Why were Higgins boats used instead of LVt's

D-Day was in June of '44, arguably the most important amphibious operation of the entire war. Yet the troop transportation of choice was the Higgins boat instead of the superior LVT boats that had been used in the Pacific since '41.

Why?

 

The first use of the LVT in combat was at Tawara late November 1943 and 2/3 of the 125 LVT -4 employed were knocked out. . Earlier versions had been used as a tracked amphibious logistic vehicle at Guadalcanal. These lacked a rear exit ramp and offered little advantage over the DUKW, which was used extensively in Europe.

The key decisions about the techniques for the cross channel assault OP Overlord were taken in 1943, months before Tarawa. They did consult US marines with Pacific experience, but at this stage of the War there wasn't much of this. By November 1943 the Allied forces in Europe had,already assembled a fleet of assault craft, including US LCVP and British LCAs. They also had lots of experience of large scale landings in Op Torch,(North Africa Nov 1942) Op Husky (Sicily July 1943) and Ops Baytown and Avalanche (Italy Sep 1943)

One of the biggest problems the SHAEF team faced in early 1944 was finding a lot of extra landing craft to support the extra two divisions that the newly appointed Supreme Commander Ike and his Land Commander Montgomery thought would be essential to .establish a big enough initial beach head.

Throughout the war there were major wrangles with the US Navy who simply did not agree with the Germany First Strategy. I am not sure whether they would have agreed to turn over LVT production to support Overlord. This is one for some expert on US inter-service politics.

The D Day landing craft shortage was solved largely by turning over the capacity of British small ships yards used for building anti submarine ships to build landing craft and ships. There was a also a massive training programme for LCT and LST crews who would be boat crew for the extra craft. It might have been useful to have had amphibious tracked APCs on D Day. However, the idea of replacing all existing LCVP and LCA with double the numbers of LVT untried in theatre would have been a non- starter.

It is also a little doubtful whether the LVTs would help that much even on Omaha Beach. The soldiers would still need to disembark on the sand under German MG and Mortar fire. While embarked in the LVT each haldf platoon would have been very vulnerable to shot from the many anti tank guns flanking Omaha Beach.

After D Day the allies made use of LVTs in the Scheldt and Rhine crossing and in the Po River crossing

 

I'd broadly echo the above.

I really can't see how an LVT is necessarily superior for massed landings than an LCVP or LCA.
Seaworthy relatively simple flat-bottomed high capacity fast lander vs barely seaworthy complex device with half the speed, half the troop capacity, and a far more awkward dismount. (despite the greater (?) armour, there always comes a point in a landing where someone has to leave the thing.)

And supply can't be understated. The pre-Normandy struggle to gather enough landing craft of all types was immense. Local production of LCAs in the UK could be carried out by a chain of conventional shipbuilders and other industries with experience of woodworking.
Complicate that by requiring a tank-like chassis that was not produced in any form at the place where the landings set off... Seems unwise.

 

LVT-1's were used to provide logistical support for the Torch Landings, FMF tracs brought supplies ashore for the landings in Morocco.

 

Agreed -

The LVT is a very modern concept. . It was a tracked amphibious APC with a gun turret. It isn't a million miles from an M113 OK it has arisen by armouring something which is already tracked, amphibious can can carry 16 men.

It converges with, but does more than the Kangaroo .(APC based on a Ram/M4 chassis by dry land only and no weapons) and the German and US armoured half tracks (poorer tactical mobility). It is more expensive complicated and slower. .It is why the British equipped RAC specialist armour units for service in flooded areas where an amphibian was useful, such as the flooded Rhineland and Netherlands.

The western armies had not really thought about how they might used mechanised infantry and so didn't know they needed an M113 until they had had a chance to think about WW2.

 

As far as the navy not wanting to turn over production of lvts for the normandy invasion I don't think that would have been a problem. In Adrian Lewis book "omaha beach- a flawed victory" he makes reference to a stockpile of around 300-500 lvt s already in Britain by April 44 . It would seem the main reason they weren't used was the Army planners thought they didn't need any changes to the plan which had worked already in North Africa and Sicily. In fact a maj. General named Colett who had experience in several pacific landings recommend the use of lvts and it fell on deaf ears . He was quoted saying that after he gave a lecture on amphibious experiences in the pacific to a group of british officers just before the invasion one of them quipped to him "if we need to take an island we"ll let u know" .

It was more a failure of imagination or willingness to accept advice than it was a supply problem.

