The Marine airpower from Midway get's a carriers

This Saratoga thread got me thinking of the airpower on Midway.


The Marines had a decent number of planes to bring to the fight:


27 fighters: 20 F2A-3 and 7 F4F

27 dive bombers: 16 SBD and 11 SB2U

10 torpedo bombers: six TBF and four B-26(Ok, neither belonged to the Marines. They operated with them).


One over strength fighter squadron, almost two dive bomber squadrons and a torpedo bomber squadron. On paper that’s almost the air group of a carrier. On paper!

In real live only a handful of the pilots were experienced. The pilots of the SB2U were not green as grass but the planes were obsolescent, the SBD were brand new but the pilots had next to no experience with this type of aircraft, which ruled out dive bombing.

Not a good start but they also didn’k make the best use of their assets. The fighters went after Japanese bombers, the SB2U attacked a battle cruiser, not a carrier and they attacked with 500lb bombs. “The world wonders” what the heck they wanted to achieve? Strip some paint off the armour?


So let’s reorganize their effort.

The most important objective is the destruction of the Japanese carriers. What does this mean for each type of plane?

Torpedo bombers: Theoretically they are the most potent weapon in the Midway’s arsenal. Underwater damage is potentially the most dangerous but they just got ten TB and four of them are Army B-26. I bet the Army pilots never dropped a practice torpedo. Given the skill required for a torpedo attack, that means they have just six TB that can be effective but are six enough to be effective? I got with: No, they are not! For that reason the improvised TB unit is dissolved. The TBF load four 500lb bombs each and join the dive bombers.


Now to the dive bombers:

The limitations of the pilots let the SBD resort to glide bombing. A much less accurate form of attack. To improve the odds Henderson and Norris decide that both parts of VMSB-241 will fly in one formation and attack one target together. They’ll be joined by the six TBF.


The fighter’s job is obvious:

Their one and only job is to protect the bombers no matter what happens. Like a Midway bound Japanese strike flying nearby.


Historically sixteen unescorted SBD tried to attack Hiryu. Six were shot down before they could even drop their 1,000lb bombs. The others “scored” only not damaging near misses.


Now Hiryu is attacked by 33 bombers, who are covered by 27 fighters. Depending on well the fighters soak up the attack of the Japanese CAP, up to 43 bombs might be dropped on Hiryu. 16*1,000lb by the SBD, 11*500lb by the SB2U and 16*500lb by the TBF(4*4).


I’ll be damned if that’s not enough for at least on hit. But what does happened if she’s hit once or twice in the hangar? Are there enough armed and fuelled planes inside to start an uncontrollable fire like Dick Best’s single 1,000lb bomb did on Akagi or were the planes parked on the flight deck at the time in readiness to launch a second wave?


Best case Hiryu burns up and the three others are set on fire at once by a Navy aircraft. Worst case, the fire on Hiryu is controllable and she is ordered to withdraw right away at maximum speed. Could that have resulted in a successfull Marine attack "saving" Hiryu? Or couldn't she have run far enough in the time between the Marine and the Navy attack?

 

The Midway air forces were beset with problems from the start.

Green pilots: As you mentioned, most of the pilots were sadly inexperienced. This situation made worse with the accidental explosion that destroyed most of the island's fuel stocks, further restricting training flights. Oddly enough, the TBF detachment may well have been one of the better trained outfits on the island. They at least had been working with the TBFs and flying and making practice drops for months. They may actually have had more accommodation time in type and opportunity to train than their seniors aboard Hornet.

Divided command: Marine and Navy at least existed in the same command structure. There had not truly been time for Navy and Army to coordinate a unified plan of attack. If there had, then B-26s and TBFs might have done a proper anvil attack on one carrier instead of half anvils on two. I note that these 10 aircraft are probably the only torpedo equipped planes on the American side that were fast enough to have posed a serious torpedo threat IF they had been properly employed.

