Lofoten Island Raids At the same time, No.4 Special Service Battalion (Referred from here as 4 SS) was formed from Nos 3 and 8 Commandos. 4 SS Battalion was selected to take part in Operation Claymore against the Lofoten Islands, who in company with 3 SS, sailed with brigadier Haydon and his headquarters with 50 Norwegian sailors aboard HMS Queen Emma and Princess Beatrix and a naval escort from Scapa Flow on 21st February. They stopped at the Faeroe islands on route for some final training and here No.3 SS Battalion Company became No.4 Commando and No.4 Company was designated No.3 Commando. They set off again on 1st March, arriving at the Lofoten Islands in the early hours of 4th March. The Germans were totally unaware of the attack, and the German troops were taken by surprise. The Fish Oil factories and military installations were destroyed and they then reembarked and headed for home. Lord Lovat had joined No.4 Commando and had captured the German staff at a seaplane base nearby. They returned home with 315 volunteers for the Norwegian forces, sixty Quislings and 225 German prisoners, all for the cost of one casualty, an officer who had accidentally shot himself in the thigh. The Trawler Krebs was also boarded and the Enigma cypher machine onboard, though thrown overboard, had a spare set of cyphers which were captured and passed onto Bletchley park. A mission was planned against the Canary Islands, in case Spain entered the war, and ten Amphibious landing ships with Force 110 aboard, with a commando contribution of four small parties, drawn from Nos. 2, 1 and 3 combined, 4 and 9 commandos. They sailed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, where they remained for a time until the plan was abandoned and they returned to the UK, stopping off at one time at Ascension Island due to a possible invasion scare. Following an abortive mission to Norway, a second raid was planned this time against Vaagso, to destroy German military installations. No.4 Commando contributed a medical detachment to the force. No.12 Commando mounted a raid against Lofoten Islands as a diversion and captured the garrison there. Vaagso was raided with the support of naval gunfire, Bomber Command Hampdens and Coastal Command Blenheims, with other Blenheims and Beaufighters overhead to keep the Luftwaffe at bay. They landed at 0700 on the 27th, and one landing craft was hit by a phosphorous bomb dropped by an aircraft and hit by German fire. The main objectives were taken, but South Vaagso was tougher than expected and almost the entire force was required to reduce the garrison there. The force reembarked at 1445 hours, bringing back some Norwegian volunteers, 98 prisoners and 4 Quislings. However, 17 commandos had been killed and the Navy had suffered 2 killed and 6 wounded, the commandos had also suffered 53 wounded.
St Nazaire Raid The Raid at St Nazaire was designed to prevent the drydock at the port being used by the Tirpitz, and therefore preventing the ship from coming south from the Norwegian fjords. The raid was led by HMS Cambeltown an American lend-lease destroyer specially refitted for the task. Her interior was stripped, and the bridge armour-plated with protection being provided for the commandoes she would carry. The motor Launches carried 150 commandos, and each was fitted with two Oerlikon 20mm guns and additional fuel tanks to increase their range. To carry more commandos, the ML fleet was increased to ten and then to 14.Only one MGB was available, MGB 314 commanded by Lt Dunstan Curtis was a C-Class Fairmile. She would led the attack. MTB 74 joined the force after her attack on Rade de Brest. MTB 74 was backup, equipped with untried flying torpedoes to breach the lock if the Cambeltown failed to reach the drydock. The Fleet sailed on 28th March, with MGB 314 at the lead and two escort destroyers flanking the MLs and Cambeltown. 60 bombers provided a diversionary air raid, and each boat flew the German flag to delay identification. HMS Sturgeon, a submarine, provided the exact position for the task force from which to make its run into the estuary, The Cambeltown crept through the estuary at 5 knots, touching bottom twice. At 0120 Search lights illuminated the entire fleet and the German flags were replaced with the White Ensign. The fleet was still two miles from its target. In 15 minutes of intense shelling half the men aboard the MLs were dead or wounded. The bombers were briefed to target only military installations, specific targets, and to avoid civilian casualties. Those who failed to acquire their targets did not drop their bombs. The Cambeltown cleared the estuary and increased speed to drive her bows through the torpedo barrier and into the dock gate. The MLs were all but stopped, only two succeeded in landing their full complement of commandos. Other MLs approached the old moe, but were forced to reembark their commandos in the face of heavy fire from 20mm cannons. Fighting was ferocious and close quartered on shore. Cambeltown meanwhile, was relieved of most of her crew by MGB 314 while MTB 74 deployed her delayed action torpedoes in the foundations of the lock gate. The MTB then left for home with 26 more survivors. The MTB stopped to pick up two more survivors and shells from the shore batteries smashed the boat. Only three of the 34 aboard survived. Cambeltown was driven onto the lock gates and its hold detonated, destroying the lock gates. The delayed torpedoes were activated two days later. Below are the VCs and awards granted for the St Nazaire raid. Of the 241 Commandoes who took part, 59 were posted as killed or missing and 109 captured. 