Was Hitler right to attack the USSR in 1941?

on the visit of Molotov:I think that the German proposals were sincere :an alliance with the SU would make Germany (from Hitler's POV) undefeatable.
Of course,if the war with the West was finished,then,the settlement with the SU would follow;but when ? It would depend on the date the war with the West would be finished and on the strength relations between both countries.

 

I'm not overlooking the restructuring at all, but I am interpretting what it would look like in late May/early June of 1942 and be capable of based on Glantz' books. According to Glantz the purges were still going to on, albeit to a lesser degree. The paralysis and subsequent tactical and operational incompetence of Red Army leadership wouldn't change in any appreciable way from one peacetime year to the next. There is no impetus, catalyst or necessity for that change to happen in the absence of combat. The basic Soviet plan for a response to German invasion would not have changed in a year either, the forces involved may have been better positioned to execute a flawed plan but thats not necessarily a good thing for the Red Army. In short, the disorganzied mess that was the Red Army in the Western Military Districts in June of 1941 would not be much different in the following year. There may have been more units, but considering all that goes into fielding new equipment, training personnel to use it, service/maintain it and also train leaders to properly integrate it into field operations....and balancing that against where the Red Army stood in all those areas in June 1941 I just don't see alot of change in peacetime conditions with the spectre of the purges hanging over everything.
The Wehrmacht on the other hand would have had a year to bring up stockage levels of spare parts/engines, etc. of tried and tested weapons systems, replace Luftwaffe losses from the French campaign and Battle of Britain and stockpile more fuel reserves to support the campaign. Much is said about the T34, but in reality its crew training was weak, as was its leadership and support (field support-mechanics, spare parts, fuelers, etc). The T34 would have created a local crisis here and there (until flanked, out of ammo, out of fuel, abandoned, etc.), but wouldn't have impacted the campaign.
The Red Army historically was not very competent in its operations in 1939 (Poland), 1940 (Finland), 1941 (Barbarossa) and 1942 (Blau). So I fail to see the Soviets as any more effective in a 1942 Barbarossa scenario.

 

All else being equal, time favors the defender, because it increases the number of unanticipated events--friction--which force the attacker to synchronize, losing even more time for the defender to draw reserves.

The Red Army was no peace time army. The release of political prisoners from Gulags to lead combat commands suggest there was plenty of urgency of purpose.

The Germans had as much preparation as they thought they needed. They could not prepare for inadequacies that they did not perceive and would not benefit from time.

German logistics system was weak. More stockpile wouldn't help them to put sufficient volume of matériel through the tube, and the Germans didn't work on those issues until they met them.

Unperceived inadequacies persisted in armament as well as logistics. The German soldiers and generals went to Russia believing they had the best tanks and guns in the world. They were wrong.

Additionally, the German strategic situation would not improve with time. The casualties incurred during Barbarossa compelled the Germans to draw on their skilled work-force which meant they were attacking the SU with the maximum number of troops mobilizable without damaging their economy. How would an extra year, with 3 million men sitting "idle" in uniform, impact their economy?

Since the Russians came out the winner in 1941 and 1942, they were skilled enough. This is the double edged sword of time. If the Wehrmacht couldn't do it in 1941 at the height of its powers, when the Red Army was not prepared, why do you think they would be more successful one year later?

 

I posted that already. I suggest you read pgs. 466-67 of Glantz' "Colossus Reborn" for better perspective on the condition of Red Army leadership (Chap 12, The Officer Corps and Command Cadre). A year would not help the Red Army's Officer Corps or its ability to anything other than follow a central command (which in light of their plan for immediate counter-attack at the border was a disaster waiting to happen). Glantz' "Stumbling Colossus" makes the situation very clear in much detail also.

According to what I have understood of the problems and issues associated with Red Army Plan MP-41 for mobilization, deployment and operations in the event of war with Germany, I don't see much advantage if any for the Soviets if they had a full year to work on it (relative to Axis preperations).

Was that after 22 June 1941? What is your source?

 

The Wehrmacht lost its campaigns in 1941 and 42. That's a fact. The badly-commanded, poorly-equipped, and ill-trained Red Army was good enough to win. It was not pretty, but it was victory.

In order to justify a delayed campaign, you need to show the Red Army would not improve while the German capabilities would. The Red Army did not need to be good. It only needed to be better than it was, historically, then the state the Wehrmacht found it in 1941. How couldn't 1 year of up-arming and up-training increase effectiveness even marginally? This was Glantz's conclusion in When Titans Clashed. If Stumbling Colossus explicitly or implicitly reject that statement, I would like to see the passage.

