The best tank killer of WWII

Knocking out 320+ enemy tanks for 13 losses qualifies as a sterling job in my book, nomatter wether the vehicle which achieved it was bug free or not, it still did a sterling job. In terms of reliability it didn't do so well however.

As for your theory regarding it never having passed through testing in America, well the Americans wouldn't have even attempted to build such a heavy or complex machine to begin with, esp. at that point in time. Even in late 44 the US army was skeptical enough regarding fielding the 45 ton Pershing, and rightly so seeing as they had never fielded tanks in this weight category before, which naturally meant they had some learning to do. As a result the Pershing turned out to be greatly unreliable, and quite frankly a waste of resources considering that the Allies already had other much more reliable tanks which were just as or more capable against German armour (Firefly, M36 & Achilles)

 

Well the T-29 and T-30 were both heavier not to mention the T-28. The US did have some legitimate questions as to their utility.

Not really. For one thing the US had pretty well recognized that the war was going to be over in Europe in 45. They cut back tank production starting in 44 so there were resources to spare. I've seen nothing to convince me that the Pershing would have been considered unreliable by German standards either. Although it was somewhat under powered.

 

I was simply offering that true evaluation of armored vehicles usually includes considerations beyond just the gun. Apparently this is not the case in your evaluation. I don't see the point of looking at any armored vehicle in this way; one dimensional thinking of that type is usually what you see with novices to historical study. I'm surprised that you would lower your standards in this manner.

My comparison to American armor is not based on the size of the vehicle but on its lack of reliability and combat readiness. I'm not sure why you focus on the size or on the Pershing. The Ferdinand was simply an answer to Hitler's call for a vehicle carrying that 88 and was rushed in to service without real evaluation or consideration of combat needs. Study of German armor production during the war shows that this happened all too often; I'm sure you are aware of that.

 

All of which were designed & built a good time later, and they didn't pass testing.

Considering that the Pershing demonstrated very poor reliability in both WW2 and Korea, despite recieving more than enough maintenance, that is more than enough proof that it wasn't reliable enough by German standards, which weren't any lower than US standards btw (a common misconception). Infact it is quite remarkable that the Germans kept the number of vehicles in operation that they did in late 44 to 45 when you consider the huge lack of maintenance, spare parts & lubricants they suffered from.

For example the operational percentage of tanks such as the Pz.IV, which had previously demonstrated very high operational reliability, plumitted to an appalling figure by late 1944 onwards, below that of both the Pz.VI Ausf.E & B.

 

That was pretty poor attempt at an insult JBark.

I started out by saying that the Ferdinand did a sterling job at Kursk, which it did, you then tried to twist that into a debate over reliability and now into one about the overall rating of a combat vehicle; I never even went there.

i.e. the only one lowering their standards here is you JBark, and that by trying to start arguments where there are none.

 

I don't see the insult.

I'm not trying to "twist" anything. A poster offered that Hitler was a "tank killer killer" by sending the Ferdinand into combat in the USSR and you jumped to its defense and called its performance "sterling." I said then and I will repeat here that evaluating an armored fighting vehicle on the performance of its gun is one dimensional. Over the years of posting on forums I have seen many a newcomer to the study of armor get all excited about a tank with a big gun, and most true students of armor know to look at more than that. You have shown me that you are extremely well researched and knowledgeable so I am surprised that you would evaluate an AFV simply on its gun's performance, ignoring that it had no defense and was slightly more mobile than a pillbox. If you don't want to discuss all aspects of a vehicle don't defend it on a forum where discussion of such things is the norm (the purpose?)

 

Where did you come up with that 13 Kursk losses figure? AFAIK out of the 89 engaged there were barely enough left to equip one batallion at the end of the battle. AFAIK after the inital attack Batallion 653 ha 33 out of 45 out of action, though many mine losses were recovered, and Batallion 654, had 18 vehicles as unrecoverable losses as they were stuck in no man's land. That figure looks like US M1 losses in Iraq, as long as you control the terrain at the end of the fight heavy tanks can usually be recovered.

I agree the Ferdinand was a very effective tank killer, if used correctly a handful of them could and did stop a Soviet T34/76 tank brigade cold, but it's best employment was more as a redeployable pantherthurm than anything else, IMO the allies never fielded anything with that sort of capabilities, some Soviet assault guns came close but lacked the long range precision of the KwK 43 and the Archer, M36 and even the somewhat similar Tortoise had a very different usage.

 

Problem is I wasn't jumping in to defend anything, I even acknowledged the Ferdinands shortcomings and the mistake of not arming it with a machinegun to begin with. Secondly I didn't even attempt to evaluate the Ferdinand as an AFV, so how did you come up with this? The result is I can't take your criticism seriously, it looking like nothing but a poor attempt at an insult to me.

All I said was that the Ferdinand did a great job at Kursk, cause it did. And this was despite it being far from an ideal design, the gun & optical equipment being pretty much the only excellent things on that tank. Fortunately for the Germans however this was enough to make it very effective at Kursk.

