Why Hitlers turn south in 1941

I had a thought, that the planning for Barbarossa included turns both north and south to clear the flanks, so it was not just Hitler who saw the need. Is the reason Hitler ordered the turn south because he saw the war was not going well and he knew that Germany needed the Ukraine and the Donbass to fight a longerwar.

 

Steve, your original thread title is dangerously close to a what-if and I suspect this was intended as a question.

 

My best guess is that Hitler was discouraged by Moscow. He was planning to starve out Leningrad anyway, but the only way he could really accomplish this was by securing the rail lines and forest roads that ran north and helped run the Ice Road. He was able to do this only temporarily, and there was no way with his supplies being stretched that far he was going to win that war of attrition.

Also, Hitler's armies had been fighting in the Ukraine that whole time, trying to prevent the Russians from retaking Kiev. It was only after he realized the Ukrainians wouldn't help with Germany's war production (also his fault, since he persecuted them) that he decided a full on push to Baku was nessicary.

 

Its not about what option its more of a why and is it a plausible why.

 

Sadly, like Russo said, one cane never be 100% sure on that.

 

It is very simple (no need to search for complicated explications and explanations) :at the moment of the Kiev decision ,there was no other viable option .

1)AGC was blocked at Smolensk and was to weak to advance to Moscow

2)AGS was in big trouble at Kiew and needed help

3)The Soviet forces at Kiew were a real danger for an advance of AGC.

Conclusion :Adolf took the decision to DELAY the advance of AGC to Moscow
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And,if I am not wrong,the generals agreed .

 

Bock of AGC and others disagreed they thought that Moscow was the key target and wanted to continue east. Guderian disagreed, but he insisted he had to have the .whole PZ group and not just part.

 

The danger on the right flank was real. But whether you turn east and destroy the 1 million Red Army soldiers at Kiev or continue to Moscow an "perhaps" win the war? That is an interesting question.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Invasion1941.jpg

 

Good ;after the war,the generals claimed that the Kiew decision was a stupid decision from the stupid Adolf and that they were against it .

Thus,we could expect some proofs for the claims of the generals:memoranda,and such things,but,curiously and,suspiciously,such proofs still are missing,,which;IMHO,is caused by the fact that these claims are the usual post war attemps to blame Adolf for everything.

If Bock was against (and had reasons to be against,and,had an alternative),why was he not going to Rastenburg? And why was Guderian going ? Was Guderian sent by Bock? Doubtfull:the relations between both were evolving from bad to worse(Bock was consulting Halder how to get rid of Guderian).

What was Guderian saying in Rastenburg? We only have the story of Guderian,,and,as he has been caught to be vey economical with the truth,why should anyone believe him?
Again :why was Guderian going to Rastenburg? Why not Kluge (a FM)? What could say Guderian as argument against the delay of Typhoon ? That PG 2 was ready ? First,it was not so,secondlyG 2 was only a small part of AGC,and it was irrelevant if Gudrian was ready ..

The person whose presence at Rastenburg was indespensable,the man who could say to Hitler :Typhoon is possible on 1 september(that's what we are talking about),was Wagner (the QMG) ,the man in charge of supplies and transport ,and,Afaics,he was not there.

Thus, no Wagner, no Bock,only a second rang person as Guderian ..

 

This does much to prove the maxim, No battle plan long survives contact with the enemy. Nothing terribly sinister here. Army group South falls behind schedule and so AGC is tasked to help them make up time. It happens in every conflict, sometimes it works in your favor unexpectedly, sometimes not and on occasion has no real difference over all.

As to the He said, He said debate I tend to take a more middle of the path stance (at least until a truck comes barreling down the path!). I can take at face value that Bock did not like the "Turn South" order and did not wish to follow it, but did so anyway.

Looking at it from his perspective he could not like the order as if the operation is a success his command must, at least, share credit with Commander, AGS. Nor could he be happier at the prospect of giving his primary target time to consolidate their defenses as it only makes his eventual attack on Moscow that much more difficult, possibly having to rely on AGN or AGS for aid (Thereby having to again share credit).

As to no great level of documentation as to his objection, this too is fairly understandable. I am sure that if we ask any member who has served in combat, they admit that at some point some level of command gave them an order they dis-agreed with or thought was wrong. I gravely doubt they put their objection in writing and signed by everyone present. They swallowed their bile, and said Yes Sir!, or in this case Jawohl.

