Hello guys,Does anyone have any info on fuel consumption of allied infantry and/or Armd Divisions.? Are there any comparisons.? Thankyou.4W
I found this on Hyperwar: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Logistics2/USA-E-Logistics2-7.html First Army, taking advantage of its higher tonnage allocation, succeeded in rebuilding its reserve to about seven days by mid-October. But Third Army averaged less than two days of supply until the end of October. In mid-September it had rationed gasoline at the rate of 5,000 gallons per day for infantry divisions, and 25,000 gallons per day for armored divisions. But deliveries were highly unpredictable and continued to fall short of requirements. Late in October the ration was set at 6,500 gallons and 12,500 gallons respectively for infantry and armored divisions. Throughout these weeks issues within the army averaged only 235,000 gallons per day.16
Cheers guys,do you think the rationing for Infantry Divs,included the normal attachment of a tank Bttln and tank destroyer battalion to them.? Thanks.4W
I seem to remember the appendix of Max Hasting's overlord book had info like this..might be worth someone looking...
Thanks Urqh,unfortunately I wopped that one,along with the rest of his stuff some years ago,during a house move.Never mind,lol.Cheers 4W
4th Wilts, There is no simple single answer, because the answer depends on the distance the formation will travel, the number of vehicles and road conditions. Philippe Bauduin in the Heimdal book on the Allied Oil supply problem lists some planning assumptions for daily consumption rates for the Normandy Campaign, and arrives at 650 tons of various supplies (food, ammunition and fuel).per (infantry) division The phase one - Normandy post D Day build up assumed 50 miles per day (8 US Gallons per wheeled vehicle; 24 gallons per half track and 52 gallons per fully tracked vehicle.). When fighting the Germans in the near static battles near Caen and in the hedgerows, a higher proportion of ammunition would be needed and less fuel. During the the pursuit after Normandy: more fuel and less ammunition. Cross country movement may use twice or three times as much fuel as on a metalled road. In Pantherfiebel (http://archive.org/details/Panther-fibel-BetriebUndKampfanleitung) the Germans quote the Panther as being able to travel for 150km on roads and 100km cross country on a 730l tank of petrol. The Administrative planning Precis (Appendix J 21) to the Course notes from the Combined Operations Long Staff Course at Largs dated 5 Jan 1944, based on combined ops Pam 4 1943 section VII says that the basic figures for planning the quantity of stores needed to maintain the force is 800 tons per day per division, including a margin to build up reserves. This figure is not dissimilar to Bauduin, is you assume that the extra 150 tones is the margin to build up a reserve. (This is the course staff officers in 21 AG attended before D day)
I've heard similar numbers to Good Ol' Boy's. I heard those numbers in the World War Two in Colour documentary. I'm not sure about Soviet numbers, I haven't heard anything. I did read in one book concerning Operation Bagration that by 1944 the Soviet army was far more mechanized than the Heer, and consumed somewhere between 3 and 5 times more fuel. I have no authoritative source to back that up though. I think it's safe to say that fuel was definitely an allied strength, and it was the Achilles hell of the Wehrmacht.