What if the Axis shared their technology ealier and more efficiently?

T.A.'s very instructive post on the what if heavy bombers thread about Japan and Germany rarely sharing technology gave me an idea for a what if. What if Hitler to show off his power and influence to Japanese diplomats ordered German industries to share their technology with Japan? This would happen in 1936, at the signing of the Anti-Comintern treaty. Limiting it to aircraft design, I thought that Japan might accept since historically, Japanese industries did adapt Western technology in one way or another. What kind of aircraft could've come out with such a development? Would adapting the technology also influence Japanese aerial operations, such as reliance on radios for better coordination?

 

Germany did share some aviation technology with Japan in the late 1930's, notably the very successful DB601 inline aircraft engine and the plans for the Bf-109. But the collaboration was less than successful from the Japanese perspective. The problem wasn't technology per se, but rather the Japanese industrial techniques and methods. While Japan did adapt western adapt to western technology, it's industrial methods did not lend themselves to large volume production of high tech products. The Japanese were slow to eliminate labor-intensive operations in favor of machinery because they had a large pool of relatively low cost labor and the militarists adopted economic polices that worked against capital investment in industrial technology. This made quality control, among other things, more difficult. The bottom line was that Japanese designers and technologists were quite capable of producing advanced designs in many areas, but Japanese industry was incapable of volume production of those designs

The same thing happened in other technologies; The Germans provided an example of an advanced U-Boat which was literally taken apart and studied by Japanese marine engineers and architects. The conclusion; it was far too advanced to be produced in quantity by Japanese yards. the Japanese captured examples of both advanced radios and radars fairly early in the war, but continued producing electronics components which were comparable to relatively crude early 1930's designs, and which could not be used to produce reliable 1940's electronic devices. They did produce a few handbuilt copies of advanced electronics which were every bit as good as what the western nations had, but were never able to produce them in the quantities needed to have any effect in the war.

It wasn't that the Japanese lacked knowledge of advanced technology, it was that their industrial infrastructure couldn't produce it in volume. For that reason, I believe the the Axis partners sharing technology in an earlier time frame might have had some small effect, but wouldn't have significantly changed the outcome of the war.

 

This was really a one-way street. The Japanese from the mid 30's bought and analyzed alot of German, Italian, and other nation's equipment. The Japanese had a license to build Italian BR 20 bombers for example and used these in China. They bought from Germany copies of the Me 109, He 112, He 100, and many other pre-war and early war aircraft. They had a license to build the DB601 engine which was used in the Ki 61 Tony. They aquired a license to manufacture the MG 151 20mm Mauser aircraft cannon.
They had a license to build Douglas DC 2 transports and built DC 3's as well. They aquired copies of the Würtzburg radar for study and had several U-boats in their possession.
The Germans on the other hand ignored Japan as a source of any technology. This included the microwave / centimetric radar technology that Japan had in advance of Britain. Germany remained blissfully unaware of this development until 1944 even though the Japanese already had developed radar sets that used it.
Chaff was another development the Japanese first used at Guadalcanal. The Germans had suppressed their research on this obstensively to keep the British from getting the technology. A year after the Japanese were already using it against the US the British used it against Germany and confounded their defenses with it.
The Japanese later aquired jet and rocket technology from Germany. They also tried to import copies of the Panther and Tiger because of their inferior armor situation.
Anyway, the list is long. Germany might have done well to pay more attention to Japanese developments too.

 

I had posted this in a couple of other threads,

I was just reading the October 2005 issue of WWII magazine. There was an interesting article on the secret submarine missions to Europe by the Japanese. It seems that the Germans gave quite a bit of tech to the Japanese. It was a good thing that alot of the subs were sunk before they could make it back to Japan.According to the article the Germans sent in one shipment, 50 Enigma machines,a complete Wurzburg air defence ground radar with bluprints,examples of German torpedoes,bombs and fire control systems along with 1 million yen of industrial diamonds. The sub was sunk before the items could be dilivered though.The Japanese did deliver blueprints of the Type 91 torpedo to the Germans. On a 2nd shipment the Germans sent 20 more Enigma machines, a HWK 509A-1 rocket motor,a Jumo 004B axial-flow turbojet,Blueprints for the ME-163 and Me-262 and a V-1 fuselage.Also sent were drawings for the Isotta-Fraschini torpedo boat engine and acoustic mines. That sub too was sunk before it could deliver. Though the blueprints for the Me-163 and Me-262 was taken off before that happened. I wonder how the war would have been affected if they had made it? Do you think that if the Japanese had received the Enigma machines instead of them being sunk on the way to them would that have caused a problem for the Allied

