Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

The quotation you are responding to was mine, not Glenn239's.

And yes, I was counting the oil in tanks in the NEI (which turned out to be quite a bit), as well as that still in the ground. The real problem for the Japanese was, from the very beginning of the war, getting the oil from the NEI to the refineries in Japan and thence to where Japan needed the refined product. They simply didn't have enough tankers to transport the oil around the Empire to the places that used it. This problem was being felt at Rabaul as early as mid-1942 according to Ugaki's diary. Getting oil or refined petroleum products to places like Darwin would be just as difficult as getting it to Rabaul or Tokyo.

As H. P. Wilmott says in "Empires in the Balance" (pages 68-69);

"However, the question of secure resources was only part of Japan's overall oil problem. The Japanese did not have a sufficiently large tanker fleet to transport captured oil from the Indies to refineries in Japan. Normally Japan's oil had been mostly carried by nations now arrayed against her. The transportation was one without solution and as time passed it gradually assumed chronic proportions. It was only partially relieved when Japan based her fleet in the south and fueled directly from the Indies in the period 1942-44. This was a course of action for which the Japanese had made no allowance before the war, and, indeed, the Japanese had made no effort to think through their oil problem until war became inevitable."

An invasion of Australia, even a small one doomed to failure, with it's attendant naval operations, would not make the Japanese oil problem any more tractable, and would simply lead to another Solomons-style battle of attrition, albeit on a larger scale with the most of the advantages ceded to the Allies.

 

It's not at all clear that the Japanese Army really had much of an edge over the US army or RAF once tactics were adjusted. Indeed the P-40 proved a match for their fighters and the P-38 superior. As for the JNAF it may have had a slight edge up to Midway compared to the USN but it was certainly gone by that point. Also the IJN pilots while the best that Japan had would for the most part stay with their carriers. (Historically they didn't have enough carriers to employ them post Midway). In the meantime the Langly isn't sunk and can spend it's time moving planes to Australia in relative safety indeed the US may be able to take over Gaudacanal without a fight as it's not at all clear that the Japanese can launch an offensive vs it while also launching one vs Australia.

 

Yes, that is true; there is some marginal efficiency to be realized in rational routing of the logistical shipping. But that was far from being Japan's real problem as far as shipping goes. There wasn't nearly enough for Japan's requirements to begin with, and what Japan did have was largely squandered
by irrational routings caused by interagency rivalries between the three Japanese shipping agencies. I would argue that the sites involved for Japanese operations paled to insignificance when one considers Japan's other shipping issues.

I think you have me confused with someone else; I have never stated that Japan had a shortage of soldiers. But, as you are asserting that Japan enjoyed unlimited manpower to renew it's Army, perhaps you would care to cite some authority as to the accuracy of your assertion?

Absolutely agree, General MacArthur.

No doubt, a "land war" would be limited to "land power" (whatever that is). But the Allies certainly would not limit their actions to ground warfare, and the Japanese consequently could not afford to either. Naval and air units on both sides would be heavily involved in any Japanese invasion of Darwin. It's absurd to think it would be only a "land war".

 

Much of the production from Java was consumed directly at the front and did not go to Japan for refinery.

 

Good points.

The US would definitely increase the rate of aircraft deployment to Australia using both aircraft ferries like the Langley (I believe the escort carrier Long Island, originally rated an aircraft ferry, was in the Pacific by this time, as well) and regular freighters carrying crated planes. And these planes wouldn't be just those not wanted in Europe; P-38's would be deployed in much greater numbers than historically.

Absolutely, as I pointed out before, putting 2+ divisions ashore at Darwin would certainly limit Japan's ability to carry out major operations elsewhere in the Pacific, if only because a Darwin invasion would tie up a major portion of the Combined Fleet. The US would be free to take advantage of this in several areas, including the Solomons.

 

Then we are no longer in dispute as to the effect, but merely trying to ascertain how beneficial it would be.

The idea that the Japanese had 2 divisions lying around, just waiting for something to do is absurd.

But this was not so. Infantry divisions were the one thing Japan did have in abundance.