Aircraft:

B-17s: Not even mentioned in your opening post and frankly appropriate. Though for months the AAC bragged THEY had won the Battle of Midway, the Forts never did harm to the Japanese at Midway and the same in turn. Flying level and dropping sticks of bombs from 20,000 feet on a moving target? Frankly the forts would better have been used supporting the PBYs on the scouting roles and freeing more PBYs to try and go after Tanaka's force.

TBFs: Good planes, but too few in number to be effective on their own. IF we grant the ability to have an actual attack plan running other than clear the island and attack, then they should be at the heart of it.

B-26s: Fast birds but not meant for anti-shipping. They aren't dive bombers either. Might as well keep them in the torpedo role but there needs to be some coordination with the TBFs. One of the 2 downed B-26s came VERY close to having a major impact on the battle when it nearly daisy cuttered Akagi's bridge.

SB2U: The Vought Vindicator, called the 'Vibrator' by its crews. Not a great plane but like all the other bombers at Midway, the piecemeal arrival of forces was the real killer.

SBD-2 The Dash 2 Dauntless is the better of the 2 available dive bombers the Marines have but the crews just are not on he level of Dick Best and Dusty Kleiss. Again: Coordination.

F4F-3 In some ways better than the F4F-4s assigned to the carriers although lacking folding wings, had a better ammunition supply for the 4 .50 machine guns. The -4 had 6 .50s but this only meant the ammunition dried up faster. A good, solid fighter IF used properly.

F2A: The Brewster Buffalo gained great acclaim in Finland in the Winter War and yet is derided as a hopeless 'Flying Coffin' for its performance at Midway. Supporters of the Buffalo blame inept handling by the pilots. The truth:

The early model F2As flown by Finland only bear a passing resemblance to the planes flown at Midway. The early F2A was fairly quick, nimble and responsive for the day but the planes flown by the Navy and handed over to the Marines were heavier with pilot armor and the self-sealing fuel tanks gave less fuel range. The burdened Marine Corps Buffalos became unbalanced, unmanageable, and a little slower. The encumbered F2A seen at Midway is a one pass only fighter. The Wildcats can be used for close escort of the bomber strike. The Buffaloes; if they go, need to climb to maximum altitude and behind the bombers. They get one pass. The Zeroes will still kill most of them but it's the best bet they have.

 

Discussion of the experience level of the Marine VMSB pilots at Midway are usually based on, even in USMC literature from an abbreviated interpretation of the actual events and requires some delving into the background to make the situation clearer . . .

One should start with the SB2U. The SB2U was a historically intermediate aircraft left behind in the technological advances in aeronautics.

SB2U was a limited production aircraft. On the entry of the US entry into the war there were but 147 of them in inventory. Aboard Ranger, VS-41 had 8 SB2U-1 and 2 SB2U-2, and VS-42 had 9 SB2U-1 and 6 SB2U-2. On Wasp, VS-71 had 4 SB2U-1 and 13 SB2U-2. VS-72 had 18 SB2U-2, VF-72, for some reason, probably as squadron hacks, had 2 SB2U-2, and the ship, itself, had 1 SB2U-2 assigned. The Atlantic Fleet pool had 16 SB2U-1 and 7 SB2U-2. Advanced Carrier Training Group, Atlantic had 3 SB2U-1 and 7 SB2U-2. One SB2U-1 was at the Vought-Sikorsky plant and 1 SB2U-2 was at the Naval Aircraft Factory at Philadelphia. Of the SB2U-3 inventory, all of which were once and forever land-based and operated by the Marine Corps, BAD-1 had 2; BAD-2, also 2; VMJ-1 had 1; VMSB-131 had 23; VMSB-231 had 24; and VMJ-152 had 1.