and this too,
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Document created: 6 September 00
Published Aerospace Power Journal - Fall 2000

Germany’s Last Mission to Japan: The Failed Voyage of U-234 by Joseph Mark Scalia. Naval Institute Press (http://www.nip.org), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, 2000, 250 pages, $29.95.

This book tells the remarkable account of U-234, a German submarine carrying German experts, Japanese officers, and German experimental technology, that ran the Allied blockade and surrendered on 15 May 1945. Germany and Japan decided to exchange technology and war material because Japan lost its overland link to Germany when the latter attacked the Soviet Union. At first the two allies used blockade-running ships, but that became too dangerous. So by 1943, Germany started sending material and specialists to Japan in U-boats to avoid the blockade.

U-234, a minelaying U-boat, left Germany on 5 April 1945, her mine-storage areas full of material for Japan. The 12 passengers included the new air attaché to Tokyo, General of the Air Force Ulrich Kessler, who had directed the air attack on Poland in 1935 and was implicated in a plot against Hitler in 1944. Accompanying the general were two military advisors—1st Lt Erich Menzel, a radar specialist, and Lt Col Fritz von Sandrart, an expert in antiaircraft defense strategy. Gerhard Falcke, a naval construction expert with diplomatic experience, headed the naval contingent. Heinrich Hellendorn, a naval antiaircraft specialist, was studying the Imperial Navy’s tactics at sea. Richard Bulla, a naval aviator, had been sent to observe Japanese carrierborne naval aviation. Naval judge Kay Nieschiling was to be the judicial officer in charge of military justice for the two thousand German naval personnel in Japan. Dr. Heinz Schlicke, one of Germany’s leading electronics experts, was to help Japan develop new radar and countermeasures systems. August Bringewald, who headed a two-man Messerschmitt contingent, was in charge of ME-262 jet-fighter production. Franz Ruf, an industrial machinery specialist, was to help the Japanese build new aircraft factories. Also on board were two Japanese officers, Lt Comdr Tomonaga Hideo, a naval aviator and submarine specialist, and Lt Shoji Genzo. The mission of these men, both of whom had served as attachés at several Japanese embassies in Europe, was to make sure the material arrived in Japan.

In May, Lt Comdr Heinrich Feller received a message telling him to surrender his boat because the war with Germany was over. Based on the location of U-234, he should have surrendered to the Canadian navy, but he was very close to the American surrender area. Thus began Feller’s dilemma—where would he go and to whom would he surrender? The passengers and officers offered their suggestions, ranging from going to Argentina or Uruguay or even an island in the South Pacific. Because Feller and his officers decided they should avoid the British and Canadians, fearing they would turn them over to the French, the crew began the cat-and-mouse game of avoiding the Canadian navy and trying to reach the Americans to surrender to them.

The Americans did in fact capture the boat and took it to Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Because of the personnel on board, U-234 was a fine prize; however, the Japanese officers, fearful of how the Americans would treat them, committed suicide with sleeping pills before capture. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) interrogated the personnel on board to find out the state of Japanese weaponry and how much German experimental weaponry had found its way to Japan. ONI also found a treasure trove in the storage compartments of the U-boat: complete drawings and prints for the V-1 and V-2 rockets, a complete, disassembled ME-262 jet fighter, an ME-163 rocket-propelled fighter, and disassembled jet engines. More mysterious was the 1,235 pounds of uranium oxide, which would give U-234 notoriety as historians and scientists tried to figure out what the Japanese planned to do with this compound.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/fal00/scalia.html

 

In 1943, single early Panther Ausf D along with PzKpfw VI Tiger was sold to Japan, but both were never delivered due to the war situation and were loaned by Japan to the German Army.