Naval units were not heavily involved in other IJA theaters in China or Burma, or in Malaya past the initial invasion. So I doubt they would be involved too deeply in an Army operation in Australia either. Darwin’s proximity to Timor, the fact that it was in MacArthur’s command zone, and the narrow confines of the theatre essentially prevented the use of Allied carriers. Without carriers, the USN does not approach Therefore a Darwin campaign will not be primarily naval in character and would not heavily engage the Imperial Navy’s resources.
Assuming that the USN did commit carriers to MacArthur's care, then given the Japanese controlled Port Moresby these would have to be based on the west coast – perhaps near Perth. If this is so, then the IJN bases its carriers at Staring Bay and achieves the objective of a naval base right on top of their oil supply.

 

Citation please.

I do not believe the Japanese began using unrefined oil in their ships until 1943, and only reluctantly then. It degraded the performance of the IJN ships by damaging boilers and due to volatile elements was dangerous to use. This was very probably a contributing factor in the loss of the carrier Taiho in June, 1944.

While there were some functioning refineries in the NEI, there output in 1942 was just beginning to recover from the sabotage carried out by the Dutch. In any case, the NEI refineries did not produce significant amounts of aviation fuel in 1942, most of which had to be transported to Japan, refined, and then
transhipped to bases throughout the Japanese Empire. Tankers, and the lack thereof, are again the key problem for Japan.

 

Will do.

I said Java, not Borneo.

Naturally. Having realised that your core assumption of refinery in Japan was being undermined by way of the fact that huge quantities of oil were supplied directly to the front, you now switch the topic to avgas – as if the amount of avgas consumed had anything to do with oil for moving ships. Or as if a campaign in Australia that used (and lost) far less airpower than the Solomons would somehow wind up costing more avgas!

You stated,

The concept I am talking about is the absolute necessity of getting in the first strike in any carrier vs. carrier battle. The Japanese ignored this principle, in favor of a full, coordinated strike, at Midway and consequently paid the price by losing four fleet carriers.


“The Japanese” ignored this principle, according to you. Not just Nagumo – “Japanese” means all of them, with Nagumo as the example you give. However, this was not so. Hara and 5th Carrier did not believe this. We know this from Coral Sea. Yamaguchi and 2nd CAR DIV certainly did not believe this either. And Nagumo? Well, maybe. Maybe not. But the fact is that the tactical situation was very difficult and he made a bad choice on the basis of quite a number of factors. Getting in the first strike? How can Nagumo get in the first strike or value doing this when he knows by 8:30am that the enemy must already have launched everything they had before he even had detected them?
The IJN was in the same situation as the USN; too much doctrine, not too little. Practice in the field was as varied as there were independent carrier commands. Hara did not do it like Ozawa who did not do it like Yamaguchi, who was also different than Nagumo. On the US side, the same thing. USN doctrine at Midway? Every carrier seemed to have a different one!

 

Your reply is misleading

My reply was to your statement that:

I stand by my statement. Furthermore how is this different from the Japanese intent at Midway? They were to prep for the invasion as the American carriers did at Guadalcanal and provide cover while the island was secured. And mac_bolan00 was referring to Midway when you made the reply.

You might wish to take your own advice. I have read virtually every book written on the Guadalcanal campaign and from your statements it appears you don't have a firm grasp of what occurred there.
Furthermore, virtually all your comments fail to take into account the different tactical considerations the Americans faced with those that wopuld be faced by Japan in an Australian invasion of Darwin.

This is a good example of what I am referring to. The statement on it's face is true, but why? The Japanese were forcing the shipping down the slot in the face of American air and naval power, They were sunk because they could not adequately be protected.
How does the Darwin scenario differ? The supplies would be pushed up from behind, screened from attack by Japanese forces located in Australia.

Once again you're dodging the point. No one has stated that Japan had a massive logistical ability. Their best option would have been to have never started the war. We are discussing their best option once they made their decision. Supplying a Japanese force in northern Australia was easier than the course they actually chose. Supporting forces in the Solomons and New Guinea, both of which would probably not have been the scene of campaigns if Glenn239's option were exercised. It is also easier than supplying Midway and offers a greater potential to actually effect the strategic course of the war.

It is true. Japan would be fighting near it's Australian bases with a protected supply line. Yes Timor is 450 miles from Darwin but the nearest Australian airbase would be at Cooktown about 900 miles away (double the difference). To the south the closest settlement of any import is Alice Springs also between 900 and 1000 miles distant. There may have been a major airfield closer but if so I am unaware of it, and if you can supply the info I will stand corrected. Lets see now, P-39 range 525mi, P-40 range 650mi, P-38 range 1300 mi doesn't seem to me that they are much of a threat initially. The A6M Zero and Ki43 Oscar were both excellent fighters, designed to operate from unimproved airstrips and had superior performance to any aircraft the encountered in 1941/42. The Japanese pilots, both army and navy were highly trained with large numbers of flying hours under their belts. Next, Glenn239 specified that the scenario in question take place in early 1942, may/June timeframe. At this time Japan still had the cream of the crop when it came to aviators.
Do not take an anachronistic view of the question. Look at it from the capabilities of each side at the time.

