USN / IJN Night ops?

Hi,

My name is Simon, and I'm researching WW2 pacific theater airborne operations for a computer game I am writing. I've been trying to find a site where I can ask all the questions I have (and I've got a lot) - and this site seems to fit the bill.

So, if anyone can answer the questions below, that would be awesome. Or if not, if anyone can point me to a forum / web resource, or even a book to read where I can learn about them?

• What technology was in use by the japanes & us navy to allow pilots to find the carriers when over the sea? I think the US used a radio transmission of some type, but I'd like details, and for both sides.
• What sort of lights were used to illuminate airfields and carriers for night operations (if at all)? What was the protocol around turning these on & off - i.e. did a pilot have to radio in to get them turned on?

That'll do for the moment - thanks!

 

The U.S. Navy did indeed use a homing beacon called a "YE" homing beacon. This gave a direction, but no distance, as I recall, and at normal ranges it was only useful from relatively high altitudes due to line of sight issues involving the curvature of the earth. For this reason both the U.S. and Japan used dead reckoning as their primary means of navigation overseas and radio navigation aids only secondarily. Damaged aircraft were often unable to climb to an altitude sufficient to detect a radio beacon, but they could still follow dead reckoning and standard search procedures. Even when pilots could follow the YE signal it was sometimes difficult to find the carrier as the intervening layers of clouds would render radio and visual detection mutually exclusive: the pilot could follow the beacon to the general area and yet never visually locate the carrier thanks to local weather.

To that end, U.S. carriers sent air missions off with intended navigation to a "point option." And aviators were trained in standard box search patterns to aid them once they found empty sea where they thought home should have been. (An all too common occurrence.) I believe IJN procedures were quite similar in this regard.

RADAR, radio, and IFF could also be useful, when they were all available, and even friendly escorts. If a RADAR fix could be obtained and confirmed flight directors could talk a stray aircraft in. (There were several examples of this early in the war, both successful and failed.) IFF would potentially be useful to verify the identity of the bogey. (Early British model "Pip-squeak" systems were in limited use on U.S. fighters in mid 1942. By 1944 IFF was more or less universal in allied aircraft.) On a few occasions CAP fighters were vectored to stray aircraft to guide them in. In early 1942 this was quite common, since IFF was still uncommon even on fighters. (The CAP could both identify the bogey and provide navigation aid and escort. Of course, this did interfere with the primary mission of any CAP aircraft: intercepting bandits.)

The IJN used a particularly nice set of reflector landing lights that would look different from different angles of approach, giving pilots a very good idea of their approach vectors even in sketchy or nonexistent visual conditions. Both navies used landing lights, of course, but the IJN reflector lights were quite sophisticated for the time.

As to night ops: both navies shied away from them. Some pilots were trained in night operations from the getgo, of course. But only a relative few. And both navies used directional landing lights that were shielded from sight unless you were on a more or less correct approach. The lights were, by design, difficult to see unless you knew where the ship was to begin with. These were quite distinct from the usual navigation lights that would be visible from all angles. These were kept off to avoid detection. Standard procedure in both navies was to sacrifice pilots to save the ship. The pilots could ask all they wanted, but no court martial would be able to find a captain guilty if he left the lights off. That said, in both cases captains and admirals turned on navigation lights (and search lights and starshells and the Fourth of bloody July) to guide in returning pilots after dark. Short of that, they were never going to find their ships unless they were specially trained in night flights. And even then, it was particularly hazardous.

Two resources I can't recommend enough:

The First Team by John Lundstrom and Shattered Sword by Jonathon Parshall and Anthony Tully. Both concentrate on early war air ops culminating in the Battle of Midway. Both are quite detailed and both include meticulous records of flights and losses.

Both are, of course, layman's histories. But they can both point you in the direction of some very good original source material if you wish to dig deeper. And between the two of them they give a great overview of the crucial first six months.

Good luck.

 

Wow what a detailed answer - very usefull, thanks! I'll check out those books. I think I have 'The First Team' on my amazon wish list already, its always good to get a recommendation from someone though.