Left: Japanese Military Attache Colonel Ioshida inspecting purchased Panther at Henschel plant.
Photo provided by Dmitry Pyatakhi

Achtung Panzer! - Panther


On June 7th of 1943, Japanese ambassador in Germany, General Oshima was shown a Tiger from sPzAbt 502. Single Tiger was then sold to Japan in 1943, but was never delivered due to the war situation and was loaned by Japan to the German Army (sSSPzAbt 101). Henschel charged Japan 645.000 Reichsmarks for fully equipped Tiger (with ammunition and radio equipment), while the regular price for the same Tiger was only 300.000 Reichsmarks.

Achtung Panzer! - Tiger I

 

Actually, Japan bought a copy of the Enigma machine in the early 1930's
and heavily modified it to produce what the US dubbed the "Red Machine". The Red Machine code was broken in 1936 by the US Army. The Japanese then, in 1938, designed and built the "Purple Machine", which was far more sophisticated than either the Enigma or "Red" machines. By August, 1940 in a joint effort, the US Navy and US Army, had cracked the "Purple Machine" code and built replica machines which allowed them to decrypt any message sent in "Purple Machine" code. It's my understanding that the Japanese did receive some Enigma machines from Germany. But, having quickly broken the "Red Machine" code which was based on the original Enigma design, and also broken the "Purple Machine code, which was far more sophisticated than Enigma, Us intelligence would have had very little trouble breaking into Enigma coded messages.

http://ovid.cs.depaul.edu/Classes?CS233-Q04/Papers/PurpleMagic.pdf


It's interesting that the Japanese thought the Germans might be interested in a Type 91 torpedo. The Type 91 was a 1931 design for a 17.7 inch aerial torpedo with a 331 pound warhead, and a maximum range of 2,200 yards, at 41 knots, using a kerosene/air wet heater for propulsion.

The other stuff sent to Japan wouldn't have made much difference because the Japanese didn't have the industrial capacity or technology to mass produce reliable jet or rocket engines or sophisticated electronics. I have read several of these articles in popular history magazines and they all seem to breathlessly speculate on how the war might have turned out differently, if only the subs had arrived with cargoes intact; They conveniently ignore the fact that the Japanese had trouble with the proven DB601 engine, and had no chance of mass producing any technologically advanced weapons. I guess it appeals to the magazine editors because it boosts readership.

 

Regardless of who or what the editors were trying to appeal to I was posting the information as to what the Germans were sending to the Japanese. I am fully aware of the what the industrial conditions were for the Japanese.

 

I was aware of the situation of Japan's industrial sector that's why I placed the scenario during the signing of the Anti-Comintern agreement. I felt that by putting it in 1936, five years before Japan opened hostilities with the US, would allow some elbow room for Japan to tool up.
Historically, Japan's leaders didn't think in terms of a long war. Since they generally thought in terms of one decisive battle that would force the enemy to give up, they saw no need to tool up.
But what if the Japanese did tool up a sector of their industry to accommodate the technology they received from Germany?
I know Japan still wouldn't be able to match the industrial capacity of the US. Most probably, the result would be a longer, more bloodier match. Still, I can't help but think if Japan had better quality lightweight radio communications, the US could've been given an even tougher time in Guadalcanal. Or in Midway, Japan's CAP could've been called back.

 

As a follow up, what do you guys think is the one piece of German technology that the Japanese could've adapted to make their military more effective?

 

Dr. Goebbels Silver Tongue? Otherwise I can't see any single item Gemany had that could be classified as war winning considering the specificiyies of Japanese strategical environment.

 

I'm not referring to war winning item. Japan can't win against the US. What I'm asking is what you guys consider as one piece of German tech that the Japanese could adapt to improve the Japanese military's capabilities.