The carriers could protect the invasion until a ground base could be put into operation. The relentless allied air attack is also a pipe dream, there were not that many front line aircraft in Australia in May/June 42, even fewer that had the range to be used in an attack and those that were available were not very effective against Japanese shipping.
From Fifth Airforce Light and Medium Bomber Operations 1942 and 1942:
by Major Timothy Gann, Air University, United States Airforce.

Lastly, at this point in 1942 Australia had less than 1000 aircraft, in Australia, mostly trainers, and the divisions being raised were only partly trained and equipped.

 

Immaterial. Both places produced oil which could be used in ship's boilers without refining.

I have not "switched to avgas" as the major point. I'm still waiting for data on just how much oil (either refined or unrefined) went "directly to the front" in 1942. I do not concede that your original statement is true. Nor have you ever demonstrated any reason to believe that an air campaign in Australia would cost fewer aircraft than historically in the Solomons. Until you either "put up or shut up" with the actual numbers, I'm standing by my statements.

The concept I am talking about is the absolute necessity of getting in the first strike in any carrier vs. carrier battle. The Japanese ignored this principle, in favor of a full, coordinated strike, at Midway and consequently paid the price by losing four fleet carriers.

My, you must be getting desperate, arguing semantics, and poorly at that. My qualifying phrase "at Midway" pretty much limits the statement to Nagumo, as he was the "Japanese" in command there. Hara was obviously not involved in any way. You are merely trying to inject confusion into the debate.

Nagumo had no such knowledge as you attribute to him regarding when the US carries launched their strikes. All of his actions seem to be based on the assumption that he would have time to launch his anti-shipping strike. His choice was obviously based on the IJN octrine of launching full strength, coordinated strikes.

I won't argue the merits of doctrine with you, nor the fact that individual commanders often choose to ignore doctrine in favor of some other course of action. However, at Midway, both Fletcher and Spruance were primarily concerned about one thing; being able to launch their strikes as early as possible. And this was, in fact, US Navy carrier doctrine from at least the mid-1930's. So try to confuse the issues as much as you like, it remains a matter of fact that the USN got in the first strike, which shattered Kido Butai and rendered it impossible for it to counter with effective counter strikes. That was the reason the US won at Midway.

 

I understand it was Midway, the original poster was referring to.

How different were the Japanese intentions at Midway? Well, for starters, Nagumo originally planned to launch his strikes from 50 miles offshore and only changed that because he was late getting there. Fletcher stayed well out of range of any land-based Japanese air power and had no intention of closing Guadalcanal to less than maximum strike range; big difference between Nagumo and Fletcher there.

Second, Nagumo was to stay near Midway until, 1.)the island's air power was neutralized, and 2.) the US carriers showed up and had been destroyed. Fletcher at Guadalcanal had no such instructions or intentions and in fact stated his intention to retire as soon as possible, prior to the operation.

Third, Nagumo was prepared to withstand land-based air attack and in fact did remian close to Midway despite numerous air attacks. Fletcher withdrew his carriers immediately upon losing just 10 % of his fighters.

There really can be no comparison of the USN 's use of carriers for distant cover at Guadalcanal and the Japanese attempt at forcing the invasion of Midway using carriers. I stand by my statement.

So have I, and from my perspective you are the one who doesn't understand the Guadalcanal campaign. And no, I haven't failed to take into account the different tactical considerations the Allies would face in any Australian invasion. The tactical situation represented by an invasion of Darwin is actually far more favorable than any that was encountered either at Midway or in the Solomons. You have seemed to assume that the Allied forces in Australia would simply sit around and do nothing for a couple of months while the Japanese made themselves at home in Darwin. You have assumed conditions favoring the Japanese which are highly questionable, if not downright false, and have overestimated their capabilities while downplaying or ignoring those of the Allies.