85 Royal Navy were killed or missing and a further 20+ captured and many others were woudned. Captain Robert Edward Dudley Ryder, RN. For great gallantry in the attack on St. Nazaire. He commanded a force of small unprotected ships in an attack on a heavily defended port and led HMS Cambeltown in under intense fire from short range weapons at point blank range. Though the main object of the expedition had been accomplished in the beaching of Cambeltown, he remained on the spot conducting operations, evacuating men from Cambeltown and dealing with strong points and close range weapons while exposed to heavy fire for one hour and sixteen minutes, and did not withdraw till it was certain that his ship could be of no use in rescuing any of the Commando Troops who were still ashore. That his motor un boat, now full of dead and wounded, should have survived and should have been able to withdraw through an intense barrage of close range fire was almost a miracle. Lieutenant-Commander Stephen Halden Beattie, RN, HMS Cambeltown. For great gallantry and determination in the attack on St. Nazaire in command of HMS Cambeltown. Under intense fire directed at the bridge from point blank range of about 100 yards, and in the face of the blinding glare of many searchlights, he steamed her into the lock gates and beached and scuttled her in the correct position. This Victoria Cross is awarded to Lieutenant-Commander Beattie in recognition not only of his own valour but also of that of the unnamed officers and men of a very gallant ship's company, many of whom have not returned. Able Seaman William Alfred Savage, RN. For great gallantry, skill and devotion to duty as gunlayer of the pom-pom in a motor gunboat in the St. Nazaire raid. Completely exposed, and under heavy fire he engaged positions ashore with cool and steady accuracy. On the way out of the harbour he kept up the same vigorous and accurate fire against the attacking ships, until he was killed at his gun. This Victoria Cross is awarded in recognition not only of the gallantry and devotion to duty of Able Seaman Savage, but also of the valour shown by many others, unnamed, in Motor Launches, Motor Gun Boats and Motor Torpedo Boats, who gallantry carried out their duty in entirely exposed positions against enemy fire at very close range.
I think there is some confusion here, No. 4 commando was the 4. SSB, No. 3 Commando was never made an SSB because John Durnford-Slater refused to have SS in his units title. Your description is rather confusing as it suggests 3 Commando was part of 4 SSB which worked seperatly from 3.SSB. Otherwise, a very interesting pair of articles. If you are interested in Commandos, I suggest you look for 'Commando' by John Durnford-Slater. An excellent book well worth a read but I suspect out of print.
Thanx for that Stefan. I am very intrested in Commandos but I haven't been able to find many books. The only one I own is about the Commandos on Dieppe. So I will keep an eye open for that book. [ 25. June 2003, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: Jet ]
You’re always going to get muddled talking about Battalions, Companies, Brigades etc. without setting out how each came about and how they kept getting reorganised. A Battalion was formed end of ’39 from the 5th Battalion Scots Guards by MI(R) [Military Intelligence Research – Joe Holland and Colin Gubbins] to operate as a ski force behind the lines in support of Finland during the Russo-Fin war. They were never sent as Norway and Sweden refused to allow them to cross their territory, then they were disbanded when that war ended. Soon after Germany’s invasion of Norway on 9th April 1940, MI(R) proposed raising a force, mainly but not exclusively, from the Territorial forces still in Britain (i.e. not committed to the BEF). These were the ‘Independent Companies’, ‘Independent’ because they were to be independent of normal military budgetary control. If they needed something, they were to have it – in theory anyway. Ten Companies were raised @ 21 April 1940, each of 21 officers and 268 other ranks, and the ‘base’ for each was to be an assault ship. They were not intended to be ‘raiders’ like the Commandos, but to stay in the field for up to three months – ergo, a Rapid Reaction force. They were to go to Norway and secure the coast between Namos and Narvik and essentially stop the Germans operating submarines from there. The first 5 Companies went, but found the objective untenable, so were recalled. Meanwhile, at the time of Dunkerque, Churchill called for a force of 5’000 raiders, but left General Staff to work out the details. John Dill’s assistant (CIGS – replaced Ironside), Lt. Col. Dudley Clarke (RA), sketched out a basic format on a single sheet of paper which included the title ‘Commando’. This went up the line to Churchill who approved it and Clarke was ordered to form the first Commando and start raiding. He went to Scotland and recruited the first Commando from the five Independent Companies not in Norway. On Sunday 9th June, 1940, Clarke appointed the first two Commando officers (Ronnie Tod and ‘Atty’ Rice) who each selected 100 men. This first Commando was know as either No.11 Commando or No.11 Independent Company, depending on the author