The Battle of France

And thus you disprove your own position. You are also wrong about the lack of radios by the way again to a large extent due to your myopic vision.

 

And yet Germany was not manufacturing significantly more tanks during the Winter of '39-40. Indeed just the opposite occured; it's armaments program was focused almost entirely on ammunition (artillery shells), for artillery pieces that were not mobile. At least, not in the same sense of the word as a Panzer. In other words, the war in the West was almost expected to turn static, as it had in WW1. Hitler did not expect to defeat France as thoroughly or suddenly as Germany did.

 

This spring chicken has read that the main problem with the excellent French tanks was:
-One man turret. The officer had to do too much work. His job should have been only to find targets, and direct the tank. Put 2 men in there, and things may have been different...Spreading them out didn't help.

 

They (meaning the Allies) just weren't in the right mindset as to what kind of war this really was. I would have thought that after conquering Poland so swiftly, that Hitler was more confident about the possibility of another quick victory against the French. I also thought the Allies would have felt the same way after the German conquest of Poland, that this war would not be won by defense but by primarily offense. But the French put so much faith in the Maginot line and believed that their defense would trump Germany's offense.

 

In may 1940,the French were in the position of the Germans in France in june 1944 : it was a mission impossible .In both situations,there were only few mobile divisions and these were committed where the danger was the greatest (Normandy and the region north of the Meuse).

 

Restating your opinion does nothing to further support of the same. A questionable position is still a questionable position, especially when many of your own arguments have undercut that position.

 

Is there anything wrong in post 85?

 

What do you think is wrong with it? Does it not sound right? Words mixed up?

 

I haven't read the rest of this thread, but this is a kind of statement which deserves to be followed by the words "discuss" - and set as a test of WW2 history!

The French in 1940 were in a very different position to the Germans in 1944.


1. Starting with the political and strategic level. Starting with the political and strategic level. The French were the major land power in a coalition with the UK (and exiled polish Government) facing the need to co-ordinate a strtaegy with two neutral powers (Belgium and the Netherlands) who were reluctant to engage in any joint strategy before Germ,ans attacked them. in 1944 Hitler was the master of most of continental Europe and any divisive strategy was of his own making, The Allies were still the coalition and faced the problems of coalition strategy..

2. The balance of forces were very different. in 1940 the Germans had no material superiority over the Allies, but had superior tactics and strategy. Politically the Allies were half hearted and divided. in 1944 the allies had material superiority on land sea and in the air. They had learned how to fight mechanised war and a strong moral purpose under the UN banner for the unconditional defeat of fascism. Hitler never faced serious political opposition.Despite being organised by his own general staff the 20 July plot had little impact on the ability of German soldiers to fight.

3. The strategic situation was very different. The 1940 campaign was a ;land campaign waged across a long frontier. It was a re-run of the setting for 1914. The 1944 campaign started with an assault from the sea. A very different set of straegic and operational issues.


Taking issue with your statement that "there were ponly a few mobile divisions" in 1940. This is simply untrue.

The entire BEF was motorised, as was the 7th Army, four DLM and four DCR. Had the Allies not dispersed their mobiel troops across the front they might have had a mass of manouvre to counter the German main effort. The worst decision, probably, was to commit the 7th army in a dash to link up with the Dutch national redoubt and action which failed to achive anything except to remove it from where it m,ight have blocked Guderian..

 

1)Compared to the total ,there were only few mobile divisions :8 is not much compared to 100 .

The allies had dispersed their mobile units across the front,...AS DID THE GERMANS : Von Bock had 3 PzD,von Rundstedt 7 : divided in 2 for Hoth (north of the Meuse) and 5 (only 5 for the PzG von Kleist,of which Guderian got 2 .

2) The commitment of the 7Army (Giraud) to the North (not the Dutch national redoubt,but Breda) was something very sensible .,without this Antwerp would fall .


3)The Ardennes was NOT the German main effort.
The Allies sent most of their mobile divisions to the north,and were defeated by von Bock,whose forces were weaker than those of von Rundstedt.If they had concentrated their forces in the south,the result would have been the same .

4)The fact is that the Germans were strong enough to start simultaneously 2 big offensives and that the French had no other choice than to send their mobile units to the north .


4)After the war,the AG A gang started a disinformatin offensive (which was successful):Guderian (the German Suvurov) with the help of Hart (called the British suvurov) claimed that the German success was due to AG A and to him



Later,Manstein did the same .

The truth is that

the successes of AGB were as big as those of AGA
that the strength of the PzG von Kleist was much to small to hurt the allies seriously unless it was helped by AGB: at Dunkirk,the PzG Kleist was allotted the role of the hammer,while von Bock would be the anvil:if on 28 may,von Bock was still at the border between Belgium and Holland,Sichelschnitt would be a failure and a disaster .

It is thus not so that Sedan was decisive : on 15 may,when the Germans were ready for their raid in France (Sedan is 446 km from Dunkirk),Holland had fallen,the Albert canal was lost,the decision had been taken to abandon the Dyle line : on 15 may,the whole northern front had collapsed .On 18 may(a week before the FIRST German units arrived at the coast),Brussel and Antwerp were lost .

