Discussion in 'WWII General' started by Richard, Jan 25, 2006.
Germany had already lost the war before the fuel problems started .=at the end of june 1940.
Yes mate, but if we made the dreaded seperate peace food and trade would not have been a problem. Its only a problem because we went on one journey. The problem of keeping afloat would not have existed if the journey went a different route. Not one I would approve of I might add.
I will be the first person to stand up for the Americans and their huge contribution to the War effort. It really ticks me off when people try to write off the Americans.
That said. The general American population (not exactly known for their mastery of history education) believe the United States won the entire war single handed, with our wacky tea loving side kick England cheering us on.. Heck I did until I got older and did my own research. So when I come across people like that I just like to remind them of our old Ruskie friends in the East.
That's certainly not what I recall reading. When did rationing start? 1939 acording to this article:
And food shorages start appearing in 41.
Then why the expensive syn fuel programs? And why were the KM and the Italian navy limiting operations due to lack of fuel?
Simply adding fuel, food, and ammo likely would not have helped Germany win. I wouldn't sue the ter "Glorious" in regards to German activities in WW2 though.
Or alternately because they didn't have a plan that addressed the reaility of the situation they found themselves in.
That doesn't make sense. If you loose because your opponent was stronger and better you obviously lacked sufficient strength and skill.
These are quite obviously two sides of the same coin.
That depends on what you mean by "lost". Certainly based on the historical case you can say that but you could just as easily say the same thing about 1939 or even earlier. In June of 1940 Germany still had options that would have left her in a stronger position than when she invaded Poland. Arguably the presence of Hitler precluded them being exericsed.
1)Rationing does not mean shortage
2)There were no fuel problems BECAUSE of the synthetic fuel program: the domestic production (crude and synthetic) was bigger than the imports .
3)An other plan for Barbarossa would change nothing : reality would still be the same : a potentially invincible SU.
4) the options for Germany in 1940 : no in 1940,the survival of Germany depended on the willingness (or not) of Britain to continue the war,which would result in the intervention of the US and the defeat of Germany,even if the SU remained neutral .
5) In all possible constellations Germany would be defeated .As in WWI .
Isn't the point of Rationing to avoid Shortage. Also I thought all the synthetic fuel factories got destroyed by the Americans pretty early on. A big reason why Germany was so desperate to get oil from the east.
And if memory serves didn't Germany not turn into a Total War economy until 44?
Well then, remind me of them, because they were certainly not around for Operation Frantic.
Destruction of the 6th Army at the Volga, and victory at Kursk to name two
Rationing is conducted because one is either in a shortage or one may occur in the not too distant future. While true there was no real food shortage in Germany in 1939 the writing was on the wall and there certainly was one in the latter part of 41.
There was indeed a very serious fuel problem. The petrol shortage would have been far worse had it not by for the syn fuel program but it was very expensive both in terms of cash and interms of coal. I don't have my copy right at hand but Tooze does a very good job of documenting this in Wages of Destruction
Germany had options, especially if Hitler was gone, that could have ended the war with Britain. Whether or not they would have been exercised and under what conditions delves deeply into what ifs.
There speaks belief rather than fact and logic. Simply put such an absolute statement in the face of all possible events cannot with any degree or reason be accepted.
I'm pretty sure some were in operation right up to near the end of the war if not to the end.
That's been pretty well debunked. I strongly recomend Wages of Destruction to you if you have much interest in this area at all. It's not a particularly easy read but it provides one with a much better basic understanding of the formation of the Third Reich and it's potentials. The paper back is under $20. I will point out that some of the military matters discussed have been criitised but on economic issues it is very strong.
Ya yes interesting.. interesting. I have always been sceptical about that myself. But I do think they did hit peak production in 44 though. (Again common sense would argue that it would been sooner, 41 ish.) ~ Something I need to read up more on.
As for the synthetic factories. I am sure some survived. But my understanding is that enough were damaged for it to cause serious concern for the war effort (again adding to the fuel issue).
