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US Army deployments during the Pearl Harbor attack

Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by John Dudek, Jul 30, 2009.

  1. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    Sorry myself for not being more clear but I didn't think that I had to repeat it three times ?

    Whoa ! How/when/where did you exaggerate up from John Dudek's source, which was talking about a few partial companies on anti-sabotge sentry duty, mostly in Honolulu, to an entire US regiment ?

    More specifically, for the night of Dec.6-7'41, his 25th Infantry Division Association: Pearl Harbor only actually lists:
    - just 30 men of Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion at Kaneohe NAS
    - 98 of the 128 men of Company A, 27th Infantry at Fort DeRussy in downtown Honolulu
    - some part of Company B, 27th Infantry was also on anti-sabotage sentry duty in downtown Honolulu.
    - some part of Company C, 27th Infantry was on anti-sabotage duty on the Honolulu waterfront and over to Fort Shafter.
    - some part of Company H, 35th Infantry seems to have been posted somewhere in the hills of Oahu, preparing for a coastal highway truck patrol, which was cancelled.

    Hardly a US regiment in total.

    At best this totals to 30 + 98 + 128 + 128 + 128 = 512 lightly armed men, in NOT even battalion strength, to cover the 608 square miles of a night time, peacetime Oahu. Less than 1 man per square mile, IN THE DARK ?

    And ONLY 30 of those were (at breakfast) in the Kaneohe Bay area. Not even on anti-sabotage sentry duty.

    Surely, AT SOME POINT IN TIME, some American defender is going to wake up and realize that the Japanese have invaded Oahu and WILL indeed try to sound an alarm. Will he have access to a working radio that he knows how to operate or just to telephone lines already cut in the darkness by the IJA invaders ? The questions remains, in light of the historically SLOW responses of Oahu's US defenders, how many Japanese infantry will already be ashore and just how far inland, when that alarm is finally sounded ? Will it actually be believed or will more hours be wasted in confirming such unbeleievable news ?

    When have we ever been talking at all about a land assault on Pearl Harbor ?.

    Since these Commands were under the control of the US Army on Oahu, I forward for your consideration, the following:

    For the Coastal Artillery Command
    which is confirmed by

    Thus twice confirming that Oahu's defensive coastal artillery (and US Army mobile artillery too for that matter) was totally blind to any target over the horizon or on the other side of Oahu's mountains, on the morning of Dec.7'41.


    Last but not Least, for the USAAF
    all from Vol. #7 of Pearl Harbor Attacked



    It seems to me that those who should have been watching for an offshore enemy on peacetime Oahu weekends, sure weren't.
     
  2. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    .....

    Well those 512 men represent who was on post. They relieved 512 other men when they assumed the post and there were 512 other men waiting to assume the post they were standing. So that makes 1,536 men either just off duty or preparing for duty.

    There was also a Battalion at Schofield Barracks tasked with the ability to be moved anywhere on the Island, by truck, within one hour. So let's conservatively say that that "Quick Reaction Battalion" was made up of 800 men. Well that battalion assumed that responsibility from another battalion and another battalion was going to relieve them at the end of their tour.

    So that adds another 2,400 into the mix

    Also, Each Company in each and every Battalion in Each and every Regiment had men standing duty. These men made up a duty platoon for the battalion and consisted of:

    1 Officer of the day = SFC-Lt.
    1 Staff Duty Officer= Ssgt-Sgt
    5 Duty NCO's= Cpls
    15 Fire watches = Pvt's-Pfc's

    In addition to standing their respective posts they would be the ones responsible for making any preparations for deployment.


    I assumed we were using Pearl Harbor and Oahu synonomously.

    Please use whatever resources you have to provide what beaches would be used for this. The Koolau Mountains provide a natural defenseive position as well as natural obstacles. Please refer to either "Google Earth" or a Topographic map of the area befor you make these assumptions.


    That may be the case. Atleast I have a working knowledge of amphibious operations and I have been to Hawaii
     
  3. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    I'm sorry but I don't follow your logic here. There were in fact some 22,000 men sleeping at the Schofield Barracks that night but the only ones who might spot a hypothetical beach landing were those actually ON DUTY and OUT IN THE FIELD within visual range of the potential landing beaches on that NIGHT. None of the rest, whenther just off duty or waiting to go on duty count for anything, at all.

    So ?

