US Army deployments during the Pearl Harbor attack

This site just concluded a long thread that asked "What if the Japanese had invaded Oahu at the same time as their aerial attacks on Pearl Harbor? The chief pro-Japanese protagonist maintained that few to no US Army troops were in the field at the time of the Japanese aerial attack and they were all tucked safely in their beds at Schofield Barracks when the Japanese struck.

The following site conclusively proves that large numbers of troops from the US 24th and 25 Infantry Divisions were already in the field from Kanehoe Bay to Fort Shaftner and many points in between after November 27th's War Warning from Washington DC on both anti-sabotage and anti-invasion patrols and other duties.

25th Infantry Division Association: Pearl Harbor

 

Thanks JW!

 

Good info., Thanks John!

 

Nice guys.

The thread gets closed so I think that I can't respond and now I find that you're meeting over here to talk it over ...

How about

"It could reasonably follow from this failure that the Army airplanes,
instead of being scattered, were bunched together wing to wing;
ammunition, except that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, was in
storehouses; antiaircraft artillery and two combat divisions were in
their permanent quarters and not in combat positions. As the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated:

"Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti-sabotage alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack, and the Japanese took full advantage of it (APHB, Report, pp.193-94). This was known to the War Department by General Short's reply to the message of November 27, but the Department took no action. The President's lack of power under the Constitution to meet the Japanese menace by an attack without a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. This they did not do."

which comes from http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/minority.html

Then there is also

"In the case of the Army, a summary report compiled by the Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent of the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., December 7. [41]

ANTIAIRCRAFT

All naval antiaircraft batteries, consisting of 780 guns, were ship-
based; that is, located on the ships in Pearl Harbor. At the time of the attack, roughly one-fourth of all antiaircraft guns were manned, and within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and firing. It appears that all naval batteries were in operating condition; the number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be negligible. All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on board, except in a few instances where removal was necessary because of repairs in progress, and ammunition was ready at the guns in accordance with existing directives. Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10 nutes after the beginning of the attack. [42]

In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and
times at which antiaircraft units were in position: [43]

In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire

Sixty-fourth
A (searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m.
B (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11:00 a.m.
E (searchlight) at Ewa- (Time not
Pearl Harbor known)
F (3-inch) at Pearl City 11:05 a.m.
G (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 10:00 a.m.
I (37-mm) at Aliamanu (Known only
K (37-mm) at Hickam Field that batteries
L (37-mm) at Hickam Field were in posi-
tion before
11:45 a.m.)
M (37-mm) at Wheeler Field 11:55 a.m.

Ninety-seventh
A (searchlight) at Fort
Kamehameha 8:34 a.m.
(alerted between 7:55 F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha 8:55 a.m.
and 8:10 a.m.). G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 8:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett 10:20 a.m.

Ninety-eighth.
A (searchlight) at Schofield (Time not
Barracks known.)
B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9:55 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump,
south of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
H (3-inch) at Waipahu High
School 1:30 p.m.

[41] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 114.
[42] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 123, 124.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 5.

68 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire

Two Hundred and Fifty-first
A (searchlight) at Ewa (Time not
known)
B (3-inch) at West Loch 11:45 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m.
D (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard
Pearl Harbor 12:41 p.m.
F (37-mm) at Navy Recreation
area 12:30 p.m.
G (37-mm) at tank farm,
Schofield Barracks 11:00 a.m.
H (37-mm) at Navy Yard 12:05 p.m.

One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting down two enemy planes at that time.

The foregoing table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries,
27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in
several instances not for a considerable period of time after the
attack.

The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units appears to have been occasioned largely by the time required for moving into position and the fact that ammunition was not readily accessible to the mobile batteries. [44]

AIRCRAFT

Seven Navy patrol flying boats were in the air at the time of the
attack. Three of these planes were engaged in a routine search of the fleet operating area approximately 120 miles south of Oahu and the remaining four were engaged in inter-type tactical exercises with United
States submarines near Lahaina Roads. Eight Scout bombers that had been launched from the carrier Enterprise, which was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, for the purpose of searching ahead of the ship and then landing at Ewa, arrived during the attack and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed after the attack while the remaining five were lost. [45] The majority of the Navy planes were on 4 hours' notice. [46]

In the case of the Army, planes were generally on 4 hours' notice.
Between 25 and 35 planes, these being fighters, took off after the
attack began and before it was concluded. [47]


ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING THE ATTACK


[44] Colonel Thielen stated "* * * only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft.
However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and Artillery units of the Twenty- fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount of machine gun and rifle ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells were in the ordnance storage depots principally at
Schofield Barracks." Committee record, pp. 119, 120.