 

Can't add much more to SP's post, but there is some pretty good info on the YE-ZB homing beacon in this thread.
http://www.ww2f.com/naval-warfare-pacific/31048-carrier-aircraft-navigation-how-did-they-do.html

 

Until about the beginning of 1944 both the IJN and USN didn't widely operate carrier aircraft at night. At about that date the USN started putting detachments of TBD torpedo and F6F fighter planes aboard some carriers for night operations. These aircraft carried radar and other equipment making them suitable for such operations along with having specially trained crews.

One of the first offensive uses of these aircraft was at the strikes at Truk in February 1944 when 12 TBD were used in night torpedo and bombing missions. These 12 aircraft actually accounted for the bulk of the shipping sunk there. The results were impressive enough that the USN began to convert some carriers to be primarily night operations ones. I'll fill in more details later today.

 

The works of Lundstrom, Tully, and Parshall being amongst my very favorites, remember that they primarily deal with 1942, long before there was any form of dedicated night air operations units in the USN. For example, a unit which appears with great regularity in The First Team - Pacific Naval Air Combat From Pearl Harbor to Midway is Yorktown's VF-42. Most of the aviators in VF-42, as it left Norfolk for the Pacific and history, were night carrier qualified in their trusty F4F-3's. Only those just joining the squadron in the week between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the ship's departure from Norfolk were not so qualified. That did not make VF-42 a night fighter squadron, it merely meant that if caught aloft after sundown most of the pilots stood a good chance of getting back aboard. Even then, as events at Coral Sea transpired, once in the confusion of combat, this was no guarantee - - - one aviator was never heard from again and another wandered off in the wrong direction, never made it back aboard, and was never seen again.

Real designated night units did not start to appear until 1944. This was after the CVG-6 attempt at night killer teams in which CAG-6 Butch O'Hare was lost. It was shortly thereafter that a training program based on the one TBF/two F6F team was set up at NAS Puuene on Maui. This short lived program was run by O’Hare’s successor as CAG-6, CDR John L Phillips, formerly VT-6 CO and he who piloted the TBF part of O’Hare’s team. The program only lasted until the next Enterprise deployment, but it was the forerunner of what became the Night Aircraft Carrier Training Unit Pacific (NACTUPac) stationed at NAS Barbers Point.

Meanwhile on the east coast of the US, at NAS Quonset Point, Project Affirm was already under way, the development of night fighter and later night air group equipment, doctrine, and tactics. This program was run by CDR William Taylor (a pre-war USN aviator, then USMC aviator, then ran his own small air service, then served in the RAF, was CO of the Eagle squadron, and then reverted back to the USN just before the war began for the US - a pretty interesting guy). Taylor, in his travels, became somewhat of a radar intercept/fighter direction expert. In fact, after returning to the fold, as it were, he was busily traveling from carrier to carrier and instructing in fighter direction methodologies. My father, one of those ubiquitous VF-42 types, remembered attending a couple of his lectures and then practicing intercepts off the Virginia capes with Taylor supervising the show. Taylor was on loan to the USAAF at the time of Pearl Harbor; in fact he was at Pearl Harbor to start the AAF training program for island defense once permanent radar installations had been established.

Anyway, Project Affirm was where airborne radar was tested and proven for the USN VF(N) community. Early participants were folks like LCDRs William Martin, Evan Peter Aurand, Turner Caldwell, Richard Harmer and probably quite a few others whose names I could conjure up if I looked hard enough; all veterans of the early days in the Pacific. It was such as these folks who became the squadron commanders of the VF(N) and VT(N) squadrons which headed west to join the fleet against the Japanese. Aurand, Caldwell, and Harmer were in the VF(N) business, Martin was in the VT(N) business and eventually commanded a night air group; he became known as the USN’s expert on night attack operations.

Project Affirm, once the developmental kinks were worked out, became NACTULant, basing out of NAAS Charlestown and remaining under the command of CDR Taylor.

There were 8 “pure” VF(N) squadrons that deployed to combat areas in the Pacific Theater. Night fighter divisions from at least 13 regular “day” VF squadrons also contributed to the night action totals as did TBMs from VT(N)-90.