 

Japan, in fact, in 1930 did have a plan to reform their industrial methodologies to increase their ability to mass produce advanced technological devices and, in particular, weapons. But it only scratched the surface of the problem and was overly optimistic in terms of the time it would take (estimated as a decade) and the economic resources it would require. In any case, the militarists scuttled the plan by taking over Manchuria and later northern China. The pressures imposed on Japanese industry and the economic resources these two projects devoured meant there was little or no capital, and even less incentive, to improve industrial infrastructure.

Moreover, such an industrial reformation involved deep social and cultural changes which were not fully understood even by the Japanese industrial planners themselves. For one thing, though the Japanese always assumed they would have enough industrial labor, the Japanese education system was not geared to turn out large numbers of the kinds of workers that were really needed; engineers, technicians, and industrial managers. Worse, as the war in China progressed, the Japanese military found it needed exactly these kinds of professionals to support it's forces engaged in the modern mechanized form of warfare that prevailed in the 1930's, and began drafting the very men who were expected to design and manufacture the necessary weapons. Even semiskilled industrial labor became a problem in the latter stages of the war and the Japanese only reluctantly turned to utilizing females in the industrial labor pool.

Perhaps the main reason Japan was incapable of mass producing advanced technological weapons was poor industrial organization. In the United States and other western countries, engineers collaborated on design and engineering projects, and companies formed consortiums to pool such talent and produce designs which were then jointly manufactured. This was a very efficient use of labor at all levels and eliminated duplication of effort. In Japan, due to the secretive and highly competitive nature of the vertically organized Zaibatsus, this industrial strategy was not pursued. Consequently, design projects often spent valuable time and engineering resources "reinventing the wheel" and working on projects which never came to fruition or were overtaken by advancing technology. The manufacturers ended up making the same obsolete components because there were simply no newer or better designs available. Thus there was no synergy between design and manufacturing and this tended to inhibit development of better or more advanced products, especially in the field of electronics.

To overcome these problems wasn't simply a matter of "tooling up" to produce technologically advanced devices. It would have required a complete restructuring of the Japanese economy and industrial organization, not to mention the educational system, over a period of two or three decades, plus a massive influx of investment capital. Such reforms also required a change in the Japanese cultural view of labor and social organization. These changes simply weren't realistic for a country in the midst of a major war from 1937 onwards.

 