The situation with respect to artillery ammunition was testified to by General Burgin as follows: "They were all ready to go into action
immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to
their field position. They were not in field positions." Roberts
Commission Record, pp. 2604-2605."

which can be seen at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html


Does any of that sound to you like the US Army's two Divisons were in their beach defense positions at 0755 on the morning of Dec.7'41, ready to fight off a hypothetical Japanese invasion attempt ?

Or does it seem that most, along with their heavy weapons and ammunition were tucked into thier Sunday morning billets ?


Also, Let's not forget:

"120 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Within 30 minutes of receiving this dispatch and after consulting only with his chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, [216] General Short replied to the War Department as follows: [217]

"Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. SHORT."

As a result of the November 27 dispatch General Short decided to
institute alert No. 1, the lowest of three alerts provided for the
Hawaiian Department. The three alerts were: [218]

No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. *No threat from without*.
No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1.
No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, pre-
pared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

At the same time that he ordered alert No. 1, the commanding general directed that the Interceptor Command, including the Aircraft Warning Service (Radar) and Information Center, should operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily. In addition, it should be noted that the six mobile radar stations operated daily except Sunday from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work. [210]
In explaining his reasons and the considerations responsible for his instituting an alert against sabotage only, General Short has stated: (1) That the message of November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii; [220] (2) that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities; [221] (3) that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act; [222] (4) that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; [223] and (5) that instituting alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian Department. [224] "


We also have record of General Short's interaction withHawaii's civilian governor as seen in:


122 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

following reply (directed to the Adjutant General) was made on November 29: [229]

"Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of
investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five) and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, etc.

Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June
twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this
headquarters to furnish him and to continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence (note that invasion is NOT mentioned) in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request
appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian
installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this
headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department, to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised.

Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are
and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters."


My previous assertion that Oahu's poulation was well used to the sounds of gunfire and explosions is well supported by:

The civil population was inured to Army and Navy maneuvers which were going on continuously. [234] To have taken any of the logical steps to defend Oahu-reconnaissance, 24 hour operation of radar, effecting a high state of aircraft and anti-aircraft readiness-would not have alarmed a population accustomed to simulated conditions of warfare. [235]


The limitations of Short's Level #1 alert are also noted by:

*General Maxwell Murray testified that the action required by
Alert No. 1-taking over water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols
all over, all important bridges guarded,-was just as much of an alarm to the people that something was anticipated "as if they had gone to the beaches"-all out alert*. See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 3096,
all fromhttp://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_3.html



I can only hope that in the interest of fairness, Slipdigit will consider attaching this posting to the end of that closed thread also.

 

So, what you're saying is that all of those guys from various companies of the 25th Infantry Division who said that they were on bivouac, stringing barbed wire and building beach defenses weeks before, and during the attack were in reality sleeping in their barracks? Thanks, but given how fast and loose that you've played with the facts in past threads, I'll take their first person accounts over your fantasy based suppositions.

 

I take it you didn't read this, did you?:

"25TH INFANTRY DIVISION UNITS IN THE FIELD BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACK

Corporal Steve Rula, company clerk in Company C, 27th Infantry didn't get too excited about an alert on November 27, 1941 that sent them to the field. But this alert was different. For the first time they were issued live ammo. Company C set up camp in tents near Ft. Shafter. The unit was assigned to guard the municipal water works, Hawaiian Electric power plant, railway station, and Honolulu docks against sabotage. On the morning of December 7, 1941 Corporal Rula, like many other Soldiers, was in the chow line when he noticed what he thought was the Navy taking anti-aircraft practice. Sergeant Earl T. Kirk a former artilleryman yelled, "Practice hell, practice shells make white smoke -- that's black!" Breakfast was over -- the war was on.

Living in tents in the hills, building concrete machine gun emplacements, and spreading barbed wire for months prior to the attack is what heavy mortar section leader Sergeant Clem S. Seroski of Company H, 35th Infantry remembers doing. All part of a defensive strategy for Oahu focused on repelling an amphibious assault. At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the attack Seroski was preparing to go on an armed motor patrol with machine guns mounted on vehicles and live ammo. When the bombs began dropping he was ordered to return fire. Random fire at Japanese planes produced no known hits. The patrol was cancelled to "await further orders". They were sent to defend Wheeler Field later that day.

