The narrow thrust proposal

One thing I have never understood about the Monty's narrow thrust proposal is did he really think Marshall and Roosevelt would approve the placing of two thirds or so of the US army in France in inactive status?? The political fall out from the American public would be enormous. For two years Britain pleaded for American aid and now its we don't need those troops. Marshall had to threaten not sending any troops to Europe if the invasion of France was not undertaken. The other part Im not sure Monty considered is what would prevent the Germans from taking troops from the inactive part of the front and transferring them to the North.

 

I think narrow front is a bit of a misnomer. Monty characterized it as a "full-blooded thrust" which would involve as many as forty divisions. Depending on the exact date, 21st Army Group only had about sixteen divisions, so:

a. The majority of the troops involved would be American.
b. That would be the majority of the American divisions on the Continent, of which there were not quite forty in fall 1944.

We might consider how Marshall or whomever would feel about Monty commanding a mainly American force, but they wouldn't be sitting idle.

Any attack eventually runs out of steam. The best strategy might have been the one the Russians used, push an attack as far as you can while preparing to strike in another sector while the enemy is off balance reacting to the first.

 

No Army would have been inactive. Your argument has no merit.

Blatant nationalistic claptrap.

 

The point is still that those units not being used would be idle and that means you don't need them. Pattons third army for example would not receive much in supplies certainly not enough to mount any kind of offense, the same for the 6th army covering the south end. Im sorry it hurts your feelings Kenny, but Churchill spent a lot of time pleading for American aid.

 

Latecomers are always welcome.

 

All these various proposed plans were just so much pie in the sky without supplies running through Antwerp. And the high command, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and most everybody else, did seem to suffer from a bit of a mental disconnect where this was concerned in the late summer/early fall of 1944.

 

Im trying to paste a link on this subject but it wont let me. Ive tried cut and paste and control c/ control v neither works

 

Russell Weigley noted that 21st AG's logistics chiefs objected the plan, citing the impossibility of meeting the POL and ammo requirements with the resources at hand. It is my belief that given German defensive advantages and their better direct-fire weaponry, the weight of the concentration required to overwhelm the defenders in a narrow front was out of reach for Allied logistical capabilities, let alone tactical handicaps such as the destruction of roads by supporting artillery and increased exposure to enemy fires that concentration tactics impose on the attacker.

As for the political implications, Monty was a professional soldier, bond to insist the military solutions he deemed the best and most expedient. I had met a proud American serviceman who thought it was inane that Pershing refused to break up the AEF into rifle regiments in the Great War! Much of the grief Monty received from American historiography for slowness and over-caution was unwarranted; he was fighting with a finite number of infantry that every British commander knew to be too few and they could do nothing about it.

 

This is the link

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/a-lingering-controversy-eisenhowers-broad-front-strategy.htm

and I know because the thread starter has posted the exact same wording on AHF.

 

That's whats weird it would post on one site but not this one.

 

Had a thought. Monty tried to separate the political and military spheres yet I don't see how that was possible. AN example if one thrust was approved what when happen when the styles of Monty and the US crossed? Monty lays out one of his detailed down to the minute plans and Bradley brushes it off because that's not how the Americans do it. Instead of stopping at point a Bradley is able to go farther and does so. This is almost what happened at Falaise. Or vise versa, Monty wont move because he hasn't planned out his attack as he wants to.

 

If you look in the top left hand corner of a reply window there is a'switch' icon that allows you to to include links.

 

Gross distortion of reality. Bradley was a grinder exactly like Monty. COBRA was a classic Monty attritional frontal attack and could be nothing else. The critical difference is that once the German front was broken by COBRA there was no second line to stop Bradley. On the Caen front there were multiple German stop lines laid out in great depth. This is because the German defences were critical at Caen. If Caen went then all German forces west of it were trapped. If the western flank went then serious but not as critical as an eastern collapse.
You really must get over the illusion the US was into manouevre warfare because it is not true. Patton did not outflank the Germans he just clung to their coat-tail as the fled east.

Can anyone explain why Monty's extensive use of bombers and artillery/tanks at GOODWOOD is a sign he was a slow slugger but Bradley's use of even greater numbers of bombers/tanks/artillery (as well as infantry numbers Monty could only dream of) is the exact opposite?

Point to ponder. GOODWOOD was planned to be a 2-pronged advance with COBRA to crack the German front. However Bradley could not manage to get ready in time so Monty was left on his own. Who knows what could have happened if Bradley had been up to the job. Do you think he might had deliberately delayed in order to make sure his advance got all the credit?

 

I'm not at all convinced of that. I think Monty had a pretty good handle on the political spheres and how they impacted the military. The thing is there wasn't just one political "sphere" there were a number. Monty wasn't IMO very focused on the one involving Washingtion, on the the other hand I think he was very intent on both the London "sphere" as well as the joint military command "sphere".

 

Kenny I said something different. American doctrine called for telling a subordinate what you wanted done and then letting them decide how to do it. Monty was a very careful planner and tried to cover every detail.

 

I think it is a rather pointless argument. The Germans were not going to be beaten in 1944. They had enough reserves left and enough war industry still going to mount a very strong defense in both east and west, and in fact succeeded in slowing and nearly halting the Soviets and the western Allies. In both east and west, the Allied offensives had simply outrun their supplies and could not mount a final drive in sufficient strength until they had set their lines of communication in order again. In the west the Germans had the additional advantage of excellent natural and man-made defenses, which could be stoutly held even by relatively low-grade troops. It would take another bout of attrition in the fall and winter to wear down the German reserves and allow for another breakthrough. Anyway, the single thrust was tried in Market-Garden and did not work. Pushing all along the line elsewhere (Aachen, Hurtgen, Metz, Vosges) did not lead to a quick breakthrough either, but it did begin the final attritional destruction of Geman power in the west.

 

Except the caveat that during the pursuit Patton was repeatedly reoriented by Bradley, which prevented the encirclement of German forces, Kenny's larger points are correct. Cobra was a frontal assault made with concentration tactics and overwhelming firepower (ref. Zetterling). The major differences that enabled American success are as follows. German defensive belt in front of St. Lo was thinly manned, with little in the way of mobile reserves. Bradley had more bayonet strength, allowing him to constitute better balanced infantry-armor assault units for a breakthrough. Finally Bradley's fire plan was better; he pushed artillery and air attacks deeper into the already shallow defended zone, and his mandate to increase the ratio fragmentation bombs, as well as the first deployment of napalm, decreased cratering of the terrain by a bit.

With the exception of the superior fire plan by Brad, those factors were out of Brad or Monty's control. The most significant factor was German weakness effected by, ironically, an attritional, broad front approach to war.