I will allow that post war, Bock, as many if not most of these officers, inflated their level of objection. This was hardly a Axis only trait. It is human nature to after the fact to reflect back to find the "crucial moment" when everything went wrong.

 

Perhaps they thought that the destruction of another million Red Army soldiers and the capture of Kiev was as also a potential path to victory. Indeed I think I've heard it suggested that taking Moscow or even attempting it without first addressing the forces at Kiev would be extremely risky.

 

The danger to AGC's southern flank was only real if they advanced past Smolensk, otherwise there is no exposed flank. Eremenko's front was tasked with hitting this flank that was assumed to be exposed as it was assumed that AGC would be continuing its advance. That was When Guderian's Pz Gruppe met Eremenko's Front head on and destroyed it on their way South to Kiev. So had AGC been heading East at that time instead of South, they would have been hit in the flank as expected (the force of which was weak, but still a threat to do damage to the logistical tail of AGC). All things considered, the Germans didn't know the extent of Red Army forces facing them at Smolensk and forming behind it and wouldn't have believed it if informed of it. The move South to Kiev was to allow the rump of AGC to replenish itself for the final push to Moscow while clearing the flanks and eliminating the last large intact elemnts of the Red Army. It ended up being a wise decision, only to be counter-balanced by the stupidity of continuing Typhoon after late October when the rains came (they should have dug in on favorable ground and withdrew the mobile units for refit).

 

Lets not forget the Romanian oil fields which would have been well in range of the Soviet Air Force had Ukraine not been secured.

Also had Ukraine not been secured, Germany would have had to feed all the troops on in the east (not possible).

The destruction of a million Red Army troops was also quite an incentive....

 

I propose that Hitler actually wanted to turn south because he realized that the original plan of taking Moscow by the mud season was not going to succeed and he knew Germany needed the resources of the Ukraine to keep fighting. Note it was actually forseen by the planners of Barbarossa that it would be a possibility to turn south and or north because Germany did not have the troops to cover the front.

 

Going to Moscow in september was impossible,the only other option was to delay the whole thing till october,and meanwhile going to Kiew

 

Hitler´s idea was to win as fast as possible, and soldiers were sent home and ammo production lowered as there would be no long lasting war. Changing strategy to getting Ukraine for the food would not mean a decisive blow to the Red Army, and Hitler would be himself making the war into a long lasting war, and Zhukov got the extra time to make the defensive belt around Moscow stronger.

 