Private First Class Walter C. Porter, a rifleman in Company C, 27th Infantry was in Honolulu on anti-sabotage duty armed with a shotgun. He had just returned to a rest area. At 0700 on December 7th he was preparing to go out again on an armed patrol. One hour later he was ordered to return fire on the Japanese planes. Company B, 27th Infantry was also set up on the Honolulu waterfront to conduct anti-sabotage duty. Private First Class Donald Burrows, the company bugler, was just coming off guard duty at the Mutual Telephone Company. Returning to the Command Post he heard a bugler to his west sound the "Call to Arms". Every bugler hearing it is ordered to repeat the call. He grabbed his bugle and was about to repeat when a new young officer in charge told him to put the bugle down until the phone rings with orders from higher up. "Consequently", says Burrows, "no outfit east of us heard the Call to Arms."

Company A, 27th Infantry was also on anti-sabotage duty in Honolulu. The Company Commander 1st Lieutenant Harold F. Brunschwein and 99 of the 128 men in his company were camped in a park near Fort DeRussy in Waikiki. They had sufficient arms and ammunition to deter possible sabotage, but not to resist an enemy amphibious assault. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry commander ordered Lieutenant Brunschwein to double the guard and send a vehicle to pick up additional ammunition. The First Sergeant was dispatched to Schofield to bring back the rest of the company and a truckload of ammunition.

All of the units that were on duty in defensive positions around Pearl Harbor and Honolulu during the attack were suddenly and perilously in harms way themselves from strafing and shrapnel from enemy bombs and errant navy anti-aircraft artillery shells. They could only watch as the U.S. Navy ships were damaged and sunk by Japanese bombers and torpedo planes. They witnessed Hickam Field, home of Army Air Corps heavy bombers, taking a similar pounding. Hangars and planes on the ground were being destroyed and people were dying. Feelings of helplessness, horror, and anger were expressed by many witnessing the carnage and destruction.

1st Lieutenant George F. Carter the 90th Field Artillery Battalion Motor and Ammunition Officer writes in his WWII memoirs (paraphrasing) of leading his ammunition train of about twelve 2-1/2-ton trucks all day and night from the ammunition magazines to his battalion's defensive positions. One driver, Private Judy, exemplified the spirit of the men by driving, without relief and uncomplaining, with a recently broken arm. On one run that night to Aliamanu Crater near Ft. Shafter in total blackout conditions, we were struck by the full impact of what had happened to the fleet. The battleship Arizona, burning from end to end with half collapsed main mast, along with other ships ablaze, lit up the evening sky and the harbor like it was daylight. Many other seriously damaged ships sat on the bottom of the shallow harbor with hulls and superstructures protruding above the waterline. Another mighty battleship, the Oklahoma, was capsized. Certainly hundreds had died, writes Lieutenant Carter.

Private First Class Philip K. H. Kam, a clerk-typist with the 65th Engineer Battalion Headquarters and Service Company was at home on pass. He was awakened at 0800 by the bombs exploding. PFC Kam drove through billowing smoke and flying shrapnel on Waipahu Rd. to report for duty. He was back at Schofield Barracks in 25 minutes.

On the eastern side of Oahu, Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion was in the field on a construction site near Kaneohe Naval Air Station. Most of the company was in Honolulu on pass. About 30 were in camp according to Corporal Camellus Cappelluzzo and Private Alwyn H. King both of whom had just finished breakfast when the Japanese planes swooped down on Kaneohe, home of the Navy's PBY long range patrol aircraft. Hangers were destroyed, planes exploded on the runways, and smoke billowed. King says one Japanese plane dove down and strafed the path between the rows of their tents, "but he was a bad shot." Company B was ordered back to Schofield to guard the motor pool. By morning on the next day, Dec. 8, they were in foxholes near Pearl Harbor."
Taken from the 25th Infantry Division Website.

 

Sure I read it. I've highlited the original text in red below and I've added my own comments [thusly] to indicate that what I read was not interpretted in the same way that you did, at all.

"25TH INFANTRY DIVISION UNITS IN THE FIELD BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACK

Corporal Steve Rula, company clerk in Company C, 27th Infantry didn't get too excited about an alert on November 27, 1941 that sent them to the field. But this alert was different. For the first time they were issued live ammo. Company C set up camp in tents near Ft. Shafter. The unit was assigned to guard the municipal water works, Hawaiian Electric power plant, railway station, and Honolulu docks against sabotage. [And so was obviously NOT on anti-invasion watch at any of Oahu's possible landing beaches] On the morning of December 7, 1941 Corporal Rula, like many other Soldiers, was in the chow line when he noticed what he thought was the Navy taking anti-aircraft practice. Sergeant Earl T. Kirk a former artilleryman yelled, "Practice hell, practice shells make white smoke -- that's black!" Breakfast was over -- the war was on.

