The seizure of Indo China by Japan, the final step to war

The seizure of Indo China was the actual final step to war. The bases Japan took enabled Japanese planes to cover the invasion sites, many convoys sailed from Saigon and Japan got a good land connection to support their land invasion of Malaysia. The embargo was Roosevelts attempt to stop the Japanese continued advance. How would it have been received by Britain if Japan attacked while being supplied by American oil and steel

 

1.) The British Empire would not have been attacked in 1941, and very unlikely in 1942, had they not been embargoed.

2.) Britain is not concerned about the US selling oil & steel to Japan, as Britain is selling them to Japan also

 

Japan was attempting to cut off supplies to China and Burma was the next route, I believe that a fight between Britain and Japan was inevitable as long as supplies flowed to China through Burma.

 

Neither the IJA or IJN wanted war with the western powers, as they didn't think it was winnable, and wanted to subdue China first.
The records from Hirihito's Imperial conferences make it clear that war would only be contemplated if they couldn't buy oil & steel.
Britain did in fact close down the Burma Road from July - Oct of 1940, and was not in a position to send much more than token support, as they were short of both arms & funds. The US government (or citizens) were prohibited from lending money to China, directly sending arms or transporting them until April of '41.
British support for the embargo was a result of a private agreement by FDR with Churchill that he would support Britain if Japan attacked.

 

But what else was the seizure of Indochina then a move against Britain? The U.S. was still sending aid like the flying Tigers. Japan's moves were logical in asense, but desperate. They were unable to win the war in China, but couldnt admit it so the next logical move is to find something to blame. As far as wanting war while the navy may not have wanted war, there were the extremists who did and would kill any one who failed to properly advocate war and the army wanted to go after the Soviets.

 

Why?
There was no oil or other significant resources, and the Japanese had earlier been routed by the Soviets in 1939

 

Indeed, but there wasn't significant oil reserves or production in the Soviet Far East. In 1941 it wasn't a primary objective of the IJA

ie If they weren't getting oil & steel?
The setbacks of the winter of 40/41 had convinced the IJA of the need to concentrate on subduing China. In the conference in the summer of 1941 there was an agreement to go to war with the colonial powers in Oct/Nov 1941 only as a last resort if resources couldn't be obtained any other way.

 

For the army it was about the anti communist crusade. As I see it, the only reason to seize Indo-China was to go after the DEI and for a base to go after Burma. I compare the seizure to Hitlers seizure of the rest of Czechoslovakia.

 

I think you missread Britain's position.

Throughout the 19th Century the British Navy had no problem in dominating all the Oceans of the World - it was the superpower of the age. But around 1900 things started to change. Kaiser started to build up the German Navy and Britain was starting to slip from being top dog. The Two Oceans policy with a formal pact with Japan was a result. With the aid of a friendly ally in the Japanese, Britain aimed to keep a strong presence in the Pacific. Relations were close.

A strongly held view in the British Foreign Office was that "we did it 300 years ago - why should we object to the Japanese creating an empire in China". For a long time both Japan and Britain (because of India) had a common enemy in Czarist then Soviet Russia. Until the Jap attack on Malaysia, the two countries had fought together several times and even as late as 1920 against the Bolsheviks

From the British point of view there was little to be gained from antagonising Japan. The Empire in Asia was clearly overstretched - India was in turmoil and about to be given Dominion Status. Total British army worldwide in the early 1930's was only 60,000.

So the only reason why the British changed their policy was America. American assistance was more important than keeping good relations with Japan. It became vital once Churchill was in charge and the the BEF had been defeated by Germany.

From the British point of view the last thing they wanted was War with Japan - I am convinced that even Churchill would have done nothing anti-Japanese, let them have China, if it had not been for the impact this would have had on Anglo- American relationships and US supplies.

 

No, it's no a "crusade" they are fighting the KMT as well as the communists.
Japan simply means to seize Chinese resources & territory.

Also Indo-China was not "seized" they forced the Vichy to allow them to base forces there.
And as Opana pointed out, it helps to encircle China.
(As well as leverage against the British)

Excellent analysis

 

Code:

So, you don't think the British saw the Japanese as a threat to Malaya, or India? 

• Well of course as soon as the British threw in their lot with the US, the threat was very real and hence the reason why Churchill sent the two battleships to hopefully deter them but really it was bluff.
  
  Short term the British had only one focus - survival and defeating the Germans - and short term, Japanese success in China would have tied up the Japanese for quite some time.
  
  Longer term it would probably have come to the fore but even then I think the Japanese might have returned to a Northern Strategy first. At some stage the Japanese would have needed to deal with the Russian presence if only to guard a massive new Empire in China - remember the difference in population - the Japanese problem would have been rather similar that of the British in India.

 

It may be a matter of framing things. If Scipio is correct and Britain sees Japan as more ally (or even neutral) than enemy, then there's no reason to see them as a threat to British possessions in the Far East. It's always been my understanding that Japan was playing a strange game in it's internal politics: The navy tended to support the old alliance with England while the army supported an alliance with Germany. Neither is surprising, as the Imperial Japanese Navy had worked closely with the Royal Navy for the past thirty or forty years, learning a great deal from them, while the Imperial Army had had a similar relationship with the Kaiser's army in the past.

Of course, once Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September of 1940 Britain can't really think of her as a potential ally. Indeed, Japan's occupation of Indochina immediately after signing the agreement must have been seen as a threat, since it was Japan's first foray into territory that had been previously held by a formal ally of Great Britain. (Albeit one that had just fallen to Germany.) Previous to that it might, I suppose, have been thought that the war would shape up more like WWI, with the US and Japan eventually joining Britain (and France) against Germany while the Soviets would probably have remained neutral (while quietly supporting China against Japan.)

I suppose Britain might still have thought of Japan as primarily neutral, even after they signed the Tripartite Pact. It was a devilishly worded little thing that gave Japan no obligation to go to war against the (then) allied powers. I can certainly believe that Churchill would have sold China to Japan to concentrate on Germany, but I'm curious if there's any evidence to that end. (At present it seems a little speculative.) But I find it hard to believe that the British public would have reacted much differently to Japanese actions in China than the American public, so I would expect that any British PM would have faced considerable pressure from his own people to support at least some diplomatic or economic pressure. At least until the Luftwaffe shows up over Jolly Olde.

Britain is a strange and interesting place. Commons has a long history of bringing the rest of the country to heel. And Commons is itself rather more sensitive than other branches of the government to the ordinary bloke on the streets. Enough so that every now and then Britain does something rather American and makes a decision with foreign policy implications that goes against the economic or security interests of the monied class. (Not often, of course. But then it's pretty rare over here too.) So I'm not completely convinced Churchill could have simply abandoned China to its fate in order to retain neutrality from the Japanese. I can easily believe he'd have wanted to. Quite easily. But I'm much less sure he could have done it in the face even of his own electorate. (And in fairness, I think Roosevelt was probably of similar mind to Churchill. I seem to recall that the oil embargo, at least, was slipped past him buried in something else.)

Interesting subject for speculation and I bet some others here will have some good evidence and that I'll learn a few things as this thread develops.

Tally ho! as it were.

 

That´s but a different way of saying they seized it.

About the Anglo-Japanese relations. They went very cool as early as WW1. Japan used it´s alliance with the UK to grab the German colonies. They also used the opportunity to make far reaching demands on China and sold France and the UK arms for profit. These actions were remembered and resulted in the end of the formal alliance in the early 1920s. They also convinced the Empire that Japan was an agressive power they had to keep an eye on. Hence the construction of the Singapore naval base.

Japan´s actions from 1931 onwards showed they were an agressive power indeed.