Would the Home Guard have been effective

An interesting point to consider is would the home gaurd have been effective if it had been called on to face an invasion. The standard image of home gaurd soldiers is old doddering men with pitch forks and shot guns but the period in which the home gaurd was ineffective was a relatively limited being around two months in critical areas.

To clarify Im not saying they were ever an elite force but after 1941 the better units would have not been much less efffective than many static and garrison divisions.

To examine the equipment of the home gaurd they recieved around 500,000 springfields as well as many BAR's, Brownings, as well as Lewis and maxim weapons. They had some early home made weapons some of which developed into widely used weapons such as PIAT and Fougasse to absurd weapons that would have been fatal to their crews.


They were equiped with basic uniforms by early 1941 in most areas and were trained at week ends with units rotated through two week intensive courses.

The man power was around 60% in the 35-50 age group most of whom would have served in world war 1 the rest were largely younger men waiting for mobilizarion with a relatively small cadre of elderly. Even in mid 1940 given that they were intended for static defence the LDV units would have had a limited utility because in key areas a mixture of machine guns were dug out of stocks either old lewis's , maxims etc and sitting in fixed bunker defences manning familiar weapons they would have had a useful role.

 

Well then you have to think that the luftwaffe managed to overrun the RAF in the Battle of Britain. How would they invade Britain? Fallschirmjagers in combination with a amphibious assault? Seems obvious and if you look at how effective they were (the fallschirmjagers) with Eben-Emael and in Holland You'll gonna have a big problem as being a Home Guard

The "normal" soldiers are recovered from Dunkirk but I don't think they would love to meet action again with those Germans although that they're defending their homes and families.

The home guards would be usefull for the soldiers who would have known the area but for the rest ... I don't know. They are like normal soldiers some would have become heroes and others would choose for their lives.

 

I found this to be very informative in making a decision when it come to how effective they might have been.IMO Some units might have been in the short term. But in the long term perhaps not.

Was the Home Guard a realistic defense against a German invasion of Britain?