Well, I guess we've gotten to the point where that "abundance of coastal shipping" theory bites the dust. Supplying Darwin would be no different than supplying the Solomons. There is no "behind" (whatever that means) to push supplies up from, and any attempt to supply Darwin would certainly face massive Allied air and naval response from both land-based air and naval units. The only Japanese forces located in Australia would be those (starving) 2+ divisions and a handful of planes operating from cratered runways around Darwin. That's exactly what the Japanese tried, and failed, to do successfully in the Solomons and so far you haven't shown a shred of evidence why things would turn out differently in Australia.

Dodging what point? That an Australian invasion would somehow be more advantageous to the Japanese than capturing Rabaul and the Solomons? No one has so far shown any reason to believe that point is valid. Glenn239's point about logistical shipping routings being marginally more efficient certainly doesn't justify any such notion especially since any such supposed gain in efficiency would almost certainly be overwhelmed by the inefficiency inherent in Japanese ship routings.

What objective would the Japanese be attempting to achieve in Australia? so far the only objective I have heard (and it is certainly questionable) is that it would "slow down" the Allied advance and somehow convince the Americans to negotiate. The latter is just not going to happen, the former is not an objective so much as a forlorn hope. If that's "affecting the strategic course of the war", the Japanese might just as well sue for peace and get it over with.

True? Hardly. Japan's supply lines would NOT be protected anymore than they were protected in the Solomons. Where you get the idea that Japan got get supplies into Darwin without being relentlessly attacked is beyond me. The nearest Allied bases would be much closer than 900 miles away. There was a railhead in Alice Springs from which materials could be trucked to within a couple hundred miles of Darwin. That would have allowed the Allies to establish air bases that could attack the Darwin area at will. Furthermore the Japanese would have no effective way of detecting such raids in time to position any defending aircraft. Alternatives would be to establish air bases on the coast to the southwest of Darwin, utilizing towns like Broome as supply points, and use carriers for suppressive air raids.

Yes, isn't it strange how despite all that, Allied air power defeated them within six months in the Solomons, and absolutely crushed them in New Guinea? What makes you think it would be any different in Australia?

Glenn 239doesn't get to specify the time frame unless he wants to start a separate thread. Since this scenario is an alternative to the Midway operation, the time frame is early June, 1942. An "non-anachronistic" view of the situation would reveal that some Japanese officers, Yamamoto, for instance is already concerned about the quality of the Japanese replacement pilots, and that just two months later (historically), the Japanese pilots have only a slight edge over their opponents at Guadalcanal. Yes, lets take a look at it from the capabilities of the time. Historically, at Midway, the USN pilots proved the equal of the Japanese pilots in training and only slightly inferior in experience. At Coral Sea, USN pilots gave as good as they got. This could not be said of other Allied pilots like the USAAF, but they were quickly improving and by mid-1942 could stand up to Japanese pilots in combat. As for the Japanese pilots, IJAAF pilots were not trained to navigate over open water and thus were not deployed where they would have to do so; Timor, for example. The Darwin beachhead would have to be defensed by IJNAF pilots since any airbases in the Darwin area would be under heavy Allied attack.

So, where do all the Japanese advantage you claim come from? There is certainly nothing in the historical record to indicate the Japanese have any marked superiority over the Allies in the mid-1942 period.

Oh? And how long would that be? How long did it take Japanese engineers to build air strips? A week, Two weeks? A month? That's going to place one hell of a strain on the Japanese carriers, especially when one considers they also have to be on guard against attacks by Allied carriers. You are aware that the longest period Japanese carriers ever spent at sea was the 33 days at sea by the Hiryu and Soryu going to, an returning from, the Pearl Harbor raid? The actual average time spent operationally at sea for Japanese carriers was just 2 weeks.(between 13.2 and 15 days) The IJN just wasn't capable of supporting opposed ground invasions for the period of time necessary to build airstrips. So no, the Japanese carriers are NOT going to be able to protect anything in Darwin for more than a few days.

Actually that's incorrect. At least two of the Australian divisions were composed mainly of Australian veterans of the Mid-east fighting. Another two were fully trained and equipped, but did not have extensive combat experience. The others, including two of the Armored divisions, were still forming and training. All of the American divisions in Australia were fairly well trained and fully equipped, as were the two on nearby islands. That means the Allies could immediately oppose those 2+ Japanese divisions with two superbly trained and blooded veteran divisions, five completely trained and equipped infantry divisions, and one partially trained and equipped armored division, reinforced later by the two American divisions from nearby islands, and eventually eight more infantry divisions, plus two armored divisions. This does not include any of the reinforcements the US would send after an invasion. Not exactly great odds for the Japanese

As for American air units there were in mid-1942, three fighter groups, five bomber groups, two transport squadrons, and one photo recon squadron in Australia in mid-1942.. The fighter groups were equipped with P-39's and P-40's. This does not include any Australian, New Zealand or British air units in Australia nor any USN air units. As another poster pointed out Allied air units would quickly be reinforced by shipments of aircraft. Sounds to me like the Japanese would be lucky to achieve numerical parity in any invasion of Darwin.

