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The consolidated Pearl Harbor mythology thread.

Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by OpanaPointer, Oct 3, 2009.

Page 2 of 7

R Leonard Member

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A ‘rhumb line’ is a constant bearing, crossing all meridians at the same angle. Maritime navigators, prior to the use of more common great circle routes, used to navigate along rhumb lines as it was simpler to follow a constant compass bearing than to periodically adjust one’s bearing as is necessary to follow a great circle. Over distance, rhumb lines are fairly consistently longer than great-circle routes. Rhumb lines are straight lines on a Mercator projection map, that is, if you draw it on a flat Mercator type map, it shows the straight line from point A to point B. Oddly enough, though, if one were to follow a Rhumb line for an indefinite period around the globe, you would eventually spiral in at one pole or the other (think about that for a minute and it makes sense).

Great circle routes are shorter in distance but are not intuitively the shortest distance on a flat map as they appear to follow an arc as opposed to a straight line. On a globe, though, the great circle is quickly seen to be the shortest distance between points A and B. The bearings from point A to point B on a great circle vary, and some considerably, as one travels the intended route.

For example, if one were to shoot a rhumb line from, say, Tokyo to, oh, say, Denver, Colorado, the straight line (rhumb) bearing would be 087°26′05″, thus, along that line one would travel, essentially, due east for about 10,140 Km to arrive at Denver. With a great circle route, the bearings would vary from 044°18′37″ around to 131°42′37″. Thus, departing Tokyo heading roughly northeast and, adjusting along the way (this is what computers are for) eventually one would find one’s self some 9400 Km later approaching Denver from the northwest, about 46° off the rhumb line bearing. The great circle route described runs east of the Kuriles, crosses over and arcs just north of the Aleutians (crossing back to the southeast quite close to Dutch Harbor, in fact), crosses the continental coast north of Vancouver and continues to the southeast to arrive at Denver.

Rich

I wonder what this button does . . .

R Leonard, Oct 9, 2009

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lwd Ace

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If the radio waves follow a direct path between the radio and the reciever then they will I think follow a great circle route. However if it's reflected off the ionisphere (pretty much required for a Japan to Alaska transmission) then the route is not exactly clear as the reflection can have a horizontal component as well as a verticle one.

lwd, Oct 9, 2009

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OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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I heard this one from a couple of people, so I'll deal with here.

The myth is that there were no slit trenches dug at Hickam Field because they wanted more casualties so they left the enlisted men exposed to strafing.

Besides being just a little sick, we can explain the lack of slit trenches very simply. The water table at Hickam was just three feet under the ground. So a six foot slit trench would have a yard of water in it at any given time. Wounded troops in those trenches might possibly drown. So it was considered a bad idea to place them at that facility.

If there had been some grand conspiracy to casually sacrifice troops then there wouldn't have been slit trenches any where on Oahu. But there were. This type of contradictory and mutally exclusive myth is typical of the conspiracy "fans".

Seen recently: "I don't care about the Third World War, that's the Third World's problem."

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OpanaPointer, Oct 15, 2009

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Below are some of the Frequently Asked Questions about the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some are "short answers" and others have links to more comprehensive information on various web pages. If you don't see your question on the list below let us know and we'll try to help.

"I just want to find sources for lots of information about the battle, point me there and let me loose!"

The Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings

PEOPLE
Survivors' stories

"Where can I see the survivor's accounts of the battle?"
Naval Historical Center: Survivor's accounts of the battle
Hawaii
USN
(Individual Commands)
US ARMY
Ground Forces
Air Forces
Japanese
Civilian
Washington
Civilian
Army
Navy
Tokyo
Civilian

"Prince Konoye was the Prime Minister before Tojo Hidecki. What does he say about the events leading up to the war?"
Memoirs of Prince Konoye Fumimaro
Premier of Japan during part of the pre-war period.
Army
Navy
PLACES
Hawaii
Pearl Harbor
Individual Ships
Non-Ship Commands
Army Commands
Elsewhere on the Island
Washington
Tokyo
SHIPS
"I need pictures!"

Battleship Row

Pearl Harbor Raid, 7 December 1941 -- Overview and Special Image Selection

Ships present

"What ships were in Pearl Harbor during the attack?"

Ships Present at Pearl Harbor, 0800 7 December 1941

Photos

Histories

"What happened to the ships after the attack?"

(DANFS entries here?)

