wacht am rhein resources wasted?

Rundstedt had an idea:

Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt commanding OB West, had come up with a plan, Fall Martin ("Case Martin"). Von Rundstedt's plan called for a two-pronged attack instead of a single thrust, but in both plans the area of operations remained east of the Meuse. Model and von Rundstedt combined their plans to present a joint solution to Hitler, called by Model the "small solution". Hitler rejected it in favour of his "big solution", which formed the basis for the Battle of the Bulge.

 

Kai basically took the words out of my mouth. The assets the Germans had allocated to the Ardennes offensive were not up to the task given to them. Certainly, given the state of the German forces in the aspects of training (or lack of same), fuel (or lack of same) and experience in large scale offensive deep maneuver (or lack of same), the idea of defeating the Western Allies essentially en toto was a pipe dream. I do believe that something similar to the "small solution" which perhaps took out a corps or two AND retained most of the personnel, armor, and other equipment for further use would have shocked the Allies and probably delayed their advance into Germany.

However, I have to wonder whether even Hitler's death on July 20th and such an offensive would have much effect on the final outcome. "Unconditional Surrender" was already an unalterable policy and the "Morgenthau Plan" had been leaked. The Third Reich's doom was sealed.

Still, another alternative was one Rommel was allegedly working on before he was wounded. The army would need to ignore Hitler and turn the assets used in the Bulge back to the Ost Front to delay the Soviets. Then they would open up the West and let the British and Amis come through. An officer would be under a white flag with a message to Eisenhower: "Our articles of unconditional surrender will be waiting you when you reach the Oder." Much better for the German civilians and all the soldiers of all armies that died in late '44 and '45.

 

Hitler was more and more a maniac towards the end of war. Personally I also believe tht his Private docor, who gave him vitamin shots everyday was giving Hitler amphetamin or the kind, as Hitler was full of energy after these injections as he himsel said.

 

Kai,

Gen. Halder in his diary stated that after 1942 Hitler didn't make too many rational decisions. He felt his will power alone was enough to stop Germany's enemies. Omnipotence and grandiosity are traits consistent with amphetamine abuse.

 

interesting Kai and Harolds.....for a different thread, how much of a maniac was he? or was it the drugs? what if he didn't take the drugs?

 

That is a hard question. He might have always been under the influence of those drugs that his doctor gave him during the war years, but it seems like he was always crazy even when he wasn't taking the drugs. Just my theory though.

 

Hitler has said long before the war that his aim is to get war. When the generals were trying not to provoke war in 1938-39, Hitler was furious and said that Generals should like mad dogs on a leash ready to attack the enemy, not like lap dogs that he has.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hossbach_Memorandum

According to the Memorandum, Hitler did not want war in 1939 with Britain and France. What he wanted was small wars of plunder to help support Germany's struggling economy. Hitler wanted a full-scale European war with Britain and France between 1941 and 1944–5.

 

Because we don't have a real idea of what Hitler was being given by his doctor(?) nor what medical conditions he might have had, it is impossible to come up with anything resembling a proper diagnosis. However, one thing I'm pretty sure of was that he had an anti-social personality disorder (AKA criminal mindset).

 

very interesting all...will have to make a thread on this?? will someone volunteer?

 

I recall reading Hitler was pretty mad at Göring using Cocaine all the while. So personally he did not like the idea of taking drugs. However the doctor was giving him stuff that he himself for some reason believed that it was vitamins etc.The SS-doctor in charge of Hitler wanted to find out what Dr Morell was giving but Hitler did not let him check anything.

 

Goring used coke??...I'm surprised he didn't fall dead before 1945

 

I've always read that it was morphine. He became addicted to it after being wounded during the "Beer Hall Putch". Perhaps it would have been better for the Luftwaffe if he had been on coke. His indolence would lead me to believe morphine or some other "downer".

 

with the stress and all, !!..53 when he died?? couldn't have lasted much longer anyway, as big as he was...I do vaguely remember something about his drug use

 

Indeed, it was morphine that Göring got to addicted first. Somehow I recall he used more coke later on, but must admit that I might mix him with Sigmund Freud. Sigmund used to put cocaine to her wife´s snuffbox when she was more depressed than usual...

Maybe Göring got both?

Initially, Sigmund was eager to employ cocaine as an antidote for his best friend’s morphine addiction. Ernst Fleischl-Marxow was a brilliant physiologist who injured his thumb while dissecting a cadaver, resulting in chronic pain tamed only by large doses of morphine.
Substituting one addictive drug for another was a common means of treating substance abuse in the late 19th century. What all these well-intentioned games of medical musical chairs did most reliably was to create “new and improved” addicts.
Freud, in essence, transformed his highly functioning, albeit opiate-dependent, friend into an addled cocaine and morphine addict who was dead seven years later at age 45.

http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/22/sigmund-freuds-cocaine-problem/

 

The Autumn Mist-Martin 'small solution' were a realistic alternative option as they offered the destruction of a US Corps for relatively little cost.

 

that wasn't the 3 army operation? destroy a Corps what size force?

 

I read that Keitel was in charge of the collecting of the fuel for the operation. However if they did not find soon more fuel from the US troops the operation would have stopped there and then. Also the possible and minor follow-up troops and supply was stopped in tracks by the Allied bombers, who bombed 24/7 the rear area because the bad weather did not make it able to see the German attacking forces in the front line.

 

I've read many, many books on the bulge, but maybe the gas situation just doesn't seem to be that interesting to many...that seems like a good reason the generals knew how foolish it was ...

 

The Small Solution (Autumn Mist/Martin concept) would have envisioned a attack designed to encircle and destroy the 4 divisions holding the Ardennes gap, plus perhaps the shoulder formations and corps/army assets directly behind these. The advantages seem clear, doable with the assets available, use of considerably less fuel, no long exposed flanks, doable in the forecasted weather window, chance to either seek defensible ground or withdrawal to original starting point before inevitable counter attack and probable limited irreplaceable losses.

If successful, likely to at least delay the Western Allies, raise morale at home and possibly further strain Anglo-American relations as Monty would have much to say about such a defeat of American forces.

 

sounds extremely logical