Whether or not it would have been effective at omaha or not it is hard to argue at the least it would have reduced some casualties. Sure several would have been knocked out by AT fire and most would have at best gotten the troops just to the seawall or shingle and no further, even 60-100 lvts would have delivered more groups across the beach and ready to move on when they reached the wire above the shingle bank. They also would have provided more places for cover for infantry and divided fire from the german AT guns among many more targets. Also they would have provide more close covering fire either with 50 cal or 37mm. At best these guns could have helped neutralize fire from bunkers with accurate fire into the openings ( see hymann hoss knocking out the 50mm gun at WN 64 or 65 with his 37mm anti aircraft gun) and at worst they would have given huge morale boost to the infantry seeing dozens more large machine guns or small cannons pounding at the unseen guns on the cliffs above .

 

They would not alone have been a huge difference maker but rather if done in conjunction with many other changes to the plan that were recommended and not heeded could have saved many lives .

 

Firstly, Welcome aboard!

That's interesting.
David Fletcher says none were available for D-Day*, but they were ready to go in time for the Scheldt a few months later.
I'd be interested if anyone had any more reference to just how many LVTs came over, when delivered, and when brought into serviceable condition.
I'm wondering if they were being reserved for ongoing trials, specifically for the envisioned large river crossings. To quote myself from elsewhere:

*Though there's a thread somewhere, here or another place, or maybe in Wheels & Tracks... that does have a picture of a solitary LVT in a post-D-day vehicle dump... If I recall.

 

My hackles rise when I see mention of Adrian Lewis' flawed book. Interesting, but a of of facts are shoehorned to support his rather poisonous arguments that it was all the British fault.....

Did he say what variant of LVT were stockpiled in the UK? Were these armoured armed versions or effectively tracked DUKW?

With hind sight a fleet of heavily armed tracked amphibious APCs would have been an obvious asset for the assault troops on D Day. Extra AFVs on Omaha Beach would have helped, even ifg distractiong fire from the tanks. However, the APC/MICV concept wasnlt really part of the allied commanders thinking in January 1944.

The commanders may well have taken the view that January 1944 was a little too late to adjust the plan. They had a lot to do.The decision to add two invasion beaches and assault divisions meant building extra light craft to support two extra assault divisions and training the boat crews to man them. The plan needed a lot of refinement, especially around the fireplan, which had lots of untested elements, including the use of the strategic bombers dangerously close to own troops.

The Americal army of Ww2 wasn't well geared up to coping with little bits of equipment here and there. The major tactical problem facing the assault troops was not crossing reefs or protection from machine guns, but neutralising the defended localities situated behind obstacles. The British developed Armoured engineer vehicles would have been even more use than LVTs. The US Army knew about them,; thought hard and decided that it would only take the DD tanks, and taking on the armoured engineer vehicles would not be worth the effort.

Incidentally, there was an attempt to use at least one M29 Weasel. The 2IC of 33 Field Regiment RA who had managed to smuggle it past the movement controllers on his LCT. However, as it was being driven off the LCT it was hit.

 

Thanks for the welcome !

https://books.google.com/books?id=U6En6BrcVVYC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA38&ots=okafTgu_Fw&focus=viewport&dq=lvts+in+england+prior+to+d%27day&output=html_text

This should be a link to a book which talks about a stock of around 300 lvts 1 and 2 's in England in March 44

 

Thanks - This also provides the explanation. LVT1 &2 were un-armoured, unarmed and lacked an access ramp.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_Vehicle_Tracked

These were the equivalent of a DUKW, but with only 80% the carrying capacity. They could carry only half the number of troops as an LCVP or LCA which carried a complete platoon. Lacking an access ramp the assault troops would have to jump over the side, exposing themselves to fire and risking a drop intoi deep water.

The armoured fire support version offered no more firepower than the landing craft support and less than a DD tank .

The LVT-4 OTOH could carry a platoon and two tons more than a DUKW.

 

The biggest Elephant in the room when you study Omaha (or any of the other invasion beaches) was that an LVT even it got ashore would have struggled just as the tanks that got ashore, to get its troops across the beach. They would have been easy meat for most of the German defensive AT, Mines and even the well sited MG's as they had little armour that would have stood up to the fire that swept that beach. Addtionally there weren't the Launching vessels available as they need LST or LSD's to launch from which were in very short supply. It was envisaged that the LCVP and LCA could make multiple trips which I doubt the LVT's could have. On top of that the LVT 4 and predesessors had little freeboard and may well have been swamped like many of the DD tanks in the rough seas unlike the generally calmer Pacific.
As Sheldrake rightly points out the LVT 1 & 2 were unarmoured (although Many LVT 2 got minor up armouring) and troops had to disembark over the sides. This would have been fairly disastrous on a fire sept beach as it was in the Pacific which led (amongst other cargo handling issues) to the rear ramp of the LVT 4

Cheers
Al