Belasar is correct, the Air Force has little desire to field the aircraft, they have a history of devoting little thought and resources for the CAS role, it's not "glamorous" enough. This concept has been in the evaluation stage since at least 2009 (that program the LAAR light attack/armed reconnaissance, specified they start fielding the aircraft no later than 2013). The also don't want the Army fielding fixed wing assets so they'll claim they're studying the the issue and then find reasons not too field it, or field it in token numbers. Of the aircraft they're looking at, the AT-6B (the one they're favoring) is less capable than the A-29 Super Tucano. The Air Force didn't even consider Boeing's OV-10X (an upgrade of a combat proven aircraft that already meets or exceeds the requirements set forth in the program) which was proffered during the 2009-2013 program that never came to anything, except morphing into the OA-X program where the same aircraft are again being evaluated. In the interim the Navy/Marine Corps went ahead in May of 2015 and deployed two recycled OV-10D's upgraded to the G specification (four bladed props and an electro-optical sensor/targeting pod mounted under the nose) and four naval aviators (they did not specify Navy or Marine or a combination) to Iraq where they were employed supporting special operations forces fighting ISIS. The results over the 82 day employment, 120 combat missions, 134 sorties, a 99% operational rate, a $1,000 per flight hour operational cost (by comparison an F-15 is around $40,000. per flight hour), excellent tactical effectiveness and had a long combat record from Vietnam to Desert Storm and now fighting ISIS. They have also been successfully been operated off the Navy's short decked carriers, Amphibious Assault Ships. https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-amazing-ov-10-bronco-was-never-allowed-to-meet-its-1695837367 Well now that the Bronco tests have been recently leaked in the media, the Air Force is saying it's now looking at actually deploying four aircraft to test the concept and will make a decision by years end. I'm betting once again they let it wither on the vine.
Is there a "Chief of the Defence Force" or CDF role/position in the US? Sounds like a single person without (too much) bias should be deciding these things...In Australia this role is given to a different branch each time...army then navy etc etc...The situation you describe is far from desirable IMO...bordering on irresponsible. Defence arms shouldn't be self serving to the detriment of the best defence/offence possible...I would have thought at least the Marines are broader thinking and leaning more to the interests of the US rather than (petty) in fighting and biases...I realise this statement is (slightly) naieve...
The Marine Corps has it's own air wing for providing it's needs so they're not too worried about if the Air Force retains it's A-10's or adopts a light attack aircraft. The one area where there has repeatedly been issues is when the Air Force is tasked with a high percentage of USMC CAS missions because they don't devote much time between conflicts practicing that skill set. That's also the reason the Air Force, early in the current conflicts had a large number of friendly fire incidents. They thought CAS was just dropping bombs and shooting shit up, they didn't practice target recognition and CAS TTP's that permit that supporting arm to employed most effectively and safely. It's not a new thing. Not long after the law that established the Air Force and DoD, the National Security Act of 1947, the Air Force started it's turf wars. They tried to get control of all aviation assets in DoD, argued that fighters and tactical air support were obsolete, that the future was strategic bombers that flew so high and so fast they were immune to interception. They poured most of their money and whatever they could get re-appropriated from the other services into that vision. Unfortunately, the Korean War came along and proved the fallacy of their position. Read this about the "Revolt of the Admiral's" then I'll give you some more informationon some of the shady things the Air Force has done. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/98-166.pdf
CAC, while the link I posted gives a good synopsis of the "Revolt of the Admirals" it gives only passing mention to certain critical facts. It is primarily concerned with the politics surrounding the event and even ignores a few of the political events that also led up to the incident. -The Air Force's strategic doctrine vision was based upon the B-36 flying so high and so fast that it could not be intercepted. If it could be, there would be the possibility that Russia could counter it with a robust enough air defense system based upon jet interceptors. The Navy tried to arrange a demonstration between the B-36 and the F2H Banshee, which theoretically could intercept the bomber. The Air Force had it's political friends forbid the test that would have exposed the fallacy of the doctrine. An interesting aside is that the F2H Banshee spent a lot of time early in the Korean War escorting US Air Force bombers to protect them against enemy interceptors. The Air Force in it's pursuit of it's strategic vision had allowed it's fighter escort capabilities to atrophy. The Air Force did not deploy the B-36 to Korea, the B-29 was deployed instead, because there was the fear that the MiG-15 might intercept them which would undercut their strategic nuclear deterrence value. -The Navy had reason to fear Secretary of Defense Johnson's Air Force advocacy. He had previously made this statement to Admiral Richard L. Conolly; "Admiral, the Navy is on its way out. There’s no reason for having a Navy and a Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We’ll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do, so that does away with the Navy." -One of the principals in the controversy that came off poorly was Omar Bradley. I lost a lot of respect for him when I first read of the political machinations surrounding the events. In 1948, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army, he testified that the Army was in bad need of equipment, reorganization and training and advocated for the same, going as far as to state that, "the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag." Then he was proffered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff job in 1949, he drank