German deserters and Barbarossa

VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS
By Valery Kalinin

Almost all Soviet intelligence agents warned Moscow of an imminent attack by Germany, but Stalin did not believe any of them

In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, German troops blockaded Leningrad, approached Moscow, occupied the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Belarus and the Crimea, and even hoisted the Nazi flag on Mt. Elbrus, the highest mountain of the Caucasus. It is usually alleged that Germany achieved these successes by “treacherously” invading the Soviet Union.

In the early postwar years, the surprise attack by German troops was blamed on the lack of information about Hitler’s plans. After the death of Stalin, it became clear that Soviet political and military leaders were warned of the planned attack. But Stalin thought it was misleading information designed to provoke an armed clash between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Hard times for intelligence service

The declassification of secret materials has allowed us to draw a fuller picture of the activity of the Soviet intelligence bodies (military intelligence, General Staff and the political intelligence of the People’s Commissariat of State Security) and the reaction of the Soviet leadership to their reports.

After the military defeat of France in June 1940, the international situation in Europe was complex, contradictory and volatile. Speculation about Hitler’s decision to break the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and cease military operations against Britain appeared after Hess, Hitler’s personal secretary and, since 1933, his deputy in the Party, flew to Britain in May 1941. At the same time, the foreign policy of Britain and the United States did not indicate any readiness to form an alliance with the Soviet Union in a likely military conflict with Germany. It will be recalled that, in March 1940, Britain and France planned to send an expeditionary corps to Finland and bomb the oil-fields of Baku and Grozny.

Preparing an attack against the Soviet Union, the political and military leaders of Germany attached special importance to the surprise factor. “It is extremely important to ensure that our intentions to attack remain secret,” said the preamble to Directive 21 (the Barbarossa Plan). The German leaders worked out a large-scale system designed to conceal preparations for aggression against the USSR. For instance, the Barbarossa Plan was typed only in eight copies. Four of them remained in Hitler’s safe, and four were sent to the headquarters of the supreme commander-in-chief and the main headquarters of the armed services. The personal role of Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goebbels in these measures shows what importance was attached to masking the planned aggression against the USSR.

Last, mention should be made of the mass repressions in Soviet intelligence, which seriously undermined data collection and processing. The heads of central and local bodies and the most competent agents were liquidated during the purge, and a large part of the intelligence network that had been built up abroad was destroyed. Five chiefs and acting chiefs of the military intelligence (Berezin, Uritsky, Gendin, Orlov and Proskurin) and four chiefs and acting chiefs of political intelligence (Trilisser, Artuzov, Spiengelglas and Passov) were arrested and shot between 1937 and 1940.

The intelligence service was reinforced by men who had proven their worth in the army, and by college graduates who did not know the principles of secret service work and often did not know foreign languages. Such was the situation in the decisive prewar years when the fate of the country depended on timely and trustworthy information.

Nevertheless, the surviving cadres, the newly trained agents, and the remaining network of agents were able to obtain information on Germany’s plans to attack the USSR and report it to the Soviet leadership.

After Hitler approved the Barbarossa Plan, political and military leaders of the USSR received many reports about the military and political plans of Germany. According to the data, about 60 reports were sent in June 1941 alone. Some of them contradicted one another, while others repeated what information was available. For this reason, it seems expedient to mention several reports from Germany on the eve of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.

Alta, Korsikanets and Starshina

On December 18, 1940, Hitler approved Directive 21 (the Barbarossa Plan), and 11 days later, on December 29, our intelligence division received a message from the head of the Alta intelligence group in Berlin: “Hitler has issued an order to prepare for a war against the USSR. War will be declared in March 1941. The order is given to check and clarify this information.” On January 4, 1941, Alta sent a radio message confirming “the correctness of information about preparations in Germany for a war against the Soviet Union in Spring 1941. This information is based not on rumours but on Hitler’s special order known only to a limited circle of people.”

Under the Barbarossa Plan, the attack on the USSR was to be launched on May 15, 1941. The Alta message accurately reflected German intentions.

