolled by half-tracks, radio contact to be maintained with in-shore and off-shore patrols and by liaison with beach patrols. A communications center was established with II Corps, with the tank radio system the backbone, and with tank liaison officers with Corps. For the support missions, extensive and intensive reconnaissance, particularly new route reconnaissance, was instituted, The difficulty in supporting the interior subsectors was accentuated by the narrowness of the new trails. South of the Pilar-Bagac Road there was little reclaimed ground. Besides the coastal roads there were only old timber roads or vague tracks, very dusty and leading nowhere. On 31 January General Wainwright asked for a "few tanks" to patrol the road in his sector--against infiltration. Tank tracks were now in precarious shape and tank gas was getting scarce. The Group commander proposed to furnish ten half-tracks and 1/4-ton C&R, which would not only do the work where the tanks were unfitted, but be able to negotiate the new roads forward without blocking them. The possibility of using tanks in the heavily wooded difficult terrain was not suggested. That night a message was received from Colonel Irwin of USAFFE, by 'phone, to send a battalion less a company to the West Coast. This was dispatched with orders for support--specifically to carry out any request of I Corps commander that was possible. The next morning (1 Feb) the Tank Command was notified that the tanks sent to the West Coast had been attached to I Corps. 194th had hurriedly taken over the East Coast defense in its entirety. B/192d was held in reserve and charged with the South Shore of Bataan, along with the 17th Ordnance Company (armored). Beach defense was kept active by repeated threats and alarms off-shore and in-shore. There were frequent tracers and flares fired from shore apparently as signals. Fire from Manila Bay seldom reached shore. Knowledge that the tanks were there and why was admitted by the enemy field commander in his conference with the Tank Group commander on 9-10 April. He left no doubt that their presence deterred hostile landings from the Manila side. If successful the end of Bataan would have been quicker and more inevitable.
47. Defense of the landing fields. - The armored troops took over on their own initiative, on 1 February, the protection of the three landing fields: Cabcaben, Bataan, and Mariveles. The inadequacy of the protection and the few weapons of the grounded air personnel as well as the high rate of sickness- 56% - made this imperative in the probability of hostile airborne or paratroop ventures. It was known (reported) they had some 12,000 airborne troops in Formosa or to the north. A composite platoon of tanks and half-tracks was well hidden at each field, with positions and plans carefully figured for several types of action possible. These fields were repeatedly looked over by hostile air, but seldom attacked, leading to the belief that the enemy hoped to use them eventually. The major alert occurred early in March when 73 planes came over.
48. The rocket fights. - Arriving on the West Coast the 1/2 February, the 192d (less one company) was immediately employed in the Aglalome and Anyasen River valleys, between the West Coast Road and the China Sea. The stories might best be told by the citations won there, and by the mounting list of casualties in both tanks and men. Here again, as on 29 December '41, in Luzon proper, an entire tank crew was lost with tank--this time by burning, the crew being buried in the tank by the dirt waste from the foxholes dug under and about the tank, which had become the center of a maze. The tank was salvaged. The 2-5 February, Lieutenant John Hay with his platoon made as many as five attacks a day, some protracted to five hours; sometimes coordinated with the infantry--usually not, as he broke trail.
Quoting the citation:
"During this period and in the terrain involved--a rugged dense jungle wherein tank movement had to be limited to the space cumulatively cleared by repeated charges of a few yards each--Lieutenant Hay's gallantry, persistence, and complete disregard of personal danger, in an entirely new phase of tank warfare, preeminently contributed to the ultimate success of the tanks and the troops which they supported."
Captain Morley, S-2 of his battalion, when sent into the north front of the I Corps sector in Bataan, P.I., to coordinate the tank action in the front of two divisions made possible by his gallant reconnaissance and actual leadership, on occasion on foot across the front, the employment of tanks under what appeared to be impossible conditions, and contributing thereby immeasurably to the success of the operations; remaining voluntarily at the front under fire since February 6, 1942, and inspiring both tank and supported troops by his disregard of danger." (2-14-42), (the Tuol Pocket in the 11th Division sector, eventually was wiped out completely.)
"Captain Burholt, S-3 of his battalion, when sent into the Anyasen River area, West Coast of Bataan, P.I., to coordinate the tank action in that difficult terrain, with that of other troops operating therein, remained continuously in that area during subsequent tank relief; and by his gallant efforts for the period 3-11 February 1942, during which he effected noteworthy joint action, he contributed to the eventual success of by his reconnaissance, planning, and leadership under conditions demanding a high degree of persistence and daring."