    An American quick reaction battalion on "one hour notice" readiness back at Schofield Barracks (as per my 3 Alert Levels postings) still had to be ALERTED by SOMEONE out IN THE FIELD, within night time sight distance of a landing beach, that invaders were coming ashore. In the case of John Dudek's oft abused source, i see NONE at all so mentioned.

    For the reasons already mentioned, I don't agree.

    Please explain to me how, while standing fire watch duty in a barracks complex full of sleeping US soldiers, any of these men could be down at Oahu's beaches looking for enemy landing craft, coming in out of the darkness ? Would not such be a deriliction of duty that risked thosands of US soldier's lives ?

    So then, you agree that they wouldn't be out prowling Oahu's peacetime beachfronts, ready to sound the alarm at a mere moment's notice. Under General Short's historical Alert Level #1, they had other things to do overnight, elsewhere than at the beaches.

    For clarity in discussion, I do not think that we should do that.

    Considering the moderator's just posted edict, I think that doing so would be unwise in the extreme. He has ordered that this thread be limited to the discussion of US Army deployments on the morning of Dec.7'41 and I intend to do my best to folllow that instruction.

    Again, in light of the moderator's recent edict, I think such experience matters not a bit to the topic of this thread, UNLESS you were actually there on Dec.7'41 ?

    Should you wish to open a new "what IF" amphibious landings on Oahu thread of your own (and agree to leave out the verbal abuse), then I would be most happy to discuss that matter further, over there.

    I wouldn't want Jagdtiger1 to bruise his forehead further by having to read such heresy here.
     
  4. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    Using your number 512 were in position to spot a beach landing.
    The others, except for firewatches and duty nco's, were available to organize a defense in depth or react to an assault.



    They wouldn't be. They would assume the duties of recalling troops and making preparations for deployments (ie alert notifications, ammo & weapons draw etc)

    Thats what I was doing. Explaining that by the "Staffing Rule of Three" what the 512 men in addition to the Reapid Deployment Battalion represented

    Granted; but, Sentry Duty in the military has not changed in 100 years so my input is germain to the discussion.

    As far as the topography of the Island of Oahu, even though it changes slightly each year, it hasn't changed that much either.

    As far as experience with amphibious operations I have landed on beaches in "Mike" boats and AAV's and I know first hand what it takes to assault a beach at night. So again my input is germain to the discussion of " US Army deployments during the Pearl Harbor attack"

    I have also spent many a day and night walking the beaches and hills of Oahu and there are topographic features one can only truly appreciate first hand.

    No, the thesis of a ground invasion of the Isalnd of Oahu, by the Imperial Japanese Navy, has already been proven silly and to discuss it further would be a fruitless waste of bandwidth.

    Please let me know via PM the "verbal abuse" to which you refer. It has always been my erstwhile endeavor to refrain from such actions.
     
  5. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    I don't feel that to be either fair or accurate.

    I previously listed, in my posting #21 :

    which clearly indicates that only the 98 men of company A, 27th Infantry's 128 soldiers, who were camped in a park behind Fort DeRussy in the City of Honolulu, and some part of Company C, 27th Infantry were deployed on anti-sabotage watches anywhere near salt water. Lets use the same proportion as Company A, shall we, to arrive at 2 x 98 = 196 pairs of eyes. ONLY on the Honolulu waterfront, that MIGHT have seen any invasion troops, ONLY if such were landing on Honolulu's waterfront, that night.

    Since you have lived on Oahu I don't really need to remind you that Oahu's shorelines measure out (as per Oahu - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia which I hate to use as a source) to about 227 MILES. Granted, by NO means are all 227 miles to be considered as possible landing beaches, IN THE DARK of night but then, John Dudek's source doesn't indicate that there were ANY other beachfront anti-sabotage sentries watching anywhere other than in Honolulu itself, "in the field" on that night, does it ?

    My posting #11 does indicate however that there was an entire list of INLAND, non-beach installations that required anti-sabotage sentries in the event that an Alert Level #1 was ordered by General Short. As was historically in effect on the night of Dec.6-7'41.

    Please explain to me exactly which American Army troops you feel were watching the remaining 225 miles of Oahu's coastlines against invasion on that night ? While they were obeying the commanding General Short's anti-sabotage watch ORDERS, of course.

    How so ?

    No one up to this point has claimed that it has although I would point out now that harbor dredging since WW2 has INDEED drastically altered Oahu's coastlines/beaches in several areas, most notably the shorelines of Honolulu Harbor, the creation of the off-shore runways of Honolulu International Airport and the creation of the industrial port at Barber's Point.

