Tigers destroyed by 12.7mm guns?

Lehr's Tigers, actual a remote control demolition unit (fkl)316, did not all go to Normandy. 2 TI's might have but the 5 (or 6)TII's remained near Paris.

Are you confusing the Goodwood bombing with the Cobra bombing? I may be wrong but you seem to link sPzAbt 503 with Cobra when its 3rd kp was the one that had 4 confirmed total losses on 18/7/44.
Far more serious losses were suffered by 1/Pz Reg 22 (21st Pz Division) this same day as it seems it was largely wiped out.

You may find Niklasb Zetterling's book Normandy 1944 useful (JJF 2000)but be warned, Zetterling has a very pronounced bias in favour of German Units and accounts. He always gives them the best possible slant and his 'effects of Allied Air Power' section will not be to your liking. Despite the almost mythical reputation of this book there are some factual errors contained within.

http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normand ... ticle.html
click on the air power link

 

German memories?

Yes thats why I posted the 'alternative' history that 'no' Tigers were killed at Kursk... a bit of tongue in cheek

I may have to go and re - read "Break Out and Pusuit" the official US Army Green Book.

I believe they quote Bayerlein in there often.

"Ja, my men are still holding in their foxholes, they are burried in them. "

maybe my memories are fading also.


But I would like Christian to summarize Pnzr Lehrs losses 25 July '44- Sept 1..

acedemic pursuit and all that, as I have said, I dispute some of the US official history 'Green books' on the Ardennes.

you know the Pozit / VT fuse stuff.

BTW 3rd Army did not cooperate and and some dispute Huge Coles Ardennes findings. The Generals did not even like the Captain.



Earlier I did post about a Tiger commander being afraid of .50 Cal/12.7 anti tank rifles

at 4,000 rpm a P-47 theoretically could chew up bits of a tank

I believe the bottom of a tiger is 26 mm, I have a 12 gauge .50 cal sabot round theat will supposedly go thru 12 mm at 100 meters

It is not AP, and I have read 20 mm did little to a Sherman turret..


bits and pieces

I beleive the US Army did not even acknowledge the 17th airborne in the Ardennes for decades.

Its fun to sort out though..

My dad flew close air support in F-100's I remember going to Ramstien and Stuggart to watch him 'game'. I remember siting on a Patton tank watching thinking the sounds alone would shake the world apart.

July 17, 1944. Napalm incendiary bombs are dropped for the first time by American P-38 pilots on a fuel depot at Coutances, near St Lo, France.

 

I just posted the 503 rd peice as it related to air power in Normandy against Tigers, I was not being specific as to the breakout.

As far as Panzer Lehr, I always figured they were in Normandy and with the 116th. 1st & 2nd Pnzr SS etc.

There is a lot, including the US Army green book that says they were.



Hmmm
This is a truly magnificent record of the performance of the German tanks
and their Panzertruppen in the Normandy Campaign.
BRITISH ARMY REVIEW

Published to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Normandy campaign, Panzers in Normandy


http://www.afterthebattle.com/panz.html

HEER
Panzer Lehr Regiment (Panzer Lehr Division)
Panzer Regiment 3 (2. Panzer Division)
Panzer Regiment 16 (116. Panzer Division)
Panzer Regiment 22 (21. Panzer Division)
Panzer Regiment 33 (9. Panzer Division)
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503
Miscellaneous Army Panzer Units
Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 654
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs Abteilung 100
Panzer Abteilung 206

WAFFEN-SS
SS-Panzer Regiment 1 (1. SS-Panzer Division)
SS-Panzer Regiment 2 (2. SS-Panzer Division)
SS-Panzer Regiment 9 (9. SS-Panzer Division)
SS-Panzer Regiment 10 (10. SS-Panzer Division)
SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (12. SS-Panzer Division)
SS-Panzer Abteilung 17 (17. SS-Panzer Grenadier Division)
Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101
Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 102

 

I should perhaps clarify that the material I posted concerned attacks by fighter-bombers. There were a few occasions on which dense concentrations of medium or heavy bombers were used to 'carpet bomb' Panzer formations to considerable disruptive effect, but such operations were very infrequent as the conditions rarely materialised (the existence and location of a concentration of armour had to be known hours in advance to plan the mission, and the Panzers tended not to stay in one place for long). Such missions were also highly dangerous to Allied soldiers in the area, as the bombing was notoriously imprecise.

It is also true that Panzer crews were terrified of Jabo attacks and frequently abandoned their tanks at the sight of them, so I'm certainly not saying that such attacks weren't effective in disrupting Panzer operations, just that they didn't knock out many tanks. The official British estimate of the hit probabilityof RPs against tanks in battle was 0.5 % (one in two hundred). Bombs were less accurate still.

The details for the book I mentioned are:

Gooderson, I. Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1939-45. Frank Cass (London 1998)

It should be required reading on this subject!