As for the range of the Allied planes, you are assuming the Allies will not be able to establish any air bases closer than Cooktown; I have already pointed out that this assumption has no basis in fact.

 

Reference is the Oxford Companion to World War II, pg 1061. In 1942, Japan imported 10.5 million barrels from the NEI, of a total production there of 25.9 million barrels. (1943: 14.5/49.6. 1944: 5/36.9) Note c states that the ‘bulk’ of the remaining production (1942: 10 million barrels, 1943: 35 million, 1944 30 million) was supplied directly to IJA and IJN forces in the South Pacific or sunk in transit. As only one or two IJN tankers were sunk in 1942, the bulk of the remaining 10 million barrels therefore was consumed directly in the field, without first going to Japan.

I said Java. Borneo crude was dangerous and volatile; most Japanese oil production efforts were concentrated elsewhere in 1942.

 

OK, but your position as clarified now is contradictory. Do you think the Japanese had an abundance of infantry divisions in WW2, or do you feel the notion they could have 2 or more available for a diversionary operation in 1942 is, “absurd” as you originally stated? You write,

The IJA insisted that it needed every division it mustered in Manchuria and China. It only grudgingly supplied division sized units to the Pacific when it became clear the Navy was botching the job in the Solomons and on New Guinea.

“Grudgingly” or otherwise, the fact remains that later in 1942 when the IJA decided that the South Pacific was an important theatre – presto! – hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops quickly appeared. So the issue was not troop availability, shipping, or anything else. Rather, it was the fact that the Imperial Japanese Army did not want to bother with the South Pacific. Not wanting to do something and not being able to do it are two very different things.

 

Not at Darwin they’re not. A land campaign emerging from this position will not see major Allied naval resistance due to the highly unfavourable geographical and logistical circumstances by which USN forces would have to operate. Nor will it see major IJN aerial assistance; the IJA provided the air cover for IJA operations in China, Malaya and Burma. Remember the interservice rivalry?

You can’t possibly be that naive. In 1942, a US carrier that entered to within escorted strike range (550 nautical miles) of a Japanese major air base network risked destruction. USN CAP was Swiss cheese in every carrier action in 1942 and had great difficulty stopping even tiny strikes. If a US carrier or surface force were to attack at Darwin, it must pass Browse Island in the west and move into the Timor Sea. That is to say, it must come within 330 miles of Kupang. That is well inside the escorted strike range of the air flotilla based on Timor. (More like the attack and then hang around for 2 hours taking pictures range). If, by a miracle the force still got into position to attack Darwin, then it would have to turn around and fight its way out again.

It would therefore be toys-in-the-attic crazy for the Allies to challenge at Darwin with any naval power other than submarines.

You are quite correct to state that these seas are cramped and confining. Unless, of course, you want to discuss the impact of US submarines. Then - suddenly and magically - these same Darwinese waters transform into a dangerous cul-de-sac for Japanese freighters.

At Guadalcanal, US carriers stayed south of Rennell Island because of Rabaul. From Timor, that same radius puts the “no go” line at Dampier or Port Hedland, over 1,000 miles from Darwin. From Port Moresby in the east, the distance is even further. Geography secures Darwin from USN attack with anything but submarines; the Japanese and American navies will fight elsewhere.

Obviously, there was not much point to a diversionary campaign in Australia if Guadalcanal and Lae were not already locked up.

 

Then we are agreed that Nagumo’s decision at Midway was a one-off choice by one Japanese admiral under exceptionally difficult tactical circumstances that in no way implied he or any other Japanese admiral intellectually neglected the crushing advantages of the first strike.

Now, are you are telling me that if Fletcher or Spruance were caught by surprise from the flank with half their aircraft off attacking a land base, half of the remaining bombers they had in the middle of a difficult armaments change-over, and all of their available fighters dragged into CAP actions, that either man would spring to life and send their small dive bomber forces out unescorted? Please. Of course you’re not. You and I have no idea what Fletcher or Spruance would do under these circumstances.