On January 21, 1941, the commander-in-chief of German land forces issued a directive on strategic deployment. Based on the Barbarossa Plan, it specified the tasks of different armies in war operations against Red Army. On February 28, Alta reported to Moscow: “In the opinion of informed military circles, war against Russia will certainly begin this year... Three groups of armies have been formed... The Konigsberg group of armies is to launch an attack towards Petersburg, the Warsaw group of armies -- towards Moscow, and the Pozen [Krakow] group of armies -- towards Kiev. The operations are supposed to begin on May 20.”

In subsequent reports, these groups of armies will be called North, Centre and South, and their strategic tasks will be to capture Leningrad (the North group), Moscow (the Centre group), and Kiev (the South group). Thus, in February 1941, the intelligence division reported to the military and political leaders of the country not only the date of the attack but also the combat plan, the strategic buildup of Wehrmacht for an attack and subsequent combat operations.

On March 20, F. I. Golikov, chief of the intelligence division, submitted a report on the likely directions of attack by Wehrmacht between May 15 and June 15. He concluded that the rumours and documents about a war against the USSR in spring 1941 should be regarded as misinformation.

On March 20, Starshina, an agent of the People’s Commissariat for State Security, reported from Berlin that there is a 50 percent chance that Germany may attack the Soviet Union, but the information may equally well prove to be a bluff.

On March 27, after the overthrow of the pro-German government in Yugoslavia, the general headquarters under Hitler’s command decided to send troops to that country. In view of the forthcoming military operations in Greece and Yugoslavia, Hitler gave the order to postpone Operation Barbarossa for five weeks. Since Hitler put off the attack on the Soviet Union from May to June, the intelligence bodies began to send information about the new dates of the German invasion.

On April 14, Korsikanets and Starshina, agents of the People’s Commissariat for State Security, reported from Berlin that a German ultimatum could be expected after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece.

On April 22, Dora, an illegal stationary agent in Geneva, reported that, in government’s circles in Berlin, April 15 was being mentioned as the date of an invasion of Ukraine. On May 5, agent AVC reported from Bucharest that “a German military operation against the USSR was to begin on May 15, but in connection with Yugoslavia, it was postponed to the middle of June.”

On May 10, the People’s Commissariat for State Security received a message from Berlin: “The question of the German invasion of the Soviet Union has been finally decided. It is not known whether any demands will be made of the Soviet Union, and for this reason an unexpected attack must be taken in account.”

On May 14, Merkulov, People’s Commissar for State Security, reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria that preparations for an operation against the Soviet Union were in full swing in the air headquarters in Germany. He added that Germany would first issue an ultimatum, demanding expanded export of goods from the USSR to Germany and renunciation of communist propaganda. The ultimatum will be preceded by “a war of nerves.”

On May 16, Starshina reported: “1. Germany has completed all military preparations for an armed attack on the USSR, and the strike can be expected any time. 2. Hungary will take an active part in the German war operations.”

In his report to Stalin, Molotov and Beria in May 1941, Merkulov gave an account of an interrogation of four German deserters, emphasizing that many German soldiers “sympathize with the Soviet Union” and fear encountering “the strong Red Army with its great number of tanks and aircraft, and the vast territory.”

On June 10, at a meeting with top military officers, Hitler made known the final date for invading the USSR. The commander-in-chief of the land forces issued an instruction saying “that June 22 is to be considered the D-Day of Operation Barbarossa.”

British provocation

Shortly before the invasion, Soviet intelligence officers did their utmost to convince the political and military leaders of the country that Germany would invade the USSR without warning.

The intelligence division. The illegal stationary agents (Ramzai in Tokyo, Dora in Switzerland and Otto in France) and military intelligence residents in Berlin (with information provided by Alta), Sofia and Vichy warned of imminent aggression, while agent XVC in the German embassy in Moscow reported that the invasion will be launched early in the morning (3:00 or 4:00) of June 22.

But the military intelligence was unable to convince the political leadership of the inevitable attack. On June 21, 1941, General I.A. Susloparov, the military attache in France, sent a report that, according to reliable sources, the German invasion will begin on June 22. Stalin wrote on the copy of this message: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who sent it and punish him.”

