Was Hawaii ever truly in danger?

Well.......look what the cat dragged up. Good to see you buddy

 

Yeah,what brings you back to the light?

Glad to have you nevertheless.

 

that sounds like a good thread....did they not think of that?

 

Good post. I'll throw Lahaina Roads out there just as a matter of interest. The old whaling fleet anchorage was sometimes used as an alternate anchorage by the Pacific fleet. The Japanese scouted it before Pearl Harbor to see if there were any targets there.

 

Who was that masked man!

 

Back at it.
I posted that the Pac Fleet had proven itself incapable of stopping the IJN offensive and gave the example of the U S subs going o-fer during the 1st invasion of Wake and doing the same during the 2nd invasion of Wake. Just to be clear, the Triton and the Tambor were at Wake from the get go and accomplished absolutely nothing. Takao posted that the second part was wrong since no subs were around during the second invasion of Wake. But, he is wrong. Pearl knew that the Triton and Tambor had pulled out and that Wake was still holding out. The first Pearl sub patrols heading toward Japan passed close to Wake and at the time of the 2nd invasion. These subs were Gudgeon, Pollack, and Plunger. In addition, patrolling around Midway were the Trout and the Argonaut. 5 boats and no one was ordered to help Wake. No material limitations with this group, just lack of something on the part of naval command.

Several people have posted that the Japanese couldn't have invaded Midway instead of Wake. That the logistics were not available due to demands of other operations. I have to call Bullshit on that one. There is no doubt that the Kido Butai had more than enough fire power to overwhelm the Midway defenders. The question is whether there was enough logistic ships available to carry and supply the invasion force. History tells you that the Wake Island second invasion force was available carrying supplies and nesting materials for the roughly 2000 troops. Other supply vessels and troops were available. More than enough resources were available especially since Midway's defenses were nowhere near as strong in December of '41 as they were in May of'42.

If Yamamoto thought that he had the resources to take, fortify, and hold Midway in May of '42, why should we doubt his ability to do the same in December of '41?

 

It doesn't seem that the schedule was all that tight.

Soryu and Hiryu, in order to provide additional firepower to the 2nd invasion of Wake, were detached from the retiring Kido Butai, on December 16th and stayed around Wake until December 23rd. Upon leaving the Wake area, they moved to Kure and arrived on the 29th. They didn't move again until January 12th, of '42 to participate in the Southern operations against the Dutch and Australians. The other 4 members of Kido Butai sailed on to Japan arriving at Kure on the 25th and stayed in port until January 8th before departing to participate in the Southern operations.

If Japan was so hard pressed for supply units in the early months of the war, Where did the Japanese on Wake get their supplies?

 

True, but you have already driven the car to Hawaii on the 7th. After turning around, you are approaching Midway. which has already been bombarded by IJN destroyers. Like at Wake, it seems that there is a several day window to lollygag around and still be home by the 29th. Instead of extending just Soryu and Hiryu's vacation, you extend everyone's vacation.

No one has answered the question, if supply ships were so critical during the first few months of the war, then how was Wake supplied?

 

Pre war work up and training periods cannot be used. The IJN plan for the first few months of the war would certainly have included what they felt were satisfactory time schedules for maintenance and upkeep on the ships of the Kido Butai.

History tells us that during the early stages of the war, the IJN did supply Wake with adequate resources. Why would Midway be any different? As late as June of' '42, Yamamoto believed that he had the logistics to transport, support, and sustain a large force on Midway. Who do we go with here, the armchair admirals or the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet? Tough call, not. As the war went on, I agree with you that the resources did get scarcer.

 

Indeed you did. That doesn't mean that your opinion is indeed a fact.

Which is a long way from substantiating the fact.

How mature of you.

Depending on what you mean by "overwhelm", they certainly weren't going to take the island.