Now, if no other IJN carrier admiral was ignorant of the importance of first strike, Nagumo’s circumstance so difficult that it can never be said that he didn’t greatly wish to strike first, and it cannot be ruled out that a USN carrier admiral would do exactly what Nagumo did if caught in the same situation; then what exactly is your point?

Doctrine is actual operational practice, not just manual no. TN-143 on the proper usage of the Mark 14 porto-potty. If Yorktown flies its escorts to cover the TBD’s and if Enterprise is using its to cover its SBD’s, then Yorktown and Enterprise are using two different operational practices, and hence, two different doctrines on escort. This divergence at Midway was Nimitz’s mistake. He should have at least placed the inexperienced carrier (Hornet) in TF-17, where the most experienced carrier command (Fletcher’s) could make the best use of her.

That statement is true, but has to be qualified. Fletcher was very concerned to get in the first lick, but also maintained a reserve of one dive bomber squadron against surprises. Had Fletcher not done this, Hiryu would have been sunk with the others and Midway would have been a 4-0 clean sweep by 11am. Spruance was not so concerned about the first punch that he didn’t close range on the Japanese for an hour before finally launcing. Nor was he primarily concerned about getting his afternoon strike aloft as quickly as possible; he dallied for so long that Yamaguchi was able to leisurely tee off on Fletcher as if TF-16 was off on holiday somewhere.

The Americans won at Midway because it was cloudy early in the morning when Nagumo’s scout plane flew directly over TF-16. Bad luck, dude-san. If it ain’t cloudy, and he does see them, then Nagumo fires his reserve force with 100 aircraft. Heck, maybe even the Midway strike gets diverted.

 

So was Java crude, both contained high levels of sulphur and other light elements. The sulphur collected in the boiler tubes and had to be cleaned out, usually requiring time in a ship yard. The other elements were volatile and caused explosive fumes to collect in fuel tanks as they were emptied.

 

No it is not contradictory. I said there were not any Japanese divisions available in mid-1942 for an invasion of Australia and that thinking there would be was absurd. And that is true because the IJA which controlled all Japanese infantry divisions was determined not to make any available. Whether or not the Japanese had an "abundance of infantry divisions in WW II" is not issue; the issue is that the IJA would never admit it if they did. Understand now?

Yes, I acknowledged that the IJA sent troops to New Guinea and Guadalcanal when it realized the IJN was botching the defense of those places. But that was a very different matter from launching a new offensive somewhere; it was forced on the IJA because the US was on the offensive and had to be stopped. Going on the offensive in Australia was not going to happen if the IJA had anything to say about (and it did). Shipping was still a problem for Japan, it would always be a problem and the troops moved to their assignments at a very slow pace.

For the IJA not wanting to do something was the same as plain not doing it. They could have let the IJN continue to flounder around in the Solomons but they realized that ultimately that would just hurt the IJA

 

Any major Japanese landing at any point on the Australian coast in 1942 will be strongly opposed by the majority of USN forces in the Pacific; that would include probably five fleet carriers and possibly six. There are no inherent geographical or logistical difficulties that the USN could not overcome. The Japanese fleet operated in the Timor Sea from time to time and there is no reason to think that the US N could not. Japanese air bases on Timor could be attacked and neutralized in the same manner as the Japanese bases initially attacked by the US carriers. strong surface elements would accompany US carrier task forces.

US submarines, of course, would operate against Japanese vessels attempting to transit the choke points on the sea routes leading to Darwin. if the Japanese manage to achieve a lodgment at Darwin, USN light forces will continue to operate in the area to interdict Japanese logistical convoys and could even make raids on the port of Darwin.

In that case, those poor troops in Darwin won't see that many Japanese planes in the air. Because IJAF pilots were not taught over water navigation, they were not very effective in flying long distances (450 miles?) over water. This became apparent when Army aircraft attempted to operate over New Guinea; the IJN considered the Army pilots and planes worthless there.

The IJAF pilots will be limited to flying out of air trips near Darwin. These bases will be subject to attack by Allied bombers already established in North Australia and thus will not be fully effective. In New Guinea, the Fifth Air Force was able to overwhelm Japanese air bases that attempted to stop the Allied advance, there is no reason that anything would be different around Darwin.