VF(N)-75 was established 1 April 1943 and was disestablished on 2 October 1944. CO was LCDR Gus Widhelm. In January 1944, 2 divisions were sent to CV duty on Enterprise and Intrepid. These divisions, together, became designated VF(N)-101, under the command of LCDR Richard Harmer. Which, of course, explains why VF(N)-75 and VF(N)-101 operated the F4U-2. Detachment 10 of VF(N)-101 operated off Enterprise and Detachment 11 off Intrepid. Land-based combat operations for VF(N)-75 began in October 1943 and ended in early February 1944. VF(N)-75 entered combat on 31 October 1943, operating F4U-2s from land bases in the Solomon Islands. First score went to LT Hugh D O’Neill, Jr. who, at about 2300 that night, was credited with shooting down a G4M (Betty) approximately 12 miles southeast of the Shortland Islands. Last score was scored at 0415, 13 January 1944 by LT Reuben L Johns; a D3A (Val) about 35 miles west-southwest of Torokina. Final tally for VF(N)-75 was 7-2-0. All of VF(N)-75s actions occurred between 2015 and 0415.

VF(N)-101 operated F4U-2s off USS Enterprise. The squadron’s first engagement was on 19 February 1944 at 0600. Squadron CO CDR “Chick” Harmer was credited with damaging a G4M (Betty) at 240 degrees, 30 miles from 9-34N, 160-5E, which is about 125 miles northeast of Pohnpei, in the Carolines. Last engagement for VF(N)-101 was on 28 June 1944 when Harmer encountered another G4M and was credited with shooting it down. Total score for VF(N)-101 was 5-1-3. The entire squadron score was split between Harmer and LTJG R F Holden; Harmer with 2-0-1 and Holden with 3-1-2. All of Harmer’s and Holden’s actions occurred between the hours of 1900 and 0600.

VF(N)-76, under LCDR Evan Peter Aurand, was established 15 July 1943 and was disestablished on 6 November 1944. There were four detachments assigned to CVs. Detachment 1 was on Bunker Hill, Detachment 2 was first aboard Yorktown and later on Hornet, 3 on Essex, and 4 on Lexington. Combat operations were between January and September 1944. Operating a combination or F6F-3N, F6F-3E, and F6F-5N the squadron entered combat on 22 February 1944 when Pete Aurand was credited with an A6M between 0645 and 0800 while on patrol between Tinian and Saipan. Last combat for VF(N)-76 was at 0630 on 22 September 1944 when LTJG John W Dear, Jr. was credited with shooting down a B6N1 (Jill) southeast of Cape San Ildefenso, Luzon, PI. Final scores for the squadron were 36-2-0, most of which occurred in daylight hours. Between the hours of 1800 and 0630 the squadron credits were 11-0-0.

VF(N)-77 was established 1 December 1943 and was disestablished on 25 September 1944. Flying a combination or F6F-3N and F6F-3E Detachment 1 was on Essex, 2 on Yorktown, 3 on Franklin, and 4 on Wasp. CO was LCDR Robert Freeman. The squadron entered combat on 20 June 1944 when ENS George L Tarleton was credited with an D3A (Val) at 0350 while on patrol Agana airfield, Guam. Last combat for VF(N)-77 was at 0330 on 1 September 1944 when LT Anthony C Benjes, Jr. shot down an H8K (Emily) flying boat at 330 degrees, 40 miles from 23-48N, 142-49E, or about 80 miles east-southeast of the Bonin Islands. Final score for VF(N)-77 was 8-0-0. All of VF(N)-77 scores were during the hours of darkness or twilight, between 0330 and 0600

VF(N)-78 was established on 1 February 1944 and was disestablished on 2 October 1944. VF(N)-78 succeeded Chick Harmer’s VF(N)-101. The squadron was later disestablished at sea and the personnel and aircraft were absorbed into VF-20. The VF(N)-78 CO, CDR James S Gray, became XO of VF-20. VF(N)-78 operated in two detachments, one, Det. 1, aboard USS Intrepid, and the other, Det. 2 aboard USS Enterprise. The squadron flew F6F-3N and F6F-3E. All scores were made by Det. 2. First action was when LCDR Gray, was credited with damaging a G4M (Betty) at 0230 on 31 August 1944 about 90 miles east of Iwo Jima. Last engagement was on 22 September 1944 when, between 0615 and 0925, LT William B Thompson and LT William H B Miller teamed up to shoot down an A6M (Zeke) about 80 miles east of Baler, Luzon, PI. Totals for VF(N)-78 were 2-0-2. Grey’s action of 31 August was the only true night action, the rest occurred during the day or early morning.