49. Citations. - These are but a few of the citations and a few of the dead. In two G.O.'s Hq Tank Group USAFFE, that have come to light,there are 15 citations for the Silver Star, in the Group, and 22 Purple Heart awards for one battalion--in the period 25 January-6 February, 1942. Two officers and two men got their DSC's, only one now surviving (Gen. Weaver). On one post-war recommendation there were 7 Legion of Merits, 3 Silver Stars, 15 Bronze Star Medals. There were others.
50. Fatalities. - Lieutenant Winger, 192d, killed in the Tuol Pocket after his tank, blinded by the enemy's first use of flame and oil throwers jammed between two trees, and had to be abandoned. Sgt. Hopple DSC, shot by snipers. Seventeen others in one battalion, and not previously mentioned, are a part of the killed in action while in Luzon, from Rosario to the south end of Bataan.
51. February-March. --While the 192d (less a company) was working on the West Coast, attached to I Corps, its companies had to be rotated with the reserve company (at Group Headquarters), successively rehabilitated and overhauled. By March the Surgeon reported the daily ration amounted to but 950 calories. Each battalion had so many sick with dengue and malaria that emergency battalion dispensaries took care of the men--they were too badly off to get to the base hospitals. Three types of worms contributed their share of misery. To the tanks--mostly working forward, apart from their rear echelons and kitchens, food was cold and precarious, and not white man's provender. Gas allowance for all purposes other than tanks was cut to 15, then to 10 gallons a day per battalion, making the prosecution of reconnaissance, administration, and services about impossible. The armored troops had been ordered by Group on January 27, to support in every way the defense, forgetting conventional tank employment; using tanks as pillboxes in the front line, if required. The half-tracks were so big as to defeat their purpose in close country and on narrow, congested trails. They offered little protection and invited fire.
52. Projects denied. - Before General Wainwright went to Corregidor in March, it was suggested by Group command that a platoon of tanks be sent there. Not favorably considered at that time, their lack was regrettable later as the enemy attack was prosecuted thereon. On the East Coast a venture with 1/4-tons pulling wheeled 37-mm's and crossing the front by emergency means for surprise, penetration, and raid was negated;--the 37's were not yielded by the artillery command. Projects off-shore with barge-carried tanks were negatived for various reasons.
53. The armored troops had to take over more and more of the beach defense as the ineffective rate of the Filipinos increased and the enemy activities and threats became more intensive. A comprehensive instruction by battalion was instituted by the armored troops amongst the Philippine Army troops, and a high degree of cooperation and coordination effected in plans and operations. Bombings were frequent near tank bivouac and combat areas but only a few got in. The tanks had learned by this time to cover and camouflage. Movement was at a minimum because of gas lack; no longer was 92-octane gas available. The only thing the armored troops had was ammunition. The ordnance had contributed to tank action by converting considerable AP 37-mm to HE and cannister, more useful in the absence of hostile armored vehicles. After the Baliuag fight, enemy tanks were never seen more than three at a time--usually less; and this only in April, in the closing phases when our artillery and AT had been virtually reduced to inaction, after their marvelous show before they lost observation.
54. April 3.--The occasion of a defunct Nipponese emperor's anniversary of dynasty assumption was made the beginning of an all-out offensive to close out the Philippine situation. It was evident at once in the increased hostile activities. The 194th took its contingent mission as primary: A/194, Pandan Point and Damilog Trail; D/194, to support 31st Infantry. The bombing on the front was terrific. The enemy pressure eased on the East front comparatively, and an obvious drive to break through east of the Panglingan, and via the Panglingan corridor, developed. On the 4th, C/194 was sent to the aid of General Lough's D subsector, where the 41st Division was being driven back. All of its artillery had been lost previously. Group S-3, Major Morley, had been sent into the II Corps sector to coordinate the tank support to the optimum advantage. A/194 was fighting a losing fight on the axis of the East Coast Road; it was ordered reinforced by elements of D/194, while other elements were ordered to take over C/194th's mission in subsector C(General Bluemel). C/194th, with Lt Col Miller, arrived on the boundary between corps, was ordered to support a counterattack at daybreak the 6th by the 45th Infantry, P.S., north via the Panglingan corridor. Group commander left south Bataan at 0200, 6th, for this operation. The East Coast of Bataan looked like a fiesta, with the tracer and flare activity--evidently from fifth columnists or infiltrated enemy. Major Morley, picked up at 0400, enroute, reported tank operations rather desperate; any move blocked the trails already cumbered with south bound materiel and troops; similarly every