Worst generals

Have you also seen the battles he lost, and the opportunities he failed to take? I'm talking mostly about clearing the Scheldt estuary, Market-Garden and the Ardennes counterattack here.

 

I'm asking for opinions, bitte, about US General Bradley. Although hardly anyone calls him a bad general, a few do, primarily for his decision to go into the Huertgen Forest and for his handling of the Bulge. Any comments?

 

Bradley doesn't seem very decisive to me, he did what Eisenhower demanded of him and little more but no less. Therefore he made few right decisions but few bad ones as well.

Frankly I know very little of how he led his men or what they thought of him, though of course he was known as the GI General for a reason...

 

OMAR, THE TENT MAKER?

HE WAS GOOD AT LOGISTICS, CONSIDERING HE HAD TO DEAL WITH LEE, A PAIN IN THE ASS.

caps off

Read "A soldiers Story".. He was down to earth, not a prima donna.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/br ... radley.htm

North Africa

During the final battles of April and May 1943 he achieved his goal. The II Corps attacked northward toward Bizerte, avoiding obvious routes of approach and using infantry to attack German defenders on the high ground before bringing up the armor. The 34th Infantry Division, maligned by the British as a unit with poor fighting qualities, fought the crucial battle and dislodged the Germans from strong defensive positions astride Hill 609, the highest terrain in the corps sector. With tanks in the assault role, the 34th Division infantry cleared the obstacle, allowing Bradley to send the 1st Armored Division through to victory. American troops entered Bizerte on 7 May, and two days later more than 40,000 German troops surrendered to II Corps.

Cobra (Better than Goodwood)

The first attempts at breaking out of the lodgment failed in the face of heavy German opposition. Bradley then conceived a plan for a one-corps attack centering on St. Lo, using heavy air support. The operation, dubbed COBRA, began on 25 July with a saturation bombing attack that fell on both American and German positions. Collins' VII Corps nonetheless assaulted on schedule. After pushing through the German lines, he committed two armored divisions to exploit the breakthrough. On Collins' right flank, Troy Middleton, commanding VIII Corps, likewise released an armored division after his infantry broke through the initial German resistance. In a 35-mile advance, the American armor reached Avranches and began a rout of the Germans that lasted just over a month, by which time the Allies had closed on the German frontier.

first opportunity to test himself came the week after 12th Army Group was activated. In what Bradley considered one of the worst mistakes anyone made in World War II, Adolf Hitler ordered his commanders to seek a decision in Normandy. Rather than withdraw, the Germans reinforced their units. Alerted by short-notice ULTRA information, Bradley reinforced the VII Corps sector at Mortain, where the German attack seemed aimed. The 30th Infantry Division, supported by tactical air power, decimated the assaulting force. Seeing the potential for a larger success, Bradley devised a plan to trap the bulk of the retreating German forces west of the Rhine, a long encirclement that he envisioned as a war-winning maneuver. In the event the American and Canadian armies did not meet at Falaise in time to trap all the Germans, and many escaped to fight again. The battle nonetheless marked the end of the fighting in Normandy, where Allied forces had literally destroyed two German armies.



In practical terms, the battle determined the future course of the war. Hard fighting in Normandy, followed by the pursuit across France through the end of September 1944, wounded or killed more than 500,000 Germans and destroyed many divisions. The famous 12th SS (Hitlerjugend) Division, for example, literally dissolved as a fighting formation. Taken together, Normandy, the Falaise pocket, and the retreat across the Seine reduced the German Army to an infantry force with limited tactical mobility. German equipment losses were staggering: some 15,000 vehicles were destroyed or abandoned. Less than 120 of more than 1,000 tanks and assault guns committed to battle in Normandy remained operational in September. Few panzer divisions could muster more than a dozen tanks.



not bad...

 

Bradley

You can credit him with Cobra and not blame him for Market Garden..

 

Except that after September many Panzer divisions could once again claim at least 70% operational strength, even in tanks. The destruction of the German armed and armoured forces after Cobra was indeed a severe blow but it wasn't terminal. Even with all the losses they inflicted, in late September the Allies still stood in front of the Siegfried Line and the rivers in the Netherlands with no place left to go.

I'm not trying to make Bradley's achievements look meaningless but it is important to put the great chase of late August/early September 1944 in the perspective of what came after it. Market-Garden, for one thing.

 

as I said, you cannot blame Bradley for Market Garden, in his book he spends a chapter writing about him trying to stop it and what he would have done instead..

You spent much time on the stupidity of Market Garden, but your analysis is pale compared to his criticism of it and what he wanted to do.


Patton crossed the Rhine with almost not even firing a shot.

I do not blame him for the failure to close at Falaise, but instead the originator of Market Garden and Goodwood, and of course LeClerc.

that sort of answers your 70% comment.


I would rather have a Panzer SS armored army in front of me than a French division behind me..

Gen Geo. S. Patton

 

Once he broke through the Siegfried Line, and while the British and Canadians had drawn all the remaining German forces into their area against operation Veritable, it was easy for Patton. That's not his work.

 

oh sure , drawn away, it was all Montys idea ....

uh huh. LOL

The fact is Bradley's many armies crossed first, with brilliance...

Monty was last..

Veritable/ smeritable...

Last is last, first is first..

The Rurh was the obkective..

 

pincered, pocketed and closed..

Monty was nowhere.

 

Just out of curiosity what was his resupply like during Cobra?

 

Here is a nice piece on the Rurh, search for the word " British", using your browser.




http://www.wood.army.mil/2-10IN/History ... 20Ruhr.htm

Much like if you search pages about the first German city occupied by any of the the allies.

Aachen, you won't find the word 'Montgomery' either...

I think he went out for tea or dutch hot chocholate.