Quickly off on a tangent, the absorption of VF(N)-78 into VF-20 was part of a brief general disestablishment of dedicated VF(N) squadrons and a transition to a night fighter division being assigned to each deployed VF (but not VBF) squadron. These divisions were each made up of two 2-plane sections in F6F-5Ns.

It was quickly realized though that night fighter divisions in regular VF squadrons expedient would not be enough, and dedicated night squadrons and then air groups came back on the scene. The change from dedicated night fighter squadrons to augmenting divisions in day squadrons and back to dedicated night fighter, and indeed, air groups was the result of a couple of issues. First of all, and having the most influence, were the two commanders of the Fast Carrier Task Force. VADM Mitscher was not a big promoter of night air operations, generally, and night fighters, specifically. Kind of an odd situation as his first operations officer was CDR Gus Widhelm, formerly commander of VF(N)-75. VADM McCain, on the other hand, was in favor of night operations and a big booster of night fighters. As the Kamikaze threat became more and more intense, McCain’s operations staff, led by CDR John Thach, developed a concept known as the “Big Blue Blanket” which called for coverage of enemy airfields to enemy airplanes from even taking off. Obviously, to catch pre-dawn and after sunset launches, as well as deliver night attacks on Japanese airfields, and still defend against increasing attack temps, dedicated squadrons would again be required. Jimmy Thach went over the concept with Widhelm’s replacement as Mitscher’s ops officer, CDR Jimmy Flatley, who became an immediate and enthusiastic booster. He managed to convince Mitscher of the need and he did not object to their reappearance. In the mean time, doctrine wise, the other big issue revolved around a question of the size of night air groups and from what carriers would they operate. A deployment of VF(N)-41 (see below) aboard Independence led to the consensus that CVLs, size-wise, were unsuitable for dedicated night operations. Thus subsequent night air groups deployments were aboard CVs.

Back to the squadron stories, Fighting 20 served on Enterprise from August 1944 to mid-November 1944 and then on Lexington to January 1945. Former VF(N)-78 skipper, Gray, took over command when VF-20’s CO, Lt Cdr Fred Bakutis, went MIA on 24 October 1944. Batukis was recovered by a submarine after floating around in his raft for a week. He did not return. This would be Gray’s third squadron command, VF-6 (at Midway), VF(N)-78, and, finally, VF-20.

VF(N)-41 was established originally as VF(N)-79 on 20 January 1944 commanded by CDR Turner Caldwell Jr. It was redesignated as VF(N)-41 on 25 August 1944 and entered combat on 12 September 1944 operating F6F-5Ns off USS Independence. First score was split between ENS George W Obenour and ENS Robert W Klock who were each credited with 0.5 G4M (Betty). This engagement occurred at 0755 near 14-25N, 128-40E, which is roughly 200 miles northeast of Leyte, PI. Last score reported for VF(N)-41 was at 1845 on 16 January 1945 when LT William E Henry was credited with shooting down a Ki-43 (Oscar) about 20 miles southwest of Canton, China. Total score for VF(N)-41 was 46-3-3, with actual night/twilight engagements of 29-1-0.

VF(N)-90 was established as VF(N)-103 on 5 April 1944 and was redesignated as VF(N)-90 on 25 August 1944, commanded by LCDR Robert J McCullough. When redesignated, it also absorbed the then still forming VF(N)-104, and VF(N)-105. Later, in October 1944, the squadron also absorbed VF(N)-106. The squadron entered combat operating F6F-5Ns off USS Enterprise at 1700 on 6 January 1945 when LT Carl S Neilsen was credited with shooting down a Ki-46 (Dinah) near Alimamao, Luzon, PI. Last action was 14 May 1945 at 0100 when LTJG Charles H Latrobe was credited with a G4M (Betty) near 310 degrees, 24 miles from 30-10N,132-53E, or roughly 100 miles east of Tanega-Shima, south of Kyushu. Final Score for VF(N)-90 was 31-2-0, all but one credit of which were scored during night or twilight hours.