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

 

The official US Army estimate for one snowy 10 day period during the battle of the bulge is 41 enemy tanks destroyed by close air support.


of no one study or book is definitive,,

I remember reading 'Jagdpilot', where the Germans used BF 109's to drop bombs on 200+ MPH B-17s.. If they could hit a B-17 in flight, how could a P-47 on the deck miss a nearly static tank 99.5 % of the time.


It is a good book, by the first sucessfull Me-163 test pilot and Me-262 pilot in Gallands sqardron. You know after Galland dumped his medals on Goerings desk.

 

The simple answer is that they couldn't, not reliably and certainly not your average pilot. But the Germans were desperate, they like the Japanese who attempted a similar tactic needed some way that an unskilled pilot could attempt to down a bomber with little risk to themselves, flying high enough above the formation to be out of range from the defending guns and simply lobbing the bombs into the formation (Not the individual planes) meant that just by the law of averages if nothing else sooner or later they had to meet with success. A time fused 250kg bomb exploding in the middle of a bomber formation would only require a fairly near miss to cause potentially catestrophic damage to a bomber, certainly close enough to cause likely fatal damage.

Compare the size of single B-17 to even something as large as a Tiger tank, by comparison the tank is tiny, now compare the size of a single combat box of B-17s to that of a single Tiger and you can appreciate how much easier it is to hit the formation (Remember that, they were attempting to get a bomb to explode in the middle of a formation, not necessarily trying to hit individual planes!). As has been mentioned a bomb or rocket required nothing less than a direct hit to stand a realistic chance of outright destroying a tank, near-misses would not be good enough.

Edit: Remember also that the tanks would be camoflaged, at the very least painted to match their surroundings, B-17s and B-24s were not at the time the Germans resorted to attmpting to bomb formations, they were nice bright silvery targets with brightly painted tailfins and wing-tips.

 

On what was that estimate based? Pilot reports?

One of the examples of mis-identification mentioned in Gooderson's book concerned snowy conditions in the Ardennes, when pilots reported attacking tanks in a field. It turned out that these were farmers' huts which were about the same size as tanks. That does give some idea of the problems of identification, and why so many reported attacks on 'tanks' were on other things entirely.

TW

 

The report was mentioned earlier by Stonewall as having taken 10% of what the pilots claimed as a realistic number of tanks destroyed, even though the percentage is of course completely arbitrary.

I must ask the two parties in this discussion to stop with the jabs at each other and each other's sources. It is not wrong or even strange to have a different opinion, and to present facts is the way to solve such a difference. Ignorance is not the same as stupidity, since ignorance can be cured.

 

It was a hand count, the percentage was actual to claimed..

It was done a few monthas after the battle, not half a century later..

also


http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupres ... shwedo.pdf

 

.

Weyland, Commander XIX TAC

 

XIX
TAC actively employed assets to counter both the German air
and ground threats in this area. By midmorning 1 August, the
Germans were introduced to the new air-ground team in-theater
when the German commanders received reports stating:
“that the Americans were at Pontorson and Dol-de-Bretagne
and that two batteries of a German assault gun brigade committed
against the armored spearheads had been destroyed
principally by fighter-bombers.”21

ibid P 43

One example comes
from the unit that Weyland had transferred to Quesada the
night before: “Tank battles were seen in the Vire–Mortain sector,
and our planes took a hand in them. In one attack, seven
P-47s of the 405th Group claimed destruction of 12 tanks, five
staff cars, four half-tracks (three of them carrying flak guns)
and four light flak positions, plus damage to four other
tanks.”22 Soon after the war, the Office of the Assistant Chief
of Air Staff for Intelligence put out a report on this battle, sensationally
stating that the Allies were “in danger of being cut
off by a determined German counterattack at Avranches but
the air ended this threat, pulverizing concentrations of enemy
troops and armor as fast as they were formed.”23 Although this
comment may exaggerate airpower’s role in this engagement,
it pales in comparison to the comments that came from the
Germans.
In 1956 German Lt Gen Bodo Zimmerman (former chief operations
officer, commander in chief [CINC] west, and Army
Group D) recalled the battle stating, “After a certain initial
success it was brought to a standstill at first light by the intervention
of the Allied Air Force. This was the first time in history that an attacking force had been stopped solely by
bombing.”24 XIX TAC and Third Army did not have to wait
until 1956 to get the Germans’ impression of the Allied air effort
—by that afternoon, ULTRA reports immediately gave evidence
of their success. The German Seventh Army reported
“the actual attack had been at a standstill since 1300 hours,
owing to the employment by the enemy of a great number of
fighter-bombers and the absence of own aircraft.”25 Lowerechelon
forces provided similar accounts. The 47th Panzer
Corps claimed “the activity of fighter-bombers is said to be
have been well-nigh unendurable” and 1st SS Panzer Division
observed that they had “no previous experience of fighterbomber
attacks on this scale.”26 Although the Germans rightfully
attributed much of the Allied success in this battle to airpower,
it would be several years before they would learn that
one of the greatest factors was ULTRA—a fact that was not
missed by the Allied commanders involved.