    What do "Mike" boats and AAVs have to do with 1941 style night beach landings or the WW2 American defence deployments needed to fight them off ?

    Finally, something that we can actually agree on.

    I lived there for about 6 months in the 1970s, for almost 13 months in the 1980s and on two different occassions, for a total of just over 19 months in the 1990s. Three of my four trips were by sea, in small sailing vessels so i also have a full appreciation of the ocean's moods in the Hawaiian Islands in general and around Oahu in particular. My now expired PADI certification allowed the underwater exploration of Oahu's sea frontier via scuba, when I wasn't being pounded into the sand by Oahu's various rollers. I never really did "get the hang" of that surfing thing.

    Such is always your choise of course but I had thought that thread closed because I was away on a fishing trip for the weekend and wasn't replying fast enough, rather than anything being proven one way or the other ?

    Was I somehow supposed to take the message from your posting #14
    "I will say this again: Your thinking is flawed. I'll even type it slower: Y O U R T H I N K I N G I S F L A W E D "
    as polite encouragement towards further research and discussion here ?



    Last but not least, and to further the discussion of American troop deployments on Dec.7'41, I attach the following quotation from Vol. #7 of Pearl Harbor Attacked:

    All of which indicates to me that the Japanese knew more about the subject of US defensive deployments back THEN than "we" seem to know about it NOW, in 2009, some 68 years later.

    Ironic, isn't it ?

    .
     
  6. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    The 512 Men on anti sabotage watch was your number.
    My experience with "Mike" boats means that I know what it's like to go over the side of a ship and the logistical problems associated with climbing down a cargo net at night.

    None of the beaches on Oahu can accomodate an amphibious landing of any size except for Waikiki, the most watched beach on Oahu.

    Most of the facilities on Oahu are well within eyesight of a beach or the water.

    A sentry's General orders are :

    1. To take charge of this post and all government property in view
    [​IMG]
    2. To walk my post in a military manner, keeping always on the alert and observing everything that takes place within sight or hearing.
    [​IMG]
    3. To report all violations of orders I am instructed to enforce.
    [​IMG]
    4. To repeat all calls from posts more distant from the guardhouse than my own.
    [​IMG]
    5. To quit my post only when properly relieved.
    [​IMG]
    6. To receive, obey and pass on to the sentinel who relieves me all orders from the commanding officer, officer of the day, and officers and noncommissioned officers of the guard only.
    [​IMG]
    7. To talk to no one except in the line of duty.
    [​IMG]
    8. To give the alarm in case of fire or disorder.
    [​IMG]
    9. To call the corporal of the guard in any case not covered by instructions.
    [​IMG]
    10. To salute all officers and all colors and standards not cased.
    [​IMG]
    11. To be especially watchful at night and, during the time for challenging, to challenge all persons on or near my post, and allow no one to pass without proper authority.
    [​IMG]

    ( http://33rdscb.tripod.com/id100.htm )

    Those are the same ones I learned in 1986 and they are the same ones that I taught in 2001.

    If you have spent so much time in Hawaii you would realise that on 90% of the beaches there is not room to manuver troops. Add to that all beaches in Hawaii are bordered inland by 800' foot mountains that were occupied by the Army. The human eye can see 12 miles for every 10' of elevation so, to say that the US possessed a commanding view of the beaches and their approaches is an understatment. I know how far you can see from Barbers Point, Ewa Field, Mags #1, #5 , #7, Bellows Beach and the Pali Look out. I have spent many hours on sentry duty there during the day and the night.

    Even 196 pairs of eyes could have been enough. We will never know.

    Hopefully that answers your questions. If not let me know.
     
  7. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    Not really as you well know.

    It was my summary of the 25th Division source that both John Dudek and you claim somehow proves that there were American troops deployed and out watching Oahu's beaches for invaders on Dec.6-7'41. Which, with the exception of the Honolulu waterfront, we have since seen is just not true.

    Which is relavent to 1941 US troop deployments on Oahu, how exactly ?

    I'd like to see a source from you that supports THAT bogus claim.

    The list of Alert Level #1 facilities that General Short ordered guarded against sabotage certainly are NOT, especially at NIGHT.