(BTW, My whole family is British, I am a first generation Yank, although I lived in GB nearly half my youth. My grand father was RAF/ Spit pilot who ended up in the Southern California aviation industry. Great Granddad was Royal Army.)

 

Your point being.


From http://www.valourandhorror.com/DB/BACK/Cobra.php



Operation Cobra would be General Bradley's third attempt to break out of the confines of the Cotentin peninsula. The first attempt on 3 July had been checked, the second on 13 July had only resulted in the communications center of St. Lô being taken.

On 25 July, on the Western side of the Allied front, the Americans launched Operation Cobra. Its goal was to attack and breakthrough the German lines between the rivers Vire and Lozon.

Bradley had fifteen divisions with 750 tanks in line opposing nine German, many of them remnants, with 115 tanks. Ten days before Rommel had warned Hitler that "the moment is fast approaching when our hard-pressed defences will crack". July 25 would be that moment.
The operation opened with a massive bombing of the German lines by 1,500 Fortresses of the Eight Airforce. At first, after the bombing had ceased, progress was slow, as many of the German infantry had survived the bombing. The Americans were also obstructed by their own crater fields. By the evening, only two miles of ground had been won at the deepest point, and the objectives still lay beyond forward troops.

Though they didn't realize it, the infantry on the first day had largely destroyed the German resistance that survived the bombing. The 2nd SS and 17th SS panzer divisions on the front were fully committed to defence of the line and had no reserves left. Panzer Lehr had been pretty much destroyed by the bombing and the fighting that followed it. While the German infantry divisions - 243rd, 353rd, 91st, and 5th Parachute - were all unable to move and under strength.

Not quite the same as Market Garden.

If you think this is the way to compare leaders or operations then are sadly mistaken.

 

yep no comparison..

one was a complete success...

the other was a dismal failure.


:bang:

 

I wouldn't say market garden was a complete success.

:bang: :bang:

 

There are 10 pages on this thread devoted to the worst Generals of WWII, much of it about Montgomery and Market Garden.

I spent a fair amount of time reading it.

Bradley was dead set against it.


In his biography (Soldiers Story) he devoted a chapter to it , his words and Roers are better than mine on this topic.

 

>I wouldn't say market garden was a complete success

hmmm, If Monty had his way the western allies would still be sitting outside Caen today. D Day+1+ 22,266

lol

 

I'm not talking about the actual corssing of the Rhine, at which Bradley's armies were indeed first; I'm talking about the reason why Patton was able to cross the Rhine practically without firing a shot. This was by capturing a bridge intact and virtually undefended. It was undefended because the Germans had drawn most of the troops in the area to the sector where the British and Canadians were attacking.

Operation Veritable wasn't meant to go across the Rhine, it was aimed at clearing the area between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine itself to ensure a stepping stone for the eventual crossing of the Rhine. It was a success in the end but at a terrible cost because the Germans offered stiff resistance and the weather was dreadful. Meanwhile Patton was allowed to waltz across the area west of the Rhine further south and capture an unguarded bridge.

 

Pattons Army was not the first army accross the Rhine..







LOL, but he made it with 'dignity"

 

Hitler saw the Rhine as a symbol of German resolve. No invading army had crossed the Rhine in 140 years, since Napoleon in 1805. Any commander surrendering or retreating would be shot. Bridges were to be blown up.

Cologne’s bridges were thus destroyed before the city was captured. The US Third Army under General George S. Patton, planning to cross the Rhine without a bridge, found the Ludendorff Railway Bridge still standing on March 7.

The Allies rushed to cross the Rhine under air and artillery attack. By March 23 the Allies had a bridgehead thirty-five mile wide and twelve miles deep. Bridges were put up over the Rhine by special bridge units; many of them segregated black units. Often the crossings were under heavy German fire.



of course there was nothing in the way, all obstacles were mysteriously destroyed


PATTON'S 3rd ARMY DRIVES TO THE RHINE


March 21, 1945 "Mystery Division" of General Patton's 3rd Army took the spotlight by reaching the Upper Rhine, entering the important chemical city of Ludwigshafen, Germany.
The same armored division, which has played an anonymous role in the drive from the Moselle River, continued its spectacular race that has turned the German stand in the Saar Palatinate into a disastrous debacle, smashed into the city of Ludwigshafen. Unnamed to the press in Patton's pre-operational press conference and referred to only as his "spearhead" armored division, the 12th Armored Division was ordered to remove all shoulder patches and vehicle markings, becoming the "Mystery Division" of the 3rd Army.
The "Mystery Division" jumped off from the Trier, Germany vicinity on March 18 with orders to pass through the 94th Infantry and race for the Rhine River, leaving enemy strong points for the infantry to mop up, and secure river crossings near Worms, Germany. From start to finish the drive across the Palatinate was a test of human endurance. Progress was about 25 miles per day. Movement was so rapid that prisoners were merely disarmed and sent back to the west. Thousands of prisoners and pieces of enemy equipment were captured. The route was littered with smashed small arms, panzerfausts, artillery, and every type of German army vehicle from Volkswagen to Tiger tank. On March 20, the "Mystery Division" was on the banks of the Rhine River.
At noon, 24 March, the 12th Armored Division reverted from control of XXI Corps and the 3rd Army to Seventh Army, it's days as Patton's "Mystery Division" were at an end. Although efforts to secure a bridge over the Rhine were unsuccessful, because the Germans had blown out all spans between Ludwigshafen and Germersheim, all other phases of the Saar breakthrough were outstanding achievements.
The 12th Armored Division had distinguished itself as Gen. George Patton's "Mystery Division" spearheading his 3rd Army across the Saar Palatinate to the banks of the Rhine River.

http://www.12tharmoreddivision.com/MEDIA_03.HTML


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