Could Wehrmacht grow stronger in any meaningful way? G. Megaree offers some fascinating insights into the decision making of the German high command during the preludes of Barbarossa. In spite of a sense of foreboding, German generals failed to pin-point their weaknesses and make amends before going to the attack.

They did not anticipate the depth and strengths of Russian reserves, did not identify the new generation of Russian weaponry that was superior to their own and could be used successfully in a long war. They did not identify key failure points in their logistics or strategy. Without the benefit of hindsight, none of those were things that time could fix.

On the other hand, the Russians only needed to be slightly more effective to make the Wehrmacht lost harder and more spectacularly.

As to the date of officers being released from Gulags, I am guilty of a exaggeration. I only know one officer for sure, his name is Konstantin Rokossovsky.

 

Good points Triple C, the Soviets were actively attempting to improve their war machines (planes and tanks) and their training system. The Germans, on the contrary believed early on that "new" stuff wouldn't be needed to defeat the "sub-human" slavs and Jews of the USSR. Waiting one more year wouldn't have brought about too many new Nazi weapons, but it would have (as time did historically) allowed the Soviets to upgrade both their armored and aircraft production.

 

the problem is ,that in 1941,the "minor" threat in the west was already preventing a substantial reinforcement for Barbarossa,in 1942 the threat in the west would become bigger,and the possibilities for the Germans to attack with more divisions,tanks,aircraft,... would be non existant .

 

The answer is within the dynamic of MP41. The Soviets were in the process of implementing this plan when Barbarossa happend in June of 1941, if the invasion were put off until late May(ish) of 1942 the deployments of MP41 are complete. This means that the already ongoing mobilization that created so many fresh units for the Red Army in 1941 is OUT OF THE PICTURE. Soviet force generation will take time to get up to speed in a 1942 scenario, unlike 1941 when it was already in full swing with a very finite goal that would have been reached by Summer 1942. thus the mobilization apparatus is dormant.
As far as capabilities being enhanced, the Red Army would need to field new equipment, "train the trainers", train the troops, train the logistical functions to maintain the equipment, conduct field training operations to integrate new units and make them effective. Considering the Russian winter and Fall and Spring Rasputista periods I find it highly dubious that the Red Army's MASSIVE expansion of MP41 would yield anything but additional cannon fodder. In addition, MP41 would put more of the Red Army's ill-trained and even more ill-led in forward areas (West of the Dnieper) where they are more likely to be encircled as per Barbarossa 1941. These poorly led troops also suffered from very low morale and I don't see any reason why they wouldn't surrender en-masse like they historically did in 1941.

As I said earlier, a 1942 scenario allows the DR and OKH to smooth things out between them and get the DR involved with planning for campaign support. The paramilitary railroad crews were understrength, underequipped and under-prioritized. I believe that full analysis of the operational plan by the DR would have yielded many changes and ultimately been able to deliver the critical logistical support to AGC. So my basic theoretical/hypothetical design is more Red Army losses West of the Dnieper, slower force generation and greater luftwaffe assets and logistical support for AGC all the way to Moscow by Sept. 1942.

A larger Soviet force (5 million) in the Western districts in the lead up to Barbarossa 1942 would very likely be detected by aerial recon simply because of its size. Once new units are detected it sets off alarm bells to look for more. Close to a full year of additional Intel gathering, wargaming (OKH, Paulus), increasing fuel, ammunition, spare parts stockage and refining of plans/schedules is likely to yield better results.

The Axis would have benefitted from a year relative to the Soviets.

 

The recent posts have been interesting and informative, but alas, I still feel that an attack either in '41 or '42 was simply a bad idea.

TripleC is correct to point out that numericaly Russia would be much better off in men, equipment, and formations. Black6 seems equally correct to point out that the Russians would be no better off operationaly ( the ability to use those men, tanks and units) perhaps even slightly worse off. Germany, on the other hand, was already at its operational hight, and numericaly and qualatively falling behind.

More intel would help, but it could also hinder. If Germany was to find out that they would face 1,200 to 1,500 T-34/KV-1 tanks in the summer of 1942 they might reconsider the wisdom of the whole idea. Hitler himself said if he knew what he faced that he might have thought twice. Perhaps the closest he came to admitting ever making a mistake.

Improving rail supply would help, good logistics is always a plus, but Germany did not fail because the trains did not run on time. They lost because they ran into too many men, too many tanks better then their own, and simply too much land to conquer.

1941 or 1942 seems a wash to me either way.

The argument that German strategy rested on the premiss that the Soviet Union would collapse after one single blow has as much merit as me buying a single lottery ticket then telling my boss to take this job and shove it, because I was sure I was going to win. It could happen, it sure is darn unlikely though.