    And from Jihn Dudek's source at http://www.25thida.org/pearlharbor.html
    we get the quote, "Private First Class Donald Burrows, the company bugler, was just coming off guard duty at the Mutual Telephone Company. Returning to the Command Post he heard a bugler to his west sound the "Call to Arms". Every bugler hearing it is ordered to repeat the call. He grabbed his bugle and was about to repeat when a new young officer in charge told him to put the bugle down until the phone rings with orders from higher up. "Consequently", says Burrows, "no outfit east of us heard the Call to Arms"."
    .. which certainly proves that it takes an officer to really screw-up an otherwise good plan.

    Had that "Call To Arms" been signalling a real Japanese invasion on Honolulu's Waikikik Beach then, "no outfit to the east of us" would have been alerted to it. Thus it is shown that NOT EVEN Honolulu was adequitely protected from invasion on that last peacetime evening of 1941.196 pairs of eyes totally defeated by just one new and junior American officer. And this from John's own source which he claims proves that the American defenders of Oahu were indeed "on the ball" that night. Sad.

    I can't help but wonder how many of the other 9 points of your sentry's 10 general orders might also have been screwed up on that Dec.6-7'41 night ?. Especially by some silenced pistols or by the sight of 30 or so rifle equipped infantrymen advancing out of the darkness towards a lone sentry. Were those peacetime US sentries all well enough trained to knowingly commit suicide in such a case by attempting to sound an alarm with 30 rifles pointed at their head ?

    I'd think not. But then, that is just my opinion.

    Thanks for that one. At least the pin up section was interesting.

    Which has what to do with US troop deployments in early December 1941 ?

    Since you provide no source at all in support of this bogus claim I would ask our readers to view the modern day (2005 IIRC) air photos of Oahu's beaches that can be seen at Hawaii Coastal Geology Group .

    I would ask them to look at the numerous photos of the beaches on Oahus's eastern coastline, particularly from Kaneohe Bay and southward so that they can form their own opinions on the landing qualities of those sand strips, as well as just how cramped they would really be for a light infantry invasion force, travellling quickly inland on a "shoestring" supply basis for the first few days. As the Japanese did historically.

    Please remember that Oahu's population has increased from 260,000 to 900,000+ since 1941 so that most of the homes up behind the beachfronts that are seen today, would NOT have been there in 1941.

    Our just preceeding analysis of John's source AND the sworn testimony of General Short which I have also provided, clearly indicates that the US Army was NOT manning the hilltops behind any of Oahu's beachfronts on the night of Dec.6-7'41.

    At NIGHT ? I don't think so. And should anyone question the state of the moon on that night, it was a waning moon with cloud cover. So, no human being was seeing any 12 miles thru the darkness, on that night.

    Once again, from John's source we get, "...Sergeant Clem S. Seroski of Company H, 35th Infantry remembers doing. ... At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the attack Seroski was preparing to go on an armed motor patrol with machine guns mounted on vehicles and live ammo." which clearly tells us that the only gent that we think was somewhere "up in the hills of Oahu" on that night was busy readying a truck rather than watching any of Oahu's beaches for invaders.

    Doesn't seem like it, based on my experiences there.

    Sure we do. 196 pairs of eyes in brightly lit peacetime Honolulu that night could NOT possibly have been watching the majority of the landing beaches on the other three sides of mountainous Oahu.

    Why would I ask you ? If I had a question about Oahu in 1986-2001, some 60 years after, then maybe but it doesn't seem to me that you have much valid information about 1941 Oahu to present.

    I note that you have made no response at all to any of General Short's sworn testimony nor to the other American troop deployment sources that I have posted here on this thread.

    .
     
  8. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    Well it's obvious we are never going to eye to eye on this subject. So I will leave you with this:

    You're wrong and your thinking is flawed. While the defenders of Oahu were not as prepared as they could have been they were prepared enough.

    I am sure if the Japanese were afforded the same 68 years of hindsight, inquest, and congressional hearings they would have taken a shot at an invasion; they would have failed, but they would have rolled the dice just the same.

    I guess I just have a higher opinion of the American Military thatn you do.

    Good Day.
     
  9. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    If that were indeed true then why are both his pre-decesser AND General Short, the commander of US Army forces on Oahu BEFORE the Pearl Harbor attacks, on record as requesting tens of thousands of additional troops and US$MILLLIONS for the improvement of Oahu's defences, particularly around the Kaneohe Bay area ?

    Such is your opinion but I note that you are now unwilling to "stick around" to attempt to suppport your PoV with evidence from published sources. That says all that needs to be said.

