and per using smoke... T. Telenko12 hours ago Report abuse Mr. Gray, Thanks for the link, but while the folks at Tank-net are usually pretty reliable, they are not in this case. I much better source. I have a copy of the US Army Ordnance 1,000 mile road test on the 39-inch grousers completed 8/5/1945 and approved as the following report on 9/5/1945. TANK ARSENAL PROVING GROUND UTICA, MICHIGAN ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT OPERATION DATE 9-5-45 REPORT NO. PG-61901.110 T.A.P.G. Project No. 668 O.D.C. No. 72 COPY 3 TITLE: Test of Special T80 Tracks Equipped with 39" Extended Grousers T. Telenko7 hours ago Report abuse >>What does Anzio's defenses in February of 1945 have to do with it? A great deal. The Chemical Warfare Service was going to use Salerno and Anzio tactics of large area smoke screens and smoke haze to limit Kamikaze attacks during first few days of the invasion, and for longer term to block IJA artillery observations until the terrain over looking American troops was taken. This is what the CWS did to save Anzio from German Railway and heavy artillery From Colonel M. E. Barker CWS, "Smoke in Defense of a Vital Port", Coast Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1945, page 13. "DETAILED CONTROL No attempt was made to lay down a dense smoke, but rather to generate a haze which would prevent the observer top of the building at Nettuno seeing through the haze well enough to pick up the details of the Littoria towers and the hill masses generally to the north of Cisterna. Thus it became necessary to operate the mechanical smoke generators at widely varying rates of fog oil consumption in order to accomplish this result with the minimum conumption of fuel. An inventive sergeant in the maintelance company soon developed a by-pass arrangement which enabled the mechanical smoke generator operator to vary the smoke consumption from thirty-five gallons per hour to 120 gallons per hour. In addition, three smoke pot emission points in hovels were laid out in the vicinity each mechanical smoke generator position so that when necessary the smoke from the mechanical generators could supplemented or replaced by HC smoke from the smoke pots. Also, in the rare cases when a north wind blew in the daytime, the smoke pot installations were operated to help conceal the exact location of the mechanical smoke generators and thus reduce the effect of German artillerv fire which was directed frequently against individual mech anical generators." and "LIVING IN SMOKE After the various units became accustomed to the use of smoke in the area, they simply moved their installations so as to take advantage of the smoke screen and to get some little distance away from the individual generators. From time to time complaints were submitted on the effect of the screen and in some cases a movement of the generator solved the problem, but in other cases the unit concerned was required to move its installation. The smoke screen required constant observation from the smoke control tower at Nettuno which had to be occupied day and night. Linesmen had to be on the job twenty-four hours a day to keep the telephone lines radiating out from the control tower in working order. Radio was used only in case of necessity when the telephone lines were out. The corner of the tower was knocked off one day by a 170 shell and several days later other 170's went through the building below the tower, but the observers stayed on the job." And these were the Operation Olympic plans the CWS had in motion from Pages 425 & 426 of "Chemicals in Combat" UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The Technical Services THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: CHEMICALS IN COMBAT by Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell "Although the planning for the invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost island of the homeland of the enemy, had not been completed when Japan surrendered, it appeared certain that smoke generator troops would have seen extensive use had the invasion been mounted. Colonel Copthorne, now Chemical Officer, Army Forces, Pacific, arranged with representatives of the operations officer of his headquarters and with the commander of Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, for the use of five chemical smoke generator companies during the early stages of Olympic, as the operation was dubbed. Earmarked for the eastern shore of Kyushu were the three companies of the 28th Smoke Generator Battalion. The two quartermaster truck companies which had formerly been the 70th and 170th Smoke Generator Companies were to be reconverted to smoke units and earmarked for operations on the western shore of Kyushu. During the initial stage of the operation and under control of the Navy, the companies were to screen ship concentrations, harbors, and beaches. Once the invasion forces had successfully landed, smoke troops would revert to Army control. How these units were to be assigned in support of tactical operations on Kyushu was still a matter of conjecture when the war came to an end. Upon orders of AFPAC, Eighth Army prepared a study on the use of smoke troops in land operations on the island. It recommended in July 1945 that twelve M2 mechanical generators be issued to the chemical service platoon assigned to each combat division and that two smoke generator battalions, each with four companies, be redeployed from Europe and assigned, one each, to the two invading armies. Colonel Copthorne approved the idea of giving mechanical smoke generators to chemical service platoons, calling attention to the growing tendency of combat troops to demand larger and larger smoke screens and arguing that the use of fog oil by the service platoon would reduce the tonnage of mortar and artillery smoke ammunition. The chemical officer of Sixth Army, Colonel Burns, opposed the plan. He felt that the chemical service platoons had neither the men nor the transportation for the conduct of screening operations. Moreover, he considered impractical any attempt to substitute a fog oil screen for a projected smoke screen because they served "different tactical purposes." There could be no doubt that chemical service platoons in the combat area were fully occupied in the supply and maintenance of chemical supplies and were already short of transportation facilities. But Burns's statement concerning tactical screening ran counter to the experience of U.S. forces in Europe who frequently used fog oil to save mortar and artillery ammunition. V-J Day found still unanswered this question of how the combat divisions" For the Chemical Smoke Generator companies referred to above, see the following document from "Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library" SMOKE GENERATOR OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN THEATERS OF OPERATION By PAUL W. PRITCHARD,. Ph. D. Page 16 "2. Inactivations. Fifteen SG companies in the ZI and Southwest Pacific Theater were disbanded or converted between March and November 1944. 33/ This action was chiefly due to a lessened demand for port-screening operations because of the decline in both Japanese and German air activities, and to the urgent manpower needs of the War Department.34/ At the end of the war in Europe, 25 SG units were still active. When the decline of enemy air power obviated the need for rear-area smoke operations in ETO, the SG units were not disbanded but were assigned to other duties, if not needed for forward-area smoke missions.35/ In January 1945, the War Department ordered the disbandment of two SG companies in ETO, but the order was not carried out. Notes: 33/ See Table No. 1. Two units, the 70th and 170th SG Companies were disbanded in SWPA (Southwest Pacific Area); the other 13 in ZI. 34/ The majority of the inactivated SG companies were converted into Engineer dump-truck units. Only one was converted to another type chemical unit. 35/ It appears that the projected plans for the Rhine crossing was a factor in not disbanding SG units in ETO after July 1944." page 17 "After the invasion of Leyte it appeared that smoke generator units were going to be needed in futher operations against Japan and the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 28th Chemical Smoke Generator Battalion, were activated at Camp Sibert during January 1945. The battalion headquarters was sent to POA (Pacific Ocean Area) in April 1945, where it was assigned to the Tenth Army and participated in the Ryukyus Campaign, but not in smoke operations. The battalion would probably have been active in smoke operations had the invasion of Kyushu been made." The VMAC was going to get two "Negro" or "Colored" Smoke Generator Companies (the 70th and 170th) to cover their landings and the three US Army Corps would get smoke generators to either be used by their Divisional Chemical Warfare Service platoons or by additional Smoke Generator companies. The 6th Army was still staffing that as the Pacific War closed.