The 3:! Allied economic superiority over the Axis existed in 1937, when as Kennedy states, the Axis' combined share of the world's war-making potential was 20.4% to the Allies combined share of 70.1%. The relative disparity changed little during the next six years, the major difference being the subtraction of France's share (4.2%) of war-making potential from the Allied column. Even if you added the entire 4.2% of France's share to the Axis column, which would be an exaggeration, you still have an Allied to Axis ratio of 65.9% to 24.6%. An earlier German economic mobilization would not have solved the fundamental economic problems the Axis nations faced. It would not have provided more raw materials, more industrial capacity, better logistics, a larger pool of labor, or a larger scale of economic activity. It would have provided more weapons earlier, but that was not the reason Hitler lost his gamble on Blitzkrieg. Hitler lost in Britain's case, because he simply could not inflict sufficient damage on Britain to force it's surrender, and he lost in the USSR because the size of the country allowed the Soviet leadership to trade territory for time. The simple fact was that the Allied economies dwarfed the Axis economies in terms of industrial capacity, labor pools, access to raw materials, and capital reserves, not to mention territorial size. Not only did the Germans fail to plan for a timely and rational mobilization of their economy, but they wasted resources on non-essential programs; for example, rounding up, moving, and incarcerating millions of people merely to kill them and dispose of the bodies added nothing to the furtherance of their war effort, but tied up significant resources. The V-weapons were built long after it was clear they had no military value and were merely used to terrify civilian populations. Huge numbers of U-boats continued to be built long after it was obvious they had lost the Battle of the Atlantic and could do nothing to defend the Reich. The Allies held an unassailable advantage in that two of it's three largest industrial centers were beyond any hope of sustained Axis attack. This allowed long-term planning for logistics and raw materials allocations without having to contend with the effects of enemy bombing of plants, transportation facilities, and materials stockpiles, a luxury denied the Axis planners. One can postulate better economic planning earlier in the game, but this yields only a transitory advantage in numbers of weapons early in the war. It's extremely unlikely that this advantage would have been enough to convince either the British or Soviet leadershaip that surrender was the only option, particularly since it was a given that the US, which alone ould out produce not only Germany, but the entire Axis and rest of Europe combined, intended to insure Germany's eventual defeat, whatever the cost.