move, in the intense dust aroused, invited immediate bombing. The troops were all intent on staying away from the tanks. The 26th Cavalry turned down a tank company's proffered assistance in a last coordinated counterattack. Tanks were being bombed on and off the trails and severely punished without opportunity to fight back. As the Group commander went through the subsectors, he encountered increasing movement of Filipino soldiers to the rear--mostly without arms, in favor of small parcels of rice. The cry was "I'm seeck," "Malaria", "I'm hunting my officer" "Going to the concentration point." A message was sent to the CG II Corps of this, suggesting dispatch of MP units to form a straggler line or control points to stop this cumulative movement. The situation on General Lough's front was not favorable. He was out of contact with I and II Corps, and with the 45th Infantry, which since arrival had not yet established contact with the broken troops on its right, and in front of D Subsector. The 45th, well to the front in the Panglingan valley, on Trail 29, was backed up by the tanks (C/194th) with Lt. Colonel Miller and Captain Moffitt coordinating. They were receiving fire from three directions--apparently from our I Corps troops across the Panglingan , as well as the enemy. Two trips were made by the Group commander between General Lough and this task force. Snipers were infiltrating, and hostile air was attempting to bomb Trail 3. The last trip back, Lough's CP was starting to move west. The 45th withdrew at dark to Trail 8, C/194th covering. Group command, estopped from return across the front to the east, had left about 1600 to contact II Corps via I Corps, and to apprise the 11th Division of the activities on their right to prevent further misdirected fire on the 45th task force. This was accomplished, but contact with II Corps via I Corps communications was not successful: (wires were out). Accomplished by Group commander about 2030 that night.
55. 7 April, the 45th headed by four tanks, made an effort to the east along Trail 8, to support the 57th Inf., P.S., encountering AT weapons at Junction Trail 8 and Trail 6,which blasted the lead tank off the road, knocking out the tank officer. This tank was hit five times. Fire from the jungle on the north side of the road became intense; progress was blocked and the effort reversed. The remaining tanks covered the withdrawal west, under 30 minutes' continued fire from the leading disabled tank, now commanded by Pfc. R. Peeples (SS awarded later). The last enemy tank seen on the front was destroyed by our tanks 37's near Junction Trails 8 and 9. C/194th, on arrival in I Corps sector, was attached to the 192d. It had seven tanks left. The company commander received two wounds. (Captain Moffitt, SS awarded)
56. Afternoon 8th April. - General King and General Parker were out of contact with the front. Tank command moved a radio truck into Bataan Force Headquarters, and sought contact with the divisions through tank radio channels and tank liaison. General Bluemel, when last contacted about 1630, was virtually alone, attempting to re-establish the line northeast of Cabcaben on Trail 20; the Alingan line had evaporated. The Group executive, Lt Col Smyth, reaching him, arranged for a plan of tank employment. The remnants of A and D/194th were involved in desperate resistance along the East Coast Road axis. The 192d was ordered to send a company to help--the situation in the I Corps sector being quiescent. First refused by the I Corps commander, the order was executed beginning at dark. By the time the company commander checked in with Group command on the road leading to Group CP it was too late, although a notable march had been made: - the 700 gallons of tank gas depended on for necessary refueling had been abandoned by the fuel dump people and had been utilized unwittingly by the SPM's. The company was ordered stopped outside the now very congested area, and turned back.
57. Cabcaben line.--The remnants of A and D/194th, as darkness fell, joined the remnants of Colonel Ganahl's SPM's near Cabcaben and on the feeder roads into the South Coast Road, to prevent the enemy from cutting in from Trail 20. About 1830 General King acknowledged the situation as very critical. Secret messages were sent by Group to the major unit commanders, substantially as follows:
"You will make plans, to be communicated to company commanders only, and be prepared to destroy within one hour after receipt by radio, or other means, of the word CRASH, all tanks and combat vehicles, arms, ammunition, gas, and radios; reserving sufficient trucks to close to rear echelons as soon as accomplished."
58. The decision.--At about 2230 General King announced to the three general officers present (McBride, Funk, Weaver) that further resistance would result in the massacre of the 6,000 sick and wounded in the area and the 40,000 refugees now congested closely about; that he was out of touch with any troops that might still be resisting behind the closely drawn lines; that there were less than 25% effective of those now holding; that at most he could not hold more than the next day; that he was going to send a flag across the line at daylight; that he would take this action on his own responsibility. Asked by the tank commander if any help was in prospect, he stated, "no". Destruction of the main ordnance dumps was to commence at 2340. Troops would destroy their arms and equipment and cease resistance at 0700 the 9th.
