The Falaise Gap

Thanks Mats and John, for the link and for the Language tool.

 

I think this is pretty neat that your fathers probably fought in the same area, and you met here! Cool!

 

Another way to get a translation is to copy the French text, paste it as a new document in Microsoft Word, then go to Tools, Language, Translate and select French to English. The translations are sometimes a bit rough, but it works.

Kieran

 

A few points about the Canadian innovations that were first used during " Operation Totalise" the break thru that resulted in the Gap.

By firing tracer anti aircraft rounds over head , at night, the armoured columns were able to keep on their proper compass headings. The fire was not constant, but it was great for maintaining a proper direction . The other innovation was " Artificial Moonlight " which was actually searchlight beams being reflected off the over head clouds to illuminate the ground ahead.

Both were the result of ideas brought forward by officers or NCO's in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. That divison suffered appaling casualties in the 60 days after June 6 th, and in one case, a battalion reported that it had 176 percent casualties in 23 days.

Think about that for a munute, the entire 850 man unit has been either killed or wounded, and the replacements are also now reduced by 76 percent dead or wounded. This was the start of the crisis of manpower shortages for the Canadians , that would only get worse by the winter of 44/45 in Holland. An entire Army ( of about 65,00 men ) stood at home in Canada, fully trained and equipped, BUT due to political dithering, it would never see any action in Europe. They had signed for " home defense only " and the gutless Prime Minister, Mckenzie King would not order the Zombies to fight , fearing the reaction in Quebec to enforced conscription.

Jim Bunting. Toronto.

 

A German veteran who helped me with my research, replied to the Normandy chapter in my manuscript. He did not see action in Normandy because he was badly wounded in January 1944 in Russia. But he wrote to me:

"ich möchte mich zuerst recht herzlich für Ihren Bericht von den Anfängen der Kämpfe in der Normandie der Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1 bedanken. Wir, einige ältere Kameraden der Pz.Sp.Kp. haben uns einmal im Jahr getroffen. Geredet wurde über Familienereignisse, über Erinnerungen des Rußland-Feldzuges, aber nie über die Ereignisse in der Normandie. Es mag dies seltsam erscheinen, aber nachdem ich Ihre Chronologie gelesen habe, ist mir diese Zurückhaltung verständlich geworden."

My translation:

First of all I must thank you for your account on the start of the fighting in Normandy of the Recce Battalion 1 (LSSAH). We, some older comrades of the armoured car company, used to meet once a year. There were conversations about family affairs, about memories from the Russian campaign, but never about what happened in Normandy. This might sound odd, but only since I have red your account do I understand these reservedness"

All the stories I collected from his comrades speak of the horror of the Falaise Pocket: "die Hölle" (the hell).

 

Timo ! Is that you back here again !? What have you been doing for four years ?

 

Well, you know, the usual stuff: worked in a nudy bar, hung around with sailors, some months in the Betty Ford. Nothing special

 

Well, you'll feel right at home back here at the WWII Forums, then !

 

I guess! I'm taking my time to look around. So many changes, so many new members. But the old grognards like you and Carl are still around I see

 

Yes - the 'Altes', grizzled veterans of many a flame war !

 

Hi there! I supposed we never crossed swords but if you are so inclined you'll know where to find me

 

good to see you again Timo it has been sometime, hope to get more input from you again via German Armor/Recon for the forums here ~

Erich

 

Hallo again Erich! It has been some time indeed. I'll see what I can do regarding the armor/recce topics. Unfortunately everything I wrote about Panzermeyer, Knittel and the rest of the Abteilung is still in German. I've planned to translate it but each time new information came in and that had priority over an English text version. But feel free to ask if you need specific details about this unit for any timeframe.

 

there would have been no gap if patton was allowed to close it before thousands of germans escaped.lee.

 

..and IF LeClerc hadn't sat by, waiting to liberate Paris, and IF the Canadians had moved faster up the Falaise/Trun road, and IF......

 

I will reply in the manner of the original post.
It was decided by Patton's superior that he was in danger of being flattened by the retreating Germans. It was judged he was not up to the task.

 

i understood patton,and the soldiers under his command,were withdrawn by bradley.but montgomery had already ordered his army c/o,s to disregard army boundaries.so how many u.s units did patton have at this time.what are these what ifs.this is a discusstion based upon hopefully fact.lee.

 

Wilts,

Are you suggesting that Patton disobey orders? However big Patton's mouth was, I never knew anybody who accused him of that.

 

It seems to be assumed that the whole of 3rd Army was just outside the Falaise Pocket and was raring to go.

In fact, 'Patton at Falaise' consisted of Wade Haislip's XV Corps which in turn was made up of two armoured and two infantry divisions. One of the armoured divisions was Leclerc's and he most certainly did disobey direct orders - and for political reasons, was immune from censure.

There was a real risk - identified from ULTRA decrypts - that the Germans were seriously considering a counterattack into the exposed left flank of Haislip's forces which were becoming over-extended. Patton was very aware of this danger and hoped to persuade Bradley to send Hodges eastward to protect XV Corps' flank.

This of course didn't happen, Haislip wa temporarily halted at Argenten which allowed the Germans to strengthen their defences, the French virtually disengaged, and Patton was happy to turn his attentions to the Seine and beyond.

The main reason for the disappointment of Falaise was that Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley considered the Germans to be almost 'finished' and simply needing containment at the Seine, and not grasping the opportunity of total destruction ( it has been pointed out by a number of historians that the Allies were doctrinally unprepared for battles of encirclement and annihilation, unlike the Russians ).

The error of the 'finished Germans' would be seen again at Arnhem and the in the Ardennes.

The above I've absorbed from various books, especially Martin Blumenson's 'The Battle Of The Generals'.

 

so patton had a corps available.he already had forward elements in falaise.so you are telling me ,patton,the finest general in many peoples eyes,in the e.t.o,did not take this gamble to close the bag,was because ultra said so.there is more to this than meets the eye.all the allied army c/o,s were ordered to throw caution to the wind,by monty.did bradley and patton not talk to one another.lee.p.s i cannot believe bradly was scared or thought patton was not capable of this job.