Ships not in harbor

'What about Navy ships not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack? Where were they?"

Disposition of the U. S. Pacific Fleet at 8 a. m. on 7 Dec. 1941 (except ships in Pearl Harbor which are listed separately)

Photos
Histories
EVENTS
Pre-attack

"What did the Chiefs of Staff think of the situation at this time?"
Memo from Gen. Marshall and Adm. Stark to FDR on the situation in the Far East
"I heard that there was a few warnings from the Dutch prior to the attack. Is this based on facts?"
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 78, The Kra Alert
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 79, The Dutch Alert
"What kind of preparation went on in Hawaii before the attack?"
Adm. J. O. Richardson's memo on defense deficiencies at Pearl, Jan. '41.
Adm. J. O. Richardson's memo regarding Pacific Fleet responsibilities under CNO Plan Dog, Jan. '41.
The Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.
detailing the possible types of enemy attack on the Hawaiian Islands and discussing defense and search requirements.
The Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 December, 1941/Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941 ("The Martin-Bellinger Report")
detailing the status of aircraft on the Hawaiian Islands and discussing search requirements.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter NO. 2CL-41
Subject: Security of the Fleet at Base and Operating Areas
(Hart Exhibit #4.)
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and Fourteenth Naval District
(Short Title: HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42)
(Hart Exhibit #5.)
Letter from CNO to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Letter from Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
And Letter from CNO to all District Commanders
Regarding Anti-torpedo baffles (nets) for protection against torpedo planes.
(Hart Exhibits #17, 18, and 19).
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41
Subject: Task Forces-Organization and Missions
(Hart Exhibit #21.)
Air Defense of Pearl Harbor
Establishing Liaison and Defining Responsibilities between Navy and Army
(Hart Exhibit #23.)
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 120, Availability of search aircraft in Hawaii on Dec. 7th, 1941.
Exchange of Letters between SecNav and SecWar
Discussing air security of Pearl Harbor
(Hart Exhibit #40.)
"The Japanese intended to deliver a message to the US before the attack. What did it say?"
The 14-part Message
which was to be delivered to the U. S. State Dept. at 1 p. m. on December 7, 1941.
"So this wasn't a declaration of war. When, then, did the actual Japanese declaration get written?"
Minutes of the conference
called to write the Japanese declaration of war.
"Did the US have any plans in case of war?"

"What were the Japanese plans for the attack?"
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 8 "General survey concerning the attack on Hawaii" from Japanese sources after the war. Included are statements on the planning of the attack and force structure.
Exhibits of the Joint Committee, Pt. 12, pp. 431-441 The "Separate Volume":
"Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume. ", Yamamoto Isoruku.
(This is the "Separate Volume" mentioned as having been destroyed in Japanese Monograph No. 97, Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans.)

Attack
Hawaii

"Is there a 'blow-by-blow' description of the events during the attack?"

"I heard a submarine was attacked outside the harbor before the attack. What happened?"
Testimony of Captain Outerbridge, CO of the USS WARD, the destroyer which fired the first shots on the U. S. side in an attack against a midget sub trying to enter Pearl Harbor before 7 a. m. on Dec. 7th.
AND
Reproduction of the Bishop's Point Radio Log
which shows WARD's reports to Com 14th.

Washington
Japan

Post-attack
Hawaii
Washington
Japan
PHOTOS
People
Ships
Planes
Places
Maps
Digital Documents
INTELLIGENCE

"What's this 'East Wind Rain' thing all about?"

Material Relating To "Winds Code"

Espionage

Magic Messages

What kind of information did they find in the "Magic" messages?

Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent By The Japanese Government Between July 1 And December 8, 1941

AND

Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc.

Counter-espionage

Code-breaking

"I heard we had broken the Japanese codes. How much could we learn from them?"

Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence
1924-1941

"What about Hawaii? Any code breaking done there?"

Rochefort on: A Successful Failure; Communications Intelligence and Pearl Harbor

Estimates

"What did the US think the Japanese were doing?"
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
"Organization of the Japanese Fleet."
Daily communication intelligence summaries
for the period 1 November 1941 through 6 December 1941.
These were for the use of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, at Pearl Harbor.
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 33, Military Intelligence Estimates Prepared by G-2, Washington, 1 July-7 December 1941.
These were for the use of the President and officials in D.C.
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 80, Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations
for Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, summaries of the world situation on all continents.
Forces

"What was the composition of the Japanese Navy?"

