War Plan Orange and the Fall of the Philippines. (Moved from General Forum)

First off, remember I had 2 days to do this, that about 120 minutes. We were supposed to do at least 2 pages, mine was 6.

WAR PLAN ORANGE AND THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES BY PATRICK DAVEY

The Plan:
In the 1930’s it was decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that America’s most potential threat in the Pacific was the Japanese. In preparation for perceived future war, the US Army developed a series of War Plans. Among them was War Plan Orange (WPO-3). This plan placed special emphasis on the Philippine Islands, more specifically, the main island of Luzon. WP- Orange called for the US forces defending the Philippines to store as many supplies and munitions on the Bataan peninsula as it would take to sustain a large force for six months. With the control of both Bataan and the Fortified islands of Manila bay, the US would deny Japanese usage of the bay for several months. This was to give the US fleet plenty of time to mobilize and set course from Pearl Harbor to the Philippines, where it would engage the Japanese fleet in a decisive battle.

General Douglas Macarthur, Commander of the Philippine army and USAFFE fought against the implementation of Orange, and in the late 30’s the plan was scrapped, he decided that the best way to repel an invasion was right at the beaches. War Plan Orange was dead.
But not quite dead.

The Armies:
USAFFE (United States Armed Forces Far East) was attacked on December 8th, 1941 by the combined attacks of the Imperial Japanese army and Navy. On paper, they had the most formidable order of battle in the entire US army. Under its command was some of the Newest and best equipment in the American Arsenal, such as the new Boeing B-17 C, and the M3-Stuart light tank. The plan was for the PA (Philippine Army) and USAFFE to guard the entire coast against a Japanese invasion. Again, this looked good on paper, but was impossible to implement, due to lack of supplies, munitions, and organization.



Opposing the men of USAFFE was the Imperial Japanese 14th Army, under the command of Lt. General Masaharu Homma. The 14th army was best equipped unit of it’s size out of all the Japanese forces that took part in the initial surprise offensive against the Allied Forces on Dec 7 (8) 1941. They were also supported by the Imperial Japanese combined Fleet, which was both much larger and better, equipped than the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, which was based at Cavite, in Manila bay.

December 8th, 1941:
On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese finally launched their ‘surprise offensive on America’s holdings in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor was not the only place attacked. They also launched their first air attacks against USAFFE’s air arm (The Philippines are across the International Date line, therefore the war began on December 8th there). Japanese air forces, flying from bases on Formosa (Taiwan), attacked the Clarke Field, Nichols Field, and the Cavite Naval Yard in Manila Bay. (Edmunds, 88). Japanese aircraft also attacked civilian targets like Manila Bay. These attacks would continue almost daily for the next 17 days. Surprisingly, the key island fortress of Corregidor, which controlled Manila Bay, was left untouched. This would not last for very long. (James, 80)



Invasion and Retreat:
On December 24th, the main body of the Japanese invasion force landed at Lingayen Gulf. They were opposed by elements of the 26th Calvary Regiment and Philippine army regulars. The defenders inflicted moderate casualties, but were forced to withdraw. The Japanese plan was simple, besides the main landing at Lingayen, which was north of Manila; the Japanese would land a second force at Lamon Bay, south of Manila. Then the two forces would advance towards each other, engulfing the Phil-American force in a large pincer movement. The Japanese expected the Americans to make their last stand here. (No Arthur given, N/A) At Lamon bay the defenders, under General Parker, were too dispersed to offer any real resistance. Macarthur immediately realized that his beach defense plan had failed, and on December 26th, 1941, he notified all armed forces under his command that War Plan Orange was in effect. What followed was a series of running battles in which the rear-guard of Phil-American troops, mostly consisting of units from the American Philippine Division, covered the retreat of Allied forces to the Bataan Peninsula. Now, all the Americans could do was to dig in, and fight it out with the enemy until help could arrive.



The Siege of Bataan:

The allied strategy for the defense of Bataan was simple, dig in, and hold out. Several main lines of defense were constructed to help stymie the Japanese offensive. The first line of defense was hinged on a small northern town called Abucay. (Toland, 180). In mid-January the Japanese began attacking this sector of the front. After nearly three weeks of combat, the Americans withdrew, they had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The Second line of defense was hinged with the towns of Bagac and Orion on its extreme flanks. To try to break this new line, the Japanese devised a string of new attacks, which would be later known as, The Battle of the Points, and the Battle of the Pockets. On January 24th, a Japanese regiment attempted an amphibious landing at the southern tip of Bataan. Here they were met with a hail of gunfire an after about 2 ½ weeks of combat, were completely decimated by elements of the American 26th, 57th, and 31st, infantry regiments of the Philippine division. (Morris, 280-320) Next the Japanese resumed their offensive on the 4,500 yard, Bagac-Orion line. Several sizable Japanese units were able to slip through the American lines and caused significant problems for the defenders. However, the Japanese were unable to rejoin their lines, and were eventually destroyed. After these two defeats for the Japanese, stalemate settled all along the front. On March 12th, after the urging and Presidential reprimand from Washington, Macarthur finally was forced to leave the Philippines. He left his friend, John Wainwright, to command the remnant of USAFFE. Upon his arrival in Australia, Macarthur gave his famous words, “I came through, and I shall return.”

The fall of Bataan:
Finally, in late March and early April, the Japanese began to use Firebombing and massive artillery before their attacks. This, combined with the massive Malaria and Dysentery epidemics among allied troop, caused the defenses on Bataan to crumble. The left flank of the Phil-American line was destroyed, allowing the Japanese to execute a large pincer maneuver. The Americans were routed, on April 9th, 1942, General King, commander of all forces in Bataan, surrendered. This was the first time an American army had surrendered in combat (non CSA).

Last stand on Corregidor:

For the defense of Corregidor, General Wainwright had 11,000 men, all of them starving, undermanned, and outgunned. They did however have massive amounts of artillery on the island, which gave the Japanese some trouble. After 3 weeks of constant bombardment, the Japanese crossed the straights and landed at Corregidor. The Defenders fought bravely, but after 12 hours of fighting they were forced to surrender when Japanese tanks reached Malinta tunnel, USAFFE’s command post. The last message sent out from Corregidor, was to President Roosevelt, in which Wainwright said,

"With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame...." He began that message, soon to be flashed to a stunned world. "Please say to the nation," he concluded, "that my troops and I have upheld the best tradition of the United States and its Army.... With profound regret and with continued pride in my gallant troops, I go to meet the Japanese commander."

Why Orange failed.
The reasons for WPO’s failure can be summed up in three points.

1) Lack of supplies transferred to Bataan.
2) The main source of rescue for the garrison was the Pacific Fleet, which was destroyed at Pearl Harbor.
3) Roosevelt’s unwillingness to relieve the garrison.

However the debate still rages as the whether or not the Garrison could have been saved. Any relief attempt would have caused, many allied casualties. This however, is for the reader to decide.

 

Exellent reading Carl

You are right about why war plan orange failed had the men been properly supplied who knows what could have happened.

Also another thing going against war plan orange was time. By 1946 the Phillipines was supposed to have it's own independent military. The army was to consist of 400,000 reserves(the population was only 16 million at the time) and about 10,000 regulars, this is not including the men who would have undergone mandatory military training 40,000 eac year. The Navy would have consisted primarily of patrol boats PCE's, and PT's and the Air Force was to consist of 100 fighter planes. The whole point was to prevent an invasion as Douglas McAurthur would say "to turn the Phillipines into a Pacific Switzerland."

Check out: http://www.geocities.com/afpmuseum/history/history_chapter03.htm