VII. CLOSING PHASE: 9 APRIL-
59. April 9th.--Colonel Williams and two other officers left at 0400 with a white flag, in a tank 1/4-ton; and returning after contact, took General King across the line at 0700. The signal CRASH was sent out by radio, telephone, and courier at 0535. Reports subsequently received indicate complete compliance. The tank radio at Bataan Force Headquarters was secreted; the Group commander proceeded to his own CP, where all present were directed to prepare for an unknown future, ready to move with bellies and canteens full. Trucks were hidden out for such use as might be possible; papers and maps of use to the enemy were destroyed. The Group commander went back to Bataan Force Headquarters, as per General King's request, to implement such instructions as might be sent back. At about 1530, no word having been received from General King, the Group commander proceeded to the motor pool (to join his CP), where he encountered a Nipponese officer and patrol. It was indicated that he was to be taken to General King. Insistence on using his own car was successful. The Chief of Staff (Gen. Funk), Bataan Force, was picked up shortly thereafter; and a start was made, ostensibly for Cabcaben and General King. Traffic was uncontrolled, termite-like, and in extraordinary congestion; with Filipino refugees moving out under enemy direction, prodding, and organized stripping; and enemy troops of all categories moving in. Three times our party was turned about on meeting various interpreters and staff officers. About 2100 we arrived at General Hospital No. 1, Little Gaggio, where the enemy tank general (who claimed to be field commander in Bataan) had established his CP under the protection of the gr.. Geneva Cross, newly illuminated by his orders. His tanks were all about. Five varieties of light tanks were observed.
60. The conference.--Through a Nipponese Spanish-speaking interpreter the Tank Group commander was questioned for about an hour, the party being seated on the cross. The most insistent question was where our tanks were. The reply was that they were destroyed. Questioned as to when, answer was "Before the surrender this morning." Location of the armored troops was indignantly demanded. This was given--apparently to be checked on. Engineer maps, old but official, were in the enemy hands and were used to locate Tank Group last positions. Inquiry then turned to Corregidor and the location of the tunnel to Bataan. The tank Group commander told the Japanese "I am a soldier and you are one. You know that I cannot give you information. But so far as I know there is no tunnel between Corregidor and Bataan." The Japanese commander evinced disbelief, whereupon the Group commander jumped to his feet, shouting, "What!" The Nipponese then explained that since there was a telephone to Corregidor there must be a tunnel. No information was given and the enemy general intimated that despite the claimed slight opportunities an American general should know more than the Group commander did or appeared to. Professional interest then developed in our tank tactics. Persistent inquiry into why we maintained a tank cordon guard on the East Coast of Bataan developed the assurance that it had saved Bataan from invasion that way; and that the threat of tank action had been a deterrent all through the campaign. The melange of tank tactics in tank groups and armored divisions gave him plenty to sort out and evaluate to no advantage. Adjournment was made to next morning, for further conference. This did not develop nor the projected trip to the armored troop positions. Apparently information thereupon had been checked during the night. General Funk had been interviewed separately, in the hospital. The Group commander and his aide, Major Pettit, were quartered that night (9/10) in the Nurses' Quarters vacated at 0400 the 9th. The next morning other Bataan Force Hq officers were brought in, and US cars assembled for their move. The Group commander insisted on sending for his staff. Major Pettit was allowed to proceed and brought back the executive, the communications officer, and the headquarters commandant, with a 1/4-ton C&R, and a truck with Headquarters personnel baggage on it. Up to the time of moving out for an undisclosed destination treatment had been satisfactory and fairly courteous. Excellent further treatment was promised by the Nipponese commander. It ceased at Balanga.
VIII. Conclusions
1. The Fil-American effort had done what it could.
2. The Armored Troops had paid for themselves.
3. The Nipponese had feared most the tanks and the artillery.
4. The tanks had by their cordon coastal guard saved Bataan from invasion from Manila Bay.
5. The enemy had over-estimated our tank strength, from 33 to 900% (158 to 1080). *radio, and written subsequently.
6. The enemy had about 200 tanks, inferior in armor, but better adapted to tropical terrain than ours and better armed as to main battery, having a very effective 47-mm gun. Report and recommendation on armored equipment was radioed to the War Department, by direction, sometime after the withdrawal to Bataan; and should be available. (Probably Ch. of Ordnance)
7. That the service rendered by the troops of this armored force was as grilling in its continuity, severity, and exactions as any rendered in either war by any arm.