 

To be honest I went with the first figure posted because I remembered a similar number of Ferdinands were total combat losses during Kursk, however it was sPzJagAbt.653 which suffered 13 total losses for 320 enemy tanks knocked out. sPzJagAbt.654 was less fortunate, but IIRC they didn't lose a single Ferdinand to direct combat, instead running into mines and getting stuck. Together they accounted for some 507 enemy tanks and an additional 100 vehicles though, so at the very least they maintained a 10:1 kill/loss ratio.

Agreed.

 

I should think they spent too much in manpower and resources to protect a vehicle that is supposed to protect itself. For this reason I would not have complimented it as you did.

 

German tanks:

April 1943
East 820 Op 837 Repair 1657 50% in repair
Afrika 240 Op 64 Repair 304 21% in repair

June 1943
East 1814 Op 417 Repair 2231 19% in repair

Nvember 1943
East 793 Op 1349 Repair 2142 63% in repair


August 1943
East 1471 Op 1000 Repair 2471 40 % in repair


Jan 1944.
East. 915 Op 1365 Repair. 2280, 60% in repair
West 442 Op. 99 Repair. 541 18% in repair
Italy. 188 Op. 122 Repair. 310 40% in repair

Sept 1944
East 1223 Op 547 Repair 1770 31% in repair
West 271 Op 73 Repair 344 22% in repair
Italy 148 Op 97 repair 245 40% in repair

Nov 1944
East 1243 Op 485 Repair 1728 28 % in repair
West 560 Op 193 Repair 753 26 % in repair
Italy 209 Op 69 Repair 278 25% in repair


Jan 1945
East 1175 Op 589 Repair 1764 33% in repair
West 650 Op 586 Repair 1236 46% in repair
Italy 210 Op 49 Repair 259 20% in repair

If you concentrate your production on tanks and neglect replacement parts for the same tanks then who is to blame?

Jentz figures. Page 11 Tiger I & II, Combat Tactics:

% Operational

.............................EAST...........................................WEST
..................PzIV.....Panth..........Tiger.........PzIV........Panth..........Tiger
May..............84..........77.............79...............88............82.............87.
Sept.............65..........72..............70..............80............74.............98
Sept ............65..........60..............81..............50............57.............67
Oct...............52.........53..............54...............74............85.............88
Nov...............72.........66..............61...............78............71.............81

Note the 'appaliing' Pz IV Oct 52% rate compared to the not so 'appalling' 53% and 54% for the Panther and Tiger!

 

Didn't pass testing??? I certainly wouldn't state it that way. The US simply decided that they weren't worth it. Indeed a fairly strong argument could be made that heavy tanks in general weren't worth it.\

You'll need to document that before I beleive it. Note that the US often made extensive road marches with their tanks while the Germans tried to avoid it. Also the Pershing was rushed to Europe and very little work done on it due to budget cuts between WWII and Korea. Again I'd like to see evidence that it's reliability was any worse than the Panther or the Tigers. Certainly the Pershing was not known to self emolate like certain other tanks.

 

The project didn't start until mid 44, and the prototypes weren't finished before well after the war was over, and both the T29 & 30 suffered some serious issues with the drive train, issues that were never resolved and as a result found their way over to later designs, such as the 12 ton lighter M103 heavy tank (1957). In addition to this neither design (T29 & 30) even entered limited service after the war, so no, they didn't pass testing.

Really? I'm wondering how you're going to explain the distances covered by German heavy tank battalions in the east then, if you believe they didn't at the very least conduct many road marches of the same distance or more you'd be seriously decieving yourself.

In Korea the Pershing didn't conduct too many road marches, yet despite this the reliability was poor, same as happened in Europe some years before. I suggest you read Zaloga's work on the Pershing, even he admits that the Pershing demonstrated poor reliability despite the huge support it recieved from US maintenance units.

 

The fact that they didn't enter into service doesn't mean that they didn't "pass testing". There have been numerous vehicles designed and prototypes built which past test but were not taken into service. I'd suggest that this is more an indicator that the US saw little utility in heavy tanks with some good reasoning behind said conclusion.

Produce some numbers then to show that the Pershing was less reliable per mile than the German tanks especially in their first few months of service. Again I never heard of a Pershing self emmolating as happened to some German tanks. I will admit the Pershing was not as reliable as the US army would have prefered or those used to working with other American tanks were used to. That doesn't mean however that it wasn't in the same range or even superior to the Panther or the German heavies.

 

Zaloga?! I thought you didn't do Zaloga. I like the way you make it sound bad that the US can provide a good degree of maintenance for their vehicles.

 

Didn't do Zaloga? I have his books, but that doesn't mean all he writes his correct or that I agree with it.

Also I am not sure how it is I am making it sound bad that the US could provide better maintenance support for their tanks. We're talking about the tanks here, not the maintenance units. The US military were always able to provide proper amounts of maintenance for their tanks, mainly thanks to their great skill at managing logisitics and wide spread standardization.

 

Hi,
Im new here so bear with me ok?

