Yes sir, we should have sufficient airlift to hit at least two targets with paradrops simultaneously. Depending on the size of the drops and how many additional transport aircraft types we can pump out pre-X day possibly more. The submarine question I am less sure of, it depends upon how many of our boats are adaptable to reconfigure. We have sufficient amphibious forces to hit multiple targets (remember we won't be making the historical Wake Island, Guam and Philipines landings). The two veteran regiments General Nishio has signed off on letting us run through airborne school should give us sufficient additional airborne troops, but if yourself and Nishio feel we need a greater "cushion" we could run a third regiment through. It really is not a problem to have additional trained airborne troops utilized in a strictly ground combat role (ala the 101st Airborne at Bastogne). It was my understanding that we would be delivering our declaration of war, on Friday evening, at close of business, London time to both the British and Dutch government in exile, also located in London. London is 8 hours behind Singapore so if we deliver our declaration at 4:30 pm London time, it would be 30 minutes past midnight Singapore time, so technically the next day. This allows for only about 4 hours for the enemy to respond. Nautical dawn in Singapore will be around 0430, at which time we can begin debarkation and pre-invasion bombardment for landing operations and airstrikes can launch. Sunrise will be around 0645 so H-hour should be aound this time. I do not think this allows for sufficient time for the enemy to effect major changes to their defensive posture. The 4 carriers of division 1 & 2 assigned to attack Singapore can probably catch a good number of ships in port and the strike package should be configured accordingly. We could possibly attach our CVL's, Ryujo and Zuiho to carrier division three and have them support the landings on southern Borneo and then Palembang, while Shokaku and Zuikaku break off and hit enemy harbor facilities. I will assign additional intelligence assets to the DEI in order to determine the most likely location of enemy naval forces in case we should decide to go this route and deal with them preemptively. Shoho is scheduled to commission in November, I do not think it possible to have her ready for the operations but will investigate further. Steverodgers wrote: Very good point sir. This is also one of the reasons I have requested that the Prime Minister allow us to immediately put some of our Minekaze/Kamikaze/Mutsuki destroyers into repair shipyards to begin upgrading the ASW capability of our Type D-destroyers, in order to deal with enemy subsurface units. I believe this is their greatest threat to our operations. The mining of enemy harbors is a good idea, if we have sufficient boats to perform the mining. I fear this is one of those areas where our assets are fairly thin. The minelaying boats are the type we will need to use to land troops if we decide to follow that route. We will need to decide which is the better use for them. I do think it wise to station submarines off the enemy's ports to attack traffic trying to leave. We need to keep additional units off Pearl Harbor and off American naval installations in the Philipines, to perform the reconaissance role and to provide warning if their fleets sortie. Additional submarines should be stationed in the northern end of the Straits of Malacca to interdict possible reinforcing British Naval units. The discussion also raises a subject I have failed to address. A certain number of our DD/DE/E units will need to be completed to fill the DMS/DML role. We will always have a need for minesweepers and minelayers.