The Home Guard was established in 1940 to meet Britain's need for an extra line of defence, should it be invaded. The Home Guard are fondly regarded, even inspiring a long running BBC sitcom - "Dad's Army". They were held in such esteem that they mounted Buckingham Palace guard twice in their four and a half years of service.
However, the Home Guard's effectiveness in defence against an invading German army has been debated for many years. No invasion of Britain took place during the Second World War, so historians speculate about the issue. David Carroll's view is that the Home Guard would have been an effective defence, but others argue that the evidence does not support this.
The Men:
Traditionally, the Home Guard is seen as consisting of old men. Some suggest that the age of Home Guard members was a detrimental factor in their effectiveness. This is only partly true. The average age of Home Guards in 1940 was around 35 . Elderly recruits existed, but many were young men in reserved occupations and those just outside conscription age. Countering this argument some suggest some recruits were too incapacitated to join the regular forces and would have been detrimental to the Home Guard's effectiveness.
Opinion is divided over the effectiveness of the "old-timers". Many say that in the face of fit and athletic enemies, these old men had no chance. Some go as far as saying they were a liability. This may be true, but others suggest their value lay elsewhere. Many older recruits were First World War veterans, and therefore knew what they were doing and could take inexperienced recruits under their wing. An SAS soldier after a training exercise with the Home Guard said the veterans "had forgotten more about fighting than we...would ever learn" . Being an elite soldier, and therefore a good assessor of fighting capability, his opinion is valuable.
Training:
Divided opinion exists about the effectiveness of training. Many believe the part time nature of the Home Guard did not allow time for adequate, and particularly specialist, training. The Secretary of State, David Margesson, wrote in 1942 that specialist training "cannot be carried out on a part time basis" , an opinion based on multiple authoritative sources. Historians, like S.P. MacKenzie, question training priorities, saying there were some commanders emphasising "square-bashing, boot and button polishing, and the value of cold steel over camouflage, modern battle tactics, and squad fighting" . This has produced a reputation that the Home Guard was a backward looking organisation, unprepared for modern warfare.
Others suggest that training was ample. There were training schools teaching essential skills like camouflage, fieldcraft, tactics, and weapons use. Often live ammunition was used giving preparation for actual combat. There were booklets for the Home Guard where they could learn new skills. There were many exercises (nearly one every weekend) set out like scenarios in modern warfare - the RAF would even perform mock strafings . Historians suggest the number of exercises as well as contemporary reports of good performances show the Home Guard was prepared for modern warfare.
However, questions are raised over the effectiveness of these exercises. There could be much confusion over just who the umpires had declared "dead". Sometimes "dead" participants would covertly rejoin the battle. Examples of lacking commitment in these exercises, such as two Home Guards having reached their objective of capturing a bridge, finding that everyone else had gone to the pub , have led to a popular belief that Home Guard training and attitude was poor.
Attitude:
Records show a huge response to War Minister Anthony Eden's request for Home Guard volunteers in May 1940 (then called the Local Defence Volunteers) which speaks volumes about the men's attitude. Within twenty-four hours of Eden's request, over 250,000 men had joined - by the end of June, 1,456,000 men were recruited . The desire to defend their country is seen through this response, and groups of people wishing to play a part in the defence of Britain existed even before Eden's announcement. According to David Carroll, this "embodied the spirit of the times" . Carroll seems to be slightly biased towards the Home Guard, but there is little conflict among historians over their determination.
But their gallant spirit was not always so high. After the imminent invasion threat of 1940 had subsided, there was by 1941, "a mood of complacency" according to a government report . MacKenzie comments that in "May 1941 the Southern Regional Police noted that German airmen who had bailed out were finding it difficult to get themselves taken into custody, since the Home Guard were no longer interested in arresting them" . Police reports are likely to be reliable, but there is a chance of bias due to a rivalry between Home Guards and policemen. This apparent lack of motivation is contrasted by the sometimes over-zealousness with which Home Guards undertook their internal security duties. MacKenzie details some of these such as Home Guards asking to see the identity papers of people they had known for years, and the numerous reports of policemen challenged at gunpoint to show identity, sometimes more than once by the same man (this could be part of the Home Guard and police rivalry). This could be seen as thoroughness or posturing self-importance. The Home Guard's actions could have serious repercussions such as roadblocks preventing fire engines reaching their destination. There were also casualties through the shooting of motorists. Home Guards' signals to motorists were not always clear and often gave incorrect instructions. Jumpy recruits after seeing something and mistaking it for invading troops would occasionally raise the invasion alarm. There is little doubt that such events occurred as they are detailed in official reports. These facts cause some to doubt the effectiveness of Home Guards, due to apparent ineptness in doing their job. Others are more forgiving due to the anxious times of 1940 when invasion was imminent.