Army General, P.I. Ivashutin, former head of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU), writes in a collection of articles entitled Soldiers of the Invisible Front, “The texts of almost all documents and radiograms concerning German military preparations and the dates of its attack were made known to Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria and Voroshilov, the people’s commissar for defence, and the chief of the General Staff... At the beginning of the war, the intelligence directorate assessed the enemy forces to be used against the USSR as follows: 191 divisions, 146 of them German. These data are very close to the actual figures of 199 and 154, respectively.”

The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. On June 2, 1941, Beria reported to Stalin and Molotov on German military preparations along the Soviet frontier. “If Germany unleashes a war against the USSR,” he concluded, “it will probably be the result of an Anglo-German agreement that will lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities between Germany and Britain.”

The People’s Commissariat for State Security. On June 9, Merkulov reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria that the question of war will be finally decided on the next week. “Germany will demand that the Soviet Union grant it the right to economic management of Ukraine, increase delivery of grain and oil, and use its navy, first of all submarines, against Britain,” he said.

On June 16, Merkulov acquainted Stalin with the message from Starshina. It said that the last measures for an attack had been taken. Stalin replied to Merkulov, “You can send your source in the German air force headquarters to the devil. He is not a source but a misinformer.”

On June 21, Beria, the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, curator of the People’s Commissariat for State Security and the Council of People’s Commissars and a Politburo member, reported to Stalin: “I again insist on the recalling and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov who continues to bombard me with misinformation about alleged preparations by Hitler for an attack on the USSR. He reported that this ‘attack’ will begin tomorrow. The same radio information was sent by Major General Tupikov, our military attache in Berlin. Referring to his residents in Berlin, this dull general asserts that three groups of armies of Wehrmacht will advance towards Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, and impudently demands that we supply these liars with a portable radio set.”

It should be admitted that Stalin and the political leaders of the Soviet Union were misled by a misinformation campaign by Nazi Germany. Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goebbels took personal part in it. Stalin believed, and the Politburo members, the heads of the People’s Commissariats for Defence, Internal Affairs and State Security agreed with him, that Germany would not invade the USSR before ending the war against Britain, or at least would make political and economic demands of the Soviet government before the attack.

It should be noted that, before the war, every people’s commissariat linked with activities abroad assessed foreign information independently and reported to the higher authorities on the sphere of its activities. This means that only some of the activities of the German state were made known by it. Before the war, the USSR had no state body to coordinate the intelligence service and people’s commissariats in gathering foreign information.

There is one more factor — military intelligence did not occupy the necessary place as the main structure among organizations linked with foreign activities (the people’s commissariats for foreign and internal affairs, state security and foreign trade) and responsible for disclosing the military and political plans of Germany.

In June 1940, when the threat of German attack increased, the intelligence division was withdrawn from the People’s Commissar for Defence and turned over to the General Staff of the People’s Commissariat for Defence. It was one more organizational and personnel reshuffle after the purges of 1937-1940. As a result, the intelligence division became one of the departments of the General Staff without direct access to the People’s Commissar for Defence. This lessened the importance of the intelligence division in the system and in dealing with other state bodies.

In addition, the Soviet leadership continued to distrust the intelligence division politically. Despite the increasing threat of German attack in 1941, Stalin asked the division head Golikov to report to him only once, in April.

As a result of underestimation of military intelligence and political distrust in it, the reports from military intelligence on the forthcoming German attack were not properly assessed by leaders of the Soviet Union. We paid the price of millions of our soldiers’ and civilians’ lives for these mistakes. It is especially appropriate to recall this when our country is preparing to mark the 60th anniversary of Great Victory.

http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=1360


and I found this too.

"These reports reached the Kremlin all day on the 21st of June. Colonel General Kirponos, the commander of the Kiev Military District, reported on the same day that a few German deserters had crossed the border and claimed the invasion would begin on the 22nd of June."

http://www.wargamer.com/articles/bprelude_part2.asp

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Yes it seemed so unbelievable. Things could have been done, the Russians have underestimated the Germans in 1941, but they quickly learnt their lesson.

 

And it showed Stalin's stupidity also. He should have listened. I wonder what happened to those Germans?

 

And to this day, those sources have not been revealed. It would be interesting to find out who it was. Some say it was Canaris.

 

very interesting.....

If only Stalin had listened to Sorge.......