Organization Of The Japanese Fleets

"How did the US naval compare with other navies at the time?"
Naval Balance of Forces
Allies and Axis comparative naval strength, computed for May 1, 1941 and December 7, 1941.
(Exhibits of the Joint Committee, Pt. 15, pp 1901-06.)

PRE-WAR PLANNING

"What did the US think about the global situation as far as allocation of military resources was concerned?"
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 55, CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT 10:00 A. M., TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1941 (Concerning, among other things, allocation of B-17s.)
"The US had a war plan called Rainbow-5? What was this?"
Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46)
Navy Plan O-1
The "short version" of Rainbow-5, with only those sections specific to the Pacific Fleet.
(Hart Exhibit #16.)
Martin-Bellinger Report

"Did the US have any discussions regarding mutual defense with any other countries?"
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 49, United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1 talks on division of military responsibility in case of US entry into the war.)
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 50, American-Dutch-British Conversations, discussing military cooperation in the Far East, April, 1941.
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 51, Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title-ABC-22), discussing military cooperation between Canada and the United States.

INVESTIGATIONS

"There was a series of investigations into the attack. What did they find?"

(Links marked FAST are complete documents in one file and are for those with high-speed access or don't mind waiting for an 800+ page document to download.)

The Knox Investigation
Dec. 9-14, 1941.
FAST The Knox Investigation
Dec. 9-14, 1941.

The Roberts Commission
Dec. 18-January-23, 1941

The Hart Investigation
Feb. 12-June 15, 1944
The Army Pearl Harbor Board
Jul. 20-Oct. 20, 1944
The Navy Court of Inquiry
Jul. 24-Oct. 19, 1944.
FAST REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF
ROBERTS COMMISSION,
ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY,
AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS,
combined as Volume 39 of the Hearings.
The Clarke Investigation
Aug. 4-Sep 20, 1944
FAST The Clarke Investigation
Aug. 4-Sep 20, 1944
The Clausen Investigation
Jan. 24-Sep. 12, 1945
FAST The Clausen Investigation
Jan. 24-Sep. 12, 1945
The Hewitt Inquiry
May 14-July 11, 1945
The Joint Congressional Committee
Nov. 15, 1945-May 23, 1946
FAST The Joint Congressional Committee
Nov. 15, 1945-May 23, 1946

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

"What was going on in the rest of the world during 1941?"

Pearl Harbor Timeline

Seen recently: "I don't care about the Third World War, that's the Third World's problem."

Master Documentarian
Hyperwar Manager "Emeritus"
WWII Resources. Primary sources.
The Myths of Pearl Harbor. Demythologizing the attack.
Hyperwar. Hypertext history of the Second World War.
Pearl Harbor Attack Message Board
Veteran: USN, 1969-1989

OpanaPointer, Oct 25, 2009

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OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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Mr. Jacobsen posted this at pearlharborattacked.com:

[FONT=&quot]pjacobsen[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Private[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]Joined: Apr 27, 2001[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Posts: 2[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Posted: 2001-04-27 12:11 [/FONT]

[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]

On 2001-04-26 14:05, Anonymous wrote:
To what extent Franklin Delano Roosevelt know of the pending attack on Pearl Harbour, and therefore was he guilty of allowing the murders that occurred, as charged in Charles Austin Beard’s thesis?

The post that follows by "Anonymous" was obviously parrotted from Robert B. Stinnett's fabrication of events contained in his revisionist conspiracy theory book, "Day of Deceit."

A few of the gross errors of omission and commission plus misleading ploys in that book were addressed in my article "A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of 'Day of Deceit'" published in "Cryptologia",one of the foremost journals on cryptology, A copy of that article is provided below for those interested in some of the actual facts not Stinnett's fantasies.

"A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of 'Day of Deceit', A Book Review"
By Philip H. Jacobsen, Lieutenant Commander USN (ret.).