Capabilities:
Those supporting the view that the Home Guard was largely inept claim evidence from their questionable weapons proficiency. MacKenzie, writing in 1995 with fifty years' information accessible to him, questions Home Guard marksmanship, highlighting poor firing range performances attributing this to "limited range time and (in the case of older volunteers) variable eyesight". Further evidence comes from the number of accidental training injuries and deaths. In 1944, seventeen men were killed in training accidents . MacKenzie states; "the chances of a Home Guard dying on duty from causes that had nothing to do with the enemy were at least four times those of a regular soldier".
The opinion of many Home Guards themselves was that they would repel invaders. Such beliefs were often genuine, but were sometimes blind optimism or a pretence to maintain morale. After the war, they realised they had little hope. A member of the Loughborough College Company claims; "We seriously believed that we could have stopped Hitler's crack paratroops and panzers!" - his statement implies this belief was optimistic. Many Home Guards now believe themselves lucky that no invasion came, however they do think they would have given a good account of themselves. Many argue that those best to comment on the Home Guard's effectiveness were actually a part of it. Conversely, others say that Home Guards are biased towards the organisation. This explains their attitude that they would stop Hitler's armies.
A significant problem for Home Guards was attending duties after work. A curate working near Nottingham remembered Home Guard duty in late 1940 was "becoming a very heavy burden to men who had already done a day's work...They felt they had already done their bit for the nation" . There was rising absenteeism until the government introduced more military organisation, with non-attendance penalties. Many Home Guards who quit said if invasion became imminent again, they would return to duty. The above leads some to suggest that Home Guards were ineffective. The hypothetical question of what they would do if Britain was invaded during working hours is raised. Others riposte with the fact that many Home Guard platoons were established to defend their place of work.
The determination of Home Guards to stop an invading army was not really in doubt. It was their competence and ability where conflicting opinion lies.
Weaponry:
Traditionally, the Home Guard is seen as being armed with broom handles, pikes and improvised Heath Robinson-like contraptions. There is some truth in this, but the adequacy of Home Guard equipment is an area of much debate.
The months after the Home Guard's formation in 1940 are characterised with the virtual absence of modern weaponry. There were those who had their own guns, but they were often antiquated (museums, like the Imperial War Museum, were raided for firearms). These old weapons, having little or no surviving ammunition, were "carried in the hope they would frighten solitary parachutists into surrender". In this situation, they probably would have sufficed, but historians concur that they were much less effective than the modern, well-engineered German weapons.
Many, including David Carroll in "Dad's Army: The Home Guard 1940-1944", claim the Home Guard was "a victim of its own success" as the government greatly underestimated the numbers who would join - a reason for the insufficient weaponry. Another was that the regular army was still reeling from the massive losses of equipment at Dunkirk. Weapons for the Home Guard could not be spared when the regular army was so short of arms. The Home Guard was always in short supply, despite the influx of weapons from Canada and the USA. Rifles arrived, but in meagre numbers - only one between four or five men. Ammunition was scarce too (as little as ten rounds per rifle ). Home Guards found that their British rifle ammunition did not fit rifles from abroad. These foreign rifles were also old. The Canadian Ross rifle had been withdrawn in the First World War due to its tendency to jam, but the Home Guard were expected to use it. It was not until 1942 (when the invasion threat was largely over) that the vast majority of Home Guards had their own firearm, leading historians to conclude that when the invasion threat was greatest, the Home Guard was least well equipped and therefore could have done little to prevent the German onslaught.
In 1941, with a lack of other weapons to give, the War Office issued pikes to Home Guards. They received a very negative reception to say the least. At this stage, Home Guards did not have the weapons needed to mount a successful defence.
Many argue that with effective weapons in short supply the Home Guard were unable to stop invaders. Others disagree, saying that by 1942 the Home Guard had access to many effective weapons like Lee Enfield rifles, Thompson and Browning machine guns, Vickers, Lewis and Sten guns, and many grenades. These weapons could potentially provide adequate fire to cause invaders significant difficulties. This may not be a good argument given that the invasion threat was over after June 1941. Also it is argued that these weapons would not have been effective in the face of tanks and other armoured vehicles.
There is debate over the effectiveness of unconventional weaponry like "Molotov Cocktails". Molotov Cocktails would have been effective against troops, but not against tanks. The so-called "Sticky Bombs" would have proved effective against tanks. Weapons like the "Northover Projector" and "Blacker Bombard" may have had potential against tanks, but their accuracy was poor.