Living in tents in the hills, [So, we know that he was NOT on anti-invasion watch on any of Oahu's possible invasion landing beaches, don't we.] building concrete machine gun emplacements, and spreading barbed wire for months [For months, plural. Sounds more to me like an endless series of training exercises and drills that were ordered by General Short. Oahu was afterall, a giant training base were raw US Army troops were sent for their military training.] prior to the attack is what heavy mortar section leader Sergeant Clem S. Seroski of Company H, 35th Infantry remembers doing. [The MEMORIES of a man who must be at least 88+ now (20 years old on Dec.7'41 plus 68 years later) not even taken from a journal or diary ?? Don't you think it more likely that his memories of 68 years before are somewhat suspect ?] All part of a defensive strategy for Oahu focused on repelling an amphibious assault. [Of course. That WAS the reason that two divisions of the US Army were stationed on Oahu.] At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the attack Seroski was preparing to go on an armed motor patrol with machine guns mounted on vehicles and live ammo. [I believe that I mentioned back in the original thread that there was a once every 4 hours truck patrol conducted around Oahu's coastal ring highway. This is an example of it.] When the bombs began dropping he was ordered to return fire. Random fire at Japanese planes produced no known hits. The patrol was cancelled to "await further orders". They were sent to defend Wheeler Field later that day.[Again, if an anti-invasion beach guard effort was the order of the day, why were they ordered inland, to Wheeler Field in the centre of Oahu ?]

Private First Class Walter C. Porter, a rifleman in Company C, 27th Infantry was in Honolulu on anti-sabotage duty armed with a shotgun. [So, we know that he was NOT guarding a possible invasion beach either.] He had just returned to a rest area. At 0700 on December 7th he was preparing to go out again on an armed patrol. One hour later he was ordered to return fire on the Japanese planes. Company B, 27th Infantry was also set up on the Honolulu waterfront to conduct anti-sabotage duty. [So, we know that he was NOT guarding a possible invasion beach either.] Private First Class Donald Burrows, the company bugler, was just coming off guard duty at the Mutual Telephone Company [which still to this day located in downtownHonolulu]. Returning to the Command Post he heard a bugler to his west sound the "Call to Arms". Every bugler hearing it is ordered to repeat the call. He grabbed his bugle and was about to repeat when a new young officer in charge told him to put the bugle down until the phone rings with orders from higher up. "Consequently", says Burrows, "no outfit east of us heard the Call to Arms." [So much for the US Army's anti-invasion signalling system. If just one bugler misses a call, the entire system breaks down.]

Company A, 27th Infantry was also on anti-sabotage duty in Honolulu. [So, we know that he was NOT guarding a possible invasion beach either.] The Company Commander 1st Lieutenant Harold F. Brunschwein and 99 of the 128 men in his company were camped in a park near Fort DeRussy in Waikiki. They had sufficient arms and ammunition to deter possible sabotage, but not to resist an enemy amphibious assault. [Could it be stated any more clearly or plainly ?] The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry commander ordered Lieutenant Brunschwein to double the guard and send a vehicle to pick up additional ammunition. The First Sergeant was dispatched to Schofield to bring back the rest of the company and a truckload of ammunition. [Likewise, does this really sound to you like a beach guard anti-invasion detail or just a few anti-sabotage security guards, as it does to me ?]

All of the units that were on duty in defensive positions around Pearl Harbor and Honolulu during the attack [And so were NOT on any anti-invasion beach guard detail over at Kaneohe Bay where my ATL Japanese would have been landing.] were suddenly and perilously in harms way themselves from strafing and shrapnel from enemy bombs and errant navy anti-aircraft artillery shells. They could only watch as the U.S. Navy ships were damaged and sunk by Japanese bombers and torpedo planes. They witnessed Hickam Field, home of Army Air Corps heavy bombers, taking a similar pounding. Hangars and planes on the ground were being destroyed and people were dying. Feelings of helplessness, horror, and anger were expressed by many witnessing the carnage and destruction.

1st Lieutenant George F. Carter the 90th Field Artillery Battalion Motor and Ammunition Officer writes in his WWII memoirs (paraphrasing) of leading his ammunition train of about twelve 2-1/2-ton trucks all day and night from the ammunition magazines to his battalion's defensive positions. [So, a WRITTEN record survives from 68 years ago that shows that there was no stockpiled ammunitioin at the possible landing beaches on the morning of Dec.7'41 since those trucks spent all day delivering it to there.] One driver, Private Judy, exemplified the spirit of the men by driving, without relief and uncomplaining, with a recently broken arm. On one run that night to Aliamanu Crater near Ft. Shafter in total blackout conditions, we were struck by the full impact of what had happened to the fleet. The battleship Arizona, burning from end to end with half collapsed main mast, along with other ships ablaze, lit up the evening sky and the harbor like it was daylight. Many other seriously damaged ships sat on the bottom of the shallow harbor with hulls and superstructures protruding above the waterline. Another mighty battleship, the Oklahoma, was capsized. Certainly hundreds had died, writes Lieutenant Carter.