Yet several did and weren't destroyed. Just for the record, how many US carriers were sunk by Japanese land-based air in 1942? How many US carriers were seriously damaged by Japanese land-base air in 1942? Hell, how many US carriers were even damaged at all by Japanese land-based air? The USN even launched a carrier raid on the Japanese Home islands without incurring any damage in return.

So you say, but the record against Japanese land-based air is revealing. A half dozen raids against Japanese air strips and bases and not a single US carrier even damaged in return.

See above; it doesn't seem like the USN carrier commanders would exactly be shaking in their boots.

If, of course, any attackers were still airborne. remember what happened to the Rabaul defenders?

You mean the same miracles that occurred at the Marshalls, Kwajalin, Marcus, Wake, Lae , Salamaua, not to mention Honshu? Frankly, it be a miracle if Japanese land-based air even managed to attack a US carrier.

The historical record sure doesn't support your hypothesis. US carriers raided numerous Japanese bases in the Pacific before Mid-1942 and were never touched by the defenders

Sorry but I never said that. I said the Japanese carriers operated there safely and the US carriers would be able to do the same thing.

As for submarines, it would be a mistake for the Allies to station subs right off the port of Darwin, where the IJN will undoubtedly concentrate their pitiful ASW assets, when so many beautiful choke points exist to make for natural ambush sites.

Possibly, but the USN will still fight at Darwin, as well. There is no "no go" line for the USN in the Timor sea. the USN will have to neutralize the land-based air on Timor, but it has already demonstrated that it can successfully do that on a temporary basis.

Then I guess an Australian invasion isn't going to happen. The Japanese never "locked up" Lae or Guadalcanal and never even came close to capturing Port Moresby. Those battles were all fought after mid-1942, when Allied ground, sea, and air power was strengthening to the point that the Japanese could no longer compete in any area.

 

In your dreams! Nagumo may have been caught in a very difficult tactical dilemma, but he had to be aware of the advantages of a first strike approach; it isn't rocket science, after all, and he had his air staff to advise him. Japanese carrier doctrine was to launch full strength, coordinated strikes and that is the decision he made; to forego a first strike opportunity in favor of being able to launch the strongest possible coordinated strike. The American commanders, on the other hand, were determined to get in a first strike. Both sides were fully aware of their respective doctrines and the advantages/disadvantages of each, and both side's commanders made a considered and conscious decision in favor of their Navy's doctrine. It just turned out that the IJN's doctrine was less effective that day.

No, of course, I'm not trying to tell you anything, that's a patent waste of time.

What I'm telling anyone who is not too opinionated to listen, is that at the time of Midway, US Navy carrier doctrine specified getting in the first strike whenever humanly possible. Under unforeseen circumstances, Fletcher and Spruance might or might not try to achieve a first strike. As hindsight at the battle Midway has proven, it's a good precept for carrier commanders.

My point is what it's been since I first stated it; that it was the decision of the US commanders to stick to US Navy carrier doctrine by launching a first strike regardless of the fact that meant that it would not be full strength nor well coordinated, that won the battle of Midway. The corollary to that is that Nagumo facilitated the American victory by deciding to ignore the potential advantages of a first strike strategy, and comply with IJN doctrine requiring full strength, coordinated strikes whenever possible. It's not that difficult to understand.

So what? Nimitz's "mistake" is immaterial; in the end all that mattered was that those SBD's arrived over the Japanese carriers before the Japanese had launched any strike against the US carriers. The fact that the individual carrier captains were utilizing differing "doctrine" in other matters is irrelevant as long as the Task Force commanders were determined to launch the first (and decisive strike). And that determination was fostered by the Naval war college-derived dictum that said the first strike in a carrier vs. carrier battle is crucial to victory. Turned out to be correct.

Maybe, maybe not, that's all conjecture. Spruance delayed his launch until he was in marginal range for his strike aircraft to make it there and back; he was still very much concerned about getting in the first strike. His judgment call regarding a first strike vs. an acceptable range turned out to be correct; he was able to get in range and launch the first strike. Maybe Fletcher mad a mistake in holding back some reserve strike capacity, but that doesn't change the fact that Fletcher's and Spruance's decision to go for the first strike proved to be decisive.

Well, you can conjecture about luck, karma, fate, and errant clouds all you want, I don't intend to get into a discussion of such intangibles. It's a documented fact that Spruance and Fletcher, based on established USN doctrine, decided on one strategy, while Nagumo, also based on estanblished IJN doctrine decided on an opposite strategy. As a direct result of those two decisions the battle of Midway was resolved in favor of the Americans.