JAS. R. N. WEAVER
Brig. Gen., USA
Formerly commanding
The Provisional Tank Group, USAFFE.

NOTES:
For further reading see:
1. The Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1953.

1. Bataan Uncensored, Col Ernest B. Miller, The Hart Publications, Inc., Long Prairie, Minnesota, February 1949 (Dewey Decimal Reference 940.5426 Mi). Col Miller was commander of the 194th Tank Battalion.
2. In addition, there is an excellent documentary video, featuring interviews with survivors, titled "In the Hands of the Enemy". For more information, visit OpenDNS

This report was copied on a manual typerwriter from the original document, borrowed from the Army Office of the Chief of Military History in 1960. It was subsequently re-typed into electronic form in 1994. There are a few omissions that were unreadable or grammatically indecipherable in the original document.

This page is sponsored byThe Alabama Center of Military History​

 

To add to the subject

The last stand of the Filipino-American forces was on the Island of Corregidor. For one month of Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment, the island?s coastal guns were all destroyed. On 5 May 1942, Japanese forces carried out their amphibious landing on Corregidor and successfully landing three (3) tanks ? two (2) 15.8-ton Type 97 Shinhoto Chi-Ha tanks and one (1) captured M3 Stuart light tank.

 

You might like this site if you havent found it already . Some good history info there.

Philippine Army Light Armor Division
Light Armor Division

 

Good of you to mention tank action in Corregidor. I am going there this Friday. I'll check if the museum or curator there has some more info.

 

I wonder what happened to the FT-17? If it was used in combat?

The First Armored Units​

Unknown to most, the first armored vehicle used by the Filipino soldier was the World War I vintage 6.5-ton Renault FT 17 (see inset pictures, left). The lone tank was used by the 1st Regular Division, Philippine Army in their infantry training at Camp Murphy (now Camp Aguinaldo) sometime from 1936 to 1940. 5


Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, on 26 September 1941, the US 194th Tank Battalion with fifty four (54) M3 Stuart light tanks and the 17th Ordnance Company (Armored) arrived in the Philippines. Two weeks later, on 14 October 1941, a total of fifty (50) M3 Gun Motor Carriages, otherwise known as Self-propelled Mounts or SPMs (Half-tracks mounted with US M1897A 75-mm field gun) arrived in the Philippines and were assigned to the 11th Provisional Artillery Brigade, USAFFE.


The 194th Tank Battalion was organized from three (3) Army National Guard tank companies, ?A? Company from Brainerd, Minnesota; ?B? Company from Saint Joseph, Missouri; and ?C? Company from Salinas, California.

Towards the middle of November 1941, the US 192nd Tank Battalion (Kentucky National Guards) with fifty four (54) M3 Stuart light tanks arrived in Manila. With the two tank battalions
extant, General Douglas MacArthur created the Provisional Tank Group under Brigadier General James Weaver.

The 192nd Tank Battalion was organized from three (3) Army National Guard tank companies, ?A? Company from Janesville, Wisconsin; ?B? Company from Maywood, Illinois; and ?C? Company from Harrodsburg, Kentucky.


The U.S. Provisional Tank Group was a formidable force with one hundred eight (108) 14.7-ton M3 Stuart light tanks, forty-six (46) 8.7-ton M2 and 9.3-ton M3 Half-tracks and fifteen (15) 3.7-ton Universal or Bren gun carriers.

Light Armor Division

 

great story well done cheers mark