Private First Class Philip K. H. Kam, a clerk-typist with the 65th Engineer Battalion Headquarters and Service Company was at home on pass. [So we know that he was NOT on anti-invasion guard duty at any of Oahu's possible invasion beaches either. If General Short was at all concerned about Japanese beach landings, would he have issued any weekend passes at all ?] He was awakened at 0800 by the bombs exploding. PFC Kam drove through billowing smoke and flying shrapnel on Waipahu Rd. to report for duty. He was back at Schofield Barracks in 25 minutes.

On the eastern side of Oahu, Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion was in the field on a construction site near Kaneohe Naval Air Station. Most of the company was in Honolulu on pass. About 30 were in camp according to Corporal Camellus Cappelluzzo and Private Alwyn H. King both of whom had just finished breakfast when the Japanese planes swooped down on Kaneohe, [As I stated in the previous thread, Kaneohe NAS was still an airbase under construction. If these construction troops were truely on anti-invasion beach guard duty, would the majority of the company really have been sent on leave in Honolulu ?? I'd think, NOT.] home of the Navy's PBY long range patrol aircraft. Hangers were destroyed, planes exploded on the runways, and smoke billowed. King says one Japanese plane dove down and strafed the path between the rows of their tents, "but he was a bad shot." Company B was ordered back to Schofield to guard the motor pool. By morning on the next day, Dec. 8, they were in foxholes near Pearl Harbor."[Yet again, clear evidense that there was NO inti-invasion watch on going but rather JUST a fear of sabotage. This is a CLEAR example of US troops being ordered AWAY from the coast in order to guard an important installation, well inland, in the centre of Oahu, rather than watching any of Oahu's beaches for invading Japanese troops.]

Taken from the 25th Infantry Division Website.

[I don't see anything here that at all suggests that Oahu was prepared to resist beach landings on the night of Dec.6-7'41.]

[The way that I read it, there were several companies of US Army troops deployed to important sites all over Oahu, on anti-sabotage duties. As we know that General Short ordered under his Alert Level #1.

I have provided the sworn (under oath) testimony of US Army and US Navy career officers, delivered during the course of some 6 official inquiries into the Pearl Harbor disaster, between 1942 and 1948, that the great bulk of the US Army's troops on Oahu were resident in their billets at Forts Shafter and Schofielf Barracks on the night of Dec.6-7'41..

If you choose instead to insist that US Army troops were on anti-beach invasion watch that night, based only on the memories of 88+ year old men, who by their own admission, were NOT posted to Oahu's beaches on Dec.7'41, then there is nothing that I can possibly do or say that will ever change your closed mind.]

 

Just when I thought you couldn't more irritating.

SO, by your rationale the troops must be on the beach to repell a beach assault?

You have never actually been to Hawaii or served in the Infantry have you? I don't mean that as an insult; I mean it in the sense that you have no grasp of what you are talking about or the need to hold key terrain or what advantage high ground affords.

So does that mean you interpet the orders for "Anti Sabotage Duties" as disregard everything that is not considered sabotage?

By "Several Companies" you are saying in excess of a Battalion? so 1200 armed men scattered accross the Island of Oahu at all of the important facilities?
And if there are 1200 men on post that means there are 1200 guys that are waiting to go on post and 1200 guys that just came off post....so that sounds pretty close to 3600 guys that are available for assignment. Thats a regiment chief; Defending High ground so that means the Japanese would need to plan on 10,800 troops making the landing if they had any hope of success.

I am sure that 10 Japanese Troop ships could just disembark all these troops and no one would give them so much as a "Fare the Well" let a lone a "Halt Who Goes There?"

I will say this again: Your thinking is flawed. I'll even type it slower: Y O U R T H I N K I N G I S F L A W E D

Do you have any idea what the 11 General Orders of a Sentry in WW2 are?

 

Let me start this posting with an apology for the "technicolor rainbow" that was my last posting here. I had just posted 9 other messages to 4 other boards and just plain forgot that I am supposed to use the

 

As previously promised, one of Short's two other NOT chosen defensive options:

As you can clearly see, this option #2 focuses some American attention on the offshore areas of Oahu that Alert Level #1 does NOT.

.

 

Lastly, I present General Short's also NOT chosen Alert Level #3:

General Short then goes on to explain his choise of Alert Level with:

This is followed later on by:

which indicates that General Short was much more focused on his training mission than he was on the likelyhood of having to defend Oahu against a surprise invasion.

I leave it up to you to evaluate the true readiness of Oahu's historical defenders to actually repel any beach landings that arrived at their island on the night of Dec.6-7'41.