 

Here it is LJAd,....
Hitler War Plans July 1940

shows how Hitler decided to attack the Soviets from July '40 [must have come as a shock to OKH] while the Wehrmacht was on a roll. He asked if something could be done immediately, the Generals said no, attacking Russia could simply not be entertained in the Autumn of '40, troops needed to be re-equipped after the Western campaign, May '41 was the fatal target.

Which makes you ask was the coup in Yugoslavia, plus Churchill sacrificing the ANZACS & Brits in his Greek disaster the reason that there was a months delay for Barbarossa, or was it a weather problem?

 

IMHO about WEAPONS: 7.5 cm Leichtgeschütz 40 ...and plus non recoil guns after the succes of tis type in Crete, 7.5 cm PaK 40 ... Panzer IV long nez, plus Tiger and the magnificent FW 190. They were on the way before Barbarossa...

Plus more standardized trucks and better logistics plannig (raylways). Barbarossa evidently did not increase fuel reserves of the Nazis (as Führer generals had warned would happen in any case) so: more oil.

But I still think the best option was 1941. At least in 1942 the Soviet armored divisions would have reserves of fuel and ammunition. Aviation might not have been grounded to review all appliances together.

And Soviet weapons and officers would have been better.

 

well,I am not convinced;maybe it is hair-splitting,but,because it is important,we should be certain that in july 1940,Hitler took the decision to attack the SU.
what we know :
on 29 july 1940,Jodl stated that Hitler had decided on an attack on the SU
reason:it was bound to be come,and it was better to do it now(ideological reason)
on 31 july 1940,Halder stated that Hitler had decided on an attack on the SU
reason:military:the SU is Britain's last hope.
P.S.:I am or sure of the reliability of Halder's diaries:I have seen claims,that,after the war,he did rewrite them .
Whatever,the following points are contradicting the claim that Hitler took his decision in july 1940
1)even in december 1940,the "schwertepunkt" of the war economy was laying on the war with Britain .
2)in july 1940,Hitler ordered the partial demobilisation of the army
3)there is no document proving Hitler's decision for the attack
4)at the visit by Molotow,Hitler proposed a German-Russian political alliance
PS:the claim that Hitler ordered on 29 july an attack in the later summer,but was convinced by Keitel and Jodl of the impossibility,is wrong .Hitler asked if the attack was possible in 1940.

 

It is possible that the statements by Jodl and Halder are consistant with LJAd's 4 points. I have read that Hitler could have a conversation with two different people within a short time frame and commit to two oposing ideas. Hitler could be brought from one subject to the next quite easily depending on who he was talking to.

The fact that so many bureaucrats and ministers would carve out miniempires for themselves, with Hiter's blessing, because he felt that if they were fighting amongst themselves, they could not effectively work to undermine his position, led to a very inefficiant war machine

 

Don't think I, [or anyone at the Berghof Conference] suggested that Hitler 'ordered' the attack in July '40 [otherwise OKH would have had to obey or things would have hit the fan one way or the other] but he 'wanted' to go in '40 until wiser heads prevailed.

But it was July '40 when he made up his mind to attack the SU......

Military Planning Conference at the Berghof, 29 July 1940...

....Jodl without any preamble, [he] disclosed to us that Hitler had decided to rid the world 'once and for all' of the danger of Bolshevism by a surprise attack on Soviet Russia to be carried out at the earliest possible moment, ... Shortly after Jodl's disclosure, we happened to discover that Hitler had originally been determined to launch the attack in the late summer of 1940.

...But the the most urgent representations from Keitel and Jodl ... had been necessary to convince the Supreme Commander that the time and space factors alone, together with the weather conditions, rendered this plan totally impracticable."

They eventually settled on May 1941.

Source: Warlimont, Inside, pp. 111-112


And Hitlers way of dealing with Britain....

Military Planning Conference at the Berghof, 31 July 1940....

This meeting included Hitler, the Chiefs of Armed Forces High Command (OKW), Army High Command (OKH), and Navy High Command. These notes are from the war diary of General Franz Halder, the Chief of Staff in OKH:

"[According to Hitler] Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East. Russia is the Far Eastern sword of Britain and the United States pointed at Japan. ... Russia is the factor upon which Britain is relying most. Something must have happened in London! (i.e., a reference to Britain's pre-war anti-communist stance being reversed) ... With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would be shattered. Germany will then be master of Europe and the Balkans. Decision: Russia's destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 1941. The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots with one blow. Holding part of the country will not do. Standing still for the following winter would be perilous ... Resolute determination to eliminate Russia."