    I have already provided a source which clearly indicates that the Japanese knew much about Oahu's defences BEFORE their historical air atacks on Oahu. Gordon Prange's book "At Dawn We Slept" delves into great detail on the subject of Yoshikawa providing Oahu detail to Tokyo PRIOR to the historical attacks. Another quote will be provided below.

    I think that your claim of "hindsight" is merely a smokescreen to hide your own inability to provide any sources (save for John Dudek's now discredited 25th Division one) that support your PoV on the subject of the deployments of Oahu's US Army defenders on Dec.7'41.

    That at least, indicates some small progress. You finally admit the possibility ...

    Considering that you were so obviously a member, that is not surprising.

    I salute your years of service, sir. If not your unwillingness to further explore the truth of the US Army's deployments on Oahu for the Dec.7'41 attacks by Japan. A hearty "Happy Trails" to you ...


    To forward the moderator's declared purpose of this thread, I provide, from Vol. #1 of Pearl Harbor Attacked:

    "Prior to the attack on December 7, alert No. 1 of the local defense
    plan set up by the Hawaiian Department was in effect.
    This alert, one of three provided in the plan, was therein defined as a "defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without." Military installations and equipment, planes, hangars, ammunition, communication centers, highway bridges, and the like were protected by standing guards and patrols.

    The two divisions, as I have already indicated, had all their principal elements located in Schofield Barracks. There were, however, a
    number of patrols and standing guards primarily on the road around
    Kakanoe Island from Honolulu, around to the east, up past Kaena
    Point, and back down the central valley. These patrols were located
    at intersections, highway bridges, and other critical points."

    This is expanded upon with:

    "When the first bombs were dropped and machine-gun fire com-
    menced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few
    minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 2 or 4 minutes
    elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that
    an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that
    all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.

    This alert required all units to occupy battle positions shown on this
    map — which I will explain in a moment — in the shortest possible time and to defend Oahu. All troops accordingly moved to their prescribed positions. The advance command post of the Hawaiian Department was operating in Aliamanu Crater by 8 : 45 a. m. with limited personnel, and the advance command posts of the Twenty-fifth Division and of the Hawaiian Air Force by 11 a. m.

    Rear echelons remained at their normal locations — which, for the
    department, was Fort Shafter; for the divisions, Schofield Barracks.

    At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding
    the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at
    about 8 : 05 a. m. Within a few minutes his chief of staff had issued
    instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing guard and to send patrols throughout the division sector — which was the northern half of the island — to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8 : 50 a. m. the division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would go into effect at once. Approximately 90 percent of the Twenty-fourth Division troops were present for duty on the morning of December 7, according to a report made shortly after by the Hawaiian Department. The division was in position in the north sector by 5 p.m. with ammunition except for the 240's, 240 millimeter howitzers.


    PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 53


    The disposition of the division, Twenty-fourth Division, as shown
    on the map, can be picked up by the crossed rifles for Infantry posi-
    tions, by the cannon for Field Artillery battalions, and the main line
    of resistance on the east coast can be seen following the ridge line of the Koolau Range on the east and the Waianae Kange on the west.

    Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray, commanding the Twenty-fifth Infantry
    Division, stated that the attack began about 7 : 53 a. m. Some machineguns were in firing positions on the roofs within 10 minutes. Alert No. 3 was placed in etf ect at about 9 o'clock. Some ammunition — other than high explosive — had been moved into the barracks which meant that most of the men had as much as 30 rounds. About 85 percent of the Twenty -fifth Division troops were reported present for duty at the time of the attack. By 4 p. m., on the 7th, all units of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division were in war positions in the south sector with ammunition, except for the 240-millimeter howitzers."

    I aslo include:

    "Colonel Thielex: As to the miscellaneous subjects of
    hostile agents, sabotage, and civilian protection I have a few remarks.

    Prior to the attack, all known Japanese, Italian, and German agents
    had been listed by Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
    Naval Intelligence. Within a few hours after the attack the Japanese
    agents were being apprehended and assembled in the Immigration
    Station, Honolulu. All agents were subsequently assembled in the
    Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians.

    There are no proven instances of sabotage before, during, or after
    the attack, although the jamming of radio frequencies which occurred immediately after the attack and which made communication difficult may have been due, in part, to sabotage.

    By noon the roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every direction. Under the direction of Mr. Addison Kirk and his civilian


    58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACKED


    relief committee, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., which operates a
    large number of buses, immediately moved into Hickam Field and
    Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating civilians from these areas.