.

 

How do your last three posts address these questions:

P.S. You didn't cite your source

 

Your comment once again proves that you don't actually read my postings.

If you were to return to line #5 of my posting #11 above you would find:

"From Vol.#30 of Pearl Harbor Attacked" indicated as my source.


Moving on, I'd like to present the following (with a few of my own notations added in red text and black underlining) historical "Japanese style" invasion details, courtesy of the US Army, a few months after the fact:

Japanese Warfare: A Summary
from Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 16, May 20, 1942

Section II: TASK FORCES FOR LANDING OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL

Japanese landing operations show that considerable thought and training have been devoted to the co-ordinated employment of the army, the navy, and the air arm in amphibious warfare. Task forces composed of units from such fighting arms have specially devised tactics and highly developed landing equipment. The latter includes both landing-craft carriers which disgorge fully loaded boats from their sterns and sides, and landing craft specially designed to negotiate shallow and weed-infested waters. Rubber assault boats and special equipment to aid the individual soldier, such as rubber belts which can be inflated, have also been used.

2. TASK FORCES

a. Organization
In recent operations the Japanese have used two types of joint task forces involving air, ground, and sea personnel and equipment—the divisional group and the brigade group. Their composition was as follows:

(1) Divisional group.—
(a) From 70 to 92 shore-based aircraft consisting of 30 to 40 heavy bombers; 24 to 36 fighters; 8 flying boats; and from 40 to 100 carrier-borne planes; (the Kido Butai's remaining air groups will just have to do)
(b) One division of troops (15,000);
(c) One battalion of parachute troops (1,600);
(I'm still trying to find a way to get these into my ATL invasion scenario and think that I have found a way to manage it but with far fewer numbers of troops - a company at best)
(d) From 32 to 46 vessels consisting of 2 aircraft carriers (each capable of carrying 40 to 60 planes); 6 cruisers (each of which carried 3 reconnaissance planes); 2 to 4 submarines; 10 to 14 destroyers; and 12 to 20 transports.

or (2) Brigade group.—
(a) From 48 to 58 shore-based aircraft consisting of 20 to 30 heavy bombers; 12 to 24 fighters; 8 flying boats; and 48 carrier-borne planes;
(b) 5,000 ground troops;
(c) From 19 to 25 vessels consisting of 1 aircraft carrier; 3 to 4 cruisers; 1 to 2 submarines; 6 to 8 destroyers; and 8 to 10 transports.

or (3) Other groups.—
(a) Landings in China.—Practically all Japanese landings in China were made with a force of two divisions (40,000 men or less). Equipment taken ashore included 3-ton tanks, 105-mm. field howitzers, and 75-mm. field guns. The Yuhung River landings by the Nakamura Detachment in 1939 which led to the capture of Nanking, China, involved only about 3,500 troops.1 The force consisted of the following units:
HQ 21st Infantry Brigade, 5th Division— (10 officers and men).
21st Infantry Regiment — (3 battalions, each of 4 rifle companies and 1 machine-gun company — 2,716 officers and enlisted men).
Brigade and Regimental Detachments:
- 1 Btty Infantry Guns — (4 guns, 175 officers and men)
- Signals — (60 officers and enlisted men).
- 1 Btty Field Artillery —(About 175 officers and enlisted men—4 guns, 4 sections, Hq. detail, combat train).
- 1 Btty Mountain Artillery—(About 175 officers and enlisted men—4 guns, 4 sections, Hq. detail, combat train).
- 1 Engineer Company —(About 170 officers and men— 4 platoons).
- 1 Mounted Platoon —(About 20 horses, officers and men— 2 squads)
- Medical Troops —(About 60 officers and enlisted men).


(b) Naval landing parties.—These are trained to perform missions similar to the United States Marines. They engage in combat in cooperation with army units or act independently, and they are also used frequently to garrison enemy territory taken over by the navy. (the JSNLF)
Usually a naval landing party is an improvised battalion which consists of 2,000 officers and enlisted men organized in 4 companies. Three of the companies have 6 rifle platoons and 1 machine-gun platoon in each, whereas the fourth company has 3 rifle platoons, 1 machine-gun platoon, and an artillery unit of 4 guns. Additionally, a party sometimes has tanks and armored cars attached when serving in a garrison capacity.
Naval landing parties are trained and equipped to undertake any type of land operation within the scope of their numerical strength. All naval personnel are trained concurrently in both land and naval warfare. The training begins when the individual enters the service and continues ashore and afloat, as opportunity offers. The individual's progress in both phases of combat is noted on his service record by his superiors, together with any special qualifications he may possess. The landing parties are selected from those having the best records. The navy, therefore, possesses at all times a large number of personnel qualified for landing and land operations.

b. Ship Loads

The allowance for transport by water is about 4 to 5 tons per man. (17,000 tons divided by 5 tons per man = 3,400 men transported per big Japanese cargo-liner) Normally two or three transports carry two-thirds of the troops, and the remaining smaller vessels carry the supplies and the remainder of the troops.