The author, Robert B. Stinnett, made a thorough search of National Archives files other repositories and contacted numerous personnel to justify his long held belief that President Franklin D. Roosevelt not only actively fo-mented war with Japan as a pretext to aid Britain in its fight with Hitler but that he purposely made Pearl Harbor an attractive target for the Japanese Navy. Then (as the theory goes) after learning of the of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt (through conspiracies continuing today) not only kept Admiral Kimmel and General Short from obtaining information on Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor but ordered or had or-dered actions that prevented those commanders from dis-covering the Kido Butai and adequately defending Pearl Harbor from the expected attack by the Japanese.
"Day of Deceit" argues that Roosevelt was convinced the loss at Pearl Harbor must be of sufficient magnitude to overcome the isolationist views of the general public so that he could safely declare war on both Japan and Ger-many. Furthermore, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roo-sevelt through his co-conspirators (who apparently in-clude General Marshall, Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, An-derson, Captain Turner and Commander McCollum and by implication Admiral Noyes, Captain Redman, Com-mander Rochefort and many others), attempted to cover up his and his co-conspirators' dastardly deeds. However, through Stinnett's foresight, expertise and diligence, he was able to see through this monstrous conspiracy and its cover-up to reveal its details to us some 58 years later when all previous efforts by revisionist conspiracy theo-rists have failed and all the participants are dead and can-not defend themselves. Nevertheless, this book will sell well among rabid Roosevelt haters, many Kimmel and Short supporters, and dedicated conspiracy theorists.
In an effort to support his conspiracy theory, Stinnett came up with many new documents not generally known to be available. However, these documents do not add anything new to the question of who knew what and when. In his zeal, he misinterprets not only some of these "new" documents but comes up with radically new meanings for the plain words and characterizations of well accepted documentation already available in this Pearl Harbor arena. One of the centerpieces of his argu-ment is an October 1940 memorandum by then Lieutenant Commander McCollum of ONI in response to the Sep-tember 1940 signing of the Tripartite Pact by Germany, Italy and Japan and not as any blueprint for initiating war with Germany and Japan. McCollum recognized the dan-ger to the western powers if Japan was able to connect up with Germany and Italy through Asia and suggested eight actions designed to contain Japan generally and to keep her from making such connection with its other Axis partners. Unfortunately, the book seizes on an off hand comment that is not one of the main points of the memo as the springboard for its conspiracy theory. That com-ment was if the eight proposed actions designed to con-tain Japan should by chance cause Japan to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. No proof of any offi-cial implementation of this mid-level memo is provided. Furthermore, Stinnett improperly ascribes McCollum's office as "an element of Station US (by which he means OP-20-G), a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters" in an effort to tie McCollum closer to OP-20-G than he actually was before WWII. A non-cryptologic fallacy of the book is the fact that Roosevelt had no assurance that Germany would de-clare war on the U.S. if the Japanese did attack Pearl Har-bor thus negating any reasonable conspiratorial design to get the U.S. into war with Germany by forcing Japan to attack the U.S.
It is well established that the SRN series of Japanese naval messages in the National Archives were decrypted in 1945-46 and translated in 1946-47, but Stinnett incor-rectly suggests they may only have been transcribed at those times and that these decrypts (or at least some of them) were available not only in radio intelligence centers in Washington, but Stations Hypo (Rochefort) in Hawaii and Cast on Corregidor. Among other things, the book misinterprets an article by Captain Pelletier in the "Cryp-tolog." Even though Pelletier is now dead, he also wrote in the NCVA History Book that all such JN-25B raw messages were two months old by the time he saw them in Washington and that no Kido Butai transmissions while enroute from the Kuriles to Hawaii were ever found be-fore or after 7 December 1941. Further, the book fails to inform its readers that Rochefort and his Hypo personnel were only assigned to and only worked on the unproduc-tive Flag Officer's Code and not the main Japanese Fleet Code JN-25B as well as the fact that they were only given the go ahead to work on JN-25B a few days or so after the Pearl Harbor attack. As mentioned before, the book also omits the well known information that JN-25B intercepts from Corregidor, Guam and Station H were only for-warded to Washington by mail and took up to two months to arrive mostly by ship and rail. Thus, even Washing-ton's alleged 10 percent capability on JN-25B decrypts had not even begun to be applied to the November and December 1941 intercepts enroute there while Stinnett maintains they were available to all commanders except of course Kimmel and Short due to FDR's co-conspirators.