    All during Sunday afternoon and the following day the evacuation of
    civilians continued, most of them being quartered in schools and homes throughout the city. At Fort Shafter, where the headquarters of the Interceptor Command was being constructed in a spur of the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter and a few from Schofield Barracks were accommodated. Slit trenches were being dug at all the posts and in parks, school grounds, and all open places accessible to civil communities."

    While not a direct account of US Army deployments, that last passage does explain what was going on wrt Oahu's roadways WHILE the US Army was attempting to get to it's own anti-invasion beach areas, as detailed by the previous quotes.

    .
     
  10. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    Doesn't matter.........Pearl Harbor was prepared enough for the Japanese to think they couldn't assault the Island by land.

    Staffing and posting was deemed adequate for the perceived threat.

    The Generals and leadership at the time felt they were acting appropriately.

    Your opinion on the matter is irrelevant. All you are doing is exploiting minutia to try and make a point.

    For the last time: Your thinking is flawed.
     
  11. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    Not at all.They just didn't have the time to properly plan an Oahu invasion since Yamamoto's strike was authorized so late.

    So ?

    The whole world saw just how well that worked out on Dec.7'41, didn't they.

    I've long felt that both Kimmel and Short were badly let down by their superiors in Washington. It is difficult to plan a good defense when one is denied the funds, the manpower. the aircraft and the intell that WAS available. But some "fall guys" were needed ...

    I don't consider the deaths of 2,400 and the wounding of another 1,000 US servicemen to be matters of minutia, do you ?

    Aren't we supposed to be posting sources that support our opinions, rather than relying only on near religious faith alone, as you seem to be doing ?

    So you keep chanting yet I see no sources from you that would support that opinion.


    Wrt the purpose of this thread I provide the following quote by General Short from Vol. #15 of Pearl Harbor Attacked:

    " ANTI-AIRCRAFT - ARTILLERY


    In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft giuis. 20 out of 135 37-inm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns...


    The shortage of personnel is much more serious than that of equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1 battalion, gun. Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO 4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 19th."

    So, no matter how the US Army's Oahu deployments were decided, Oahu's defenders could have manned AA guns OR manned shore defense guns, they COULD NOT have both at the same time.

    Which would you have chosen in the event of an invasion ?

    .


     
  12. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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  13. John Dudek

    John Dudek Member

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  14. John Dudek

    John Dudek Member

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    I don't agree that the 25th Divisional website has been discredited. Louis Morton's book aptly states that the November 27th War warning was not the first time that an alert had been invoked. They had been issued several times since 1940 and the alerts were oftentimes anti-invasion alerts necessatating that all available army personel and their equipment be placed along the possible invasion beach positions. Once in their beach defense positions, any commanding officer worth his salt would immediately begin making plans for improvements on the defenseability of his unit's position.

    Regimental Commanders have a great deal of leeway as to how they commit their troops. In spite of General Short's Type III alert, I'm certain that the men who were stringing barbed wire while building beach defenses and command posts in the days preceding the Japanese attack were doing that very thing, as was stated in that website. They may not have been standing-to, awaiting a possible Japanese invasion, but they had been issued live ammunition.
     
  15. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    The first use of the word "minutia" here on this thread was by you so I think you to be the person best qualified to explain what you meant, exactly.

    How would that course of action further advance the discussion of this thread's reason for being, the deployment of the US Army's troops on Oahu ? You certainly aren't providing much historical information or sources where such might be found.

    Such as ?

    I have just previously provided you with the sworn testimony of the commanding General (one Walter Short) of those two Oahu based divisions.
    He swears that he was short of gunners prior to Dec.7'41.

    Do you offer ANY contradictory source ? Were YOU there at the time so as to be able to offer first hand evidence yourself ? Or, as seems to be the usual case with you, do you offer ONLY your own unsupported opinion which seems to be based on the belief that the US Army couldn't ever make a mistake ?

    Of course, in this case, the US Army HAD previously asked for the funding needed to overcome Oahu's defensive shortfalls but was denied by a US Congress still dealing with economic fallout from the Great Depression.

    .
     
  16. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    John, Its nice to see you back again.

    I don't think that a supply of strong backs would have been the problem but rather the training and practise at high level mathematics needed to place a shell near to a fast moving aircaft above or a warship, maneuvering violently, at speed, many miles away.