Debate exists over the effectiveness of the Home Guard's arsenal. Consensus among historians regarding the early days of the Home Guard is that weapons were not adequate. Improvements came later but by this time the threat of invasion was over.
Intended Role and Purpose:
Many argue that the Home Guard was unable to fulfil its intended role in invasion, highlighting the capability of the German army, it having stormed through Europe, easily overwhelming regular armies with their Blitzkrieg tactics. The Home Guards were not of the same calibre as regular troops and would have capitulated quickly.
Advocates of the Home Guard's effectiveness agree, but suggest the Home Guard's role was not repelling invasion, but supporting regular troops. In 1940, the government defined their role to include "delaying and obstructing the enemy advance `by any means in their power'" . The intention was to delay invaders so the regular army could rally and take decisive action (the regular army was still reeling from Dunkirk in 1940). Invaders would not have made easy progress as in every town and village, the Home Guard would have delayed them, even if only for a short time, impairing the German Blitzkrieg. Their role was also to observe the enemy, keep any fifth columnists in check, and combat parachutists. Since parachutists could land virtually anywhere, Home Guards would have been the first to reach them and exploit their vulnerability just after landing. Winston Churchill, in a speech marking the Home Guard's third anniversary, noted this; "(the Home Guard) are specially adapted to meet that most modem form of overseas attack - the mass descent of parachute troops" . Churchill's speech, evidently intended to boost morale with some exaggeration in it, clearly states the importance of Home Guards in defending against parachute landings.
The War Office's first training instructions reveal the Home Guard's intended role; "(Home Guards) are neither trained nor equipped to offer strong resistance to highly trained German troops, and they will therefore best fulfil their role by observation, by the rapid transmission of information, and by confining the enemy's activities. They will also act as guards at places of tactical or strategic importance" . Historians suggest that Home Guards could have fulfilled these roles.
The Home Guard was important for freeing regular troops from supporting positions in Britain to fight abroad. Many Home Guards were trained to operate Anti-Aircraft batteries. Freeing regular troops to fight overseas was a form of effective defence as it helped wage war against Germany, ultimately preventing invasion.
There are those who believe that the government knew that the Home Guard was ineffective, using it simply as a tool to provide an outlet for men's patriotic desires. Some argue that the secretive "Auxiliary Units" (underground groups intended for guerrilla warfare against invaders) were the real force intended to harass invaders, not the Home Guard. In contrast, others say the Home Guard were still important and Auxiliary Units were just an additional defence.
It can be argued that the Home Guard did not need to be an effective defence as they were never likely to be required. Operation Sealion, the proposed German invasion plan of Britain, was something of a pipe dream and never likely to go ahead. Historians believing this draw attention to Hitler's apparent disinterest in the scheme - Hitler felt it was more of a propaganda ploy to frighten Britons than a real strategic option. Indeed, many high-ranking German officials, including the principal army commander, Gerd von Runstedt, disapproved of the risky plan. Besides, the RAF managed to repel the Luftwaffe's efforts to establish air superiority over Britain and the plan was abandoned in summer 1940. After this, invasion was never again likely, especially by 1942, which heralded the British victory at El Alamein, American entry into the war and the German disaster at Stalingrad. Many argue that Hitler's position was now too defensive to consider invasion a viable option.
Some argue, however, that had Sealion gone ahead, the Home Guard would have proved an ineffective defence. The invasion was scheduled to take place in summer 1940 or spring 1941. This period of 1940-41 was the time when the Home Guard was least well prepared to defend against invaders. Sealion planned to take twelve divisions over the English Channel to five beachheads established by an initial wave of small fast motorboats. Paratroops of the 7th Fliegerdivision would land behind the beachheads in support.
It was more the job of the Navy and coastal defences to stop the troops landing on the south coast, but the paratroops were to be attacked by the Home Guard. MacKenzie suggests that Home Guards would have capitulated as "Older men hastily grouped together and armed with a few shotguns and rifles would have been no match for squads of elite Fallschirmtruppen (paratroops) armed with submachine guns".
Conclusions:
Home Guards were effective insofar as harassing an invading army, in accordance with Carroll's views. Even if the Home Guard proved to be inept, the invader would still have to delay to deal with them. A detrimental factor in the Home Guard's effectiveness was its weaponry. Without effective weapons, they were of minimal utility. In the end, weapons were adequate, but in 1940, when they were most needed, weapons were poor. Home Guards were determined and had the necessary resolve to do their duty to the best of their ability. People of the time were perhaps more patriotic and jingoistic than today and staunchly resisted the idea of being invaded.
If Britain was invaded, the Home Guard would have fought admirably, but there is little doubt among historians that they would have been overrun by the awesome potential of the German army. Perhaps the question is not whether the Home Guard were an effective defense, but whether the German army could be stopped.
Bibliography:

S. P. MacKenzie, The Home Guard (Oxford University Press, 1995)
Frank and Joan Shaw, We Remember The Home Guard (Echo Press, 1983)
David Carroll, Dad's Army: The Home Guard 1940-1944 (Sutton Publishing Limited, 2002) Norman Longmate, How We Lived Then (Arrow Books, 1974)

Home Guard@Everything2.com

 

And there is this too,


On 10 May, 1940, after seven months of inactivity on the Western Front, the German Armed Forces invaded the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France. From the outset, Blitzkrieg1 indicated that this war would not be like the Great War of 1914-18 and that the Allies would face defeat. Since the British Army was heavily involved with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France and Belgium and was still required to defend the Empire, the mainland of Great Britain would be almost undefended. With this in mind, the Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, broadcast an appeal for volunteers to form a defence force against invasion on 14 May, 1940. The response was the beginning of what was to become the Home Guard.
Genesis
The Second World War began in September 1939. A large number of middle-aged men volunteered their services but were often turned down on account of their age or physical condition. Sir John Anderson2 in charge of Air Raid Precautions (ARP) agreed with an idea from Winston Churchill that men over 40 years of age should be formed into an organised body for use in their local area. This was discussed in October 1939 but set to one side as the Sitzkrieg or 'Phoney War', a period of military inactivity, continued in Western Europe. This ended with the attack on 10 May 1940.
Anthony Eden asked for volunteers between the ages of 40 and 65, fit enough to march and fire a shotgun or rifle. The response was immediate; unfortunately no one had thought about the logistics of enrolment. Police stations and local government offices were besieged by volunteers who would not go until a list had been drawn up. The plan was for 150,000 volunteers but the first month brought 750,000 made up of men in reserved occupations3, and those too young or too old for war service. Many of the older ones were veterans of the Great War. By the end of June, there were over one million volunteers.
If the enrolment was a poor example of organisation, then the equipping of the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV) could be said to have none. The only uniform was an armband with LDV on it. Since the military had first use of modern weapons and lost many in the retreat through France, any weapons were usually owned by the volunteers. These ranged from shotguns, hunting rifles and obsolete military rifles to swords and flintlock muskets. For those who had none, they either shared or did without. A batch of surplus bayonets from the USA was welded onto gas pipes and used as pikes; bottles mysteriously vanished from doorsteps and shops to reappear as Molotov cocktails4 for use against German Panzers.
Appeals were issued in the UK and, thanks to President FD Roosevelt, in the USA for any suitable personal firearms. An astonishing variety, totalling 200,000, was collected and distributed. Going a step further President Roosevelt, leader of a neutral USA, also got Congress to permit the disposal of a million old rifles from reserve to Britain in mid-July 1940 with 10 rounds of ammunition apiece.
Uniform and webbing appeared in dribs and drabs. Perhaps three pairs of trousers with no buttons, a jacket now and again, belts of all descriptions and bags and pouches that would not fit. It was not uncommon to find issues of trousers only or some with jackets and some with caps - the variation was endless. So comical was the appearance and activities of the volunteers, that jokes were easily made about the LDV ('Look, Duck and Vanish'). Eventually, production and distribution was stabilised and a standard issue was established.
As in every other aspect, no one really knew what to do with the volunteers. There was no established role for them to fulfil. There were considerable regional variations on equipment, organisation and deployment. Dartmoor had a mounted 'cavalry' unit while on Windermere in the Lake District they used motorboats. This aspect always remained with the volunteers, no two units were quite alike.
Establishment
In August 1940, Winston Churchill made a radio broadcast in which he called the LDV the 'Home Guard'. The name stuck and became the official title. One of the features of the Home Guard was the number of ex-soldiers who volunteered. Officers would happily enlist as soldiers, one unit boasting eight generals serving in the ranks. The organisational confusion was gradually overcome and the Home Guard was given a number of roles in the defence of the mainland. A signal dated 29 November, 1940, from Brigadier GV Clark explained the roles and conditions of service envisaged. Each month they would be expected to do 48 hours of unpaid duty, as well as their civilian job. They were to resist the enemy by any means possible mainly at nodal (road junctions, railway facilities) or vulnerable points, defend local communities, airfields, any vital infrastructure points and traffic routes. In addition, they often supported the Civil Defence in recovery and rescue following air raids.
Given their poor equipment, it was left to units to develop their own methods. Some of these methods were comical, but may have been effective at least initially. One was to place boxes on the road propped up at one end with a stick to which was attached a length of string. This led off into the hedgerow or undergrowth, prompting the Germans to investigate. It was recommended that some had bombs or booby traps incorporated, just to make them think about the others.5. One of the least effective would be the idea of removing all manhole covers so that the Germans would fall down them in the dark!
Organisation
Once they started their guarding activities it released the Services to more vital tasks. Initially, they were regarded as a poor relation of the Civil Defence, which was formally organised by the local authorities. Hitler however, branded them 'murder gangs' and promised to have them shot on sight. Perhaps with this in mind, they took on a more military air and organisation, before long becoming linked to local regiments whose badges and colours they adopted. A typical organisation is illustrated by the Workington (Cumbria) Battalion:

• A Company - Workington Iron and Steel Works.
• B Company - The town company.
• C Company - Largely manned by railway and other transport employees.
• D Company - Clifton, to the east of the town.
• E Company - High-duty Alloys Factory at Distington.
• HQ Company - Headquarter.
• Coastal Battery detachment: guarding/manning guns.
• Signals and Intelligence.

This is largely the same as a service infantry battalion of the period. Armament would be different though.
Weapons
The mix of civilian and obsolete military weapons gave way to a more regular issue once the USA began supplying arms in earnest, although still neutral. Most Home Guard weapons were chambered for .30" M1906 (30'06), the US standard rifle ammunition, and were marked with a red band to avoid confusion with .303" weapons. The P17 bolt action rifle was well used, together with some .303" Canadian Ross rifles. Light machine guns consisted of Lewis Guns, most adapted from aircraft guns, Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR) and there were even some Vickers MMGs, all of 30'06 calibre. Naturally, there were some native .303" weapons, but most of these were used to re-equip the returning troops. There are instances where Regular and Home Guard units salvaged German MG15s from downed bombers and set them up as makeshift anti-aircraft guns. Ammunition was not an immediate problem as it could be salvaged from downed aircraft or they could use tank machine gun ammo (BESA) which was 7.9mm and not in as much demand as .303" in 1940.
There were some novel and ingenious methods of projecting explosives. The Northover Projector looked like a 'drainpipe with legs' and the Smith Gun which could be towed on its wheels, upended and used the axle to traverse. Both were crude, smooth-bore pieces which used black powder to project grenades, both anti-personnel and anti-tank from 100 - 450 yards. One of these anti-tank grenades was a glass bottle containing phosphorous and latex (raw rubber). They were sealed and designed to ignite on contact with air as the glass smashed against the side of a tank. These have been found fifty years later, buried to provide a hidden reserve in 1940, and still highly dangerous today.
The End
By late 1941, the Home Guard was an effective fighting force, well armed and trained. By then, the threat of invasion had receded and the invasion of Russia in the Summer of 1941 more or less finished the idea of the Germans crossing the Channel. Air attacks lessened too, but the Home Guard remained to capture downed airmen and man anti-aircraft batteries. It was stood down (deactivated) in September 1944 and a final parade held in London on 3 December 1944.

BBC - h2g2 - Britain's Home Guard

 

as usual great stuff Falkenberg.

 

Well the Aux Units were HG.

Try this thread; http://www.ww2f.com/battle-europe/25328-britains-secret-army.html

 

Thanks. I do try LOL .

 

You beat me to it LOL.

 

Well makes a change.

I think it's also worth considering that for well defended fights, involving bunkers, pillboxes etc. you can post a young boy or an elderly woman behind a machine gun and they'll still put up a good fight against men scuttling across a beach.

 

One might compare them to the effectiveness of Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia or Soviet partisans in their early stages. By 1941 they appear to be the equal of newly trained green regulars. This would make their perfomance by then somewhere between partisans and more seasoned and thoroughly trained regular troops.

 

Keep in mind too that the Home Guard were largely made up of WWI veterans, men who had already seen long service in the trenches of France, 20+ years before. They would have easily re-adapted themselves to the hard strictures and camraderie of military life,. Should the occasion present itself, they might not have fought as hard as the German invaders that they would have encountered, but the Home Guard would have given good account of themselves.

 

I remember discussing the LDV's effectiveness against the planned use of paratroopers with one of my lecturers who stated that the plan was in 1940 for the home gaurd to remain in their home area's and defefend their villages. The plan in Sea lion was for the German Paratroopers to silence the mdoern sea fort over looking the invasion area. They were to land behind the town fight their way in past the regular mobile columns through the villages and town they were then to silence the guns by seizing Dover castle and over running the coastal gunnery position at its rear.