The book implies more improprieties by the fact that Hypo had no assigned Japanese diplomatic intercept or decrypt authority until RCA President Sarnoff made available RCA cables from Honolulu beginning in early December 1941. Part of the book's overall conspiracy theory includes the allegation that Hypo only decrypted the administrative messages of these low level Japanese diplomatic messages provided by RCA before Pearl Har-bor and did not decrypt the "bomb plot" messages until after Pearl Harbor.
Although Stinnett obtained definite information from Captain Whitlock that no significant JN-25B decrypts were made by Station Cast on Corregidor during the pe-riod in question, he disputes this fact and misinterprets other documents and sources as proof that Whitlock is wrong. Some navy cryptologic veterans involved in this book have complained Stinnett gained their confidence by agreeing to tell their stories but ignored their version of events in favor of the monstrous conspiracy theory final-ized in the book. Admiral Layton terminated his interview with the author, most likely when he learned where the book was going. It should be noted that it took OP-20-G some 14 months to read the much simpler JN-25A system that was used from 1 June 1939 to 1 December 1940.
The book misleads its readers by not revealing there were two distinct codes, the earlier one part JN-25A and its much more complicated successor JN-25B used during the period in question and refers to them collectively as "Code Book D" or "5-Num code." Thus, the final suc-cesses of JN-25A are improperly imputed to JN-25B that was not read to any significant extent until early 1942 when the first published decrypt is found. The ever-increasing requirements to provide Japanese diplomatic decrypts and translations during 1941 took most of the time of navy cryptographers so that few people at both Washington and Station Cast were assigned to work on the new version of the Fleet Code, JN-25B. In addition, JN-25B used about eight additive cipher books up through 4 December 1941 further delaying the effort to read any significant amount of this new and far more complicated code and cipher combination.
Stinnett and his sources are apparently not aware that Japanese naval shore broadcast stations transmitted si-multaneously on a number of frequencies covering their communications area and it was up to the ships in their communications zone (or U.S. intercept operators) to choose the best frequency on which to copy such broad-cast. Thus, the deduction that because an intercept opera-tor copied one message in the 12 MHz. range part of one day and 16 MHz. on part of a different later day means the ship or force has moved further away from the shore station is patently incorrect. These Tokyo broadcast transmitters were active on several of their assigned fre-quencies simultaneously and the 16 MHz. frequency had long been used by the Tokyo broadcast as a daytime fre-quency.
Stinnett often claims carriers or fleet units must have transmitted on high frequencies when they are only seen in the headings of messages on fleet broadcasts. He does not tell his readers that many ships are tied up at docks and have landline or cable communications available to them so they do not have to use radio and the original transmissions of such messages will never be heard by foreign intercept operators. In this regard, he maintains that Admiral Yamamoto's messages sent (while tied up at a Kure dock) to the Pearl Harbor attack force and other ships on the Tokyo broadcast violated radio silence when, in fact, the radio silence imposed then only meant that ships (or aircraft) are not permitted to transmit by high frequency radio, not that messages to these units cannot be sent by fleet broadcasts or that fleet units or commands that have land-line, cable or other approved facilities available to them cannot use them.
Apparently, Stinnett did come up with records to sub-stantiate Hypo's summaries about the carrier Agaki being active on the air several times up to 26 November 1941. However, there is no documentation that any high fre-quency direction finder (HFDF) fixes were available to Hypo on such transmissions. The single line bearings re-portedly obtained by Corregidor's HFDF went by the island of Honshu as well as the Kurile Islands and the former location with acceptable HFDF variations was within Hypo's previous general determination of carrier locations. According to the book, a possible cross bearing from Dutch Harbor was found in that station's November monthly report that did not reach Station H until after 7 December and for some reason was not reproduced in the book. No documentary evidence was shown that such bearing was actually transmitted to Station H or subse-quently forwarded to Rochefort at Hypo except a general statement as to routine forwarding by a Dutch Harbor operator.