 

In 1944 the Germans had only few mobile divisions in the West and took the correct decision to station most of them south of the Seine,where they would be able to intervene if the Allies would land in Normandy.15 th Army on the Pas de Calais had to care for itself,with only 1 PzD,because it had the Atlantikwall.There was no Atlantikwall in Normandy,thus,Normandy got the mobile divisions .

The sittuation was the same for France in 1940:The Ardennes got no mobile divisions because the fortifications on the Meuse would stop the Germans . There was nothing in the north that could stop the Germans,thus the mobile divisions went northwards,some 20 (if one is counting the BEF,which is very questionable)and these 20 (or 8) were defeated by von Bock who had only ..3 PzD.

If Giraud was not going to Breda (something you are calling wrongly divisive) with the BEF,the result would be that von Bock would be at Dunkirk before the evacuation and that the BEF would be lost .

 

That would be a good "what if" topic. Remember that the troops sent to Breda were the elite ones, it wouldn't have been easy for the Germans to push them around had they been united in France with defensive support. Holland was a trap and it worked .
Second consequence: the BEF would have adopted a more defensive strategy in Flanders and places like Lille, Dunkirk and Abeville would have been a tougher match because both the British and the French wouldn't have been wasting so much time waiting for spares and supplies. Effective air defense, instead of wasting lives by sending more or less useless recos and operations to Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland and Germany, would have helped too .

 

There was an other reason for the French to go north :if the Dyle line could be held,the French would have to defend only the sector Wavre/Givet(100 km).If they did not go to the north,the Dyle Line was lost,and the French would have to man the border with Belgium (400 km) for which they had not the manpower .

 

I don't mean to appear rude, but my first reaction to this post was What have you been smoking and can I have some please?

1. The Germans did not have 100 mobile divisions. Only the Panzer and Motorised Divisions were not dependent on horse drawn transport. That is about 20 formations, roughly the same as French, DLM, DCR motorised and BEF divisions..

2. In retrospect Antwerp mattered far less than the destruction of the Anglo French army in Belgium. The whole dash into the Netherlands was the result of the Allies finding themselves unable to say no to the Dutch,. Neither Belgium nor the Netherlands were willing to commit themselves to joining Britain and France or even agree to collaborative planning. The proper aims were not the preservation or capture of terrain, but preservation or destruction of armed forces. .

3. Army Group A had seven out of ten Panzer divisions and three of the Motorised infantry divisions. The commitment of 70% of the German Panzer Divisions on 50km of frontage between Sedan and Dinant from 1000 km of frontage is a big indication that this was indeed the point of main effort. That is not suggest that Germans did not do well tactically in their frontal engagements in Army Group B.. However it was the break though at Sedan which mattered to Churchill long before Liddle Hart had any say in the matter! Even wikipedia has a page on the Supreme allied council meeting 16 May http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-French_Supreme_War_Council

 

1) We are not talking about the Germans but about the Allies (especially the French) and 8 mobile French divisions on a total of 100 is not very big

2) About the BEF: In "Britain's Army in the 20th Century ", Fieldmarshall Carver wrote the following :

" The BEF was not equipped for modern war ",thus the claim that the BEF was motorized is questionable

3) The fact remains that the PzG von Kleist engaded only 3 of its 5 PzD at Sedan and that without the successes of AGB,Sichelschnitt would have resulted in a catastrophe :the successes of AG A were due to the successes of AGB,not the opposite .The fact that on 25 may 1940 Germany units were at Abbeville,was no mortal danger for the allies .


4) The fact that 7 of 10 German PzD belonged to AG A,does not prove that the Schwerpunkt was in the south:the campaign in the West was not won by 10 PzD,this is an invention from Guderian .The ID of von Bock were advancing as fast as the mobile divisions of von Keist .

5) The distance Sedan -Dinant is 84 km

6) AG A was advancing on a broad front from Aachen to Luxemburg, not on a narrow front at Sedan .

 

Wrong. If the allies had roughly as many mobile formations as the Germans then the Germans had little advantage in this area. So saying the French didn't have many tells you almost nothing.

Without more detail it's your conclusion that is questionable.

Which suggest that your orignial theses i.e. a German preponderance of forces guaranteed a win.

 

1) It tells us that Sheldrake's objection in post 89 was wrong

2)What conclusion ?

 

Not that I can see.

 

For those who are still believing the myths of WWII (elite PzD,inferior infantry divisions,etc) :3 exemples where the "elite " PzD failed ,where they were rescued by the LW of the "incompetent" Goering,where they failed because the disdained ID were not there .

1)May 1940 : the PzD of Guderian failed to cross the Meuse and had to call for the intervention of the LW (something which the German Suvurov hided in his memoirs)


2)May 1940:the "elite" PzD failed again,this time before Dunkirk:reason : the ID were not there (Guderian blamed Hitler,always very quick to blame an other for his failures,der Schnelle Heinz)

3)Guderian (always him) failed in the summer of 1941 and blamed the ID for his failure : they were to slow

4)The motorized (haha) BEF and the elite(ha) divisions of Giraud failed in the north :they were defeated by the "inferior" ID of von Bock .

 

Translation : I refuse to see it .

Sheldrake said that it was untrue that there were only a few mobile divisions in 1940.He is wrong : there were only a few mobile divisions in 1940: on the German side :10 PzD and a few motorized on a total of 135. It was not better on the Allied side .

On itself it was not very important,as the PzD were only cavalry,helpless without the protection of the artillery and infantry .