By late war it wasn't so much the fuel as getting it where it was needed. At least that's my reading. Mid war the fuel impact started being significant as it did things like:
1) restricted flight hours for training pilots
2) Kept the KM in port except for the subs and rare occasions.
Earlier in the war it severely handicaped the Italian fleet.
No:you can't prevent shortage by rationing : the aim of rationing it to have a fair distribution.
About synthetic fuel
1933: Crude: O.25 million ton;synthetic:0.17 million ton; import:2.65 million ton
1934: crude:O.31;synthetic : 0.15 ; import : 3.1 million
1937: C:O.45;S: O.65;I:4.3
1939: C:0.7;S:2.2 :I : 5.1
1940: Crude:1.5 million;Synthetic: 3.1 million;Import:2.1 million
1941:Crude: 1.6 million;Synthetic:3.9 million;Import:2.8 million
1942:Crude:1.7 million;synthetic:4.6 million;Import:2.7 million
1943:Crude:1.9 million;Synthetic:5.6 million;Import:2.8 million
1944:Crude:1.6 million;Synthetic:3.8 million;Import:1 million
During the war, the increase of the crude production and the imports was limited,but the needs were catched by an enormous increase of the production of synthetic oil:from 2.2 million ton in 1939 to 5.6 million ton in 1943
interesting. I guess the question then is what was demand of such oil for each year. (If they needed 10 million ton for example that'd be a problem)
Well it was enough that the Italians (who were dependent on the Germans for oil for the most part) were pumping oil out of their battleships so some of their smaller vessels could go to sea. The number of hours of flight time for LW recruits also decreased over the course of the war primarily due to fuel shortages. The clear implication was that the Germans didn't have enough fuel. Then there were things like the production of steel being highly correlated with coal production. Again the implication is that more coal meant more steal so lack of coal was putting a lid on steel production. The conversion of coal to syn fuels by the way isn't very ifficient.
In wartime,needs are without limit (no commander ever will say that he has sufficient/to much supplies) and must be adjusted to what is available .
About the KM: the fact that after operation Cerberus,the big surface ships remained idle,can be explained by shortage of fuel,but also by the decision to waste no more fuel for the surface fleet,who could not leave safely the Ostsee,.After Cerberus,the big surface operations were over .
For the LW: the fuel problems started in the summer of 1943,but ,I doubt that the number of training hours fot the new pilots were decreasing because of fuel shortage : an other possibility is that the total training period was shortened because the LW needed more replacements than the training schools could provide,thus: even if more fuel was available,no more time was available ,a,d the training schools would provide recruits with insufficient instruction .
That is neither true or relevant. I've seen more than a few reports saying that there was enough of item x or even too much of y by military officers. On the otherhand what we are discussing is national needs. The lack of supplies at any particular point can be due to the delivery network as much as the actual availaibility of the item of interest. Needs are also not without limit. What is needed is enough to do what you want to do and a decent reserve. Germany didn't have enough to do what they wanted to do in a number of areas.
But would that decision have been made if fuel had been in ample supply?
I see you doubt it so you make up some reasons that it wasn't a concern. How about a little research? A quick google finds:
Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction" page 493 (Chapter 15)
"By the end of autumn (1941 me) the rest of Germany's surface fleet was confined to harbour, not only by the British, but also by the chronic lack of fuel. To meet the minimum fuel requirements of the navy and merchant fleet of roughly 90,000 tons of heavy oil per month, Germany disposed of monthly production of only 52,000 tons plus stocks of only 220,000 tons. An Atlantic operation by Germany's capital ships would double consumption and threaten the imminent paralysis of all Axis shipping."
it goes on:
"As the Wehrmacht's military-economic office concluded: "It follows from this that we simply cannot wage war simultaneously with all three branches of the Wehrmacht."
Please learn how to use the quote function properly. Figuring out what your wrote in response to my comments is non trivial when you mix them all together.
Possibly to the first probably to the second. But of course the point was they didn't have the option and they certainly would have like to.
I've seen a number of soruces that say it was and even linked one. All you offer is your opinions. Until you can make a logical case based on decent sources you are wasting our time repeating your opinions as if they are facts.