 

So very true. Now there is a feasible "What If ?" scenario LOL.

 

This says it pretty much as to how far Stalin felt about Sorge,

" Rather then honoring Sorge for his work,however,Stalin disowned the unfortunate agent after the Japanese captured him. When they offered to exchange him for Japanese prisoners held by the Russians,Stalin replied, " Richard Sorge? I do not know a person of that name" The Japanese hanged Sorge in 1944".

 

On 21/6/1941 and in the early hours of 22/6/1941 a number of German communists serving in front line Wehrmacht units crossed the line and advised the Russians that Barbarossa was due to begin at 03.00 German time , 04.00 Russian time.

One was identified as Obergefreiter Alfred Liskow from Bavaria and a Wilhelm Korpik from Berlin , their info tied in with a Lithuanain deserter who had crossed the line at Kaunas 600km to the North.

Stalin ordered that the deserters be shot for " disinformation " !!!!!!!

Paul

 

Thanks for the info. Im not surprised at thier fate LOL.

 

Nice info Paul ;-))

Stalin should be renamed: Joe Paranoid, from Joe Steel. That man has never failed to amaze me with his back-stabbing ways.

 

Some of the German deserters were actually welcomed by the Soviets , they would become members of the future Soviet occupied Gemrany. The Russians needed German communists to convince more people , so they certainly did not intern all of them. Some of the DDR polititians are examples of this.

 

I read some times ago,.. at the battle of Lake Ilmen,.. there were records of few SSmen from totenkopf who were desserted to Russia,..

 

If they did they were shot straight away. Especially the men with SS markings got no mercy from the Red Army men. And no wonder....

 

If I were the Russians I would have been obviously more distrustful of the SS troopers then anyone else. Just because of their indoctrination alone.

 

Oh yes, Waffen SS received no mercy from the Russians. Difficult to believe that any of them would have deserted towards the Russians. If anything, they would have deserted westward.

Towards the end of the war, whole Waffen SS units were making tracks towards the West to surrender to the Americans or British. They knew what was waiting for them in the East

 

Closet Communists perhaps? Some were bound to stay hidden and take the first chance they could get to desert and escape?

 

They should have came out the closet earlier!

 

lol right

 