Wiki again with a grain of salt,

Japanese-German military technology collaboration
It is known that Japan and Germany signed agreements on military technological collaboration, both before the 1939 outbreak of World War II, and during the conflict. The first air technology interchange occurred during World War I when Japan joined against Germany on the side of the Allies, and Germany lost a Rumpler Taube at Tsingtao, which the Japanese rebuilt as the Isobe Kaizo Rumpler Taube, and an L.V.G. known to the Japanese as the Seishiki-1, in 1916.
After the war had ended the Japanese purchased licences for the Hansa-Brandenburg W 33 which was built as the Yokosho Navy Type Hansa in 1922 and as the Aichi Type 15-ko "Mi-go" in 1925.
During World War II the Japanese Navy traded a reconnaissance seaplane Nakajima E8N "Dave" (Itself a multi-generational development of the [[Vought] O2U]]) to Germany which was later seen in British markings on the German raider Orion, and some sources mention the probable dispatch of a Mitsubishi Ki-46 "Dinah", among other weapons.
In the other direction:
-The German Focke Wulf company sent a Focke Wulf Fw-190 A-5, and was contracted to send a Focke Wulf Fw 200 V-10(S-1) or Focke-Wulf Ta 152.
-The Heinkel company sent examples of the Heinkel He 50 A (manufactured in Japan by Aichi as the D1A1, Allied codename "Susie"), Heinkel He 70 "Blitz", Heinkel He 112 (V12,12 B-0, Japanese designation A7He1), Heinkel He 100 D-1 (in Japan designated AXHe1), Heinkel He 116 (V5/6), and Heinkel He 118, Heinkel He 119 V7 and V8, Heinkel HD 25, Heinkel HD 62, Heinkel HD 28, Heinkel HD 23, Heinkel He 162 "Volksjager", Heinkel He 177 A-7 "Greif" designs.
-The Bucker company sent its Bucker Bu 131 "Jungmann" which in Japan was designated Kokusai Ki-86/Kyushu K9W1.
-The Dornier Company sent its Dornier Do 15 Wal (in Japan made by Kawasaki as the KDN-1), Dornier Do N built as the Kawasaki Army Type 87 Heavy Bomber, and the Dornier Do C.
-Fieseler sent the Fieseler Fi-103 (V-1) "Reichenberg" and Fieseler Fi 156 Storch (redesigned by the Japanese and produced as the Kobeseiko Te-Go).
-The Junkers company sent its Junkers K 37 (developed by the Japanese as the Mitsubishi Ki-1 and Ki-2), Junkers G-38b K51 (Japanese design Mitsubishi Ki-20), Junkers Ju 88 A-1, Junkers Ju 52, Junkers Ju 87 A, Junkers Ju 86 and made sales of its Junkers Ju 290, Junkers Ju 390 and Junkers Ju 488 designs.
-The Messerschmitt company sold Messerschmitt Me Bf 109 E-3/4, Messerschmitt Me 110, Messerschmitt Me 210 A-2, Messerschmitt Me 163 A/B "Komet" (a Japanese design was based only on partial drawings received was built as the Mitsubishi J8M/ Ki-200 "Shusui" Rocket Intercepter) and Messerschmitt Me 262 A-1a whose design influenced Nakajima Ki-201 "Karyu"; and studied the possibility of the use of the Messerschmitt Me 264 - also sent the design of the Messerschmitt Me 509, (which may have influenced the design of the Yokosuka R2Y1 Keiun reconnaissance plane).
-The Arado Company sent(?) an example of Arado Ar 196 A-4, which had been traded for the Nakajima E8N already mentioned;
-Focke-Achgelis sent its design Focke-Achgelis Fa 330 Bachstelze, an observation plane for submarines, and other aircraft examples.
When it comes to aircraft equipment, the Japanese Army Fighter Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien "Tony" used a licence built Daimler-Benz DB-601A engine which resulted in the Allies believing that it was either a Messerschmitt Me Bf 109 or an Italian Macchi C.202 Folgore until they examined captured examples. It was also fitted with Mauser MG 151/20 20mm Cannons also built under licence.
Japanese Ambassador General Hiroshi Oshima in the name of Japanese Army bought one example of the Panzerkampfwagen PzKpfw VI Ausf E Tiger I Tank with additional equipment, and the Navy received examples of the German Submarine Type IXD-2 Ausf "Monsun" and other submarines, such as the U-181 (Type IXD-2) (Japanese sub I- 501), the U-862 (Type IXD-2), (Japanese submarine I-502), Italian submarines "AQUILA III" (Japanese submarine I-503), and "AQUILA VI" (Japanese submarine I-504), U-219 (Type XB) (Japanese submarine I-505), the U-195 (Type IXD-1) (Japanese submarine I-506), two Type IXC submarines (Japanese submarines RO-500 & RO-501), and Flagvierling 20 mm anti-aircraft cannons, with a disarmed V-2, etc.
There are other cases of military technology interchange. The Ho-Ru Sp with 47mm AT Cannon resembled the German Hetzer SP vehicle combined with wheel guide pins like T-34 and Heavy Tank Destroyers Ho-Ri I and II, armed with 105 mm Cannon. They seem to have been influenced by German Jagd Heavy tanks Ferdinand, Elefant and Jagdtiger and Type 4 Medium Tank "Chi-To" armed with 75mm Cannon and Type 5 Medium Tank "Chi-Ri" armed with 75 or 88mm Cannon, influenced of Panther, Tiger I, and Tiger II German Tanks and Armored Carrier Type 1 Half-Track "Ho-Ha" are similar to the German Armored Carrier SdKFZ 251/1 "HANOMAG".