The Home gaurd were not seriously intended to win just to delay the enemy troops and allow the regular forces to have warning of any attack.

The invasion areas on the south east coast got highest priority with the largest allocation of the thousands of heavy machine guns scraped up from naval and army reserve weapon stocks these included virtually all models and makes including maxims, old lewis guns, Hotchkiss, maxims and even a few Nordefelds.

They were layered between regular troops on the invasion area in dover they would have been defending the vilages behind the town with local mobile forces from the army. The town itself was garrisoned with Royal marines, naval ratings and a Home gaurd unit mostly of Dockers which had been specially trained by a group of Spanish republican army veterans recruited to teach the Local defence volunteers urban warfare. Assuming the paratroopers made it up to Dover Castle the castle itslf was an eighteenth century fortification modernised during the first world war with bunkers and updated in the late 1920's. These were manned by an understrength unit of the Irish gaurds with addition AA unit personnel. defending a modern anval gun fort on the sea side armed with radar guided 9.2 and six inch guns.

The local defence forces had a mixture of recently arrived US weapons spingfields and even some pump action shotguns intended to be used like smg's in the built up areas. The US supplied the spring fileds in June 1940 they arrived straight from storage still packed for long term storage early August and were largely issued by early september in time for the invasion. Though with very limited time to train they came with a large quantity of ammunition.

A total aside the naval personnel in Dover supposedly recived some lanchesters which were a straight copy of the MP 28 but in Brass rather than in steel for majority of the gun. There were apparently 50,000 made for the navy and RAf though I dont know when they were delivered but it was a rush order in ealy July.I doubt the LDV would have stopped the German Paras for long but they may have inflicted casualties and because every area was defended tactical suprise would have been almost impossible.

In addition old men who using machine guns they were extremely familiar with from well sited and concealed positions (50,000 bunkers were built in july to august) could have been a problem.

It seems unlikely that the Paratroopers however good could have completed their task in the two hours allocated in which case the invasion would have reamained under fire by modern well protected guns that the airforce would have had little chance to silence given their performance against similar gun position s in North africa. The defences were designed against naval artillery fire and well protected with AA guns.

The home gaurd was also used to cover the organisation of leave behind units who were listed as home gaurd but were in fact picked regulars. Some were planned to attack rear area units and sow confusion in the support and supply elements. Though these troops were not LDV somewhat fall outside the scope of this discusion.

By the end of 1941 by the time invasion was unlikely they were probably better trained and equiped than most static units and were even used to carry out skilled tasks such as manning AA guns freeing regular gunners for service over seas. Indeed the doctrine changed from local defence to a mixture of strong points and counter attack forces that exercised with the regular army and recived a great deal of training . The LDV once it recieved a full issue of rifles and machine guns would have provided a useful defensive capability and this occured with a apearance of the US weapons in the midle of 1940 by septemeber the LDv in the threatened area had recieved a reasonable issue of weapons.

 

It was a brilliant and necessary propaganda move by Churchill. Afterall he had to do everything possible to rid the British population of from feeling of standing no chance against Hitler and to convience them that Hitler(Which he never intended in 1940) wanted war with Britain.

Otherwise it would have been hard to impossible for Churchill to convience his countryman about the necessity to wage war with Hitler.

Militarywise the Home Guard in May 40 - Sept. 40 would have been as effective as Hitlers Volkssturm in 1945.

Regards
Kruska

 

The German manpower pool had been pretty much scraped clean by the time the volksturm were used and even then they were often suprisingly effective in the east at least because they were well motivated. The home gaurd were defending their homes and country and were very motivated.

This influenced the regular army a lot too whilst more careful later in the war one of my uncles volunteered for a leave behind role which was pretty much a one way mission. His role was to activate booby traps attached to the phone system and deactivate the rest of the network in the dover area as it was over run. He knew his chances of survival were almost nil if he was ever called into action.

The degree of motivation felt by the troops both regular and irregular in most countries when it came to defending home territory is difficult to overstate.