This looks interesting, and I´ll get it next. Especially the economical aspects interest me , did Germany have ammo and other material to continue the fighting for how long etc if in 1940 there would have been no breakthrough in the Ardennes area...or even earlier in Poland... The Wages of Destruction By Adam Tooze The Wages of Destruction - Adam Tooze - Penguin UK On the other hand for an economic historian the question is not why did Hitler not win World War II, but how Nazi Germany ever managed to get as far as it did. What are the new conclusions? Well, we have fundamentally dismantled the propagandistic myths, which continue to surround Hitler’s work creation programme and such public relations stunts as the Volkswagen project. Goering’s Four Year Plan, of 1936 also appears as less significant than it was once thought to be. By contrast, what has emerged as crucial for the entire period between 1933 and 1940 is the management of Germany’s cripplingly inadequate foreign exchange reserves. In 1934 this problem was so severe that Hitler’s regime came very close to economic meltdown, a crisis which has been grossly underrated in the literature. And even after that crisis was overcome, every aspect of Hitler’s economic policy whether with regard to armaments, the forced expulsion of the German and Austrian Jews, or the maintenance of the domestic standard of living, was dictated by the difficulty of managing the balance of payments. Just as the international crisis was reaching its climax, Hitler was forced to face the fact that his armaments effort was set to decelerate. He knew by the summer of 1939 that he would be unable to match the renewed efforts of Britain and France. This throws dramatic new light on his decision to start the war a few months later. ....in the early summer of 1944 Speer’s office maintained a telephone hotline to the railway ramp in Auschwitz, where hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were selected either for gassing or forced labour. Speer’s role was not only to produce more guns, ammunition and tanks. It was crucial that these weapons were “made to tell a story”, to maintain a narrative of the invincibility of the German nation, despite the overwhelming odds against it. Within weeks of his appointment Speer had struck up a new relationship with Joseph Goebbels, from which emerged a new brand of “armaments propaganda” celebrating and mythologizing the triumphs of mass production and the invincible quality of Germany’s new tanks, machine-guns and U Boats.