the Kool Aid and changed his stance to, it would be a "disservice to the nation" if he asked for a larger military force and more funding. Then he had the temerity to criticize the naval officers as being disloyal for voicing legitimate concerns. They maintained their integrity, he sacrificed his. The paper also did not address the real cuts the Navy was facing when it several times mentions that the US had the worlds largest Navy which it was. Large numbers of ships of all types were being decommissioned or sold, particularly hard hit were amphibious types, due to lack of funds. Johnson was in the process of reducing Navy active fleet carriers to six when Korea broke out. When North Korea invaded the south, Truman ordered a naval blockade of the peninsula, he was told the navy did not have sufficient ships. US Army troops rushed from Japan to stem the North Korean assault were quickly defeated and forced to retreat, a result of personnel cutbacks and lack of training which Bradley had changed his position to support. UN forces were forced back into a small pocket around the port of Pusan, with it's airfields over run the Air Force had to rebase to Japan, limiting it's ability to provide air support to help stem the tide. The only US carrier in the region, the Valley Forge provided the majority of air support for allied forces until two more carriers could be rushed to join her. So much for the Air Force's claim it should be the sole provider for air power. --more later--
The Army should have dedicated CAS units like the Marine Corps has. I've always felt that way once I learned how the USMC benefited from the set up. If the Army had the organic CAS, that would free up the Air Farce to go and do what they do best. A retired full bird Marine Corps colonel/drinking buddy of mine says that the Air Farce should be done away with, and all assets transferred back to the Army, as in the Army Air Corps. I don't think that sounds like a bad idea.
The military triad is (weakened?) with a fourth arm...at least the doctrine...or perhaps the Marine Corp is an overlay...it’s own triad in one. Clearly defined roles should make allocation of orders and funds much easier and strategists can see who should do what...IMO if the Marines have been tasked with a job, they should use their own assets and if more or different assets are used, they should be under the command of the Marines...all arms are still very much needed...but at the end of the day they support the man on the ground...that seems to always be the Marines these days...I’m beginning to see the complication in my own mind now...
The Air Force does strategic air very well, always has. Air superiority, they do that very well also. Military air lift, outstanding but not a glamorous job. Not helpful for getting big budgets.The have all those responsibilities, jobs they have to remain capable of doing, so tactical air just gets shunted aside. Marine Corps air only has one job, well job area, direct support of the troops. Within their niche they're outstanding they can ferry, resupply and evacuate their troops, they can provide their troops with air support, they can defend their areas against enemy air, and perform interdiction missions on an operational level. They lack the organization, assets, and infrastructure to be responsible for theater wide and strategic level missions. The Navy provides the strategic and theater wide air assets and augments the Marine Corps operational level assets. Marines are Naval Aviators, they train at the same Navy run schools, learn the same doctrines, so it's easy for the two to integrate. Then they go on to specialize in their specific mission skill sets within the Marine Corps. Most carriers deploy with a Marine fighter/attack squadron, and it poses no integration issue. Bobby: I don't think the Air Force should be done away with. I do think that if they're not willing to devote adequate resources to the fixed wing, direct support of ground troops mission the US Army requires then they should, as you suggested give that mission to the US Army. The Army does an outstanding job with it's rotary wing assets. The US Army and Air Force are huge organizations (the Air Force is larger than the US Navy and it's reserve components alone, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, are bigger than the active duty Marine Corps), so they're not as adaptable as an organization. Marine tankers get their training at the Army's armor school, their artillerymen go to the Army's artillery school at Ft. Sill, so they're trained in the Army way of doing things. (There are Marine Detachments at each school that are responsible for the Marines attending) Using armor as the example, after the school most Army personnel go off to armored units where they practice large scale armored warfare. The Marines go to the divisional tank battalions where they focus on integrating with and supporting the infantry regiments. Once deployed they work with and directly support those assets. If you were to pull that Marine Corps tank battalion and plug it into a US Army armored division for a big armored operation, they could function proficiently because they've been trained in the US Army's tactics and doctrine. They wouldn't perform to the same level of proficiency as the best Army units that practiced the mission daily, and had leadership that trained them to a high level. They would however perform as well or better than of the other poor and average Army units because of higher morale, esprit and focus on training in basic tanker skills. If you reversed the scenario, the Army tankers, even the better ones would be at a disadvantage because they weren't familiar with Marine Corps doctrine, TTPS and didn't have practice in direct support of infantry forces. The better Army units would quickly adapt and become effective in the mission, the average and poor units would just remain ineffective. I digress, back to topic. One thing the Air Force is putting out now, with support from Senator McCain, is that had the light attack/reconnaissance role been pursued ten years ago at the height of the War on Terror, it might have been worth the investment. They think going forward it may not be needed. I got to thinking, if we go back to immediately post WWII, how many conflicts have we been in where it would have been a viable asset? In my mind virtually all, so why is it probable that it won't be important going forward?