but as a recent arrival to this forum I shall beat it some more...... From my study of the operation I can only conclude that there was no one in the Allied command structure with the wherewithal to say no to Montgomery. Why else undertake such a gamble of an operation, in such a hurry, with scant time for planning, limited and/or shoddy intelligence, all while one enjoys a decided advantage in the field? The operation seems to be suited to a desperate army, not the undertaking of a force which holds all the advantages and all the initiative. There was no need for the Western Allies to take major risks at that stage of the war, no need at all. Yet there they were. Was there no one to say all this to Monty? Evidently not. People didn't seem to have a problem saying no to Patton, but Monty was apparently untouchable. I find the notion that it was a "good plan" to be plainly preposterous and don't know how anyone could say that with a straight face. All large operations are complex, but they don't all require so many multiple independent objectives to be met in order to attain success, where any 2 or 3 things going wrong (as they always do) can doom the whole thing. This one didn't even look good on paper. The haste with which it was thrown together only made it worse. Even Japanese planners could not have made the plan any more extravagant. Yet while the consequences of failure were not crippling - the decisive Allied advantage at that stage of the war permitted a failure or three - the mauling of the British 1st Airborne was appalling and needless. Outside of the casualties, there were virtually no consequences at all. The scapegoating of Gen. Sosabowski, a relative pawn in the operation, makes the whole thing all the more appalling. Were the operation indeed "90% successful" as Monty claimed, there'd have been no need of a scapegoat. And if the 90% claim were accurate, I wouldn't have written this.