3. LANDING OPERATIONS

a. Preparations

(1) Preliminary.—For a number of years Japanese officers and secret agents, disguised in many cases as fishermen, gathered pertinent military information in the areas which the Japanese attacked. The army even had meteorological experts assigned throughout the islands of the southwest Pacific and in Malaya, Burma, China, Thailand, and Indo-China until as late as September 1941. Many of these men, including professors in the science of meteorology, were employed as laborers on rubber plantations and in rice fields and tin mines. They made particular studies on the beginning and the ending of the monsoon.2 Their findings were based on rainfall, atmospheric pressure, temperature, and sun-spot observations. The army claims that the studies enable it to forecast when the monsoon will begin, how long it will last, and whether it will be normal, wet, or dry.
The timing and routing of Japanese military thrusts in recent months indicate careful study and full consideration of weather factors. The staff of each field army includes commissioned meteorologists and enlisted assistants.
In all their recent landing operations the Japanese have made air reconnaissance weeks ahead of the landings. Besides aircraft, secret agents and submarines have aided in making early reconnaissances. In each instance to date, the Japanese have selected landing sites within 400 miles of at least one Japanese air base. (none within range for Oahu so the KB's carriers will have to do that work)
(2) Final.—Submarines usually make additional reconnaissance ahead of the task forces. Long-range planes—which may be flying boats—follow up with more reconnaissances and also light daylight attacks. Type 96 heavy bombers, usually unescorted by fighters, then make light attacks to damage runways, destroy airdrome installations, get data on the opposition and secure weather information.
However, if the first group of reconnaissance planes detects concentrations of defending aircraft on airdromes in the vicinity of the objective, a surprise raid in force is made to destroy the planes on the ground. Planes used in the raid include high-level-type bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. The dive bombers and fighters concentrate on planes dispersed within revetments near the field, since the revetments lend a considerable measure of protection from high-level bombers unless direct hits are scored. The Japanese keep a close watch for replacements on the airdromes and maintain sustained attacks until defending planes have been destroyed or forced to leave.3 (see footnote #3)
A final heavy bombing attack is made before darkness on the night the landings are attempted. Usually 50 to 150 aircraft make the attack to destroy communications, coast defense batteries, and antiaircraft installations. The air attack sometimes is assisted by warships which shell the defense areas from positions offshore. The ships can achieve howitzer fire by high elevation of guns and use of a reduced charge.
The approaching convoy is protected doubly on the day before landings are attempted. Direct air reconnaissance is given from all bases and carriers within range, and harassing attacks are made on opposition air bases from which attacks could be made on the convoy. If a suitable anchorage is available, troop ships, landing-boat carriers, and supply vessels stop for the night preceding the landing attack. If no anchorage is available, the vessels arrive off the designated landing place between midnight and dawn.
The Japanese do not consider rough weather or unfavorable beaches as obstacles; in fact, such conditions sometimes are chosen deliberately and considerable loss of life by drowning is accepted in order to achieve surprise. The time for the landing operations usually is 2 or 3 hours before high tide, on moonless nights if possible. This rule is broken only for strategical or navigational reasons.
If feasible, a few landing craft with engineers try to gain the shore secretly, before operations begin, to set up small lights—not visible from inshore—to guide the landing craft. In some instances, Fifth Columnists install the lights for the engineers. As a rule, at least part of the landing boats reach the beach before daylight. From 5 to 16 miles of shoreline are utilized for the landings.

b. The Landing Battle

Warships—which include cruisers and destroyers and sometimes aircraft carriers—form a protective screen around the troop transports during landing operations. Their guns are set to fire either at opposing aircraft or onshore batteries. Meanwhile transports carrying the advance assault troops go as near the shore as feasible before the troops disembark in small motor-propelled landing boats.4
A heavy machine gun and a light machine gun5 are set up near the bow of each boat for the landing attack, and each man, not otherwise engaged, has a rifle or a light automatic weapon to fire. Patrol boats armed with pompoms and machine guns give close support to the landings. Air support is available if needed. If used, it is under radio control of the landing units. The bulk of the air task force is held in reserve to counterattack opposition bases within effective range.
When very near the shore the Japanese, all equipped with life jackets, plunge into the water regardless of its depth, since the waves will carry them to the shallow water. If at all possible, the Japanese try to land with the initial force some light artillery, usually mountain-type (75's), and light tanks. Transports with the main body of troops remain some distance from the shore until the beach has been secured. Then the remainder of the troops are disembarked. The landings are directed either against fixed objectives or into localities which will permit flanking movements. Earliest landing parties use radio to direct air support.