of the paperwork. While Churchill liked the title ‘Commando’, some among the Chiefs of Staff did not. This led to a persistence of the term ‘Special Service’ in various titles until 1944. Ronnie Tod led Operation Collar on the night of 24/25 June 1940, landing some 4 miles south of Boulogne. Meanwhile, letters went out to the commands in Britain calling for volunteers. Ten Commandos of 500 men each were formed in June, Numbers 1 to 11, No.10 from Northern England Command did not produce enough volunteers so the No.10 was left vacant for the time – until 1942 when it was assigned to a Commando of non British soldiers. Other Commandos were formed later in the war with the first Royal Marines Commando (No.40 Commando (RM) ) in 1942, Dieppe being their first major operation. In September/October 1940, everyone was jumpy about the invasion threat and the Independent Companies and the Commandos were grouped together and placed temporarily under Home Forces command. 1 SS Battalion - Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 Independent’s. 2 SS Battalion - Nos. 6 and 7 Independent’s and Nos.9 and 11 Commandos 3 SS Battalion – Nos. 4 and 7 Commandos 4 SS Battalion – Nos. 3 and 8 Commandos 5 SS Battalion – Nos. 5 and 6 Commandos No.10 Independent had been sent off to Dakar, No.1 Commando was intended to be formed from disbanded Independents of which there were none yet, and No.2 Commando was raised as the first paratroops but later was reinstated as the paratroops went on to become the Parachute Regiment in their own right (after, for a while, being titled 11 Special Air Service). No.12 Commando was formed as, and remained, a force of 250 in Northern Ireland, specifically poised to act the event of an Irish/nazi alliance. The other special force not included was Independent Company Gibraltar who lasted till 1944. The existing SS formations were not popular and were found to be ‘unwieldy’ in command. There was arguing at the top about whether or not to seize Pantellaria, provided this would not compromise seizing the Azores if Hitler went for Spain. In the interim a case came up for the Dodecanese – Rhodes. Laycock set off with Force Z which strangely single out Nos. 7, 8 and 11 Commando and one Troop of No.3. This of course left 3 SS and 4 SS with one Commando each. Lofoten was a legitimate and important target, but it was not ‘hard’ and ranks nowhere near St Nazaire, being the greatest raid of all. Lofoten was filmed and recorded and gave the public a great morale boost. However, some men left the Commandos afterwards becoming disillusioned with the promise of action. The SS Battalions chosen were 3 and 4 which now only contained Nos. 4 and 3 Commandos respectively. As no one liked the SS Battalion structure, Nos. 4 and 3 Commandos reverted to their original titles and discarded the SS Battalion labels. Hence, No.4 and No.3 always were No.4 and No.3 – nothing changed, they just dropped the unpopular SS Battalion labels. Immediately on returning from Lofoten, everything was reorganised again. Essentially, after Lofoten, the object was to have 11 Commando companies and no Independents. The already formed Commandos stayed as was, but, some men from the Commandos elected to return to their original regiments as their expectations of being a Commando were not met. A smaller number were RTU’ed (Returned To Unit) by the Commandos. Regarding the Independents, their choice was to join the existing Commando companies or rejoin their original regiments. As usual, men who wanted to stay in or join the Commandos, had to be suitable by Commando standards. The basic channels for men when the SS Battalions were disbanded was thus: No.1 Commando draw from 1 SS No.2 Commando draw from 1 SS No.3 Commando draw from 4 SS No.4 Commando draw from 3 SS No.5 Commando draw from 5 SS No.6 Commando draw from 5 SS No.7 Commando draw from 3 SS No.8 Commando draw from 4 SS No.9 Commando draw from 2 SS No.11 Commando draw from 2 SS No.12 Commando no change A friend of mine who was in 2 Independent Company said they were around Devon at the time, and one day were called on parade and told they were now No.2 Commando! Generally though, those already in a Commando (as opposed to an Independent) stayed in their Commando. The piece on St. Nazaire (1942) is exceeding abridged and misleading, and far too large a subject to sum-up now. However, this was a true Combined Operations task, it was designated a Commando operation, not a Naval one, and the job was given to No.2 Commando plus the demolition sections from Nos.1, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 12 Commandos (241 all told). The Campbeltown (USS Buchanan) was not a ‘lease-lend’ ship, it was one of 50 obsolete rust-bucket Destroyers the Americans dredged from the scrapheap in exchange for our Caribbean bases in 1940. They had hundreds tied up waiting to be scrapped. Don’t think America ever ‘gave’ Britain anything without an invoice. Anyway, there were 83 awards with 5 VC’s, including Sgt. Durrant (No.1 Cdo) and Lt. Col. Newman (No.2 Cdo). Get hold of ‘The Greatest Raid of All’ by Lucas Phillips, plenty about in paperback or hardback. Durnford-Slater’s ‘Commando’ is well worth having. Slater has a big ego which becomes apparent in his writing. However, he’s humorous and is otherwise on the metal. Just kept in mind what I’ve said when he refers to other Commandos at times. No.9 [ 28. June 2003, 12:34 PM: Message edited by: No.9 ]