"From June 1940 to June 1941, military intelligence received more than 300 concrete reports about Germany's active preparations for war with the USSR. The more important reports were submitted personally to the Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov and Lavrenty Beria, as well as to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. Beginning in late 1939, particularly important reports were also sent to commanders of military districts in the west of the country.
On September 18, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff submitted to Stalin and Molotov a document titled The Principles of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and the East in 1940-1941. The document, based on intelligence information, analyzed the military-political situation in the world, the state of the armed forces of potential enemies and their plans of operations. The report said that "the Soviet Union must be ready to fight on two fronts: in the West against Germany supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the East against Japan. Germany is the main and strongest enemy."
Military intelligence forecasts corresponded with reports from other government bodies (the People's Commissariat of the Interior, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and others). This is why the Soviet leadership took the necessary measures: in 1940 defense production increased 33 percent from the 1939 figure, and the strength of the Army grew. By 1939, 42 new military schools had been opened. In late 1938, rehabilitation of those illegally arrested began. It also decided to increase the production of new tanks, aircraft and artillery guns, and many more decisions were made to strengthen the country's military potential. However, the country was not ready for war, largely owing to the repressions that deprived it of a large part of the intellectual elite. Hence the Soviet leadership's attempt to gain time and prevent war from breaking out at least until 1942 by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany. This became an idee fixe for Stalin and his company, but their hopes for "political honesty" of Hitler and his retinue were in vain.
[SIZE=-1]Major-General V. Tupikov, military attache in Germany[/SIZE]
Fear of purges prevented dissenters from openly expressing their views. Consequences were grave: the Armed Forces were not fully mobilized and alerted. Unfortunately, this referred to military intelligence, too. Inspite of the available alarming information about Germany's actions, it began to adequately react to it only in March 1941 and, of course, failed to carry out the required measures before the war began.
Developments after 1939 became ever more dramatic. All military intelligence sources and agencies repeatedly reported to Moscow about the start of the implementation of an invasion plan (the so-called Barbarossa Plan), the movement of German troops to the Soviet border, the formation of strike groupings, the preparation of a theater of operations, talks between the leaders of countries of the anti-Soviet bloc, the planned date for the invasion, and other facts.
Follow excerpts from some reports:
In late February 1941, Alta (Stoebe) reported from Berlin that, according to information obtained by Aryan (von Schelia), "preparations for war with the USSR have gone too far. Three army groups are being formed under the command of Bock, Runstedt and von Leeb. The Koenigsberg army group will advance on Leningrad, the Warsaw army group will advance on Moscow, and the Poznan army group will advance on Kiev. May 20 should be considered the date of the beginning of the offensive." Later it was reported that the date of the attack on the USSR was postponed until June 22-25 because of "a slowed-down course of the operation in the Balkans."
A report of December 28, 1940, from Sorge from Japan: "The Germans plan to occupy Soviet territory along the Kharkov-Moscow-Leningrad line." April 17, 1941: "The German General Staff has fully completed preparations for an attack on the USSR. The war is going to be short and may begin any time." May 30, 1941: "Berlin has informed Ambassador Otto that war with the USSR will begin in the second half of June. The main blow will be delivered by the left flank."
Similar alarming reports came from western military districts, too.
In other words, in 1940 and the first half of 1941 the Intelligence Agency had abundant concrete and reliable information about Nazi Germany's plans, including:
v the decision of the German government to launch war against the USSR;
v political goals and strategic plans of the German command;
v concrete measures taken by Germany at all stages of preparations for war;
v forces and armaments intended to be used in the war, and methods of waging war;
v army groups and the composition of troops deployed along the Soviet border;
v concrete dates of the attack on the USSR, up to June 21 when our source at the German embassy in Moscow (H. Kegel) reported that the attack and war would begin at 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning on June 22.
Apart from coded reports sent by sources and chiefs of foreign-based intelligence agencies and from summaries of intelligence information, the Soviet military-political leadership was also submitted analytical documents. On March 20, 1941, the Intelligence Agency director General F. Golikov handed over the memo Propositions, Measures and Variants of Combat Actions of the German Army Against the USSR, which summed up all kinds of intelligence information and suggested that Germany might attack between May 15 and June 15. However, apparently to please Stalin who did not believe that Hitler could attack the USSR, Golikov concluded that this information might be British or German misinformation.
Later Marshal Georgy Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that, although the memo expounded the Barbarossa Plan, Golikov's conclusion diminished the memo's value. However, this was not so. On May 9, 1941, the Soviet military attache in Germany General V. Tupikov submitted a detailed report to the People's Commissariat of Defense S. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov on possible actions by the German Army against the USSR in accordance with the Barbarossa Plan. The report said that Germans hoped to rout the Red Army and approach Moscow within one or one-and-a-half months. The report contained no conclusions similar to those made by Golikov. It should be said, however, that the Soviet leadership regularly received all major reports from military intelligence and could have come to the correct conclusions.
In prewar years military intelligence duly fulfilled its tasks. As to people holding a different view, they should be reminded of V. Laker's observation made in his book War of Secrets published in London in 1985: "Intelligence is a prerequisite of an efficient policy and strategy. Without an efficient policy even the most accurate and reliable intelligence data will be useless. The ability to use intelligence data is a decisive factor."
It would be appropriate to cite Germans' estimates of Soviet intelligence operations. A highly placed German counterintelligence officer, Oscar Reily, wrote in his book German Secret Services in World War II: "During the years that preceded World War II, Soviet intelligence set up a broad and efficient network. Thanks to this network, Moscow achieved results that played a major role in organizing the Soviet Union's defense. In that period of time, no other country in the world had an espionage organization that matched the Soviet one in power and capabilities." One can say with confidence that during the prewar years, despite difficulties and shortcomings in its operations, Soviet military intelligence gathered a sufficient amount of information that allowed to draw correct and objective conclusions about Nazi Germany's true plans and intentions."

MILITARY PARADE JANUARY-FEBRUARY

 

JC;
Who is it that said "We did not win the Great Patriotic War because of Comrade Stalin. We won the Great Patriotic War in spite of Comrade Stalin"?
JeffinMNUSA