Although the book claims more carrier and carrier commander transmissions were made after 26 November (the Kido Butai sailing date), this information is appar-ently due to a possible misinterpretation of the TESTM reports from Corregidor to Station H and a misunder-standing of traffic analysis procedures identifying call signs appearing in broadcast and point to point messages sent by shore communication stations. The single TESTM report provided in the book first lists the trans-missions heard and their bearings and such bearings are on unidentified call signs. Then, any fleet level call signs identifications made from the traffic analysis of message headings in shore station transmissions by Station Cast are given. In the enthusiasm to support its conspiracy the-ory, the book apparently assumes that the latter call sign identifications by traffic analysis of shore station trans-missions actually represent high frequency radio trans-missions by such fleet units and commanders. Layton, Pelletier and Whitlock among others deny such transmis-sions were ever received. One wonders why Stinnett did not reproduce the other two TESTM reports upon which he relies to make his specific allegations to clarify his identification and deductive processes, especially since the one page reproduced does not support his allegations.
Gross misinterpretations of two decrypts and transla-tions in the SRN series at the National Archives make up the other parts of the book's centerpiece of its conspiracy theory. In an effort to give some credence to its allegation of a massive conspiracy, the book contradicts the plain meaning on the face of translations of these two decrypted messages, established Japanese naval communications practice, and standard decryption procedures. These mes-sages were reported on long ago by Frederick D. Parker in "Cryptologia" Vol. 15 (4) p. 295. However, Parker fully reported that JN-25B was being decrypted at best on a 10 percent basis in Washington and those November and December 1941 raw messages discussed were enroute to Washington D.C. so that they were not available to be worked on until long after the Pearl Harbor attack. The glaring omission in the book of this vital "unavailability" information is instructive.
The first decrypt refers to naval spy Suzuki who was sent to the First Air Fleet on business to be picked up on 23 or 24 November at Hitokappu Wan (Bay). It is abun-dantly clear from the document that Hitokappu Wan is spelled out letter by letter in five numeral code groups of JN-25B because there was no two or three letter coded geographic designation available for this remote location (like AF for Midway Island.) Nevertheless, the book baldly claims, without any substantiation, that the words Hitokappu Wan were sent in plain language while the rest of the message was sent in code, an incredible absurdity. No prior or subsequent example of a plain language insert in a JN-25 message was ever seen. Apparently, Stinnett did not consider this lack of prior or subsequent plain language insert of a JN-25B message when he made this incredible allegation. No one else has had the temerity to make such a ridiculous assertion when confronted with the JN-25B code designation on the face of the decrypt and no reference to a plain language insert in the decrypt.
The second gross misinterpretation contained in the book is that Yamamoto's famous message of 2 December 1941 only referred to as "Climb Mount. Niitaka 1208" may have been sent in plain language. If so, it implies Rochefort knew of these two plain language "busts" by the Japanese and therefore is part of the conspiracy for not reporting them in his summaries. For this strong implica-tion, one Japanese historian is cited saying the message was sent in the clear while Yamamoto's biographer is identified as saying the message was encoded in a five numeral code (JN-25B). Captain Pelletier confirmed in the NCVA History Book that the message was coded in JN-25. To show the extreme lengths the book will go to conjure up his implication of conspiracy, it omits the fact in the narrative that this message labeled SRN 115376 by the National Archives had a cryptographer's reference below the heading clearly showing that it was encoded in JN-25B. Furthermore, the book does not clearly point out to its readers that "Climb Mount Niitaka" was prefaced by the words, "This dispatch is Top Secret. This order is ef-fective at 1730 on 2 December #10." Can you imagine the Japanese sending a Top Secret message in the clear and depending on a transparent underlying meaning for secu-rity? Except for battle tactical reports during the war, the Japanese seldom used plain language and even then pre-ferred tactical codes. These are only a small part of the omissions, errors and misinterpretations contained in the book to try to make its revisionist conspiracy theory seem plausible to the uninitiated.