If i Was C in C of Wermacht in late July 1941.,without the hind sight I believe I would have done the same thing as Hitler.
Obvious reason is economical; -wealthy Ukrainian wheat fields will secure that hunger that led to revolution and defeat at the end of WWI,which Hitler remembers so well doesn't happen again,-raw materials and heavy industry primarly of Donbas region.-opening of the way to major economical goal of nazi Germany, the oil fields of cis and trans Caucaus region and protection of own oil fields in Romania by seizing Crimea.These economical arguments that influenced Hitler so much should've been secondary in campaign designed to destroy enemy armies before winter.Because once the army is defeated all the prize goes to the winner anyway.
More important issue was of military-operational nature..There are several moments that are relevant here..To start with there is a matter of ever widening gap between racing panzers and the infantry that reached critical extent in mid July,with infantry legging hundreds of miles behind.If nothing else,it's never been tried before and top military experts(mostly of the old guard) started to feel very nervous.The logistic of AGC armoured formations was on breaking point and the right flank of army group center was non existent with neighboring army group south far behind.This problem would only expand if they pressed forward.
Last of military reasons has to do with ferocious defensive/offensive battles Soviets waged around Smolensk from mid July deep into August.Von Bock wrote at that time:' I'm compelled to engage all my divisions from army reserve..I'm in need of every single man at the front line.. If no strong blow delivered against the Russians on some sector in near future,it will be hard to destroy their army before winter. 'In light of all these information turning south would achieve economic goals,provide time for supplies,railroad construction and infantry to catch up,eliminate danger of exposed right flank, opportunisticly avoid and bypass obviously numerous and prepared forces of western front grouping east of Smolensk and easily net some 660 000 Soviet troops,the entire Southwestern front.
If one grants himself the luxury of hind sight things are some what different..It is known now that most important enemy of nazi army was time.Time they had to destroy Soviet prewar army and to size mobilization centers which were producing new units at incredible pace.Soviet mobilization system between 22.June and 31.December added to order of battle 373 rifle,58 tank and 88 cavalry divisions for a galactical grand total of 518 new divisions!!Quality of these divisions is another matter but these numbers alone have tremendous power.Back in '41 nazi intelligence estimated total Soviet mobilization capacity at 200 divisions.A fatal mistake. While Germans knew that Moscow was major transport, population, industry and political center,they just couldn't comprehend that this was only center capable of raising 15! brand new armies in 6 months(10 out of 28 raised in western USSR from 31.July to 31. December).Seizing center of such mobilization potential was essential for Germans to win before winter,perhaps to win at all..Not to mention the importance of Moscow as central hub of soviet centralised railway sistem, plus the political prestige.. Furthermore now is known that '41 Red army lacked any significant mobility and resupply capacity imperative for any serious offensive .Again back then German intelligence on the matter was flawed as they were so concerned about non existent or very small danger to AGC right flank,especially after carnage at Uman and loss of soviet armoured and mobile reserves in the south.
All in all drive to Moscow was IMHO the best option.Alternative route would be to take Ukraine,than to use blitzkrieg once again in Typhoon and stop after Vyazma,just as supply lines are cracking,mobile war becoming impossible because of rasputica(Russian term for impassable roads due to thick mud every fall and spring),troops need to rest and refit and winter dangerously close.In the spring offensive would continue,with preserved forces,finally capturing Moscow and dealing a death blow to Soviet army.The Russians on the other hand were betting all on this one card,that exhausted German armies on the end of over stretched supply lines would come into the trap they set for them at Moscow..Most of the reserves were there as well as fresh regular,fully equipped units from far east.The Russian bear was just waiting for this pack of superiorly mobile hungry nazi wolfs to come close,lose it's evading and manoeuvring abilities and get messy.That's just what they did, coming out with bloody noses,as AGC almost disintegrated.

 

Anybody read this? Interesting explanation,too.

BARBAROSSA DERAILED: THE BATTLE FOR SMOLENSK 10 JULY-10 SEPTEMBER 1941 VOLUME 1 by Glantz

Between 22 June and 10 July, the Wehrmacht advanced up to 500 kilometers into Soviet territory, killed or captured up to one million Red Army soldiers, and reached the western banks of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, by doing so satisfying the premier assumption of Plan Barbarossa that the Third Reich would emerge victorious if it could defeat and destroy the bulk of the Red Army before it withdrew to safely behind those two rivers. With the Red Army now shattered, Hitler and most Germans expected total victory in a matter of weeks. The ensuing battles in the Smolensk region frustrated German hopes for quick victory. Once across the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, a surprised Wehrmacht encountered five fresh Soviet armies. Despite destroying two of these armies outright, severely damaging two others, and encircling the remnants of three of these armies in the Smolensk region, quick victory eluded the Germans. Instead, Soviet forces encircled in Mogilev and Smolensk stubbornly refused to surrender, and while they fought on, during July, August, and into early September, first five and then a total of seven newly-mobilized Soviet armies struck back viciously at the advancing Germans, conducting multiple counterattacks and counterstrokes, capped by two major counteroffensives that sapped German strength and will. Despite immense losses in men and materiel, these desperate Soviet actions derailed Operation Barbarossa. Smarting from countless wounds inflicted on his vaunted Wehrmacht, even before the fighting ended in the Smolensk region, Hitler postponed his march on Moscow and instead turned his forces southward to engage "softer targets" in the Kiev region. The 'derailment" of the Wehrmacht at Smolensk ultimately became the crucial turning point in Operation Barbarossa.

 

Yes , very good work and explanation as usual with Glantz. It was actually normal blitzkrieg behaviour to act opportunisticly and engage softer targets for maximum gains with minimal losses. The problem was they wanted to do to much at once. For 1941 it should've been Kiev or Moscow not both, but it's hard to halt an army that wasn't yet defeated in battle and with ultimate prise in sight..