VT(N)-90, commanded first by LT Russell Kippen, also operating off USS Enterprise in TBM-3Es accounted for 4-1-0. Confirmed as shot down were an H8K (Emily), an L2D (Tabby), an A6M2-N (Rufe), and an unidentified aircraft. The lone probable was an N1K (George). All of VT(N)-90’s engagements occurred between the hours of 2020 and 0545.

CAG(N)-90 was CDR Bill Martin.

VF(N)-91 was the fighter component of an all night air group assigned to USS Bonhomme Richard in the waning days of the war; CO was LCDR Alphonse Minvielle. The squadron operated F6F-5Ns. First action was at 1830 on 25 July 1945 when ENS Kenneth J Baldwin was credited with shooting down a K5Y1 (Willow) trainer near Saiki, Kyushu. Last action was 13 August 1945 at 1915 when ENS Phillip T McDonald was credited with a Ki-45 (Nick) over one of the task Force “watchdog” radar pickets, west of Mito. McDonald was the squadron high scorer, credited with two Ki-45 and two P1Y (Frances), all on the night of 13 August. Final Score for VF(N)-91 was 9-2-0. VT(N)-91 served with VF(N)-91 forming CVG(N)-91. All of VF(N)-91 scores were from engagements occurring between 1820 and 1915 hours. VT(N)-91 had no shoot-downs credited, though it did operate extensively at night over the Japanese home island when the fleet was in action, conducting harassment “heckler” raids over enemy airfields.

Among, but probably not at all inclusive as I never give it much thought, regular day squadrons with night fighter divisions scoring were: VF-6, VF-9, VF-10, VF-12, VF-14, VF-15, VF-17, VF-20, VF-33, VF-82, VF-83, VF-84, and VF-85. As near as I can tell scores were all in F6F-5Ns and totaled, for just this lot, 56-1-3 of various stripes.

VF(N)-53 did not score. The squadron, commanded by LCDR Main was established on 2 January 1945 and soon thereafter deployed aboard Saratoga until March 1945. VF(N)-53 was unique in that it was in an air group that had both a full night fighter squadron and a full day squadron, VF-53. Also deploying but not registering any credits was VF(N)-63, established on 20 June 1945 under CDR Vince McCormack and deployed aboard Kula Gulf in August and September 1945. VF(N)-63 was to provide dedicated night fighters to 7th Fleet operations.

Other VF(N) squadrons that did not deploy were:

VF(N)-107 established 5 June 44, disestablished 2 October 44
VF(N)-108 established 20 June 44, disestablished 2 October 44
VF(N)-109 established 5 July 44, disestablished 2 October 44
VF(N)-110 established 20 July 44, disestablished 2 October 44
VF(N)-111 established 20 August 44, disestablished 2 October 44
VF(N)-42 established 25 August 44, disestablished 2 October 44
VF(N)-43 established 24 August 44, transferred to NACTU 2 January 1945
VF(N)-52 established 20 October 44, disestablished 25 May 45
VF(N)-55 established 1 March 45, disestablished 11 December 45

Regards

 

Wow R Leonard - thanks for that, plenty to digest!

I have two more questions, one you've part answered already.

• What were the main targets of night operations? Obviously you've got bomber intercepting, and you've mentioned airfield bombing in your post, how about shipping / subs?
• How were ground targets lit for accurate aiming? Were flares used?

 

I've got some documents on the technical side of the carriers... not the aircraft. The following image was circulated as an example of typical night fighter operations lighting on carriers, even though it was specifically Enterprise:

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Ite8ByRWB...o/s1600-h/1945+CV-6+Nighttime+Deck+Lights.jpg

I've got the full report I've intended to post for a bit but it's been lower priority than other docs... let me know if you think it might be of use.