c. Action after Landing

Once having established a beachhead, the Japanese push inland rapidly, carrying out thorough air and ground reconnaissance ahead of their advance units. Automobiles, bicycles, gasoline, and other supplies are confiscated quickly, and small groups, making the fullest possible use of darkness, penetrate the lines of the opposition to harass defended positions from the rear, cut communications, and attempt to force withdrawals.
If unopposed at the beaches, the Japanese hold to the roads, as a rule, until making contact with the opposition. They also use rivers and creeks to penetrate inland by boat and to turn flanks. They have special craft for such operations, including pontons propelled by outboard motors and boats driven by airplane-type motors with propellers rigged above the surface of the water. Smoke screens are used freely to facilitate inland movements. To avoid being fired on by their own planes, Japanese patrols and smaller units out in front are required to identify themselves during daylight with Rising Sun flags displayed toward the sky.
Meanwhile, immediately upon landing, parachute troops or special units of ground forces try to seize airdromes from which fighter planes may operate (protection of ground troops the first day usually is provided by seaplanes or carrier-based aircraft). Fighter squadrons are formed quickly, and from one or more seized airdromes, or from carriers, type 0 navy fighters come to the support of troops as quickly as possible.
Native labor is put to work repairing and resurfacing airdromes and extending them for use by heavy bombers within 2 to 7 days. Within 14 days, prefabricated shelters are put up, interceptor units are installed, and an aircraft warning service is spread over a 60- to 100-mile area. There also is evidence of searchlight installations being correlated with effective sound detectors. Supplies are accumulated and at intermediate points service and maintenance units for aircraft are set up—all within a period of 2 to 3 weeks.
The Japanese are great believers in thorough reconnaissance—a fact definitely established by translation of the captured orders dealing with the landing operations which led to the capture of Nanking. They seek information about the opposition by use of air reconnaissance and scouts; by questioning prisoners (especially high-ranking officers); by scrutinizing local newspapers, annuals, and other literature in occupied towns, and captured documents; and by careful estimation. The information obtained is sent immediately, by radio if practicable, to unit headquarters.

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1 This particular information was taken from captured Japanese orders. For detailed tactics employed in this landing operation, see Section I, Information Bulletin No. 12, M.I.S.
2 A periodic wind in certain latitudes of southern Asia and the Indian Ocean. It blows from the southwest from the latter part of April to the middle of October and from the northeast from about the middle of October to April. Generally, the southwest monsoon In India and the adjacent countries brings unusually heavy rainfall.
3 In some cases, particularly in China, in order to achieve surprise, the Japanese made no preliminary reconnaissances or bombardments.
4 See paragraphs 41a and b, pages 73-75, for detailed descriptions of Japanese landing boats.
5 In one attempt to land on the east coast of Bataan, the Japanese mounted 75-mm. guns and smaller weapons on barges. Effective artillery fire from United States and Filipino troops sank several of the barges and forced others to withdraw. Japanese losses were heavy.


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This is most likely how a Japanese landing force would have come ashore on Oahu before dawn on Dec.7'41.

How would the meagre US Alert Level #1 defending force, deployed mostly in Honolulu as only lightly armed anti-sabotage sentries, that is described by http://www.25thida.org/pearlharbor.html , even hope to slow it down, in the darkness ?

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I didn't realize you were citing the same source...........apologies.

You still havent answered how you are going to get 10,000 troops ashore, when there is a regiment on guard duty, without raising any suspicion.

All your last post represents is an intelligence assesment of Japanese amphibious doctrine and does not pertain to a land assualt of Pearl Harbor.

You're wasting bandwidth.....again

 

Are we really back to talking about landing troops on Hawaii.....:headbash:

 

Jagdtiger1, I'm sorry if I have caused your self-inflicted pain.

I was under the impression after reading John Dudek's posting #1 here that he had uncovered a new source with evidence on that topic that he wished to further discuss ?

formerjughead seems to have taken up that cause too ...

I will attempt to restrain my future comments to just historical US troop deployments on Oahu if that is what the readers here feel that this thread is really JUST about ?

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I have to admit, I did chuckle reading that...

No, certainly carry on with your argument as long as the mods allow, just make sure you are clear in your postings and open to other rouges opinions

 

Looking at the thread title, the place it was created and the link, I do not see any 'What if' continuation. Only the topic of deployments on the island, not deployment plans of the Imperial Japanese Navy/Army.

Only after you hijacked this thread.....again.

Yes, please do that, everybody.