I primarily joined the site to use it as a research tool (you never stop learning in this life). I have a particular interest in the IR Panthers, Sdkfz 250/20's and the Jadgpanther but that's for another thread...

However to the point in question: can I ask what purpose does asking which was 'the best tank killer of WWII' serve?

With the risk of upsetting some established contributors, please drop the 'top trumps' (which appeals to pre-pubescent boys) approach and concentrate instead on the socio-political aspects of what constitutes a 'tank killer' and its reason for existence.
e.g. the need for a mobile AT gun is based on making an effective armour penetrating weapon less prone to be outflanked and more flexible at the lowest unit cost.

So the origin of the idea is to be able to field a weapon on the redundant chassis of an AFV that is obsolete in terms of its ability to protect its crew and to be up-gunned to parity or greater of the enemy. e.g. Pzpkfw III after 1941 where Communist and Allied small calibre AT guns could penetrate its armour at most ranges.

Early Wehrmacht combat in Poland and France showed the Germans were aware of the inadequacy of their armour from high velocity rifle calibre weaponry which resulted in a solution of applique armour adding weight and affecting manoeuverability and suspension reliability.

The Wehrmacht, is usually the focus of these discussions purely because german afv design and its use was tested first (for instance, Spain) whilst British tank doctrine was still entrenched with the experiences of the Somme and Paschendaele. We wont go there with US tank combat experience.

to illustrate the point: The western Desert was one example where british tank design and doctrine fielded slow but well armoured infantry tanks (Matilda II and M3 Lee) against the more agile Pzkpfw III and IV. Allied tank killing by anything other than another tank was achieved with artillery until the 6pdr became available.
In the mean time the Wehrmacht was experiencing the T34/76 and KVI (impervious to the KwK36 and 37 if published data is to be believed) and their ability to outperform the overly complex german vehicles. An experience the western allies didn't have until the invasion of Italy and France where the Sherman encountered panthers and tigers and the KwK L/56...for the fist time to the dismay of US tankers (as opposed to the use of 88 AA gun in the western desert against thicker skinned Matildas)

So gentlemen, the question should be: why did the bespoke tank hunter/killer evolve to the point where vehicle such as the Jagdpanther became an original design rather than modifications of existing obsolete MBT's.
I believe this a particular facet of the German psyche and Allied parallels with the jagdpanther and jagdtiger are hard to come by.
Strangely there are plenty of parallels with putting a AA gun on a half track, loading it with armour piercing ammunition and pointing it at ground targets. So why did german designers come up with the jagdpanther when the panther was a perfectly good afv with a gun that was effective? it surely can't be that they wanted to save materials and time in removing the turret and up armouring the glacis sticking a PaK 43 in there for good measure. If we know the panther was vulnerable to transmission and steering failure then why add to the problem with a heavier superstructure?

Also lets look at how allied designs were influenced by the doctrine of tanks being seen as an adjunct to infantry operation by a cadre of commanders who were still wedded to cavalry (light recon tanks) and masses of troop movement.

Maybe then we can see that it really is only three aspects:

1: Design influenced by a political doctrine in turn influenced by military advisers with access to the decision makers (Nazi ideology producing too many derivative vehicles for their small manufacturing base/raw material supply to cope with)

2: The commercially driven imperialist hegemony of the USA/Britain and its Commonwealth churning out adequate vehicles (the Sherman and its inadequate 75mm gun on the M3 chassis)for mass profit from government contracts.

3: Communist ideology self sacrifice, poor quality control sound basic design and mass production to overwhelm the opposition. Something which NATO feared right up to the end of the Soviet Bloc system, and with a little conjecture would have had Soviet tank brigades at the Channel in about three or four days...

In the end its the ability of the human involvement to use the machinery adapt to its strengths and weaknesses and succeed or die. It's a numbers game at the expense of human life after all.

FWIW, when I was a 'pre-pubescent' kid, I thought Hans Ulrich Rudel was utterly amazing...I discovered later that he was a rabid Nazi and for all his skill and exploits not to be mistaken for some kind of hero or role model despite his obvious prowess in using another obsolete killing machine to dispatch russian tank crews.

thanks for reading..I'm happy to take critique of my argument.

 

This is a rather biassed way of putting something that doesn't look particularly correct to me.

 

The reasons (to me anyway) for the JagdPanther are pretty straight forward and are derived from cumulative experience on the Ostfront. The gun and heavy armor are consistent with the associated arms race between Soviet and German armor designers. The lack of a turret is consistent with German success with turretless StuGs and self propelled guns as very effective defensive weapons and coupled with the gun and armor is consistent with the strategic situation the Germans were in (in 1944). The fully armored crew compartment/casemate design has to do with crew survivability as opposed to the Marder series and other SP guns. Soviet Artillery had a deadly effect on exposed crews and trained/experienced personnel attrition was a major issue at that point. The Jagdpanther did not have the same final drive and transmission (or associated issues) as the Panther but shared most of its other components automotively, also indicative of German late war efforts to rationalize production, supply and maintenance.