In contrast, there were, at the same time, almost twice as many SBDs in the inventory, 291 on 31 December 1941, to be exact (53 SBD-1, 76 SBD-2, and 162 SBD-3). Significantly, VB-2 and VS-2 on Lexington, VB-3 and VS-3 on Saratoga, VB-5 and VS-5 on Yorktown, and VB-6 and VS-6 on Enterprise, all had full complements of SBDs. The SB2U had already been replaced by SBDs where they had previously been assigned in VB-3 and VB-2. The thing to remember about the SB2U was that it was a monoplane replacement for biplanes. Better than biplanes, certainly, in 1937 and 1938, but not as good as the next monoplane dive bomber coming down the track, the BT, and, by a long shot, inferior to the BTs successor, the SBD.

You see the same thing with the SBC-4 biplanes assigned to Hornet’s VB-8 and VS-8. They had to use something until more SBDs came along and a biplane, built for purpose, dive bomber is better than nothing. As things turned out, Hornet operated SBCs until the spring on 1942, not exchanging them for SBDs until arriving in the Pacific. It was an availability issue and key to the point was that production of the SBC and the SB2U had long ceased. Actually, the SBC-4 was rather well thought of as a dive bombing platform. It was a smooth handler and steady on the angle of attack.

The SB2U was severely limited in capabilities. It was not a true dive bomber as the dive bombing was practiced in USN doctrine, but, rather, a somewhat steep glide bomber. It suffered from a lack of stabilizing dive brakes (eventually lowering the landing gear was to serve this purpose, a very poor substitute) and its wings had far to much flex in them when under diving stress, at times during both testing and actual operation leaving obvious stretches and distortions. In other words, all those things the SBD could do, the SB2U either had trouble performing or simply could not perform.

While it was true that the designers of the SB2U planned on using propeller pitch as the airplane's dive brake, in squadron service, the finally applied brake mechanism was the landing gear. It was the USN's acceptance testing, beginning in July 1936, at Anacostia NAS Flight Test that pointed out the insufficiency of, and rejected, the proposed reversible propeller-based brake. The landing-gear-as-dive-brake system was adopted only after Vought had attempted to provide a dive brake through the installation of thin spar “finger flaps” near the leading edge of the wings that, while flush with the wing in flight, could be extended at a near right angle to the wing surface to actuate a braking of the airplane. Testing of this spar-flaps-as-dive-brake system revealed that it created so much drag that full power was needed just to maintain control of the airplane; not to mention causing aileron buffeting and increasing the weight of the airplane by about 140 pounds. The Navy rejected this concept as well. Thus, by the time the airplane entered squadron service in December 1937, Flight Test had already determined that the only workable solution to the dive brake problem was for the extended landing gear to fulfill this duty and, because of this quite unhappy arrangement, to restrict the airplane to shallower dive angles than were the current practice for “true” dive bombing; all in all an unhappy compromise.

All of the SB2Us in service were subject to this constraint, regardless of model. The SB2U-2 differed from the SB2U-1 in that it was heavier due to internal equipment changes, largely of a hydraulics nature. Deliver of this type began in late 1938. The SB2U-3 differed in from the SB2U-2 in another increase in operating weight stemming from improved armament and protection, increased standard fuel capacity, and provision for long range fuel tanks for ferry flights; not to mention an engine change (R-1535-02 vice the R-1535-96). The SB2U-3, which served the Marines of VMSB-241 at Midway, was never destined for carrier use and the entire sub-type went to the USMC.

The salient fact, then, was that the SB2Us, regardless of model, were simply and widely recognized as being incapable of true dive-bombing as spelled out in USN doctrine. Without dive brakes, the aircraft was incapable of "pushing over" to the 70 plus degree dive angle of a proper dive bombing attack as any attempt to do so resulted in a rapid increase in air speed that caused the rear fuselage and tail plane fabric to begin to shed. (The strange white stripes seen on the famous movie photos of VMSB-241 SB2U-3s taking off are, in fact, strips of medical tape applied to help keep the fabric on the planes during glide-bombing)

VMSB-241, which started life as VMSB-231, was originally equipped solely with SB2U-3s, therefore followed established practice in its training, restricted to the operating profile of the airplane adhering to the glide bombing attack method, a shallow 50-40-degree attack angle. Once at Midway in January 1942, the squadron entered an extensive period of training during which they self developed and adopted a 19-plane box formation (the squadron inventory was 19 aircraft plus 2 spares), which they practiced extensively. Even with their less than capable aircraft and the attack method chosen, the squadron was well prepared and practiced by May 1942.