    Do you have any evidence/source at all that contradicts the sworn testimony of General Short, the man IN CHARGE of Oahu's defenses at that time, that he was lacking in the number of gunners needed to provide BOTH AA and CAC artillery fire, at the samer time ?

    .
     
  17. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    Is there a particular reason (with source please) why you feel that way ?

    But what has any of that to do with this thread, which you in your posting #1 which started it, entitled, "US Army deployments during the Pearl Harbor attack" ?

    I believe that it has been VERY clearly established that General Short had ordered a Level #1 Alert, NOT a level #3 alert, in response to the Nov.27th "War Warning" message that he received from Washington.

    Merely repeating the 68 year old recollections of just ONE MAN, now likely to be in his late 80s or early 90s, doesn't make them true. I note that you have not responsed at all to the sworn testimonies that I have previously provided here on this thread that contradict his memories ?

    So ?

    That same source that you solely rely upon also provides, "They had sufficient arms and ammunition to deter possible sabotage, but not to resist an enemy amphibious assault."



    Further to the moderator stated purpose of this thread, I provide exerpts from a November 1994 article entitled Beach Defenses of Hawaii (1924-1942) by William H. Dorreance wherein he states that:

    "Finally in October 1933, the Corps of Engineers awarded a contract for the construction of 12 concrete "pillbox" type machinegun emplacements at strategic beach locations around Oahu. Six empacements were situated on small islands in the entrances to Honolulu Harbor, one was at the beach on the Fort Kamehameha reservation, two were located on the western beaches at Onaula (Ewa) and Nanakuli, and three were located at the north shore, one at Waialua and two at Waimea Bay." Followed by:

    "The construction of all twelve emplacements was completred by June 1934.


    Please note that NONE at all were constructed on Oahu's eastern windward coastline where Kaneohe Bay is located.

    These twelve camoflaged pillboxes , each of 13' x 13' x 7.5' depth appear to be the only formal beach defenses constructed on Oahu beachfronts until AFTER the historical Dec.7'41 Japanese air attacks.

    .
     
  18. mikebatzel

    mikebatzel Dreadnaught

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    I think that the marines on Wake proved that a full gun crew was not neccessary to still be efficient.

    From: HyperWar: A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island

    Bill Sloan in his book Given up for Dead gives an account of a Japanese SNLF medic who came in on Patrol Boat 34 (the second PB), who claimed that his ship was sunk/destroyed by the three inch gun battery before it could acomplish it's mission of beaching itself.

    Note that the three inch battery used on Wake took a full gun crew of 8-10 men to operate. On Wake it was manned by two marines and three civilians not trained in the operation of the gun, all at night while under fire with a gun you had to aim by looking down the bore.

    I would say that based on this, a partial gun crew can still remain efficient if even slightly slower.
     
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  19. John Dudek

    John Dudek Member

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    The account never mentioned pillboxes. The account spoke of building improved machine gun nests near the possible invasion beaches and the fact that his unit had been in the field for weeks beforehand, engaged in this laborious process. Offhand, I would say that the men engaged in this were using the native flora and fauna to strengthen and camouflage their foxholes to create more of an impervious gun position.
     
  20. dabrob

    dabrob Dishonorably Discharged

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    An "interesting" supposition against a stationary target perhaps but how exactly does one boresight a gun at a "dodging and weaving" enemy aircraft flying by at speed several thousand feet overhead or at an enemy warship (or landing transport for that matter) on the OTHER SIDE of the Koolau Mountains ?

    I wasn't aware that even a trained Marine gunner could boresight thru several miles of soild volcanic mountain rock ?

    How praytell, would this miracle actually be accomplished on Oahu ?




    While they were NOT a US Army asset, I present the following from Pearl Harbor Attacked Vol.#16:


    "On
    the other hand, I quote about them from a recent letter from
    Kimmel:

    "The 12 PTs which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless


    in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here."



    These boats have shown weakness when pounded into heavy seas. I might add that we know the weaknesses of these PTs. We gave them some grueling tests in fairly heavy weather from New London up around Block Island, down around Fire Island and back. They made a destroyer hump to stay with them, but all the boats which made the race suffered severe structural damage.



    We deliberately pounded them to see what they would stand and to develop their weaknesses. Profiting by what we learned, we hope to develop a much sturdier craft. Meanwhile, we sent out what we had, hoping they would be of some use."



    ... lest anyone mistakenly think that they might have contributed significantly to Hawaiian defences.

     

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