The book also resurrects the old allegations of Robert D. Ogg, a seaman in the 12th Naval District Intelligence office, and disregards Ogg's oral history recording by then Commander Newman that he was not even sure the prewar transmissions reported by commercial ships were Japanese and might have been Russian. The book now says Ogg had prewar information on Japanese warship transmissions in the Kuriles with HFDF bearings by Dutch Harbor in spite of Ogg's subsequent recantation to the contrary. The book apparently neglected to mention that Ogg was a relative of Admiral Kimmel and failed to notify the Kimmel family of his allegation until 1947 or so
The old and thoroughly repudiated hearsay report of dead Dutch codebreakers' prewar determinations that Japanese carriers were in the North Pacific enroute to Hawaii are regurgitated by the book. Only now it has the Dutch putting them in the Kuriles instead of the North Pacific. The book also repeats Parker's reporting of the tanker Shiriya moving eastward from the Bonin Islands in a 1 December 1941 message (SRN 11539 to Destroyer Division 7 with the Kido Butai that was intercepted on the Tokyo broadcast. Again, it does not tell its readers that this JN-25B message was only decrypted in 1945-46 and translated in 1946-47 and that the raw intercept was en-route to Washington DC in the U.S. postal system on 7 December 1941.
To further its revisionist conspiracy theory, the book ar-gues that government censors are still withholding the publication of decryptions (and translations) of hundreds of vital Japanese naval messages whose secrecy is a part of this monstrous conspiracy. Stinnett points to missing Station Message Serial (SMS) numbers and missing ver-sions of original transmissions by fleet units and com-manders (supposedly on high frequency radio) that appear on shore station fleet broadcasts to naval ships and point to point circuits. However, the book does not mention that after the war navy analysts discovered that about 7,000 Japanese naval messages per month were forwarded to Washington from Corregidor, Guam and Hawaii from July to December 1941. During the expanded intercept coverage of WWII, an OP-20-G official estimated that the U.S. intercepted 60 percent of Japanese naval traffic. Therefore, far more than 10,000 messages were probably sent over the airways by the Japanese Navy per month in the months before Pearl Harbor and less than 60 percent were actually intercepted. Thus, the missing SMS num-bers and original transmissions could be accounted for by missed intercepts and transmissions originated by land-line, cable, visual means or even hand carried to shore radio stations. In fact, there was a cable office at Hito-kappu Wan available to fleet units to send messages to Tokyo without transmitting on high frequency radio.
Again, in 1945-46 analysts decrypted those intercepts from the Pacific that were available in Washington. A total of 26,581 messages in seven different crypto systems were intercepted between 5 September and 4 December 1941. Between 15 March 1946 to 20 August 1947, OP-20-G analysts and linguists from ONI undertook the study of these 26,581 post war decrypts and only 2,413 were considered important enough for full translations. Of these, only 188 were isolated as pertaining specifically to the events of 7 December 1941. This information contra-dicts the book's assertion that government censors are withholding disclosure of hundreds of vital decrypted and translated messages in furtherance of the alleged conspir-acy by President Roosevelt and many top an middle level government officials. Those 2,413 messages that were translated in this period are available in the SRN series and no other decrypts or translations are available for this period of time.
To his credit, Stinnett does recognize that the Winds Execute message (a favorite revisionist conspiracy alle-gation) was never sent. He also recounts Secretary of War Stimson's blatant attempt to reverse the Army Board of Inquiry's determination that Marshall was in dereliction of his duty as to his Pearl Harbor actions. Stimson sent attorney Clausen around the world to obtain new affida-vits countering the witnesses' previous testimony of Mar-shall's neglect to act on Purple decrypts. However, Stin-nett omits the fact that Clausen also tried to place the blame for not fully informing Hawaiian commanders on navy cryptologic officers. The latter effort is also part of the aim of this book, but its shot is far wide of the mark.
To those of us who are familiar with Japanese naval codes and communications procedures at the time, avail-able documentation in the Pearl Harbor arena as well as the pertinent personnel and history of OP-20-G, it is abundantly clear that the book fails to prove any part of its massive revisionist conspiracy theory. In fact, the ex-pansion of prior revisionist conspiracy theories to include so many new allegations of wrong doing by Roosevelt and his mid and high level co-conspirators plus a con-tinuing cover-up makes its enormous conspiracy theory a complete impossibility.
In conclusion, it is still clear that no U.S. official knew beforehand of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor or discovered that the Kido Butai was on its way to Hawaii for such an attack in spite of this latest in a series of revi-sionist conspiracy theory books.