You've assumed the answer rather than proving it. In the face of a Wake Island capable of patroling the area out to a significant distance and the US fleet at PH there are signficiant risks it trying to take Midway. Indeed I don't beleive the plans used on either Wake Island invasion would work at Midway. For one thing they involved beaching craft for the invasion force to land from the reef at Midway wasn't condusive to that like the one at Wake. The Midway defences certainly weren't as strong in Dec of 41 as they were in June of 42 but it is not clear that the IJN could have landed a force there capable of defeating them during that period.

You are neglecting to consider just how much fuel flight ops consume not just for the carriers but for the escorts as well. Then there's the risk associated with hanging around that close to PH and the impact on future ops if the KB suffers too much attrition.

Supplies were pretty minimal asided from those landed after the initial invasion. Wake didn't play much of a role in the rest of the war either. Life on Midway wouldn't have been that easy.

Why not? Certainly they are not perfect but that doesn't mean they are useless.

Indeed but events during the early war period showed that they were optimistic in these areas, perhaps in part due to their plans for a short war.

1) Midway was further away than Wake (longer transit times that consume more resources)
2) Midway was much closer to PH than Wake. (greater danger to the supply vessels and greater losses of supplies and personel on the island due to frequent attacks)
3) Wake is still under US control at this point. (Forces greater detours implying time and resource penatlies, greater chance of attack both ways)
The above also imply a greater risk of a counter invasion which requires greater defences which requires more troops and supplies.

The question is would they view it as worth it at the time? Remember Midway was not in the initial plan the whole reason for it was to draw out the US carriers. The fact that he had the transport in and other required resources in June doesn't mean that they were available in Ded of 41 either. The Japanese badly needed to secure both the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. They can't let themselves get distracted from that but sending an invasion force to Midway when PH is that close is going to require a major portion of the fleet as escort and that was needed elsewhere.

 

well said LWD---my #29 I think is your 1 and 2.... ..,, you just don't organize, load, and send supply ships out in 30 minutes.....

 

Bronk seems to think that I am suggesting a last minute ad hoc operation. I am not.

Yamamoto's plan was to attack Pearl and damage the Pac Fleet to the extent that they could not come charging across the Pacific and interfere with his other operations. Part of the plan was to take Wake Island and push his recon ability out thousands of miles toward Hawaii. He succeeded on both counts.

But this thread is about was Hawaii in danger. The answer is no based upon the original strike and leave plans of the IJN. However, if Midway had been the invasion objective, instead of Wake, then an argument could be made that, yes, Hawaii was in danger. Historical fact tells us that Midway was as weakly defended as Wake, and like Wake, it's only reinforcement option was by sea. Historical fact tells us that the Pac Fleet was unwilling to risk a carrier vs carrier encounter to provide relief for Wake, why should anyone believe that they would have risked it for Midway? Historical fact shows that the IJN had a huge force advantage, in the area during this time period, with the additional advantage of long term planning of when and where to strike. Historical fact shows that the IJN had the assets available to man, transport, and land an invasion force. Historical fact shows that the Japanese could have funneled long range bombers and recon planes, from the Marshalls to Midway, without having their carriers exposed. Historical fact also shows that the Pac Fleet's sub interdiction results were abysmal during the early months of the war. There is no reason to believe that the sub campaign would stop the flow of supplies to the island.

How is Hawaii in danger? The long range recon planes were bombers as well and Hawaii was well within their flight range. From the get go, its been my belief that if the IJN had started a night nuisance bombing campaign against Pearl and the Port of Hawaii, then the Pac Fleet would have no choice but to go after Midway. Other posters have written that there is no way that Japan could mount a large enough bombing campaign to destroy Pearl. I agree, but it is my contention that they could have mounted one that would have embarrassed the Pac Fleet and the only way to stop it would be to go to Midway. Going after Midway would mean that the Pac Fleet carriers would have to be used. Who knows what might have happened on the long voyage to launching positions off of Midway. If it could happen to the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, then why couldn't it happen to the Pac Fleet carriers?

Would my alternate scenario have changed the course of the war? No, but it might have rewritten the first few chapters.