In 1935 a German technical mission arrived in Japan to sign some accords and licenses to use the technology in the "Akagi" Class Carrier for the Type "A" (Graf Zeppelin) and "B" (cencelled) aircraft carriers from Deutsche Werke Kiel A. G. They also acquired the technical data on the adaptations to the Messerschmitt Me 109T/E and Junkers Ju 87C/E, for use on such carriers. This technology was also applied in the following aircraft:

• Fieseler Fi 156
• Fieseler Fi 167
• Arado Ar 95/195
• Arado Ar 96 B
• Arado Ar 197
• Heinkel He 50
• Avia B 534. IV

To put this in perspective, The Japanese also bought licences and acquired aircraft (sometimes singly and sometimes in large quantities) from most of the western countries. These included the United Kingdom (with which it had a close relationship up until shortly after the end of World War I) and whose De Havilland aircraft were extensively used, France, who supplied a huge variety of aircraft of all types from 1917 through to the 1930's, and whose Nieuport-Delage NiD.29 C.1 fighter provided the Japanese Army Air Force with its first modern fighter aircraft, as well as the bias toward extremely maneuverable aircraft. The United States of America supplied the Douglas DC-4E and Douglas DC-5, North American NA.16 (T-6/SNJ precursor) as well as too many others to list. This resulted in many Japanese aircraft being discounted as being copies of western designs - which from 1935 onwards was rarely the case except for trainers and light transports where development could be accelerated, the Nakajima Ki-201 and Mitsubishi J8M being rare exceptions.
the months of 1944, Japan was to rely heavily on the Nippon-German Technical Exchange Agreement, obtaining manufacturing rights, intelligence, blueprints, and in some cases, actual airframes for several of Germany's new air weapons. These included the Me 163 "Komet" ( developed as the Mitsubishi J8M Shusui ), the BMW 003 axial-flow jet engine (which was reworked to Japanese standards as the Ne-20 ), information on the Me262 (which resulted in the Nakajima Kikka),data on the Fiesler Fi103R series (which culminated in the development of the Kawanishi Baika ),and even data on the Bachem Ba349 "Natter" point-defense interceptor.
While the Nakajima Kikka bore some resemblance to the German Me262, it was only superficial, even though the Ne-20 engines which powered the Kikka were the Japanese equivalent of the German BMW 003 engine which initially powered the Me262 prototype. Also, the Kikka was envisioned from the outset not as a fighter, but as a special attack bomber and was only armed with a bomb payload.
Over Tachikawa Ki-162 The Japanese became involved in the He 162 when the final blow was coming to Germany in 1945.It seems, however, that the Japanese were sent data concerning the He 162 not by submarine or courier, but by wire transmission. This transfer occurred in April of 1945. What was sent is not known but certainly could not have been useful in the absence of any form of blueprints, technical drawings, or other more solid data needed to produce such an aircraft as the He 162.
if considered the Japanese acquired illustrations or pictures of the He 162 from some source and perhaps from the data obtained from the transmissions, could have produced something from it, much as they did the Ne-20 from photographs of the BMW 003 turbojet. If dimensions of the He 162 were sent, it is probable Japanese engineers could have replicated the appearance of the He 162 and either equipped it with the later Ne-330 engine or the Maru pulsejets. Certainly the He 162 lent itself to the use of non-war critical materials in its construction and was relatively simple to assemble and build, all things the Japanese were capable of doing. As it was, with the situation the Japanese air industry found itself in by this time, the task of producing a new aircraft from such sketchy data would have taken more effort than could be spared.

Japanese-German pre-WWII industrial co-operation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

That's more than enough technology sharing to keep one happy, I guess!

 

It seems that there were real attempts at technical collaboration between the Axis. Fortunately for us, the Axis weren't as efficient.
From the posts here, it looks like Japan's militaristic culture during the 1930's was one major factor that discouraged attempts at industrial reform.

 

Nice post JCFalkenbergIII

Did not know that much was exchanged. I could just imagine what would have happened had the Japanese had developed all that German hardware especially had they had all those navalised versions of the Messerscmitt 109T or Junkers Ju-87 and that the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy had the Me-262.

v.R