[/FONT]

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OpanaPointer, Oct 25, 2009

#25
Kevin Kenneally Member

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OpanaPointer said:

PDF copies of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings before Congress

Parts 21, 31, 32, and 38 pend acquisition of PDF versions.
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Dude,

Great info.

But the files not found are 21, 25, 31 and 38.

I will have plenty to read until they are in pdf form.

Thanks.

Kevin

Kevin
"Before starting a thread, please use the <Search> function at the top of the forums to help discover if the topic you wish to start has already been discussed."
The moderators and administrators reserve the right to decide what qualifies as "spam".

Kevin Kenneally, Oct 29, 2009

#26
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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Kevin Kenneally said:

Dude,

Great info.

But the files not found are 21, 25, 31 and 38.

I will have plenty to read until they are in pdf form.

Thanks.

Kevin
Click to expand...

That's what "pend acquisition" means, amigo. I'm on the trail. Just have to make the right connections to get the best quality copies.

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OpanaPointer, Oct 30, 2009

#27
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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OpanaPointer said:

PDF copies of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings before Congress

Parts 21, 31, 32, and 38 pend acquisition of PDF versions.
Click to expand...

Vols. 31, 32, and 38 will be up as soon as I finish scanning them. Thanks to Mizzou!

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OpanaPointer, Nov 15, 2009

#28
Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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I would like permission to reprint here an article I read many years ago in the pages of The Avalon Hill 'General' called "Myths of the Pearl Harbour Attack". It appeared in 'The General' as a reprint, and now that that Avalon Hill is defunct, qualifies as fair game for posting on the internet, which I seek a moderators permission to do exactly that.

Mods, are you there?

Llamas are bigger than frogs.

Volga Boatman, Nov 17, 2009

#29
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Volga Boatman said:

I would like permission to reprint here an article I read many years ago in the pages of The Avalon Hill 'General' called "Myths of the Pearl Harbour Attack". It appeared in 'The General' as a reprint, and now that that Avalon Hill is defunct, qualifies as fair game for posting on the internet, which I seek a moderators permission to do exactly that.

Mods, are you there?
Click to expand...

Yes, one of us is here.

As long as you give credit where credit is due.

Best Regards,
Jeff

Old Hickory Recon, Memories of the 30th Infantry Division, 1943-1945 Kindle

Slipdigit, Nov 17, 2009

#30
Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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No problem....

I'll start on this one directly, should be finished in a couple of hours. Do I post it as a new thread?

Llamas are bigger than frogs.

Volga Boatman, Nov 17, 2009

#31
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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On of my favorites:

The IJN tanker Shiriya sent a message saying, in part: "This ship is proceeding direct to a position 30-00 North, 154-20 East." In the first edition of Stinnett's book this was called "just north of Hawaii". If you look at this map, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/CarrierChartE.jpg
you'll see it's nearer Wake than Hawaii. Stinnett read "East" as "West" and so off he went.

It's a pity they can't "open and change" all of the copies of Stinnett's book. The "fix" they patched in (pg. 216) is rather clumsy and pointless.

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OpanaPointer, Nov 20, 2009

#32
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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All volumes of the Hearings are now online.

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OpanaPointer, Oct 16, 2011

#33

ResearcherAtLarge likes this.
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Congratulations! Quite a body of work there. I don't know that many people could hold that dedication.

Tracy White
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ResearcherAtLarge, Oct 18, 2011

#34
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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ResearcherAtLarge said:

Congratulations! Quite a body of work there. I don't know that many people could hold that dedication.
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Meh, you should check out the sites in my sig. Patrick and I have put together the odd bit of documentation on the war.

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OpanaPointer, Oct 18, 2011

#35
gunbunnyb/3/75FA Member

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sir, i know this question is probably in the wrong area, but im gonna ask it any way, what do you think about adm. edwin t. layton's book "and i was there"?

gunbunnyb/3/75FA, Oct 18, 2011

#36
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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gunbunnyb/3/75FA said:

sir, i know this question is probably in the wrong area, but im gonna ask it any way, what do you think about adm. edwin t. layton's book "and i was there"?
Click to expand...

No problem, ask any questions you wish. The collective body of information here is comprehensive. I learn something from the Rogues every time we go into new territory.

As for Layton, I don't have a problem with him stating his point of view, of course, but I do think that his opinions are flavored by a need to make himself and his boss look better than they came out at the end. His complaints about not getting "Magic" decrypts have been voided by several folks who pointed out that he was getting all the information a theater commander needed to work with.

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OpanaPointer, Oct 18, 2011

#37
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OpanaPointer said:

Meh, you should check out the sites in my sig. Patrick and I have put together the odd bit of documentation on the war.
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Check out the site in mine; I'm chugging along behind you guys! But that's why I can say it's good work.

Tracy White
Researcher@Large

ResearcherAtLarge, Oct 20, 2011

#38
OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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ResearcherAtLarge said:

Check out the site in mine; I'm chugging along behind you guys! But that's why I can say it's good work.
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I've visited, and liked what I saw. Keep on with the good work.

Seen recently: "I don't care about the Third World War, that's the Third World's problem."

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OpanaPointer, Oct 20, 2011

#39
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i have to agree with you on that. on the other hand, what if joe rochefort had gotten the magic intercepts prior to the attack? do you think he could have warned kimmel in time?

gunbunnyb/3/75FA, Oct 21, 2011

#40

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