Three unforeseen events combined to virtually destroy this status.

First, at the end of February 1942, the squadron was split. Key, experienced, personnel were rotated back to MCAS Ewa, this group retained the designation VMSB-231. Remaining on the island was the other half of the squadron, now re-designated as VMSB-241. The VMSB-231 personnel were replaced with men, including some senior officers, fresh out of training pipeline and, thus with a minimum of operational training and none in the type available. SB2U type training began again.

This event was followed on 26 May by the arrival, via USS Kitty Hawk, of nineteen SBD-2s along with 12 new entirely new pilots (including one fighter pilot, accidentally assigned to the unit, with zero hours in any VB type) and all with even less operational training than the earlier batch of replacements.

No sooner had the new aircraft been fully worked up than one of Eastern Island's main fuel a tank was accidentally destroyed in a test of the islands demolition systems. As a result, there was no more fuel for additional, and critically needed, type training on the SBD, particularly in proper, doctrinal dive bombing technique. With but a week to go before going into action, that left them with the concept of glide bombing.

Faced with the virtual loss of the months work done since the Pearl Harbor attack, the over-strength squadron split into to parts, putting all the experienced pilots, these being the remains of the original already trained SB2U pilots, in the SBD-2s and making up 12 new aircrews from the most promising replacements for assignment to the most serviceable of the 19 SB2U-3s still on hand. Nonetheless, with no training in dive-bombing, Major Henderson decided to adopt the well-practiced "glide-bombing" technique with both types. Thus, in both of the Squadron attacks on 4 and 5 June, all the aircraft executed glide-bombing attacks. The VMSB-241 report laconically recounts:

extract:

1. The report of activities of VMSB-241 during the battle of Midway on June 4 and June 5, 1942, is submitted herewith.

2. The squadron had been divided into two (2) separate attack units constituted as follows: eighteen (18) SBD-2 airplanes commanded by Major Henderson, and twelve (12) SB2U-3 airplanes commanded by Major Norris. Ten (10) of the pilots manning these twenty-eight (28) planes had joined the squadron only one week prior to the initial engagement. This fact and a shortage of gasoline permitted a maximum of but two (2) hours of training for Major Norris’s group and one hour for Major Henderson’s group.

3. Major Henderson realized that he would not have sufficient time to train properly all the new and inexperienced pilots nor fit them into the squadron flight organization and develop them into a proper team. With this in mind, he kept the older, better trained pilots in one unit and put the new pilots into one unit with experienced section and division leaders.

4. Also, because all but three (3) of his pilots had had no time in SBD type airplanes, and because the squadron had been forced to practice only glide bombing in the SB2U-3 planes, Major Henderson decided to use only glide bombing in his plan of attack. He was so desirous of delivering a crushing blow to the enemy on his first opportunity that he decided to lead the squadron in on a glide bombing approach which would permit them to glide to five hundred (500) feet or less before releasing their bombs. To insure against duds, because of the probable low release altitudes, all fuses were turned seventy (70) full turns by hand on the ground, making only twenty (20) turns necessary for complete arming of the bombs.

end of extract.

So, in actuality, regardless of any training level, and, as has been pointed out, the least trained were flying the least capable SB2Us and could not have executed a dive bombing attack profile anyway. Had the most trained pilots available had flown in the SB2Us they still would have been restricted to the glide bombing program due to the limitations of the aircraft, they could not have dive-bombed even if they had wanted to or been trained to.

As it was, the most trained were in the SBDs, but their training had been accomplished in SB2Us, so glide bombing was what they knew, they could simply do it a little faster in an SBD than in an SB2U.

Aphorisms such as “Train as you fight, fight as you train” or “stick with what you know” come to mind.

And now you know the rest of the story.