Source: Halder, Diaries, pp. 533-4 (31 July 1940)

BTW, what's your take on the vital month lost in '41, from May to June, Yugoslavia & Greece or the weather?

 

Bingo! Russian mechanized formations that counterattacked the Germans in 1941 fell apart because they had no adequate amount of spare parts, fuel, ammunition, trucks, and no training worthy of the name whatsoever for the bulk of their tankers. It's impossible not to improve drastically on those standards.

 

Weather, Balkans campaign as well as the massive deployment schedule and building of supply depots behind the borders. The deployments for Barbarossa have as much responsibility for the "delay" as the weather and Balkan's campaign do. The German Railroad Service's expansion (Plan Otto) was complete in the Spring and that is when the deployments to the East began. The deployments were still ongoing when Barbarossa kicked off on 22 June.

 

I think the most important reason for the delayal of Barbarossa was the weather:"What mitigated against a theoretical invasion date at the end of May or in early june was the fact that many rivers in the western SU which would have to be crossed in the course of the attack,including the Bug and the Narev,were still in flooduntil well into june and would therefore have presented a very disagreeable obstruction."(H.Magenheimer:Hitler's War )
P.S.:I have my doubts on the mythical importance of these "lost" weeks,those who are arguing their importance,are starting from the POV,that without the "loss" of these weeks,the Germans would have won .
Nothing is that sure:already on the beginning of september,the German campaing had ended in a strategical crisis:the red army being not defeated,the Germans had to restart the whole thing .

 

Drastically? They were still awaiting their complete fill on personnel and equipment when Barbarossa started on 22 June. That leaves 3 months -July-Sept. to complete mobilization and fieldings and then train as a unit (to include all echelons from Platoon to Front). Oct. brings Rasputista, then winter, the spring Rasputista and then Barbarossa 1942. All of that drastic improvement is to be expected with an undermanned officer corps that is both professionally incompetent and institutionally devoid of personal initiative.
btw-the older models of tanks were worn out from the large scale manuevers and training exercises of the previous summer(s) and were due to be replaced by newer models over time. They were not being repaired or scheduled to be repaired, most units still had these models and were in the neighborhood of 20-30% readiness. In a 12 month period I don't see that readiness rate changing for older models and I don't see the overall effective number of Soviet armor rising at all (gains vs. losses-turned in or just deadlined). It is also notable that the new models still did not have radios and the Red Army was horribly underequipped with communication equipment at all levels. The key reason for armored operations disintegrating in space in 1941 was lack of situational awareness in a tactical environment and inability to swiftly coordinate/react with combined arms and support (ie. fuelers, maintenance, recovery ops, recon, etc.). This wouldn't change at all by 1942.


Red Army forces may look good on paper and their doctrine may sound good, but the reality of the forces in the Western Districts in 1941 or 1942 is no where near what appearences may suggest.

 

Yes, quite.

You seem to have underestimated the degree of Russian unpreparedness in 1941.

The Russian T-34 gunner-commanders fired no more than four rounds for practice and drivers were allowed to drive their assigned vehicles once. Motor rifle units had no trucks. Not just individual tank crews lacked radios; but signal units of Rifle Army to Front HQs lacked functioning radios.

Most Russian counterattacks during the first week of the war failed due to the inability of the units executing them to assemble and march without dissolving, from the lack of coordination or transport. The problem was not the Red Army could not fight, as Glantz states, but their lack of rudimentary logistical support and staff officers.

Complicating Russian staff work was the fact that most of the generals in Division to Front HQs were new to their formations and the Wehrmacht attacked before commanders understood the capabilities of their subordinates and units. I don't think Russian officer training stopped for Rasputista or winter climate. There was little if no off-time for their junior officer's curriculum. Given the modicum of trained officers and technical experts available during 1941, any increase in their numbers would reap tangible benefits.

That was the opponent that Barbarossa failed to overwhelm fast enough to win. However, there are no indications, if any, that the German Army cared to examine their plans to invade Russia realistically, no evidence that their industrial base would be better served with an extra year, or the time would allow them to rebuild Russian railroads to European standards faster than they already did in 1941.

 

Hello bndirt,
sorry for the late response but I have been a bit busy at work. As I'm sure you know, (at least I hope so) it has never been nor will ever be my intention to denigrate US and Allies help to Russia. I have seen the Lend Lease number as low as 8% and as high as 12%, 10% just fits nicely in the middle. While the numbers above look impressive, the 10% of what Russia needed to come out victorious not only includes what she manufactured but also what she already had stockpiled.

My opinion of LL stands on the same line with Glantz's; LL was responsible for saving countless lives and shortening the war but not the ultimate determining factor in the conflict.