Airpower’s systematic reduction of enemy forces left a
strong impression on the Germans caught within the pocket.
Gen Fritz Bayerlein, commander, Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr,
provided some insight into what it was like to be on the receiving
end of the Falaise air attack when he said,
Traffic was in a terrific snarl in the village, moving north and east to
get out of the Falaise–Argentan trap . . . Punctually at 0900 in the
morning of the 13th came the fighter-bombers. They swept in very low
over at least 250 motor transport, trucks, cannon, and nebelwerfer on
the roads in and around the village and nearby fields and orchards.
They hit a truck train of rocket ammunition right off the bat, and this
64

started exploding and throwing rockets in all directions. The streets of
the town were so littered with the burning remains of trucks and
equipment as to be impassable, yet the fighters kept on until it was
practically dark, after which two-motor bombers came in and bombed
intermittently at night.72


The gigantic offensive kept
up until after nightfall.”73 The Germans continually acknowledged
the effects of Allied airpower. Many were impressed with
road attacks and claimed fighters would “pounce down even
on a single vehicle or motor cyclist,” while another officer summarized
the frustrations of many POWs when he said, “you
have bombed and strafed all the roads causing complete congestion
and heavy traffic jams.


bicycles?


hmmmm

 

Just east of Le Mans was one of the best examples of armor and air cooperation
I have ever seen. For about two miles the road was full of
enemy motor transport and armor, many of which bore the unmistakable
calling card of a P-47 fighter-bomber—namely a group of .50-caliber
holes.

Patton, Commander 3rd Army

 

'nuff said

 

Depends on what Patton would consider "armour".

They could have been anything armoured, ranging from halftracks to recce vehicles and SP guns, notoriously lightly armoured. And then even if it was armour, odds are very very small that this is about Tigers. It's much more likely that they were thinly armoured PanzerIVs.

 

I have read some of Tony's stuff, It seems well written and documented..

http://www.simhq.com/cgi-bin/ultimatebb ... 008886;p=0

And over the last few days I have read wht other people on over forums have said.

Things like .50 cal, meters per second, Ap etc..no way..

And yes, Tigers could take multiple bazooka hits to the front..

At the risk of repeating myself here...

At the beginning of the war, the only hand-held ranged AT weapons issued were usually anti-tank rifles, which were just large caliber rifles, with projectiles usually from 13mm - 20mm in diameter. While unable to destroy heavy armor, these weapons were used throughout the war, and could be surprisingly effective. The Russians and Finns had good ones. In his memoir, Otto Carius, a German Tiger Tank Ace, says that he hated them. While no danger to the crew of his Tiger behind the thick armor, a lucky shot could hit vital equipment, possibly causing a radiator or oil leak that could even disable the vehicle. Because they were operated by only a 1-2 man crew, they could operate from ambush and were usually not worth the effort of hunting down.


I have been out to the sighting range where my father was having his guns aligned on a F-100. It also had eight .50 cals (memory?) like an F-86.

They would sight the guns so that at 1000 meters all rounds would hit inside a 1 meter bullseye. 4000 rounds a minute, chewing away bits and pieces..

4000 opportunities for a lucky shot on a individual basis and a sand blaster or a pressure washer can wear through automotive metal rather quickly.


Think about it.

Patton did not however 'qualify' his statements either.

 

this may give a hint of the breakdown by category

German Gen. Fritz Bayerlein of the Panzer Lehr Division gave an account of how the Jabos worked over his division on June 7: "By noon it was terrible; every vehicle was covered with tree branches and moved along hedges and the edges of woods. Road junctions were bombed and a bridge knocked out. By the end of the day I had lost forty tank trucks carrying fuel, and ninety other vehicles. Five of my tanks were knocked out, and eighty-four half-tracks, prime movers and self-propelled guns." Those were heavy losses, especially for a panzer division that had so far not fired a shot.

Stephen Ambrose- Citizen Soldier

I suspect the 'Jabos' got even better at it as time went on...

 

Bayerlein is not the best of sources. He gave all this evidence 'from memory' after the war and it is grossly exaggerated (to please his American captors?)
Though he gives the losses on the way to Normandy as 5 tanks, 84 half-tracks and 90 wheeled vehicles for the WHOLE of June the division lost a total of 82 half tracks. Thus they could not possibly have lost 84 on the march.
There is also a Divisional report written on June 10th stating losses on the approach march were not significant.

His Cobra testimony is equally suspect.

 

yeah, his name sticks out a lot, because of his mouth..

He is quoted often,

BTW what did you think of the Patton quote above..

 

There is no dispute that TAC did great damage to the German war machine. However in the rather specialised area of tank killing it was not a very good weapon. That is all. Pilots may claim the knocked out tanks but the OR reports (and there are several) show that a/c were not the main tank killers.
It needed a direct hit on a tank and that was a rare event.
It did happen but not all that often. Certainlt not as often as pilots claimed anyway!

 

I guess, a direct hit would do it..

A 1000 lb bomb? I dunno the kill range.. I would say that you would not have to drop it on the open hatch, ditto for napalm..



We have all seen the pictures of the Gap,..


ka boooom